diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.9.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.9.xml
index 9b9506d..3f09b61 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.9.xml
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.9.xml
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@
             <regex-instance>.*</regex-instance>
         </interface>
     </hal>
-    <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+    <hal format="aidl" optional="true" updatable-via-apex="true">
         <name>android.hardware.biometrics.face</name>
         <version>2</version>
         <interface>
diff --git a/graphics/mapper/stable-c/vts/VtsHalGraphicsMapperStableC_TargetTest.cpp b/graphics/mapper/stable-c/vts/VtsHalGraphicsMapperStableC_TargetTest.cpp
index 2c06353..b329de2 100644
--- a/graphics/mapper/stable-c/vts/VtsHalGraphicsMapperStableC_TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/graphics/mapper/stable-c/vts/VtsHalGraphicsMapperStableC_TargetTest.cpp
@@ -1371,6 +1371,28 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(buffer->info().usage, *value);
 }
 
+TEST_P(GraphicsMapperStableCTests, GetUsage64) {
+    BufferDescriptorInfo info{
+            .name = {"VTS_TEMP"},
+            .width = 64,
+            .height = 64,
+            .layerCount = 1,
+            .format = PixelFormat::RGBA_8888,
+            .usage = BufferUsage::FRONT_BUFFER | BufferUsage::GPU_RENDER_TARGET |
+                     BufferUsage::COMPOSER_OVERLAY | BufferUsage::GPU_TEXTURE,
+            .reservedSize = 0,
+    };
+    if (!isSupported(info)) {
+        GTEST_SKIP();
+    }
+    auto buffer = allocate(info);
+    auto bufferHandle = buffer->import();
+    auto value = getStandardMetadata<StandardMetadataType::USAGE>(*bufferHandle);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(value.has_value());
+    using T = std::underlying_type_t<BufferUsage>;
+    EXPECT_EQ(static_cast<T>(buffer->info().usage), static_cast<T>(*value));
+}
+
 TEST_P(GraphicsMapperStableCTests, GetAllocationSize) {
     auto buffer = allocateGeneric();
     auto bufferHandle = buffer->import();
diff --git a/security/rkp/README.md b/security/rkp/README.md
index a966141..f8e1d5e 100644
--- a/security/rkp/README.md
+++ b/security/rkp/README.md
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 ## Objective
 
 Design a HAL to support over-the-air provisioning of certificates for asymmetric
-keys. The HAL must interact effectively with Keystore (and other daemons) and
+keys. The HAL must interact effectively with Keystore (and other services) and
 protect device privacy and security.
 
 Note that this API was originally designed for KeyMint, with the intention that
@@ -20,125 +20,52 @@
 To more securely and reliably get keys and certificates to Android devices, we
 need to create a system where no party outside of the device's secure components
 is responsible for managing private keys. The strategy we've chosen is to
-deliver certificates over the air, using an asymmetric key pair created
-on-device in the factory as a root of trust to create an authenticated, secure
-channel. In this document we refer to this device-unique asymmetric key pair as
-Device Key (DK), its public half DK\_pub, its private half DK\_priv and a Device
-Key Certificate containing DK\_pub is denoted DKC.
+deliver certificates over the air, using an asymmetric key pair derived from a
+unique device secret (UDS) as a root of trust for authenticated requests from
+the secure components. We refer to the public half of this asymmetric key pair
+as UDS\_pub.
 
-In order for the provisioning service to use DK (or a key authenticated by DK),
-it must know whether a given DK\_pub is known and trusted. To prove trust, we
-ask device OEMs to use one of two mechanisms:
+In order for the provisioning service to trust UDS\_pub we ask device OEMs to
+use one of two mechanisms:
 
-1.  (Preferred, recommended) The device OEM extracts DK\_pub from each device it
-    manufactures and uploads the public keys to a backend server.
+1.  (Preferred, recommended) The device OEM extracts the UDS\_pub from each
+    device they manufacture and uploads the public keys to a backend server.
 
-1.  The device OEM signs the DK\_pub to produce DKC and stores it on the device.
-    This has the advantage that they don't need to upload a DK\_pub for every
-    device immediately, but the disadvantage that they have to manage their
-    private signing keys, which means they have to have HSMs, configure and
-    secure them correctly, etc. Some backend providers may also require that the
-    OEM passes a factory security audit, and additionally promises to upload the
-    keys eventually as well.
+1.  The device OEM signs the UDS\_pub and stores the certificates on the device
+    rather than uploading a UDS\_pub for every device immediately. However,
+    there are many disadvantages and costs associated with this option as the
+    OEM will need to pass a security audit of their factory's physical security,
+    CA and HSM configuration, and incident response processes before the OEM's
+    public key is registered with the provisioning server.
 
-Note that in the full elaboration of this plan, DK\_pub is not the key used to
-establish a secure channel. Instead, DK\_pub is just the first public key in a
-chain of public keys which ends with the KeyMint public key, KM\_pub. All keys
-in the chain are device-unique and are joined in a certificate chain called the
-_Boot Certificate Chain_ (BCC), because in phases 2 and 3 of the remote
-provisioning project it is a chain of certificates corresponding to boot phases.
-We speak of the BCC even for phase 1, though in phase 1 it contains only a
-single self-signed DKC. This is described in more depth in the Phases section
-below.
-
-The BCC is authenticated by DK\_pub. To authenticate DK\_pub, we may have
-additional DKCs, from the SoC vendor, the device OEM, or both. Those are not
-part of the BCC but included as optional fields in the certificate request
-structure.
-
-The format of the the DK and BCC is specified within [Open Profile for DICE]
-(https://pigweed.googlesource.com/open-dice/+/HEAD/docs/specification.md).  To
-map phrases within this document to their equivalent terminology in the DICE
-specification, read the terms as follows: the DK corresponds to the UDS-derived
-key pair, DKC corresponds to the UDS certificate, and the BCC entries between
-DK\_pub and KM\_pub correspond to a chain of CDI certificates.
-
-Note: In addition to allowing 32 byte hash values for fields in the BCC payload,
-this spec additionally constrains some of the choices allowed in open-DICE.
-Specifically, these include which entries are required and which are optional in
-the BCC payload, and which algorithms are acceptable for use.
+Note that in the full elaboration of this plan, UDS\_pub is not the key used to
+sign certificate requests. Instead, UDS\_pub is just the first public key in a
+chain of public keys that end the KeyMint public key. All keys in the chain are
+transitively derived from the UDS and joined in a certificate chain following
+the specification of the [Android Profile for DICE](#android-profile-for-dice).
 
 ### Phases
 
-RKP will be deployed in three phases, in terms of managing the root of trust
+RKP will be deployed with phased management of the root of trust
 binding between the device and the backend. To briefly describe them:
 
-* Phase 1: In phase 1 there is only one entry in the BCC; DK_pub and KM_pub are
-  the same key and the certificate is self-signed.
-* Phase 2: This is identical to phase 1, except it leverages the hardware root
-  of trust process described by DICE. Instead of trust being rooted in the TEE,
-  it is now rooted in the ROM by key material blown into fuses which are only
-  accessible to the ROM code.
-* Phase 3: This is identical to Phase 2, except the SoC vendor also does the
-  public key extraction or certification in their facilities, along with the OEM
-  doing it in the factory. This tightens up the "supply chain" and aims to make
-  key upload management more secure.
+* Degenerate DICE (Phase 1): A TEE root of trust key pair is used to sign
+  certificate requests; a single self-signed certificate signifies this phase.
+* DICE (Phase 2): A hardware root of trust key pair is only accessible to ROM
+  code; the boot process follows the [Android Profile for
+  DICE](#android-profile-for-dice).
+* SoC vendor certified DICE (Phase 3): This is identical to Phase 2, except the
+  SoC vendor also does the UDS\_pub extraction or certification in their
+  facilities, along with the OEM doing it in the factory. This tightens up the
+  "supply chain" and aims to make key upload management more secure.
 
 ### Privacy considerations
 
-Because DK and the DKCs are unique, immutable, unspoofable hardware-bound
-identifiers for the device, we must limit access to them to the absolute minimum
-possible. We do this in two ways:
-
-1.  We require KeyMint (which knows the BCC and either knows or at least has the
-ability to use KM\_priv) to refuse to ever divulge the BCC or additional
-signatures in plaintext. Instead, KeyMint requires the caller to provide an
-_Endpoint Encryption Key_ (EEK), with which it will encrypt the data before
-returning it. When provisioning production keys, the EEK must be signed by an
-approved authority whose public key is embedded in KeyMint. When certifying test
-keys, KeyMint will accept any EEK without checking the signature, but will
-encrypt and return a test BCC, rather than the real one.  The result is that
-only an entity in possession of an Trusted EEK (TEEK) private key can discover
-the plaintext of the production BCC.
-1.  Having thus limited access to the public keys to the trusted party only, we
-need to prevent the entity from abusing this unique device identifier.  The
-approach and mechanisms for doing that are beyond the scope of this document
-(they must be addressed in the server design), but generally involve taking care
-to ensure that we do not create any links between user IDs, IP addresses or
-issued certificates and the device pubkey.
-
-Although the details of the mechanisms for preventing the entity from abusing
-the BCC are, as stated, beyond the scope of this document, there is a subtle
-design decision here made specifically to enable abuse prevention. Specifically
-the `CertificateRequest` message sent to the server is (in
-[CDDL](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8610)):
-
-```
-cddl
-CertificateRequest = [
-    DeviceInfo,
-    challenge : bstr,
-    ProtectedData,
-    MacedKeysToSign
-]
-```
-
-The public keys to be attested by the server are in `MacedKeysToSign`, which is
-a COSE\_Mac0 structure, MACed with a key that is found in `ProtectedData`. The
-MAC key is signed by DK\_pub.
-
-This structure allows the backend component that has access to EEK\_priv to
-decrypt `ProtectedData`, validate that the request is from an authorized device,
-check that the request is fresh and verify and extract the MAC key. That backend
-component never sees any data related to the keys to be signed, but can provide
-the MAC key to another backend component that can verify `MacedKeysToSign` and
-proceed to generate the certificates.
-
-In this way, we can partition the provisioning server into one component that
-knows the device identity, as represented by DK\_pub, but never sees the keys to
-be certified or certificates generated, and another component that sees the keys
-to be certified and certificates generated but does not know the device
-identity.
+Because the UDS, CDIs and derived values are unique, immutable, unspoofable
+hardware-bound identifiers for the device, we must limit access to them. We
+require that the values are never exposed in public APIs and are only available
+to the minimum set of system components that require access to them to function
+correctly.
 
 ### Key and cryptographic message formatting
 
@@ -195,24 +122,6 @@
 choice for algorithm implies the implementor should also choose the P256 public
 key group further down in the COSE structure.
 
-### Testability
-
-It's critical that the remote provisioning implementation be testable, to
-minimize the probability that broken devices are sold to end users. To support
-testing, the remote provisioning HAL methods take a `testMode` argument. Keys
-created in test mode are tagged to indicate this. The provisioning server will
-check for the test mode tag and issue test certificates that do not chain back
-to a trusted public key. In test mode, any EEK will be accepted, enabling
-testing tools to use EEKs for which they have the private key so they can
-validate the content of certificate requests. The BCC included in the
-`CertificateRequest` must contain freshly-generated keys, not the real BCC keys.
-
-Keystore (or similar) will need to be able to handle both testMode keys and
-production keys and keep them distinct, generating test certificate requests
-when asked with a test EEK and production certificate requests when asked with a
-production EEK. Likewise, the interface used to instruct Keystore to create keys
-will need to be able to specify whether test or production keys are desired.
-
 ## Design
 
 ### Certificate provisioning flow
@@ -220,25 +129,20 @@
 TODO(jbires): Replace this with a `.png` containing a sequence diagram.  The
 provisioning flow looks something like this:
 
-Provisioner -> Keystore: Prepare N keys
-Keystore -> KeyMint: generateKeyPair
-KeyMint -> KeyMint: Generate  key pair
-KeyMint --> Keystore: key\_blob,pubkey
-Keystore -> Keystore: Store key\_blob,pubkey
-Provisioner -> Server: Get TEEK
-Server --> Provisioner: TEEK
-Provisioner -> Keystore: genCertReq(N, TEEK)
-Keystore -> KeyMint: genCertReq(pubkeys, TEEK)
-KeyMint -> KeyMint: Sign pubkeys & encrypt BCC
-KeyMint --> Keystore: signature, encrypted BCC
-Keystore -> Keystore: Construct cert\_request
-Keystore --> Provisioner: cert\_request
-Provisioner --> Server: cert\_request
-Server -> Server: Validate cert\_request
+rkpd -> KeyMint: generateKeyPair
+KeyMint -> KeyMint: Generate key pair
+KeyMint --> rkpd: key\_blob,pubkey
+rkpd -> rkpd: Store key\_blob,pubkey
+rkpd -> Server: Get challenge
+Server --> rkpd: challenge
+rkpd -> KeyMint: genCertReq(pubkeys, challenge)
+KeyMint -> KeyMint: Sign CSR
+KeyMint --> rkpd: signed CSR
+rkpd --> Server: CSR
+Server -> Server: Validate CSR
 Server -> Server: Generate certificates
-Server --> Provisioner: certificates
-Provisioner -> Keystore: certificates
-Keystore -> Keystore: Store certificates
+Server --> rkpd: certificates
+rkpd -> rkpd: Store certificates
 
 The actors in the above diagram are:
 
@@ -246,10 +150,12 @@
     the uploaded device public keys and is responsible for providing encryption
     keys, decrypting and validating requests, and generating certificates in
     response to requests.
-*   **Provisioner** is an application that is responsible for communicating with
-    the server and all of the system components that require key certificates
-    from the server. It also implements the policy that defines how many key
-    pairs each client should keep in their pool.
+*   **rkpd** is, optionally, a modular system component that is responsible for
+    communicating with the server and all of the system components that require
+    key certificates from the server. It also implements the policy that defines
+    how many key pairs each client should keep in their pool. When a system
+    ships with rkpd as a modular component, it may be updated independently from
+    the rest of the system.
 *   **Keystore** is the [Android keystore
     daemon](https://developer.android.com/training/articles/keystore) (or, more
     generally, whatever system component manages communications with a
@@ -257,51 +163,37 @@
 *   **KeyMint** is the secure area component that manages cryptographic keys and
     performs attestations (or perhaps some other secure area component).
 
-### `BCC`
+### Android Profile for DICE
 
-The _Boot Certificate Chain_ (BCC) is the chain of certificates that contains
-DK\_pub as well as other often device-unique certificates. The BCC is
-represented as a COSE\_Key containing DK\_pub followed by an array of
-COSE\_Sign1 "certificates" containing public keys and optional additional
-information, ordered from root to leaf, with each certificate signing the next.
-The first certificate in the array is signed by DK\_pub, the last certificate
-has the KeyMint (or whatever) signing key's public key, KM\_pub. In phase 1
-there is only one entry; DK\_pub and KM\_pub are the same key and the
-certificate is self-signed.
+The Android Profile for DICE is based on the [Open Profile for
+DICE](https://pigweed.googlesource.com/open-dice/+/refs/heads/main/docs/specification.md),
+with additional constraints for details that the Open Profile for DICE leaves
+intentionally underspecified. This section describes the differences from the
+Open Profile for DICE.
 
-Each COSE\_Sign1 certificate is a CBOR Web Token (CWT) as described in [RFC
-8392](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8392) with additional fields as described
-in the Open Profile for DICE. Of these additional fields, only the
-_subjectPublicKey_ and _keyUsage_ fields are expected to be present for the
-KM\_pub entry (that is, the last entry) in a BCC, but all fields required by the
-Open Profile for DICE are expected for other entries (each of which corresponds
-to a particular firmware component or boot stage). The CWT fields _iss_ and
-_sub_ identify the issuer and subject of the certificate and are consistent
-along the BCC entries; the issuer of a given entry matches the subject of the
-previous entry.
+#### Algorithms
 
-The BCC is designed to be constructed using the Open Profile for DICE. In this
-case the DK key pair is derived from the UDS as described by that profile and
-all BCC entries before the leaf are CBOR CDI certificates chained from DK\_pub.
-The KM key pair is not part of the derived DICE chain. It is generated (not
-derived) by the KeyMint module, certified by the last key in the DICE chain, and
-added as the leaf BCC entry. The key usage field in this leaf certificate must
-indicate the key is not used to sign certificates. If a UDS certificate is
-available on the device it should appear in the certificate request as the leaf
-of a DKCertChain in AdditionalDKSignatures (see
-[CertificateRequest](#certificaterequest)).
+The choice of algorithm must remain consistent with a given certificate e.g. if
+SHA-256 is used for the code hash then the authority hash, config hash, etc.
+must also use SHA-256.
+
+* UDS and CDI key pairs:
+  * Ed25519 / P-256 / P-384
+* Hash algorithms (digests can be encoded with their natural size and do not
+  need to be the 64-bytes specified by the Open Profile for DICE):
+  * SHA-256 / SHA-384 / SHA-512
+* HKDF with a supported message digest for all key derivation
 
 #### Mode
 
-The Open Profile for DICE specifies four possible modes with the most important
-mode being `normal`. A certificate must only set the mode to `normal` when all
-of the following conditions are met when loading and verifying the software
-component that is being described by the certificate:
+A certificate must only set the mode to `normal` when all of the following
+conditions are met when loading and verifying the software component that is
+being described by the certificate:
 
-*   verified boot with anti-rollback protection is enabled
-*   only the verified boot authorities for production images are enabled
-*   debug ports, fuses or other debug facilities are disabled
-*   device booted software from the normal primary source e.g. internal flash
+* verified boot with anti-rollback protection is enabled
+* only the verified boot authorities for production images are enabled
+* debug ports, fuses, or other debug facilities are disabled
+* device booted software from the normal primary source e.g. internal flash
 
 The mode should never be `not configured`.
 
@@ -310,11 +202,11 @@
 
 #### Configuration descriptor
 
-The Open Profile for DICE allows for an arbitrary configuration descriptor. For
-BCC entries, this configuration descriptor is a CBOR map with the following
-optional fields. If no fields are relevant, an empty map should be encoded.
-Additional implementation-specific fields may be added using key values not in
-the range \[-70000, -70999\] (these are reserved for future additions here).
+The configuration descriptor is a CBOR map with the following optional fields.
+If no fields are relevant, an empty map should be encoded. The key value range
+\[-70000, -70999\] is reserved for the Android Profile for DICE.
+Implementation-specific fields may be added using key values outside of the
+reserved range.
 
 ```
 | Name              | Key    | Value type | Meaning                           |
@@ -332,42 +224,6 @@
 :                   :        :            : version                           :
 ```
 
-Please see
-[ProtectedData.aidl](https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/+/master:hardware/interfaces/security/rkp/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl)
-for a full CDDL definition of the BCC.
-
-### `CertificateRequest`
-
-The full CBOR message that will be sent to the server to request certificates
-is:
-
-```cddl
-CertificateRequest = [
-    DeviceInfo,
-    challenge : bstr,       // Provided by the server
-    ProtectedData,          // See ProtectedData.aidl
-    MacedKeysToSign         // See IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
-]
-
-DeviceInfo = [
-    VerifiedDeviceInfo,     // See DeviceInfo.aidl
-    UnverifiedDeviceInfo
-]
-
-// Unverified info is anything provided by the HLOS. Subject to change out of
-// step with the HAL.
-UnverifiedDeviceInfo = {
-    ? "fingerprint" : tstr,
-}
-
-```
-
-It will be the responsibility of Keystore and the Provisioner to construct the
-`CertificateRequest`. The HAL provides a method to generate the elements that
-need to be constructed on the secure side, which are the tag field of
-`MacedKeysToSign`, `VerifiedDeviceInfo`, and the ciphertext field of
-`ProtectedData`.
-
 ### HAL
 
 The remote provisioning HAL provides a simple interface that can be implemented