Implement keymint V1 aidl interfaces, service module, and vts tests.
Bug: b/160968242
Test: atest VtsHalKeyMintV1_0TargetTest
Change-Id: I5f9d642f96e262dd567d88f4d582e621d168dceb
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.current.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.current.xml
index ea8d6ad..6c8cb58 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.current.xml
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.current.xml
@@ -299,6 +299,14 @@
</interface>
</hal>
<hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.keymint</name>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IKeyMintDevice</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ <instance>strongbox</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
<name>android.hardware.light</name>
<interface>
<name>ILights</name>
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/Android.bp b/keymaster/aidl/Android.bp
index 5206721..56a3ca9 100644
--- a/keymaster/aidl/Android.bp
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/Android.bp
@@ -20,12 +20,3 @@
"2",
],
}
-
-// This is a reminder that the next version of keymaster should be frozen at
-// version "5" to avoid confusion with other versions of this interface.
-cc_library {
- name: "android.hardware.keymaster-V3-java",
-}
-cc_library {
- name: "android.hardware.keymaster-V4-java",
-}
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/SecurityLevel.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/SecurityLevel.aidl
index f129783..00578a4 100644
--- a/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/SecurityLevel.aidl
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/SecurityLevel.aidl
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/Timestamp.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/Timestamp.aidl
index 4b2f108..19ea944 100644
--- a/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/Timestamp.aidl
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/Timestamp.aidl
@@ -16,6 +16,14 @@
package android.hardware.keymaster;
+
+/**
+ * Time in milliseconds since some arbitrary point in time. Time must be monotonically increasing,
+ * and a secure environment's notion of "current time" must not repeat until the Android device
+ * reboots, or until at least 50 million years have elapsed (note that this requirement is satisfied
+ * by setting the clock to zero during each boot, and then counting time accurately).
+ */
+
@VintfStability
parcelable Timestamp {
long milliSeconds;
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
index eff9ca6..f053254 100644
--- a/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@
import android.hardware.keymaster.SecurityLevel;
import android.hardware.keymaster.Timestamp;
-import android.hardware.keymaster.HardwareAuthenticatorType;
/**
* VerificationToken instances are used for secure environments to authenticate one another.
@@ -40,6 +39,7 @@
*/
Timestamp timestamp;
+
/**
* SecurityLevel of the secure environment that generated the token.
*/
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/Android.bp b/keymint/aidl/Android.bp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0dae527
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/Android.bp
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+aidl_interface {
+ name: "android.hardware.keymint",
+ vendor_available: true,
+ srcs: [
+ "android/hardware/keymint/*.aidl",
+ ],
+ stability: "vintf",
+ backend: {
+ java: {
+ sdk_version: "module_current",
+ },
+ ndk: {
+ vndk: {
+ enabled: true,
+ },
+ },
+ rust: {
+ enabled: true,
+ },
+ },
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/OWNERS b/keymint/aidl/OWNERS
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5c79db8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/OWNERS
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+jdanis@google.com
+seleneh@google.com
+swillden@google.com
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/Algorithm.aidl b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/Algorithm.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f51a412
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/Algorithm.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+@Backing(type="int") @VintfStability
+enum Algorithm {
+ RSA = 1,
+ EC = 3,
+ AES = 32,
+ TRIPLE_DES = 33,
+ HMAC = 128,
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/BeginResult.aidl b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/BeginResult.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2f56be6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/BeginResult.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable BeginResult {
+ long challenge;
+ android.hardware.keymint.KeyParameter[] params;
+ android.hardware.keymint.IKeyMintOperation operation;
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/BlockMode.aidl b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/BlockMode.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..94de930
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/BlockMode.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+@Backing(type="int") @VintfStability
+enum BlockMode {
+ ECB = 1,
+ CBC = 2,
+ CTR = 3,
+ GCM = 32,
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/ByteArray.aidl b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/ByteArray.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2dc22a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/ByteArray.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable ByteArray {
+ byte[] data;
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/Certificate.aidl b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/Certificate.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ca55054
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/Certificate.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable Certificate {
+ byte[] encodedCertificate;
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/Digest.aidl b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/Digest.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc4d2fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/Digest.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+@Backing(type="int") @VintfStability
+enum Digest {
+ NONE = 0,
+ MD5 = 1,
+ SHA1 = 2,
+ SHA_2_224 = 3,
+ SHA_2_256 = 4,
+ SHA_2_384 = 5,
+ SHA_2_512 = 6,
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/EcCurve.aidl b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/EcCurve.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4e446ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/EcCurve.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+@Backing(type="int") @VintfStability
+enum EcCurve {
+ P_224 = 0,
+ P_256 = 1,
+ P_384 = 2,
+ P_521 = 3,
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/ErrorCode.aidl b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/ErrorCode.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2679243
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/ErrorCode.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+@Backing(type="int") @VintfStability
+enum ErrorCode {
+ OK = 0,
+ ROOT_OF_TRUST_ALREADY_SET = -1,
+ UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE = -2,
+ INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE = -3,
+ UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM = -4,
+ INCOMPATIBLE_ALGORITHM = -5,
+ UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE = -6,
+ UNSUPPORTED_BLOCK_MODE = -7,
+ INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE = -8,
+ UNSUPPORTED_MAC_LENGTH = -9,
+ UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE = -10,
+ INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE = -11,
+ UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST = -12,
+ INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST = -13,
+ INVALID_EXPIRATION_TIME = -14,
+ INVALID_USER_ID = -15,
+ INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_TIMEOUT = -16,
+ UNSUPPORTED_KEY_FORMAT = -17,
+ INCOMPATIBLE_KEY_FORMAT = -18,
+ UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM = -19,
+ UNSUPPORTED_KEY_VERIFICATION_ALGORITHM = -20,
+ INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH = -21,
+ KEY_EXPORT_OPTIONS_INVALID = -22,
+ DELEGATION_NOT_ALLOWED = -23,
+ KEY_NOT_YET_VALID = -24,
+ KEY_EXPIRED = -25,
+ KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED = -26,
+ OUTPUT_PARAMETER_NULL = -27,
+ INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE = -28,
+ INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER_SPACE = -29,
+ VERIFICATION_FAILED = -30,
+ TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS = -31,
+ UNEXPECTED_NULL_POINTER = -32,
+ INVALID_KEY_BLOB = -33,
+ IMPORTED_KEY_NOT_ENCRYPTED = -34,
+ IMPORTED_KEY_DECRYPTION_FAILED = -35,
+ IMPORTED_KEY_NOT_SIGNED = -36,
+ IMPORTED_KEY_VERIFICATION_FAILED = -37,
+ INVALID_ARGUMENT = -38,
+ UNSUPPORTED_TAG = -39,
+ INVALID_TAG = -40,
+ MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED = -41,
+ IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH = -44,
+ SECURE_HW_ACCESS_DENIED = -45,
+ OPERATION_CANCELLED = -46,
+ CONCURRENT_ACCESS_CONFLICT = -47,
+ SECURE_HW_BUSY = -48,
+ SECURE_HW_COMMUNICATION_FAILED = -49,
+ UNSUPPORTED_EC_FIELD = -50,
+ MISSING_NONCE = -51,
+ INVALID_NONCE = -52,
+ MISSING_MAC_LENGTH = -53,
+ KEY_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED = -54,
+ CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED = -55,
+ KEY_MAX_OPS_EXCEEDED = -56,
+ INVALID_MAC_LENGTH = -57,
+ MISSING_MIN_MAC_LENGTH = -58,
+ UNSUPPORTED_MIN_MAC_LENGTH = -59,
+ UNSUPPORTED_KDF = -60,
+ UNSUPPORTED_EC_CURVE = -61,
+ KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE = -62,
+ ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE_MISSING = -63,
+ KEYMINT_NOT_CONFIGURED = -64,
+ ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID_MISSING = -65,
+ CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS = -66,
+ ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE = -67,
+ HARDWARE_TYPE_UNAVAILABLE = -68,
+ PROOF_OF_PRESENCE_REQUIRED = -69,
+ CONCURRENT_PROOF_OF_PRESENCE_REQUESTED = -70,
+ NO_USER_CONFIRMATION = -71,
+ DEVICE_LOCKED = -72,
+ EARLY_BOOT_ENDED = -73,
+ ATTESTATION_KEYS_NOT_PROVISIONED = -74,
+ ATTESTATION_IDS_NOT_PROVISIONED = -75,
+ INVALID_OPERATION = -76,
+ STORAGE_KEY_UNSUPPORTED = -77,
+ UNIMPLEMENTED = -100,
+ VERSION_MISMATCH = -101,
+ UNKNOWN_ERROR = -1000,
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/HardwareAuthToken.aidl b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/HardwareAuthToken.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1f5f8e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/HardwareAuthToken.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable HardwareAuthToken {
+ long challenge;
+ long userId;
+ long authenticatorId;
+ android.hardware.keymint.HardwareAuthenticatorType authenticatorType;
+ android.hardware.keymint.Timestamp timestamp;
+ byte[] mac;
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/HardwareAuthenticatorType.aidl b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/HardwareAuthenticatorType.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..95ec5c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/HardwareAuthenticatorType.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+@Backing(type="int") @VintfStability
+enum HardwareAuthenticatorType {
+ NONE = 0,
+ PASSWORD = 1,
+ FINGERPRINT = 2,
+ ANY = -1,
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1616622
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+@VintfStability
+interface IKeyMintDevice {
+ android.hardware.keymint.KeyMintHardwareInfo getHardwareInfo();
+ android.hardware.keymint.VerificationToken verifyAuthorization(in long challenge, in android.hardware.keymint.HardwareAuthToken token);
+ void addRngEntropy(in byte[] data);
+ void generateKey(in android.hardware.keymint.KeyParameter[] keyParams, out android.hardware.keymint.ByteArray generatedKeyBlob, out android.hardware.keymint.KeyCharacteristics generatedKeyCharacteristics, out android.hardware.keymint.Certificate[] outCertChain);
+ void importKey(in android.hardware.keymint.KeyParameter[] inKeyParams, in android.hardware.keymint.KeyFormat inKeyFormat, in byte[] inKeyData, out android.hardware.keymint.ByteArray outImportedKeyBlob, out android.hardware.keymint.KeyCharacteristics outImportedKeyCharacteristics, out android.hardware.keymint.Certificate[] outCertChain);
+ void importWrappedKey(in byte[] inWrappedKeyData, in byte[] inWrappingKeyBlob, in byte[] inMaskingKey, in android.hardware.keymint.KeyParameter[] inUnwrappingParams, in long inPasswordSid, in long inBiometricSid, out android.hardware.keymint.ByteArray outImportedKeyBlob, out android.hardware.keymint.KeyCharacteristics outImportedKeyCharacteristics);
+ byte[] upgradeKey(in byte[] inKeyBlobToUpgrade, in android.hardware.keymint.KeyParameter[] inUpgradeParams);
+ void deleteKey(in byte[] inKeyBlob);
+ void deleteAllKeys();
+ void destroyAttestationIds();
+ android.hardware.keymint.BeginResult begin(in android.hardware.keymint.KeyPurpose inPurpose, in byte[] inKeyBlob, in android.hardware.keymint.KeyParameter[] inParams, in android.hardware.keymint.HardwareAuthToken inAuthToken);
+ const int AUTH_TOKEN_MAC_LENGTH = 32;
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5327345
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+@VintfStability
+interface IKeyMintOperation {
+ int update(in @nullable android.hardware.keymint.KeyParameterArray inParams, in @nullable byte[] input, in @nullable android.hardware.keymint.HardwareAuthToken inAuthToken, in @nullable android.hardware.keymint.VerificationToken inVerificationToken, out @nullable android.hardware.keymint.KeyParameterArray outParams, out @nullable android.hardware.keymint.ByteArray output);
+ byte[] finish(in @nullable android.hardware.keymint.KeyParameterArray inParams, in @nullable byte[] input, in @nullable byte[] inSignature, in @nullable android.hardware.keymint.HardwareAuthToken authToken, in @nullable android.hardware.keymint.VerificationToken inVerificationToken, out @nullable android.hardware.keymint.KeyParameterArray outParams);
+ void abort();
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/KeyCharacteristics.aidl b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/KeyCharacteristics.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4e73381
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/KeyCharacteristics.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable KeyCharacteristics {
+ android.hardware.keymint.KeyParameter[] softwareEnforced;
+ android.hardware.keymint.KeyParameter[] hardwareEnforced;
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/KeyDerivationFunction.aidl b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/KeyDerivationFunction.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8e2c774
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/KeyDerivationFunction.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+@Backing(type="int") @VintfStability
+enum KeyDerivationFunction {
+ NONE = 0,
+ RFC5869_SHA256 = 1,
+ ISO18033_2_KDF1_SHA1 = 2,
+ ISO18033_2_KDF1_SHA256 = 3,
+ ISO18033_2_KDF2_SHA1 = 4,
+ ISO18033_2_KDF2_SHA256 = 5,
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/KeyFormat.aidl b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/KeyFormat.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cfa585d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/KeyFormat.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+@Backing(type="int") @VintfStability
+enum KeyFormat {
+ X509 = 0,
+ PKCS8 = 1,
+ RAW = 3,
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/KeyMintHardwareInfo.aidl b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/KeyMintHardwareInfo.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8263e60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/KeyMintHardwareInfo.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable KeyMintHardwareInfo {
+ int versionNumber;
+ android.hardware.keymint.SecurityLevel securityLevel;
+ @utf8InCpp String keyMintName;
+ @utf8InCpp String keyMintAuthorName;
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/KeyOrigin.aidl b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/KeyOrigin.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8d03d2b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/KeyOrigin.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+@Backing(type="int") @VintfStability
+enum KeyOrigin {
+ GENERATED = 0,
+ DERIVED = 1,
+ IMPORTED = 2,
+ RESERVED = 3,
+ SECURELY_IMPORTED = 4,
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/KeyParameter.aidl b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/KeyParameter.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..923cc68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/KeyParameter.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable KeyParameter {
+ android.hardware.keymint.Tag tag;
+ boolean boolValue;
+ int integer;
+ long longInteger;
+ byte[] blob;
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/KeyParameterArray.aidl b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/KeyParameterArray.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b9b9782
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/KeyParameterArray.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable KeyParameterArray {
+ android.hardware.keymint.KeyParameter[] params;
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1aee56a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+@Backing(type="int") @VintfStability
+enum KeyPurpose {
+ ENCRYPT = 0,
+ DECRYPT = 1,
+ SIGN = 2,
+ VERIFY = 3,
+ WRAP_KEY = 5,
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/PaddingMode.aidl b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/PaddingMode.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..97f93db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/PaddingMode.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+@Backing(type="int") @VintfStability
+enum PaddingMode {
+ NONE = 1,
+ RSA_OAEP = 2,
+ RSA_PSS = 3,
+ RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT = 4,
+ RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN = 5,
+ PKCS7 = 64,
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/SecurityLevel.aidl b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/SecurityLevel.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1fb529d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/SecurityLevel.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+@Backing(type="int") @VintfStability
+enum SecurityLevel {
+ SOFTWARE = 0,
+ TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT = 1,
+ STRONGBOX = 2,
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/Tag.aidl b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/Tag.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fba58af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/Tag.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+@Backing(type="int") @VintfStability
+enum Tag {
+ INVALID = 0,
+ PURPOSE = 536870913,
+ ALGORITHM = 268435458,
+ KEY_SIZE = 805306371,
+ BLOCK_MODE = 536870916,
+ DIGEST = 536870917,
+ PADDING = 536870918,
+ CALLER_NONCE = 1879048199,
+ MIN_MAC_LENGTH = 805306376,
+ EC_CURVE = 268435466,
+ RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT = 1342177480,
+ INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID = 1879048394,
+ BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS = 268435757,
+ BOOTLOADER_ONLY = 1879048494,
+ ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE = 1879048495,
+ HARDWARE_TYPE = 268435760,
+ EARLY_BOOT_ONLY = 1879048497,
+ ACTIVE_DATETIME = 1610613136,
+ ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME = 1610613137,
+ USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME = 1610613138,
+ MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS = 805306771,
+ MAX_USES_PER_BOOT = 805306772,
+ USER_ID = 805306869,
+ USER_SECURE_ID = 1073742326,
+ NO_AUTH_REQUIRED = 1879048695,
+ USER_AUTH_TYPE = 268435960,
+ AUTH_TIMEOUT = 805306873,
+ ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY = 1879048698,
+ TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED = 1879048699,
+ TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED = 1879048700,
+ UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED = 1879048701,
+ APPLICATION_ID = -1879047591,
+ APPLICATION_DATA = -1879047492,
+ CREATION_DATETIME = 1610613437,
+ ORIGIN = 268436158,
+ ROOT_OF_TRUST = -1879047488,
+ OS_VERSION = 805307073,
+ OS_PATCHLEVEL = 805307074,
+ UNIQUE_ID = -1879047485,
+ ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE = -1879047484,
+ ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID = -1879047483,
+ ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND = -1879047482,
+ ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE = -1879047481,
+ ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT = -1879047480,
+ ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL = -1879047479,
+ ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI = -1879047478,
+ ATTESTATION_ID_MEID = -1879047477,
+ ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER = -1879047476,
+ ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL = -1879047475,
+ VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL = 805307086,
+ BOOT_PATCHLEVEL = 805307087,
+ DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION = 1879048912,
+ IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY = 1879048913,
+ STORAGE_KEY = 1879048914,
+ ASSOCIATED_DATA = -1879047192,
+ NONCE = -1879047191,
+ MAC_LENGTH = 805307371,
+ RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION = 1879049196,
+ CONFIRMATION_TOKEN = -1879047187,
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/TagType.aidl b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/TagType.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8214453
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/TagType.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+@Backing(type="int") @VintfStability
+enum TagType {
+ INVALID = 0,
+ ENUM = 268435456,
+ ENUM_REP = 536870912,
+ UINT = 805306368,
+ UINT_REP = 1073741824,
+ ULONG = 1342177280,
+ DATE = 1610612736,
+ BOOL = 1879048192,
+ BIGNUM = -2147483648,
+ BYTES = -1879048192,
+ ULONG_REP = -1610612736,
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/Timestamp.aidl b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/Timestamp.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f95d8db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/Timestamp.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable Timestamp {
+ long milliSeconds;
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/VerificationToken.aidl b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/VerificationToken.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7b4989a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymint/current/android/hardware/keymint/VerificationToken.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable VerificationToken {
+ long challenge;
+ android.hardware.keymint.Timestamp timestamp;
+ android.hardware.keymint.SecurityLevel securityLevel;
+ byte[] mac;
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/Algorithm.aidl b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/Algorithm.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8c5d99c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/Algorithm.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+
+
+/**
+ * Algorithms provided by IKeyMintDevice implementations.
+ */
+@VintfStability
+@Backing(type="int")
+enum Algorithm {
+ /** Asymmetric algorithms. */
+ RSA = 1,
+ /** 2 removed, do not reuse. */
+ EC = 3,
+
+ /** Block cipher algorithms */
+ AES = 32,
+ TRIPLE_DES = 33,
+
+ /** MAC algorithms */
+ HMAC = 128,
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/BeginResult.aidl b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/BeginResult.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..58eb024
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/BeginResult.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+
+
+import android.hardware.keymint.IKeyMintOperation;
+import android.hardware.keymint.KeyParameter;
+
+
+/**
+ * This is all the results returned by the IKeyMintDevice begin() function.
+ */
+@VintfStability
+parcelable BeginResult {
+ /* This is the challenge used in verifyAuthorization. It must be a nonce. */
+ long challenge;
+
+ /**
+ * begin() uses this field to return additional data from the operation
+ * initialization, notably to return the IV or nonce from operations
+ * that generate an IV or nonce.
+ */
+ KeyParameter[] params;
+ IKeyMintOperation operation;
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/BlockMode.aidl b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/BlockMode.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b6b36cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/BlockMode.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+
+
+/**
+ * Symmetric block cipher modes provided by IKeyMintDevice implementations.
+ */
+@VintfStability
+@Backing(type="int")
+enum BlockMode {
+ /*
+ * Unauthenticated modes, usable only for encryption/decryption and not generally recommended
+ * except for compatibility with existing other protocols.
+ */
+ ECB = 1,
+ CBC = 2,
+ CTR = 3,
+
+ /*
+ * Authenticated modes, usable for encryption/decryption and signing/verification. Recommended
+ * over unauthenticated modes for all purposes.
+ */
+ GCM = 32,
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/ByteArray.aidl b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/ByteArray.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..18d187e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/ByteArray.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+
+
+/**
+ * This is used to contain a byte[], to make out parameters of byte arrays
+ * more convenient for callers.
+ */
+@VintfStability
+parcelable ByteArray {
+ byte[] data;
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/Certificate.aidl b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/Certificate.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3a70970
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/Certificate.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+
+/**
+ * This encodes the IKeyMintDevice attestation generated certificate.
+ */
+
+@VintfStability
+parcelable Certificate {
+ /**
+ * EncodedCertificate contains the bytes of a DER-encoded X.509 certificate.
+ */
+ byte[] encodedCertificate;
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/Digest.aidl b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/Digest.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a92ac23
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/Digest.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+
+
+/**
+ * Digests provided by keyMint implementations.
+ */
+@VintfStability
+@Backing(type="int")
+enum Digest {
+ NONE = 0,
+ MD5 = 1,
+ SHA1 = 2,
+ SHA_2_224 = 3,
+ SHA_2_256 = 4,
+ SHA_2_384 = 5,
+ SHA_2_512 = 6,
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/EcCurve.aidl b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/EcCurve.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..abd44b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/EcCurve.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+
+
+/**
+ * Supported EC curves, used in ECDSA
+ */
+@VintfStability
+@Backing(type="int")
+enum EcCurve {
+ P_224 = 0,
+ P_256 = 1,
+ P_384 = 2,
+ P_521 = 3,
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/ErrorCode.aidl b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/ErrorCode.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2a54954
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/ErrorCode.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+
+
+/**
+ * KeyMint error codes. Aidl will return these error codes as service specific
+ * errors in EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC.
+ */
+@VintfStability
+@Backing(type="int")
+enum ErrorCode {
+ OK = 0,
+ ROOT_OF_TRUST_ALREADY_SET = -1,
+ UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE = -2,
+ INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE = -3,
+ UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM = -4,
+ INCOMPATIBLE_ALGORITHM = -5,
+ UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE = -6,
+ UNSUPPORTED_BLOCK_MODE = -7,
+ INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE = -8,
+ UNSUPPORTED_MAC_LENGTH = -9,
+ UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE = -10,
+ INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE = -11,
+ UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST = -12,
+ INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST = -13,
+ INVALID_EXPIRATION_TIME = -14,
+ INVALID_USER_ID = -15,
+ INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_TIMEOUT = -16,
+ UNSUPPORTED_KEY_FORMAT = -17,
+ INCOMPATIBLE_KEY_FORMAT = -18,
+ UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM = -19, /** For PKCS8 & PKCS12 */
+ UNSUPPORTED_KEY_VERIFICATION_ALGORITHM = -20, /** For PKCS8 & PKCS12 */
+ INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH = -21,
+ KEY_EXPORT_OPTIONS_INVALID = -22,
+ DELEGATION_NOT_ALLOWED = -23,
+ KEY_NOT_YET_VALID = -24,
+ KEY_EXPIRED = -25,
+ KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED = -26,
+ OUTPUT_PARAMETER_NULL = -27,
+ INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE = -28,
+ INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER_SPACE = -29,
+ VERIFICATION_FAILED = -30,
+ TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS = -31,
+ UNEXPECTED_NULL_POINTER = -32,
+ INVALID_KEY_BLOB = -33,
+ IMPORTED_KEY_NOT_ENCRYPTED = -34,
+ IMPORTED_KEY_DECRYPTION_FAILED = -35,
+ IMPORTED_KEY_NOT_SIGNED = -36,
+ IMPORTED_KEY_VERIFICATION_FAILED = -37,
+ INVALID_ARGUMENT = -38,
+ UNSUPPORTED_TAG = -39,
+ INVALID_TAG = -40,
+ MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED = -41,
+ IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH = -44,
+ SECURE_HW_ACCESS_DENIED = -45,
+ OPERATION_CANCELLED = -46,
+ CONCURRENT_ACCESS_CONFLICT = -47,
+ SECURE_HW_BUSY = -48,
+ SECURE_HW_COMMUNICATION_FAILED = -49,
+ UNSUPPORTED_EC_FIELD = -50,
+ MISSING_NONCE = -51,
+ INVALID_NONCE = -52,
+ MISSING_MAC_LENGTH = -53,
+ KEY_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED = -54,
+ CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED = -55,
+ KEY_MAX_OPS_EXCEEDED = -56,
+ INVALID_MAC_LENGTH = -57,
+ MISSING_MIN_MAC_LENGTH = -58,
+ UNSUPPORTED_MIN_MAC_LENGTH = -59,
+ UNSUPPORTED_KDF = -60,
+ UNSUPPORTED_EC_CURVE = -61,
+ KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE = -62,
+ ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE_MISSING = -63,
+ KEYMINT_NOT_CONFIGURED = -64,
+ ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID_MISSING = -65,
+ CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS = -66,
+ ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE = -67,
+ HARDWARE_TYPE_UNAVAILABLE = -68,
+ PROOF_OF_PRESENCE_REQUIRED = -69,
+ CONCURRENT_PROOF_OF_PRESENCE_REQUESTED = -70,
+ NO_USER_CONFIRMATION = -71,
+ DEVICE_LOCKED = -72,
+ EARLY_BOOT_ENDED = -73,
+ ATTESTATION_KEYS_NOT_PROVISIONED = -74,
+ ATTESTATION_IDS_NOT_PROVISIONED = -75,
+ INVALID_OPERATION = -76,
+ STORAGE_KEY_UNSUPPORTED = -77,
+
+ UNIMPLEMENTED = -100,
+ VERSION_MISMATCH = -101,
+
+ UNKNOWN_ERROR = -1000,
+
+ // Implementer's namespace for error codes starts at -10000.
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/HardwareAuthToken.aidl b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/HardwareAuthToken.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9b56a2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/HardwareAuthToken.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+
+import android.hardware.keymint.Timestamp;
+import android.hardware.keymint.HardwareAuthenticatorType;
+
+/**
+ * HardwareAuthToken is used to prove successful user authentication, to unlock the use of a key.
+ *
+ * HardwareAuthTokens are produced by other secure environment applications, notably GateKeeper and
+ * biometric authenticators, in response to successful user authentication events. These tokens are passed to
+ * begin(), update(), and finish() to prove that authentication occurred. See those methods for
+ * more details. It is up to the caller to determine which of the generated auth tokens is
+ * appropriate for a given key operation.
+ */
+@VintfStability
+parcelable HardwareAuthToken {
+
+ /**
+ * challenge is a value that's used to enable authentication tokens to authorize specific
+ * events. The primary use case for challenge is to authorize an IKeyMintDevice cryptographic
+ * operation, for keys that require authentication per operation. See begin() for details.
+ */
+ long challenge;
+
+ /**
+ * userId is the a "secure" user ID. It is not related to any Android user ID or UID, but is
+ * created in the Gatekeeper application in the secure environment.
+ */
+ long userId;
+
+ /**
+ * authenticatorId is the a "secure" user ID. It is not related to any Android user ID or UID,
+ * but is created in an authentication application in the secure environment, such as the
+ * Fingerprint application.
+ */
+ long authenticatorId;
+
+ /**
+ * authenticatorType describes the type of authentication that took place, e.g. password or
+ * fingerprint.
+ */
+ HardwareAuthenticatorType authenticatorType;
+
+ /**
+ * timestamp indicates when the user authentication took place, in milliseconds since some
+ * starting point (generally the most recent device boot) which all of the applications within
+ * one secure environment must agree upon. This timestamp is used to determine whether or not
+ * the authentication occurred recently enough to unlock a key (see Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT).
+ */
+ Timestamp timestamp;
+
+ /**
+ * MACs are computed with a backward-compatible method, used by Keymaster 3.0, Gatekeeper 1.0
+ * and Fingerprint 1.0, as well as pre-treble HALs.
+ *
+ * The MAC is Constants::AUTH_TOKEN_MAC_LENGTH bytes in length and is computed as follows:
+ *
+ * HMAC_SHA256(
+ * H, 0 || challenge || user_id || authenticator_id || authenticator_type || timestamp)
+ *
+ * where ``||'' represents concatenation, the leading zero is a single byte, and all integers
+ * are represented as unsigned values, the full width of the type. The challenge, userId and
+ * authenticatorId values are in machine order, but authenticatorType and timestamp are in
+ * network order (big-endian). This odd construction is compatible with the hw_auth_token_t
+ * structure.
+ */
+ byte[] mac;
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/HardwareAuthenticatorType.aidl b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/HardwareAuthenticatorType.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5c25e2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/HardwareAuthenticatorType.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+
+/**
+ * Hardware authentication type, used by HardwareAuthTokens to specify the mechanism used to
+ * authentiate the user, and in KeyCharacteristics to specify the allowable mechanisms for
+ * authenticating to activate a key.
+ */
+@VintfStability
+@Backing(type="int")
+enum HardwareAuthenticatorType {
+ NONE = 0,
+ PASSWORD = 1 << 0,
+ FINGERPRINT = 1 << 1,
+ // Additional entries must be powers of 2.
+ ANY = 0xFFFFFFFF,
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8fbab79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,790 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+
+import android.hardware.keymint.BeginResult;
+import android.hardware.keymint.ByteArray;
+import android.hardware.keymint.Certificate;
+import android.hardware.keymint.HardwareAuthToken;
+import android.hardware.keymint.IKeyMintOperation;
+import android.hardware.keymint.KeyCharacteristics;
+import android.hardware.keymint.KeyFormat;
+import android.hardware.keymint.KeyParameter;
+import android.hardware.keymint.KeyMintHardwareInfo;
+import android.hardware.keymint.KeyPurpose;
+import android.hardware.keymint.SecurityLevel;
+import android.hardware.keymint.VerificationToken;
+
+/**
+ * KeyMint device definition.
+ *
+ * == Features ==
+ *
+ * An IKeyMintDevice provides cryptographic services, including the following categories of
+ * operations:
+ *
+ * o Key generation
+ * o Import of asymmetric keys
+ * o Import of raw symmetric keys
+ * o Asymmetric decryption with appropriate padding modes
+ * o Asymmetric signing with digesting and appropriate padding modes
+ * o Symmetric encryption and decryption in appropriate modes, including an AEAD mode
+ * o Generation and verification of symmetric message authentication codes
+ * o Attestation to the presence and configuration of asymmetric keys.
+ *
+ * Protocol elements, such as purpose, mode and padding, as well as access control constraints, must
+ * be specified by the caller when keys are generated or imported and must be permanently bound to
+ * the key, ensuring that the key cannot be used in any other way.
+ *
+ * In addition to the list above, IKeyMintDevice implementations must provide one more service
+ * which is not exposed as an API but used internally: Random number generation. The random number
+ * generator must be high-quality and must be used for generation of keys, initialization vectors,
+ * random padding and other elements of secure protocols that require randomness.
+ *
+ * == Types of IKeyMintDevices ==
+ *
+ * All of the operations and storage of key material must occur in a secure environment. Secure
+ * environments may be either:
+ *
+ * 1. Isolated execution environments, such as a separate virtual machine, hypervisor or
+ * purpose-built trusted execution environment like ARM TrustZone. The isolated environment
+ * must provide complete separation from the Android kernel and user space (collectively called
+ * the "non-secure world", or NSW) so that nothing running in the NSW can observe or manipulate
+ * the results of any computation in the isolated environment. Isolated execution environments
+ * are identified by the SecurityLevel TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT.
+ *
+ * 2. Completely separate, purpose-built and certified secure CPUs, called "StrongBox" devices.
+ * Examples of StrongBox devices are embedded Secure Elements (eSE) or on-SoC secure processing
+ * units (iSE). StrongBox environments are identified by the SecurityLevel STRONGBOX. To
+ * qualify as a StrongBox, a device must meet the requirements specified in CDD 9.11.2.
+ *
+ * == Necessary Primitives ==
+ *
+ * All IKeyMintDevice implementations must provide support for the following:
+ *
+ * o RSA
+ *
+ * - TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT IKeyMintDevices must support 2048, 3072 and 4096-bit keys.
+ * STRONGBOX IKeyMintDevices must support 2048-bit keys.
+ * - Public exponent F4 (2^16+1)
+ * - Unpadded, RSASSA-PSS and RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 padding modes for RSA signing
+ * - TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT IKeyMintDevices must support MD5, SHA1, SHA-2 224, SHA-2 256, SHA-2
+ * 384 and SHA-2 512 digest modes for RSA signing. STRONGBOX IKeyMintDevices must support
+ * SHA-2 256.
+ * - Unpadded, RSAES-OAEP and RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 padding modes for RSA encryption.
+ *
+ * o ECDSA
+ *
+ * - TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT IKeyMintDevices must support NIST curves P-224, P-256, P-384 and
+ * P-521. STRONGBOX IKeyMintDevices must support NIST curve P-256.
+ * - TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT IKeyMintDevices must support SHA1, SHA-2 224, SHA-2 256, SHA-2
+ * 384 and SHA-2 512 digest modes. STRONGBOX IKeyMintDevices must support SHA-2 256.
+ *
+ * o AES
+ *
+ * - 128 and 256-bit keys
+ * - CBC, CTR, ECB and GCM modes. The GCM mode must not allow the use of tags smaller than 96
+ * bits or nonce lengths other than 96 bits.
+ * - CBC and ECB modes must support unpadded and PKCS7 padding modes. With no padding CBC and
+ * ECB-mode operations must fail with ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH if the input isn't a
+ * multiple of the AES block size. With PKCS7 padding, GCM and CTR operations must fail with
+ * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE.
+ *
+ * o 3DES
+ *
+ * - 168-bit keys.
+ * - CBC and ECB mode.
+
+ * - CBC and ECB modes must support unpadded and PKCS7 padding modes. With no padding CBC and
+ * ECB-mode operations must fail with ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH if the input isn't a
+ * multiple of the DES block size.
+ *
+ * o HMAC
+ *
+ * - Any key size that is between 64 and 512 bits (inclusive) and a multiple of 8 must be
+ * supported. STRONGBOX IKeyMintDevices must not support keys larger than 512 bits.
+ * - TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT IKeyMintDevices must support MD-5, SHA1, SHA-2-224, SHA-2-256,
+ * SHA-2-384 and SHA-2-512. STRONGBOX IKeyMintDevices must support SHA-2-256.
+ *
+ * == Key Access Control ==
+ *
+ * Hardware-based keys that can never be extracted from the device don't provide much security if an
+ * attacker can use them at will (though they're more secure than keys which can be
+ * exfiltrated). Therefore, IKeyMintDevice must enforce access controls.
+ *
+ * Access controls are defined as an "authorization list" of tag/value pairs. Authorization tags
+ * are 32-bit integers from the Tag enum, and the values are a variety of types, defined in the
+ * TagType enum. Some tags may be repeated to specify multiple values. Whether a tag may be
+ * repeated is specified in the documentation for the tag and in the TagType. When a key is
+ * created or imported, the caller specifies an authorization list. The IKeyMintDevice must divide
+ * the caller-provided authorizations into two lists, those it enforces in tee secure zone and
+ * those enforced in the strongBox hardware. These two lists are returned as the "teeEnforced"
+ * and "strongboxEnforced" elements of the KeyCharacteristics struct. Note that software enforced
+ * authorization list entries are not returned because they are not enforced by keymint. The
+ * IKeyMintDevice must also add the following authorizations to the appropriate list:
+ *
+ * o Tag::OS_VERSION
+ * o Tag::OS_PATCHLEVEL
+ * o Tag::VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL
+ * o Tag::BOOT_PATCHLEVEL
+ * o Tag::ORIGIN
+ *
+ * The IKeyMintDevice must ignore unknown tags.
+ *
+ * The caller must always provide the current date time in the keyParameter CREATION_DATETIME
+ * tags.
+ *
+ * All authorization tags and their values, both teeEnforced and strongboxEnforced, including
+ * unknown tags, must be cryptographically bound to the private/secret key material such that any
+ * modification of the portion of the key blob that contains the authorization list makes it
+ * impossible for the secure environment to obtain the private/secret key material. The
+ * recommended approach to meet this requirement is to use the full set of authorization tags
+ * associated with a key as input to a secure key derivation function used to derive a key that
+ * is used to encrypt the private/secret key material.
+ *
+ * IKeyMintDevice implementations ignore any tags they cannot enforce and do not return them
+ * in KeyCharacteristics. For example, Tag::ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME provides the date and
+ * time after which a key may not be used to encrypt or sign new messages. Unless the
+ * IKeyMintDevice has access to a secure source of current date/time information, it is not
+ * possible for the IKeyMintDevice to enforce this tag. An IKeyMintDevice implementation will
+ * not rely on the non-secure world's notion of time, because it could be controlled by an
+ * attacker. Similarly, it cannot rely on GPSr time, even if it has exclusive control of the
+ * GPSr, because that might be spoofed by attacker RF signals.
+ *
+ * IKeyMintDevices do not use or enforce any tags they place in the softwareEnforced
+ * list. The IKeyMintDevice caller must enforce them, and it is unnecessary to enforce them
+ * twice.
+ *
+ * Some tags must be enforced by the IKeyMintDevice. See the detailed documentation on each Tag
+ * in Tag.aidl.
+ *
+ * == Root of Trust Binding ==
+ *
+ * IKeyMintDevice keys must be bound to a root of trust, which is a bitstring that must be
+ * provided to the secure environment (by an unspecified, implementation-defined mechanism) during
+ * startup, preferably by the bootloader. This bitstring must be cryptographically bound to every
+ * key managed by the IKeyMintDevice. As above, the recommended mechanism for this cryptographic
+ * binding is to include the Root of Trust data in the input to the key derivation function used to
+ * derive a key that is used to encryp the private/secret key material.
+ *
+ * The root of trust consists of a bitstring that must be derived from the public key used by
+ * Verified Boot to verify the signature on the boot image and from the lock state of the
+ * device. If the public key is changed to allow a different system image to be used or if the
+ * lock state is changed, then all of the IKeyMintDevice-protected keys created by the previous
+ * system state must be unusable, unless the previous state is restored. The goal is to increase
+ * the value of the software-enforced key access controls by making it impossible for an attacker-
+ * installed operating system to use IKeyMintDevice keys.
+ *
+ * == Version Binding ==
+ *
+ * All keys must also be bound to the operating system and patch level of the system image and the
+ * patch levels of the vendor image and boot image. This ensures that an attacker who discovers a
+ * weakness in an old version of the software cannot roll a device back to the vulnerable version
+ * and use keys created with the newer version. In addition, when a key with a given version and
+ * patch level is used on a device that has been upgraded to a newer version or patch level, the
+ * key must be upgraded (See IKeyMintDevice::upgradeKey()) before it can be used, and the previous
+ * version of the key must be invalidated. In this way, as the device is upgraded, the keys will
+ * "ratchet" forward along with the device, but any reversion of the device to a previous release
+ * will cause the keys to be unusable.
+ *
+ * This version information must be associated with every key as a set of tag/value pairs in the
+ * hardwareEnforced authorization list. Tag::OS_VERSION, Tag::OS_PATCHLEVEL,
+ * Tag::VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, and Tag::BOOT_PATCHLEVEL must be cryptographically bound to every
+ * IKeyMintDevice key, as described in the Key Access Control section above.
+ */
+@VintfStability
+interface IKeyMintDevice {
+ const int AUTH_TOKEN_MAC_LENGTH = 32;
+
+ /**
+ * @return info which contains information about the underlying IKeyMintDevice hardware, such
+ * as version number, security level, keyMint name and author name.
+ */
+ KeyMintHardwareInfo getHardwareInfo();
+
+ /**
+ * Verify authorizations for another IKeyMintDevice instance.
+ *
+ * On systems with both a StrongBox and a TEE IKeyMintDevice instance it is sometimes useful
+ * to ask the TEE KeyMintDevice to verify authorizations for a key hosted in StrongBox.
+ *
+ * For every StrongBox operation, Keystore is required to call this method on the TEE KeyMint,
+ * passing in the StrongBox key's hardwareEnforced authorization list and the challenge
+ * returned by StrongBox begin(). Keystore must then pass the VerificationToken to the
+ * subsequent invocations of StrongBox update() and finish().
+ *
+ * StrongBox implementations must return ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED.
+ *
+ * @param the challenge returned by StrongBox's keyMint's begin().
+ *
+ * @param authToken A HardwareAuthToken if needed to authorize key usage.
+ *
+ * @return error ErrorCode::OK on success or ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED if the KeyMintDevice is
+ * a StrongBox. If the IKeyMintDevice cannot verify one or more elements of
+ * parametersToVerify it must not return an error code, but just omit the unverified
+ * parameter from the VerificationToken.
+ *
+ * @return token the verification token. See VerificationToken in VerificationToken.aidl for
+ * details.
+ */
+ VerificationToken verifyAuthorization(in long challenge,
+ in HardwareAuthToken token);
+
+ /**
+ * Adds entropy to the RNG used by KeyMint. Entropy added through this method must not be the
+ * only source of entropy used, and a secure mixing function must be used to mix the entropy
+ * provided by this method with internally-generated entropy. The mixing function must be
+ * secure in the sense that if any one of the mixing function inputs is provided with any data
+ * the attacker cannot predict (or control), then the output of the seeded CRNG is
+ * indistinguishable from random. Thus, if the entropy from any source is good, the output
+ * must be good.
+ *
+ * TODO(seleneh) specify what mixing functions and cprng we allow.
+ *
+ * @param data Bytes to be mixed into the CRNG seed. The caller must not provide more than 2
+ * KiB of data per invocation.
+ *
+ * @return error ErrorCode::OK on success; ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH if the caller
+ * provides more than 2 KiB of data.
+ */
+ void addRngEntropy(in byte[] data);
+
+ /**
+ * Generates a new cryptographic key, specifying associated parameters, which must be
+ * cryptographically bound to the key. IKeyMintDevice implementations must disallow any use
+ * of a key in any way inconsistent with the authorizations specified at generation time. With
+ * respect to parameters that the secure environment cannot enforce, the secure envionment's
+ * obligation is limited to ensuring that the unenforceable parameters associated with the key
+ * cannot be modified. In addition, the characteristics returned by generateKey places
+ * parameters correctly in the tee-enforced and strongbox-enforced lists.
+ *
+ * In addition to the parameters provided, generateKey must add the following to the returned
+ * characteristics.
+ *
+ * o Tag::ORIGIN with the value KeyOrigin::GENERATED.
+ *
+ * o Tag::BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS with the appropriate value (see KeyBlobUsageRequirements in
+ * Tag.aidl).
+ *
+ * o Tag::OS_VERSION, Tag::OS_PATCHLEVEL, Tag::VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL and Tag::BOOT_PATCHLEVEL with
+ * appropriate values.
+ *
+ * The parameters provided to generateKey depend on the type of key being generated. This
+ * section summarizes the necessary and optional tags for each type of key. Tag::ALGORITHM is
+ * always necessary, to specify the type.
+ *
+ * == RSA Keys ==
+ *
+ * The following parameters are required to generate an RSA key:
+ *
+ * o Tag::Key_SIZE specifies the size of the public modulus, in bits. If omitted, generateKey
+ * must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE. Required values for TEE IKeyMintDevice
+ * implementations are 1024, 2048, 3072 and 4096. StrongBox IKeyMintDevice implementations
+ * must support 2048.
+ *
+ * o Tag::RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT specifies the RSA public exponent value. If omitted, generateKey
+ * must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT. The values 3 and 65537 must be supported. It is
+ * recommended to support all prime values up to 2^64. If provided with a non-prime value,
+ * generateKey must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
+ *
+ * The following parameters are not necessary to generate a usable RSA key, but generateKey must
+ * not return an error if they are omitted:
+ *
+ * o Tag::PURPOSE specifies allowed purposes. All KeyPurpose values (see KeyPurpose.aidl)
+ * except AGREE_KEY must be supported for RSA keys.
+ *
+ * o Tag::DIGEST specifies digest algorithms that may be used with the new key. TEE
+ * IKeyMintDevice implementatiosn must support all Digest values (see digest.aidl) for RSA
+ * keys. StrongBox IKeyMintDevice implementations must support SHA_2_256.
+ *
+ * o Tag::PADDING specifies the padding modes that may be used with the new
+ * key. IKeyMintDevice implementations must support PaddingMode::NONE,
+ * PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP, PaddingMode::RSA_PSS, PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT and
+ * PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN for RSA keys.
+ *
+ * == ECDSA Keys ==
+ *
+ * Either Tag::KEY_SIZE or Tag::EC_CURVE must be provided to generate an ECDSA key. If neither
+ * is provided, generateKey must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE. If Tag::KEY_SIZE is
+ * provided, the possible values are 224, 256, 384 and 521, and must be mapped to Tag::EC_CURVE
+ * values P_224, P_256, P_384 and P_521, respectively. TEE IKeyMintDevice implementations
+ * must support all curves. StrongBox implementations must support P_256.
+ *
+ * == AES Keys ==
+ *
+ * Only Tag::KEY_SIZE is required to generate an AES key. If omitted, generateKey must return
+ * ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE. 128 and 256-bit key sizes must be supported.
+ *
+ * If Tag::BLOCK_MODE is specified with value BlockMode::GCM, then the caller must also provide
+ * Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH. If omitted, generateKey must return ErrorCode::MISSING_MIN_MAC_LENGTH.
+ *
+ *
+ * @param keyParams Key generation parameters are defined as KeyMintDevice tag/value pairs,
+ * provided in params. See above for detailed specifications of which tags are required
+ * for which types of keys.
+ *
+ * @return generatedKeyBlob Opaque descriptor of the generated key. The recommended
+ * implementation strategy is to include an encrypted copy of the key material, wrapped
+ * in a key unavailable outside secure hardware.
+ *
+ * @return generatedKeyCharacteristics Description of the generated key, divided into two sets:
+ * hardware-enforced and software-enforced. The description here applies equally
+ * to the key characteristics lists returned by generateKey, importKey and
+ * importWrappedKey. The characteristics returned by this parameter completely
+ * describe the type and usage of the specified key.
+ *
+ * The rule that IKeyMintDevice implementations must use for deciding whether a
+ * given tag belongs in the hardware-enforced or software-enforced list is that if
+ * the meaning of the tag is fully assured by secure hardware, it is hardware
+ * enforced. Otherwise, it's software enforced.
+ *
+ * @return outCertChain If the key is an asymmetric key, and proper keyparameters for
+ * attestation (such as challenge) is provided, then this parameter will return the
+ * attestation certificate. If the signing of the attestation certificate is from a
+ * factory key, additional certificates back to the root attestation certificate will
+ * also be provided. Clients will need to check root certificate against a known-good
+ * value. The certificates must be DER-encoded. Caller needs to provide
+ * CREATION_DATETIME as one of the attestation parameters, otherwise the attestation
+ * certificate will not contain the creation datetime. The first certificate in the
+ * vector is the attestation for the generated key itself, the next certificate is
+ * the key that signs the first certificate, and so forth. The last certificate in
+ * the chain is the root certificate. If the key is a symmetric key, then no
+ * certificate will be returned and this variable will return empty. TODO: change
+ * certificate return to a single certificate and make it nullable b/163604282.
+ */
+ void generateKey(in KeyParameter[] keyParams, out ByteArray generatedKeyBlob,
+ out KeyCharacteristics generatedKeyCharacteristics,
+ out Certificate[] outCertChain);
+
+ /**
+ * Imports key material into an IKeyMintDevice. Key definition parameters and return values
+ * are the same as for generateKey, with the following exceptions:
+ *
+ * o Tag::KEY_SIZE is not necessary in the input parameters. If not provided, the
+ * IKeyMintDevice must deduce the value from the provided key material and add the tag and
+ * value to the key characteristics. If Tag::KEY_SIZE is provided, the IKeyMintDevice must
+ * validate it against the key material. In the event of a mismatch, importKey must return
+ * ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH.
+ *
+ * o Tag::RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT (for RSA keys only) is not necessary in the input parameters. If
+ * not provided, the IKeyMintDevice must deduce the value from the provided key material and
+ * add the tag and value to the key characteristics. If Tag::RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT is provided,
+ * the IKeyMintDevice must validate it against the key material. In the event of a
+ * mismatch, importKey must return ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH.
+ *
+ * o Tag::ORIGIN (returned in keyCharacteristics) must have the value KeyOrigin::IMPORTED.
+ *
+ * @param inKeyParams Key generation parameters are defined as KeyMintDevice tag/value pairs,
+ * provided in params.
+ *
+ * @param inKeyFormat The format of the key material to import. See KeyFormat in
+ * keyformat.aidl.
+ *
+ * @param inKeyData The key material to import, in the format specified in keyFormat.
+ *
+ * @return outImportedKeyBlob descriptor of the imported key. The format of the keyblob will
+ * be the google specified keyblob format.
+ *
+ * @return outImportedKeyCharacteristics Description of the generated key. See the
+ * keyCharacteristics description in generateKey.
+ *
+ * @return outCertChain If the key is an asymmetric key, and proper keyparameters for
+ * attestation (such as challenge) is provided, then this parameter will return the
+ * attestation certificate. If the signing of the attestation certificate is from a
+ * factory key, additional certificates back to the root attestation certificate will
+ * also be provided. Clients will need to check root certificate against a known-good
+ * value. The certificates must be DER-encoded. Caller needs to provide
+ * CREATION_DATETIME as one of the attestation parameters, otherwise the attestation
+ * certificate will not contain the creation datetime. The first certificate in the
+ * vector is the attestation for the generated key itself, the next certificate is
+ * the key that signs the first certificate, and so forth. The last certificate in
+ * the chain is the root certificate. If the key is a symmetric key, then no
+ * certificate will be returned and this variable will return empty.
+ */
+ void importKey(in KeyParameter[] inKeyParams, in KeyFormat inKeyFormat,
+ in byte[] inKeyData, out ByteArray outImportedKeyBlob,
+ out KeyCharacteristics outImportedKeyCharacteristics,
+ out Certificate[] outCertChain);
+
+ /**
+ * Securely imports a key, or key pair, returning a key blob and a description of the imported
+ * key.
+ *
+ * @param inWrappedKeyData The wrapped key material to import.
+ * TODO(seleneh) Decide if we want the wrapped key in DER-encoded ASN.1 format or CBOR
+ * format or both. And specify the standarized format.
+ *
+ * KeyDescription ::= SEQUENCE(
+ * keyFormat INTEGER, # Values from KeyFormat enum.
+ * keyParams AuthorizationList,
+ * )
+ *
+ * SecureKeyWrapper ::= SEQUENCE(
+ * version INTEGER, # Contains value 0
+ * encryptedTransportKey OCTET_STRING,
+ * initializationVector OCTET_STRING,
+ * keyDescription KeyDescription,
+ * encryptedKey OCTET_STRING,
+ * tag OCTET_STRING
+ * )
+ *
+ * Where:
+ *
+ * o keyFormat is an integer from the KeyFormat enum, defining the format of the plaintext
+ * key material.
+ * o keyParams is the characteristics of the key to be imported (as with generateKey or
+ * importKey). If the secure import is successful, these characteristics must be
+ * associated with the key exactly as if the key material had been insecurely imported
+ * with the IKeyMintDevice::importKey. See attestKey() for documentation of the
+ * AuthorizationList schema.
+ * o encryptedTransportKey is a 256-bit AES key, XORed with a masking key and then encrypted
+ * with the wrapping key specified by wrappingKeyBlob.
+ * o keyDescription is a KeyDescription, above.
+ * o encryptedKey is the key material of the key to be imported, in format keyFormat, and
+ * encrypted with encryptedEphemeralKey in AES-GCM mode, with the DER-encoded
+ * representation of keyDescription provided as additional authenticated data.
+ * o tag is the tag produced by the AES-GCM encryption of encryptedKey.
+ *
+ * So, importWrappedKey does the following:
+ *
+ * 1. Get the private key material for wrappingKeyBlob, verifying that the wrapping key has
+ * purpose KEY_WRAP, padding mode RSA_OAEP, and digest SHA_2_256, returning the
+ * error INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE, INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, or INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST if any
+ * of those requirements fail.
+ * 2. Extract the encryptedTransportKey field from the SecureKeyWrapper, and decrypt
+ * it with the wrapping key.
+ * 3. XOR the result of step 2 with maskingKey.
+ * 4. Use the result of step 3 as an AES-GCM key to decrypt encryptedKey, using the encoded
+ * value of keyDescription as the additional authenticated data. Call the result
+ * "keyData" for the next step.
+ * 5. Perform the equivalent of calling importKey(keyParams, keyFormat, keyData), except
+ * that the origin tag should be set to SECURELY_IMPORTED.
+ *
+ * @param inWrappingKeyBlob The opaque key descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey().
+ * This key must have been created with Purpose::WRAP_KEY.
+ *
+ * @param inMaskingKey The 32-byte value XOR'd with the transport key in the SecureWrappedKey
+ * structure.
+ *
+ * @param inUnwrappingParams must contain any parameters needed to perform the unwrapping
+ * operation. For example, if the wrapping key is an AES key the block and padding
+ * modes must be specified in this argument.
+ *
+ * @param inPasswordSid specifies the password secure ID (SID) of the user that owns the key
+ * being installed. If the authorization list in wrappedKeyData contains a
+ * Tag::USER_SECURE_IDwith a value that has the HardwareAuthenticatorType::PASSWORD
+ * bit set, the constructed key must be bound to the SID value provided by this
+ * argument. If the wrappedKeyData does not contain such a tag and value, this argument
+ * must be ignored.
+ *
+ * @param inBiometricSid specifies the biometric secure ID (SID) of the user that owns the key
+ * being installed. If the authorization list in wrappedKeyData contains a
+ * Tag::USER_SECURE_ID with a value that has the HardwareAuthenticatorType::FINGERPRINT
+ * bit set, the constructed key must be bound to the SID value provided by this argument.
+ * If the wrappedKeyData does not contain such a tag and value, this argument must be
+ * ignored.
+ *
+ * @return outImportedKeyBlob Opaque descriptor of the imported key. It is recommended that
+ * the keyBlob contain a copy of the key material, wrapped in a key unavailable outside
+ * secure hardware.
+ *
+ * @return outImportedKeyCharacteristics Description of the generated key. See the description
+ * of keyCharacteristics parameter in generateKey.
+ */
+ void importWrappedKey(in byte[] inWrappedKeyData,
+ in byte[] inWrappingKeyBlob,
+ in byte[] inMaskingKey,
+ in KeyParameter[] inUnwrappingParams,
+ in long inPasswordSid,
+ in long inBiometricSid,
+ out ByteArray outImportedKeyBlob,
+ out KeyCharacteristics outImportedKeyCharacteristics);
+
+ /**
+ * Upgrades an old key blob. Keys can become "old" in two ways: IKeyMintDevice can be
+ * upgraded to a new version with an incompatible key blob format, or the system can be updated
+ * to invalidate the OS version (OS_VERSION tag), system patch level (OS_PATCHLEVEL tag),
+ * vendor patch level (VENDOR_PATCH_LEVEL tag), boot patch level (BOOT_PATCH_LEVEL tag) or
+ * other, implementation-defined patch level (keyMint implementers are encouraged to extend
+ * this HAL with a minor version extension to define validatable patch levels for other
+ * images; tags must be defined in the implementer's namespace, starting at 10000). In either
+ * case, attempts to use an old key blob with begin() must result in IKeyMintDevice returning
+ * ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE. The caller must use this method to upgrade the key blob.
+ *
+ * The upgradeKey method must examine each version or patch level associated with the key. If
+ * any one of them is higher than the corresponding current device value upgradeKey() must
+ * return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT. There is one exception: it is always permissible to
+ * "downgrade" from any OS_VERSION number to OS_VERSION 0. For example, if the key has
+ * OS_VERSION 080001, it is permisible to upgrade the key if the current system version is
+ * 080100, because the new version is larger, or if the current system version is 0, because
+ * upgrades to 0 are always allowed. If the system version were 080000, however, keyMint must
+ * return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT because that value is smaller than 080001. Values other
+ * than OS_VERSION must never be downgraded.
+ *
+ * Note that Keymaster versions 2 and 3 required that the system and boot images have the same
+ * patch level and OS version. This requirement is relaxed for 4.0::IKeymasterDevice and
+ * IKeyMintDevice, and the OS version in the boot image footer is no longer used.
+ *
+ * @param inKeyBlobToUpgrade The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey();
+ *
+ * @param inUpgradeParams A parameter list containing any parameters needed to complete the
+ * upgrade, including Tag::APPLICATION_ID and Tag::APPLICATION_DATA.
+ *
+ * @return A new key blob that references the same key as keyBlobToUpgrade, but is in the new
+ * format, or has the new version data.
+ */
+ byte[] upgradeKey(in byte[] inKeyBlobToUpgrade, in KeyParameter[] inUpgradeParams);
+
+ /**
+ * Deletes the key, or key pair, associated with the key blob. Calling this function on
+ * a key with Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE in its hardware-enforced authorization list must
+ * render the key permanently unusable. Keys without Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE may or
+ * may not be rendered unusable.
+ *
+ * @param inKeyBlob The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey();
+ */
+ void deleteKey(in byte[] inKeyBlob);
+
+ /**
+ * Deletes all keys in the hardware keystore. Used when keystore is reset completely. After
+ * this function is called all keys with Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE in their hardware-enforced
+ * authorization lists must be rendered permanently unusable. Keys without
+ * Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE may or may not be rendered unusable.
+ *
+ * @return error See the ErrorCode enum.
+ */
+ void deleteAllKeys();
+
+ /**
+ * Destroys knowledge of the device's ids. This prevents all device id attestation in the
+ * future. The destruction must be permanent so that not even a factory reset will restore the
+ * device ids.
+ *
+ * Device id attestation may be provided only if this method is fully implemented, allowing the
+ * user to permanently disable device id attestation. If this cannot be guaranteed, the device
+ * must never attest any device ids.
+ *
+ * This is a NOP if device id attestation is not supported.
+ */
+ void destroyAttestationIds();
+
+ /**
+ * Begins a cryptographic operation using the specified key. If all is well, begin() must
+ * return ErrorCode::OK and create an operation handle which must be passed to subsequent calls
+ * to update(), finish() or abort().
+ *
+ * It is critical that each call to begin() be paired with a subsequent call to finish() or
+ * abort(), to allow the IKeyMintDevice implementation to clean up any internal operation
+ * state. The caller's failure to do this may leak internal state space or other internal
+ * resources and may eventually cause begin() to return ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS when it
+ * runs out of space for operations. Any result other than ErrorCode::OK from begin(), update()
+ * or finish() implicitly aborts the operation, in which case abort() need not be called (and
+ * must return ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE if called). IKeyMintDevice implementations
+ * must support 32 concurrent operations.
+ *
+ * If Tag::APPLICATION_ID or Tag::APPLICATION_DATA were specified during key generation or
+ * import, calls to begin must include those tags with the originally-specified values in the
+ * inParams argument to this method. If not, begin() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.
+ *
+ * == Authorization Enforcement ==
+ *
+ * The following key authorization parameters must be enforced by the IKeyMintDevice secure
+ * environment if the tags were returned in the "hardwareEnforced" list in the
+ * KeyCharacteristics. Public key operations, meaning KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT and
+ * KeyPurpose::VERIFY must be allowed to succeed even if authorization requirements are not met.
+ *
+ * -- All Key Types --
+ *
+ * The tags in this section apply to all key types. See below for additional key type-specific
+ * tags.
+ *
+ * o Tag::PURPOSE: The purpose specified in the begin() call must match one of the purposes in
+ * the key authorizations. If the specified purpose does not match, begin() must return
+ * ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE.
+ *
+ * o Tag::ACTIVE_DATETIME can only be enforced if a trusted UTC time source is available. If
+ * the current date and time is prior to the tag value, begin() must return
+ * ErrorCode::KEY_NOT_YET_VALID.
+ *
+ * o Tag::ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME can only be enforced if a trusted UTC time source is
+ * available. If the current date and time is later than the tag value and the purpose is
+ * KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT or KeyPurpose::SIGN, begin() must return ErrorCode::KEY_EXPIRED.
+ *
+ * o Tag::USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME can only be enforced if a trusted UTC time source is
+ * available. If the current date and time is later than the tag value and the purpose is
+ * KeyPurpose::DECRYPT or KeyPurpose::VERIFY, begin() must return ErrorCode::KEY_EXPIRED.
+ *
+ * o Tag::MAX_USES_PER_BOOT must be compared against a secure counter that tracks the uses of
+ * the key since boot time. If the count of previous uses exceeds the tag value, begin() must
+ * return ErrorCode::KEY_MAX_OPS_EXCEEDED.
+ *
+ * o Tag::USER_SECURE_ID must be enforced by this method if and only if the key also has
+ * Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT (if it does not have Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT, the Tag::USER_SECURE_ID
+ * requirement must be enforced by update() and finish()). If the key has both, then this
+ * method must receive a non-empty HardwareAuthToken in the authToken argument. For the auth
+ * token to be valid, all of the following have to be true:
+ *
+ * o The HMAC field must validate correctly.
+ *
+ * o At least one of the Tag::USER_SECURE_ID values from the key must match at least one of
+ * the secure ID values in the token.
+ *
+ * o The key must have a Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE that matches the auth type in the token.
+ *
+ * o The timestamp in the auth token plus the value of the Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT must be less than
+ * the current secure timestamp (which is a monotonic timer counting milliseconds since
+ * boot.)
+ *
+ * If any of these conditions are not met, begin() must return
+ * ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED.
+ *
+ * o Tag::CALLER_NONCE allows the caller to specify a nonce or initialization vector (IV). If
+ * the key doesn't have this tag, but the caller provided Tag::NONCE to this method,
+ * ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED must be returned.
+ *
+ * o Tag::BOOTLOADER_ONLY specifies that only the bootloader may use the key. If this method is
+ * called with a bootloader-only key after the bootloader has finished executing, it must
+ * return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB. The mechanism for notifying the IKeyMintDevice that
+ * the bootloader has finished executing is implementation-defined.
+ *
+ * -- RSA Keys --
+ *
+ * All RSA key operations must specify exactly one padding mode in inParams. If unspecified or
+ * specified more than once, the begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE.
+ *
+ * RSA signing and verification operations need a digest, as do RSA encryption and decryption
+ * operations with OAEP padding mode. For those cases, the caller must specify exactly one
+ * digest in inParams. If unspecified or specified more than once, begin() must return
+ * ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST.
+ *
+ * Private key operations (KeyPurpose::DECRYPT and KeyPurpose::SIGN) need authorization of
+ * digest and padding, which means that the key authorizations need to contain the specified
+ * values. If not, begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST or
+ * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING, as appropriate. Public key operations (KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT
+ * and KeyPurpose::VERIFY) are permitted with unauthorized digest or padding modes.
+ *
+ * With the exception of PaddingMode::NONE, all RSA padding modes are applicable only to certain
+ * purposes. Specifically, PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN and PaddingMode::RSA_PSS only
+ * support signing and verification, while PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT and
+ * PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP only support encryption and decryption. begin() must return
+ * ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE if the specified mode does not support the specified
+ * purpose.
+ *
+ * There are some important interactions between padding modes and digests:
+ *
+ * o PaddingMode::NONE indicates that a "raw" RSA operation is performed. If signing or
+ * verifying, Digest::NONE is specified for the digest. No digest is necessary for unpadded
+ * encryption or decryption.
+ *
+ * o PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN padding requires a digest. The digest may be Digest::NONE,
+ * in which case the KeyMint implementation cannot build a proper PKCS#1 v1.5 signature
+ * structure, because it cannot add the DigestInfo structure. Instead, the IKeyMintDevice
+ * must construct 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 || M, where M is the provided message and PS is a
+ * random padding string at least eight bytes in length. The size of the RSA key has to be at
+ * least 11 bytes larger than the message, otherwise begin() must return
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
+ *
+ * o PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_1_5_ENCRYPT padding does not require a digest.
+ *
+ * o PaddingMode::RSA_PSS padding requires a digest, which may not be Digest::NONE. If
+ * Digest::NONE is specified, the begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST. In
+ * addition, the size of the RSA key must be at least 2 + D bytes larger than the output size
+ * of the digest, where D is the size of the digest, in bytes. Otherwise begin() must
+ * return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST. The salt size must be D.
+ *
+ * o PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP padding requires a digest, which may not be Digest::NONE. If
+ * Digest::NONE is specified, begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST. The OAEP
+ * mask generation function must be MGF1 and the MGF1 digest must be SHA1, regardless of the
+ * OAEP digest specified.
+ *
+ * -- EC Keys --
+ *
+ * EC key operations must specify exactly one padding mode in inParams. If unspecified or
+ * specified more than once, begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE.
+ *
+ * Private key operations (KeyPurpose::SIGN) need authorization of digest and padding, which
+ * means that the key authorizations must contain the specified values. If not, begin() must
+ * return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST. Public key operations (KeyPurpose::VERIFY) are
+ * permitted with unauthorized digest or padding.
+ *
+ * -- AES Keys --
+ *
+ * AES key operations must specify exactly one block mode (Tag::BLOCK_MODE) and one padding mode
+ * (Tag::PADDING) in inParams. If either value is unspecified or specified more than once,
+ * begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_BLOCK_MODE or
+ * ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE. The specified modes must be authorized by the key,
+ * otherwise begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE or
+ * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE.
+ *
+ * If the block mode is BlockMode::GCM, inParams must specify Tag::MAC_LENGTH, and the specified
+ * value must be a multiple of 8 that is not greater than 128 or less than the value of
+ * Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH in the key authorizations. For MAC lengths greater than 128 or
+ * non-multiples of 8, begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MAC_LENGTH. For values less
+ * than the key's minimum length, begin() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_MAC_LENGTH.
+ *
+ * If the block mode is BlockMode::GCM or BlockMode::CTR, the specified padding mode must be
+ * PaddingMode::NONE. For BlockMode::ECB or BlockMode::CBC, the mode may be PaddingMode::NONE
+ * or PaddingMode::PKCS7. If the padding mode doesn't meet these conditions, begin() must
+ * return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE.
+ *
+ * If the block mode is BlockMode::CBC, BlockMode::CTR, or BlockMode::GCM, an initialization
+ * vector or nonce is required. In most cases, callers shouldn't provide an IV or nonce and the
+ * IKeyMintDevice implementation must generate a random IV or nonce and return it via
+ * Tag::NONCE in outParams. CBC and CTR IVs are 16 bytes. GCM nonces are 12 bytes. If the key
+ * authorizations contain Tag::CALLER_NONCE, then the caller may provide an IV/nonce with
+ * Tag::NONCE in inParams. If a nonce is provided when Tag::CALLER_NONCE is not authorized,
+ * begin() must return ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED. If a nonce is not provided when
+ * Tag::CALLER_NONCE is authorized, IKeyMintDevice msut generate a random IV/nonce.
+ *
+ * -- HMAC keys --
+ *
+ * HMAC key operations must specify Tag::MAC_LENGTH in inParams. The specified value must be a
+ * multiple of 8 that is not greater than the digest length or less than the value of
+ * Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH in the key authorizations. For MAC lengths greater than the digest
+ * length or non-multiples of 8, begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MAC_LENGTH. For
+ * values less than the key's minimum length, begin() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_MAC_LENGTH.
+ *
+ * @param inPurpose The purpose of the operation, one of KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT,
+ * KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, KeyPurpose::SIGN or KeyPurpose::VERIFY. Note that for AEAD
+ * modes, encryption and decryption imply signing and verification, respectively, but
+ * must be specified as KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT and KeyPurpose::DECRYPT.
+ *
+ * @param inKeyBlob The opaque key descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey(). The key
+ * must have a purpose compatible with purpose and all of its usage requirements must be
+ * satisfied, or begin() must return an appropriate error code (see above).
+ *
+ * @param inParams Additional parameters for the operation. If Tag::APPLICATION_ID or
+ * Tag::APPLICATION_DATA were provided during generation, they must be provided here, or
+ * the operation must fail with ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB. For operations that require
+ * a nonce or IV, on keys that were generated with Tag::CALLER_NONCE, inParams may
+ * contain a tag Tag::NONCE. If Tag::NONCE is provided for a key without
+ * Tag:CALLER_NONCE, ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED must be returned.
+ *
+ * @param inAuthToken Authentication token. Callers that provide no token must set all numeric
+ * fields to zero and the MAC must be an empty vector. TODO: make this field nullable.
+ * b/173483024.
+ *
+ * @return BeginResult as output, which contains the challenge, KeyParameters which haves
+ * additional data from the operation initialization, notably to return the IV or nonce
+ * from operations that generate an IV or nonce, and IKeyMintOperation object pointer
+ * which is used to perform update(), finish() or abort() operations.
+ */
+ BeginResult begin(in KeyPurpose inPurpose,
+ in byte[] inKeyBlob,
+ in KeyParameter[] inParams,
+ in HardwareAuthToken inAuthToken);
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1b79296
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+
+import android.hardware.keymint.ByteArray;
+import android.hardware.keymint.HardwareAuthToken;
+import android.hardware.keymint.KeyParameter;
+import android.hardware.keymint.KeyParameterArray;
+import android.hardware.keymint.VerificationToken;
+
+@VintfStability
+interface IKeyMintOperation {
+ /**
+ * Provides data to, and possibly receives output from, an ongoing cryptographic operation begun
+ * with begin().
+ *
+ * If operation is in an invalid state (was aborted or had an error) update() must return
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
+ *
+ * To provide more flexibility for buffer handling, implementations of this method have the
+ * option of consuming less data than was provided. The caller is responsible for looping to
+ * feed the rest of the data in subsequent calls. The amount of input consumed must be returned
+ * in the inputConsumed parameter. Implementations must always consume at least one byte,
+ * unless the operation cannot accept any more; if more than zero bytes are provided and zero
+ * bytes are consumed, callers must consider this an error and abort the operation.
+ * TODO(seleneh) update the code to always consume alll the input data. b/168665179.
+ *
+ * Implementations may also choose how much data to return, as a result of the update. This is
+ * only relevant for encryption and decryption operations, because signing and verification
+ * return no data until finish. It is recommended to return data as early as possible, rather
+ * than buffer it.
+ *
+ * If this method returns an error code other than ErrorCode::OK, the operation is aborted and
+ * the operation handle must be invalidated. Any future use of the handle, with this method,
+ * finish, or abort, must return ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
+ *
+ * == Authorization Enforcement ==
+ *
+ * Key authorization enforcement is performed primarily in begin(). The one exception is the
+ * case where the key has:
+ *
+ * o One or more Tag::USER_SECURE_IDs, and
+ *
+ * o Does not have a Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT
+ *
+ * In this case, the key requires an authorization per operation, and the update method must
+ * receive a non-empty and valid HardwareAuthToken. For the auth token to be valid, all of the
+ * following has to be true:
+ *
+ * o The HMAC field must validate correctly.
+ *
+ * o At least one of the Tag::USER_SECURE_ID values from the key must match at least one of
+ * the secure ID values in the token.
+ *
+ * o The key must have a Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE that matches the auth type in the token.
+ *
+ * o The challenge field in the auth token must contain the operationHandle
+ *
+ * If any of these conditions are not met, update() must return
+ * ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED.
+ *
+ * The caller must provide the auth token on every call to update() and finish().
+ *
+ * -- RSA keys --
+ *
+ * For signing and verification operations with Digest::NONE, this method must accept the entire
+ * block to be signed or verified in a single update. It may not consume only a portion of the
+ * block in these cases. However, the caller may choose to provide the data in multiple
+ * updates, and update() must accept the data this way as well. If the caller provides more
+ * data to sign than can be used (length of data exceeds RSA key size), update() must return
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
+ *
+ * -- ECDSA keys --
+ *
+ * For signing and verification operations with Digest::NONE, this method must accept the entire
+ * block to be signed or verified in a single update. This method may not consume only a
+ * portion of the block. However, the caller may choose to provide the data in multiple updates
+ * and update() must accept the data this way as well. If the caller provides more data to sign
+ * than can be used, the data is silently truncated. (This differs from the handling of excess
+ * data provided in similar RSA operations. The reason for this is compatibility with legacy
+ * clients.)
+ *
+ * -- AES keys --
+ *
+ * AES GCM mode supports "associated authentication data," provided via the Tag::ASSOCIATED_DATA
+ * tag in the inParams argument. The associated data may be provided in repeated calls
+ * (important if the data is too large to send in a single block) but must always precede data
+ * to be encrypted or decrypted. An update call may receive both associated data and data to
+ * encrypt/decrypt, but subsequent updates must not include associated data. If the caller
+ * provides associated data to an update call after a call that includes data to
+ * encrypt/decrypt, update() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG.
+ *
+ * For GCM encryption, the AEAD tag must be appended to the ciphertext by finish(). During
+ * decryption, the last Tag::MAC_LENGTH bytes of the data provided to the last update call must
+ * be the AEAD tag. Since a given invocation of update cannot know if it's the last invocation,
+ * it must process all but the tag length and buffer the possible tag data for processing during
+ * finish().
+ *
+ * TODO: update() needs to be refactored b/168665179.
+ *
+ * @param inParams Additional parameters for the operation. For AEAD modes, this is used to
+ * specify Tag::ADDITIONAL_DATA. Note that additional data may be provided in multiple
+ * calls to update(), but only until input data has been provided.
+ *
+ * @param input Data to be processed. Note that update() may or may not consume all of the data
+ * provided. See return value.
+ *
+ * @param verificationToken Verification token, used to prove that another IKeymasterDevice HAL
+ * has verified some parameters, and to deliver the other HAL's current timestamp, if
+ * needed. If not provided, all fields must be initialized to zero and vectors must be
+ * empty.
+ *
+ * @return error Returns ErrorCode encountered in keymint as service specific errors. See the
+ * ErrorCode enum in ErrorCode.aidl.
+ *
+ * @return int Amount of data that was consumed by update(). If this is less than the
+ * amount provided, the caller may provide the remainder in a subsequent call to
+ * update() or finish(). Every call to update must consume at least one byte, unless
+ * the input is empty, and implementations should consume as much data as reasonably
+ * possible for each call.
+ *
+ * @return outParams returns the updated key parameters from the blob, if needed.
+ * operation.
+ *
+ * @return out variable output The output data, if any.
+ */
+ int update(in @nullable KeyParameterArray inParams,
+ in @nullable byte[] input,
+ in @nullable HardwareAuthToken inAuthToken,
+ in @nullable VerificationToken inVerificationToken,
+ out @nullable KeyParameterArray outParams,
+ out @nullable ByteArray output);
+
+ /**
+ * Finalizes a cryptographic operation begun with begin() and invalidates operation.
+ *
+ * This method is the last one called in an operation, so all processed data must be returned.
+ *
+ * Whether it completes successfully or returns an error, this method finalizes the operation.
+ * Any future use of the operation, with finish(), update(), or abort(), must return
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
+ *
+ * Signing operations return the signature as the output. Verification operations accept the
+ * signature in the signature parameter, and return no output.
+ *
+ * == Authorization enforcement ==
+ *
+ * Key authorization enforcement is performed primarily in begin(). The exceptions are
+ * authorization per operation keys and confirmation-required keys.
+ *
+ * Authorization per operation keys are the case where the key has one or more
+ * Tag::USER_SECURE_IDs, and does not have a Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT. In this case, the key requires
+ * an authorization per operation, and the finish method must receive a non-empty and valid
+ * authToken. For the auth token to be valid, all of the following has to be true:
+ *
+ * o The HMAC field must validate correctly.
+ *
+ * o At least one of the Tag::USER_SECURE_ID values from the key must match at least one of
+ * the secure ID values in the token.
+ *
+ * o The key must have a Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE that matches the auth type in the token.
+ *
+ * o The challenge field in the auth token must contain the operation challenge.
+ *
+ * If any of these conditions are not met, update() must return
+ * ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED.
+ *
+ * The caller must provide the auth token on every call to update() and finish().
+ *
+ * Confirmation-required keys are keys that were generated with
+ * Tag::TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED. For these keys, when doing a signing operation the
+ * caller must pass a KeyParameter Tag::CONFIRMATION_TOKEN to finish(). Implementations must
+ * check the confirmation token by computing the 32-byte HMAC-SHA256 over all of the
+ * to-be-signed data, prefixed with the 18-byte UTF-8 encoded string "confirmation token". If
+ * the computed value does not match the Tag::CONFIRMATION_TOKEN parameter, finish() must not
+ * produce a signature and must return ErrorCode::NO_USER_CONFIRMATION.
+ *
+ * -- RSA keys --
+ *
+ * Some additional requirements, depending on the padding mode:
+ *
+ * o PaddingMode::NONE. For unpadded signing and encryption operations, if the provided data is
+ * shorter than the key, the data must be zero-padded on the left before
+ * signing/encryption. If the data is the same length as the key, but numerically larger,
+ * finish() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT. For verification and decryption
+ * operations, the data must be exactly as long as the key. Otherwise, return
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
+ *
+ * o PaddingMode::RSA_PSS. For PSS-padded signature operations, the PSS salt length must match
+ * the size of the PSS digest selected. The digest specified with Tag::DIGEST in inputParams
+ * on begin() must be used as the PSS digest algorithm, MGF1 must be used as the mask
+ * generation function and SHA1 must be used as the MGF1 digest algorithm.
+ *
+ * o PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP. The digest specified with Tag::DIGEST in inputParams on begin is
+ * used as the OAEP digest algorithm, MGF1 must be used as the mask generation function and
+ * and SHA1 must be used as the MGF1 digest algorithm.
+ *
+ * -- ECDSA keys --
+ *
+ * If the data provided for unpadded signing or verification is too long, truncate it.
+ *
+ * -- AES keys --
+ *
+ * Some additional conditions, depending on block mode:
+ *
+ * o BlockMode::ECB or BlockMode::CBC. If padding is PaddingMode::NONE and the data length is
+ * not a multiple of the AES block size, finish() must return
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH. If padding is PaddingMode::PKCS7, pad the data per the
+ * PKCS#7 specification, including adding an additional padding block if the data is a multiple
+ * of the block length.
+ *
+ * o BlockMode::GCM. During encryption, after processing all plaintext, compute the tag
+ * (Tag::MAC_LENGTH bytes) and append it to the returned ciphertext. During decryption,
+ * process the last Tag::MAC_LENGTH bytes as the tag. If tag verification fails, finish()
+ * must return ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED.
+ *
+ * TODO: update() will need to be refactored into 2 function. b/168665179.
+ *
+ * @param inParams Additional parameters for the operation. For AEAD modes, this is used to
+ * specify Tag::ADDITIONAL_DATA, but only if no input data was provided to update().
+ *
+ * @param input Data to be processed, per the parameters established in the call to begin().
+ * finish() must consume all provided data or return ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
+ *
+ * @param signature The signature to be verified if the purpose specified in the begin() call
+ * was KeyPurpose::VERIFY.
+ *
+ * @param authToken Authentication token. Can be nullable if not provided.
+ *
+ * @param verificationToken Verification token, used to prove that another IKeyMintDevice HAL
+ * has verified some parameters, and to deliver the other HAL's current timestamp, if
+ * needed. Can be nullable if not needed.
+ *
+ * @return outParams Any output parameters generated by finish().
+ *
+ * @return The output data, if any.
+ */
+ byte[] finish(in @nullable KeyParameterArray inParams, in @nullable byte[] input,
+ in @nullable byte[] inSignature,
+ in @nullable HardwareAuthToken authToken,
+ in @nullable VerificationToken inVerificationToken,
+ out @nullable KeyParameterArray outParams);
+
+ /**
+ * Aborts a cryptographic operation begun with begin(), freeing all internal resources. If an
+ * operation was finalized, calling update, finish, or abort yields
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE. An operation is finalized if finish or abort was
+ * called on it, or if update returned an ErrorCode.
+ *
+ * @param operationHandle The operation handle returned by begin(). This handle must be
+ * invalid when abort() returns.
+ *
+ * @return error See the ErrorCode enum in ErrorCode.aidl.
+ */
+ void abort();
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/KeyCharacteristics.aidl b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/KeyCharacteristics.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ac7c2b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/KeyCharacteristics.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+
+import android.hardware.keymint.KeyParameter;
+
+/**
+ * KeyCharacteristics defines the attributes of a key, including cryptographic parameters, and usage
+ * restrictions. It consits of two vectors of KeyParameters, one for "softwareEnforced" attributes
+ * and one for "hardwareEnforced" attributes.
+ *
+ * KeyCharacteristics objects are returned by generateKey, importKey, importWrappedKey and
+ * getKeyCharacteristics. The IKeyMintDevice secure environment is responsible for allocating the
+ * parameters, all of which are Tags with associated values, to the correct vector. The
+ * hardwareEnforced vector must contain only those attributes which are enforced by secure hardware.
+ * All others should be in the softwareEnforced vector. See the definitions of individual Tag enums
+ * for specification of which must be hardware-enforced, which may be software-enforced and which
+ * must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
+ */
+@VintfStability
+parcelable KeyCharacteristics {
+ /* TODO(seleneh) get rid of the software enforced in keymint. replace hardware enforced with
+ * tee enforced and strongbox enforced.
+ */
+ KeyParameter[] softwareEnforced;
+ KeyParameter[] hardwareEnforced;
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/KeyDerivationFunction.aidl b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/KeyDerivationFunction.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1eba446
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/KeyDerivationFunction.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+
+/**
+ * Key derivation functions, mostly used in ECIES.
+ */
+@VintfStability
+@Backing(type="int")
+enum KeyDerivationFunction {
+ /** Do not apply a key derivation function; use the raw agreed key */
+ NONE = 0,
+ /** HKDF defined in RFC 5869 with SHA256 */
+ RFC5869_SHA256 = 1,
+ /** KDF1 defined in ISO 18033-2 with SHA1 */
+ ISO18033_2_KDF1_SHA1 = 2,
+ /** KDF1 defined in ISO 18033-2 with SHA256 */
+ ISO18033_2_KDF1_SHA256 = 3,
+ /** KDF2 defined in ISO 18033-2 with SHA1 */
+ ISO18033_2_KDF2_SHA1 = 4,
+ /** KDF2 defined in ISO 18033-2 with SHA256 */
+ ISO18033_2_KDF2_SHA256 = 5,
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/KeyFormat.aidl b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/KeyFormat.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..13044dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/KeyFormat.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+
+
+/**
+ * Formats for key import and export.
+ */
+@VintfStability
+@Backing(type="int")
+enum KeyFormat {
+ /** X.509 certificate format, for public key export. */
+ X509 = 0,
+ /** PCKS#8 format, asymmetric key pair import. */
+ PKCS8 = 1,
+ /** Raw bytes, for symmetric key import. */
+ RAW = 3,
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/KeyMintHardwareInfo.aidl b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/KeyMintHardwareInfo.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5815b10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/KeyMintHardwareInfo.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+
+import android.hardware.keymint.SecurityLevel;
+
+
+/**
+ * KeyMintHardwareInfo is the hardware information returned by calling KeyMint getHardwareInfo()
+ */
+
+@VintfStability
+parcelable KeyMintHardwareInfo {
+ /**
+ * Implementation version of the keymint hardware. The version number is implementation
+ * defined, and not necessarily globally meaningful. The version is used to distinguish
+ * between different versions of a given implementation.
+ * TODO(seleneh) add the version related info to the code.
+ */
+ int versionNumber;
+
+ /* securityLevel is the security level of the IKeyMintDevice implementation accessed
+ * through this aidl package. */
+ SecurityLevel securityLevel;
+
+ /* keyMintName is the name of the IKeyMintDevice implementation. */
+ @utf8InCpp String keyMintName;
+
+ /* keyMintAuthorName is the name of the author of the IKeyMintDevice implementation
+ * (organization name, not individual). This name is implementation defined,
+ * so it can be used to distinguish between different implementations from the
+ * same author.
+ */
+ @utf8InCpp String keyMintAuthorName;
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/KeyOrigin.aidl b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/KeyOrigin.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..70320d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/KeyOrigin.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+
+
+/**
+ * The origin of a key (or pair), i.e. where it was generated. Note that ORIGIN can be found in
+ * either the hardware-enforced or software-enforced list for a key, indicating whether the key is
+ * hardware or software-based. Specifically, a key with GENERATED in the hardware-enforced list
+ * must be guaranteed never to have existed outide the secure hardware.
+ */
+@VintfStability
+@Backing(type="int")
+enum KeyOrigin {
+ /** Generated in keyMint. Should not exist outside the TEE. */
+ GENERATED = 0,
+
+ /** Derived inside keyMint. Likely exists off-device. */
+ DERIVED = 1,
+
+ /** Imported into keyMint. Existed as cleartext in Android. */
+ IMPORTED = 2,
+
+ /** Previously used for another purpose that is now obsolete. */
+ RESERVED = 3,
+
+ /**
+ * Securely imported into KeyMint. Was created elsewhere, and passed securely through Android
+ * to secure hardware.
+ */
+ SECURELY_IMPORTED = 4,
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/KeyParameter.aidl b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/KeyParameter.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d58e4aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/KeyParameter.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+
+
+import android.hardware.keymint.Algorithm;
+import android.hardware.keymint.BlockMode;
+import android.hardware.keymint.Digest;
+import android.hardware.keymint.EcCurve;
+import android.hardware.keymint.HardwareAuthenticatorType;
+import android.hardware.keymint.KeyDerivationFunction;
+import android.hardware.keymint.KeyOrigin;
+import android.hardware.keymint.KeyPurpose;
+import android.hardware.keymint.PaddingMode;
+import android.hardware.keymint.SecurityLevel;
+import android.hardware.keymint.Tag;
+
+
+/**
+ * Identifies the key authorization parameters to be used with keyMint. This is usually
+ * provided as an array of KeyParameters to IKeyMintDevice or Operation.
+ *
+ * TODO(seleneh): Union was not supported in aidl when this cl is first drafted. So we just had
+ * the Tags, and bool, int, long, int[], and we will cast to the appropate types base on the
+ * Tag value. We need to update this defination to distingish Algorithm, BlockMode,
+ * PaddingMode, KeyOrigin...etc later, as union support is recently added to aidl.
+ * b/173253030
+ */
+@VintfStability
+parcelable KeyParameter {
+ /**
+ * Identify what type of key parameter this parcelable actually holds, and based on the type
+ * of tag is int, long, bool, or byte[], one of the fields below will be referenced.
+ */
+ Tag tag;
+
+ boolean boolValue;
+ int integer;
+ long longInteger;
+ // TODO: change this to nullable.
+ byte[] blob;
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/KeyParameterArray.aidl b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/KeyParameterArray.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc9e37a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/KeyParameterArray.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+
+import android.hardware.keymint.KeyParameter;
+
+/**
+ * Identifies the key authorization parameters to be used with keyMint. This is usually
+ * provided as an array of KeyParameters to IKeyMintDevice or Operation.
+ */
+@VintfStability
+parcelable KeyParameterArray {
+ /**
+ * Identify list of key parameters corresponding to a particular key blob.
+ */
+ KeyParameter[] params;
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bc029fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+
+
+/**
+ * Possible purposes of a key (or pair).
+ */
+@VintfStability
+@Backing(type = "int")
+enum KeyPurpose {
+ /* Usable with RSA, EC and AES keys. */
+ ENCRYPT = 0,
+
+ /* Usable with RSA, EC and AES keys. */
+ DECRYPT = 1,
+
+ /* Usable with RSA, EC and HMAC keys. */
+ SIGN = 2,
+
+ /* Usable with RSA, EC and HMAC keys. */
+ VERIFY = 3,
+
+ /* 4 is reserved */
+ /* Usable with wrapping keys. */
+ WRAP_KEY = 5,
+
+ /* TODO(seleneh) add AGREE_KEY and ATTEST_KEY and their corresponding codes and tests later*/
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/PaddingMode.aidl b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/PaddingMode.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..337ed91
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/PaddingMode.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+
+/**
+ * TODO(seleneh) update the description.
+ *
+ * Padding modes that may be applied to plaintext for encryption operations. This list includes
+ * padding modes for both symmetric and asymmetric algorithms. Note that implementations should not
+ * provide all possible combinations of algorithm and padding, only the
+ * cryptographically-appropriate pairs.
+ */
+@VintfStability
+@Backing(type="int")
+enum PaddingMode {
+ NONE = 1, /* deprecated */
+ RSA_OAEP = 2,
+ RSA_PSS = 3,
+ RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT = 4,
+ RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN = 5,
+ PKCS7 = 64,
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/SecurityLevel.aidl b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/SecurityLevel.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d8de024
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/SecurityLevel.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+
+/**
+ * Device security levels.
+ */
+@VintfStability
+@Backing(type="int")
+enum SecurityLevel {
+ SOFTWARE = 0,
+ TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT = 1,
+ /**
+ * STRONGBOX specifies that the secure hardware satisfies the requirements specified in CDD
+ * 9.11.2.
+ */
+ STRONGBOX = 2,
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/Tag.aidl b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/Tag.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e85a8f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/Tag.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,892 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+
+import android.hardware.keymint.TagType;
+
+// TODO(seleneh) : note aidl currently does not support double nested enum definitions such as
+// ROOT_OF_TRUST = TagType:BYTES | 704. So we are forced to write definations as
+// ROOT_OF_TRUST = (9 << 28) for now. Will need to flip this back later when aidl support is added.
+
+/**
+ * Tag specifies various kinds of tags that can be set in KeyParameter to identify what kind of
+ * data are stored in KeyParameter.
+ */
+@VintfStability
+@Backing(type = "int")
+enum Tag {
+ /**
+ * Tag::INVALID should never be set. It means you hit an error.
+ */
+ INVALID = (0 << 28) | 0,
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::PURPOSE specifies the set of purposes for which the key may be used. Possible values
+ * are defined in the KeyPurpose enumeration.
+ *
+ * This tag is repeatable; keys may be generated with multiple values, although an operation has
+ * a single purpose. When begin() is called to start an operation, the purpose of the operation
+ * is specified. If the purpose specified for the operation is not authorized by the key (the
+ * key didn't have a corresponding Tag::PURPOSE provided during generation/import), the
+ * operation must fail with ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE.
+ *
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ PURPOSE = (2 << 28) | 1, /* TagType:ENUM_REP */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::ALGORITHM specifies the cryptographic algorithm with which the key is used. This tag
+ * must be provided to generateKey and importKey, and must be specified in the wrapped key
+ * provided to importWrappedKey.
+ *
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ ALGORITHM = (1 << 28) | 2, /* TagType:ENUM */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::KEY_SIZE pecifies the size, in bits, of the key, measuring in the normal way for the
+ * key's algorithm. For example, for RSA keys, Tag::KEY_SIZE specifies the size of the public
+ * modulus. For AES keys it specifies the length of the secret key material. For 3DES keys it
+ * specifies the length of the key material, not counting parity bits (though parity bits must
+ * be provided for import, etc.). Since only three-key 3DES keys are supported, 3DES
+ * Tag::KEY_SIZE must be 168.
+ *
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ KEY_SIZE = (3 << 28) | 3, /* TagType:UINT */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::BLOCK_MODE specifies the block cipher mode(s) with which the key may be used. This tag
+ * is only relevant to AES and 3DES keys. Possible values are defined by the BlockMode enum.
+ *
+ * This tag is repeatable for key generation/import. For AES and 3DES operations the caller
+ * must specify a Tag::BLOCK_MODE in the additionalParams argument of begin(). If the mode is
+ * missing or the specified mode is not in the modes specified for the key during
+ * generation/import, the operation must fail with ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE.
+ *
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ BLOCK_MODE = (2 << 28) | 4,
+ /* BlockMode. */ /* TagType:ENUM_REP */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::DIGEST specifies the digest algorithms that may be used with the key to perform signing
+ * and verification operations. This tag is relevant to RSA, ECDSA and HMAC keys. Possible
+ * values are defined by the Digest enum.
+ *
+ * This tag is repeatable for key generation/import. For signing and verification operations,
+ * the caller must specify a digest in the additionalParams argument of begin(). If the digest
+ * is missing or the specified digest is not in the digests associated with the key, the
+ * operation must fail with ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST.
+ *
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ DIGEST = (2 << 28) | 5, /* TagType:ENUM_REP */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::PADDING specifies the padding modes that may be used with the key. This tag is relevant
+ * to RSA, AES and 3DES keys. Possible values are defined by the PaddingMode enum.
+ *
+ * PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP and PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT are used only for RSA
+ * encryption/decryption keys and specify RSA OAEP padding and RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 randomized
+ * padding, respectively. PaddingMode::RSA_PSS and PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN are used
+ * only for RSA signing/verification keys and specify RSA PSS padding and RSA PKCS#1 v1.5
+ * deterministic padding, respectively.
+ *
+ * PaddingMode::NONE may be used with either RSA, AES or 3DES keys. For AES or 3DES keys, if
+ * PaddingMode::NONE is used with block mode ECB or CBC and the data to be encrypted or
+ * decrypted is not a multiple of the AES block size in length, the call to finish() must fail
+ * with ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
+ *
+ * PaddingMode::PKCS7 may only be used with AES and 3DES keys, and only with ECB and CBC modes.
+ *
+ * In any case, if the caller specifies a padding mode that is not usable with the key's
+ * algorithm, the generation or import method must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE.
+ *
+ * This tag is repeatable. A padding mode must be specified in the call to begin(). If the
+ * specified mode is not authorized for the key, the operation must fail with
+ * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE.
+ *
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ PADDING = (2 << 28) | 6, /* TagType:ENUM_REP */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::CALLER_NONCE specifies that the caller can provide a nonce for nonce-requiring
+ * operations. This tag is boolean, so the possible values are true (if the tag is present) and
+ * false (if the tag is not present).
+ *
+ * This tag is used only for AES and 3DES keys, and is only relevant for CBC, CTR and GCM block
+ * modes. If the tag is not present in a key's authorization list, implementations must reject
+ * any operation that provides Tag::NONCE to begin() with ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED.
+ *
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ CALLER_NONCE = (7 << 28) | 7, /* TagType:BOOL */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH specifies the minimum length of MAC that can be requested or verified
+ * with this key for HMAC keys and AES keys that support GCM mode.
+ *
+ * This value is the minimum MAC length, in bits. It must be a multiple of 8 bits. For HMAC
+ * keys, the value must be least 64 and no more than 512. For GCM keys, the value must be at
+ * least 96 and no more than 128. If the provided value violates these requirements,
+ * generateKey() or importKey() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ *
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ MIN_MAC_LENGTH = (3 << 28) | 8, /* TagType:UINT */
+
+ // Tag 9 reserved
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::EC_CURVE specifies the elliptic curve. EC key generation requests may have
+ * Tag:EC_CURVE, Tag::KEY_SIZE, or both. If both are provided and the size and curve do not
+ * match, IKeyMintDevice must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
+ *
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ EC_CURVE = (1 << 28) | 10, /* TagType:ENUM */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT specifies the value of the public exponent for an RSA key pair.
+ * This tag is relevant only to RSA keys, and is required for all RSA keys.
+ *
+ * The value is a 64-bit unsigned integer that satisfies the requirements of an RSA public
+ * exponent. This value must be a prime number. IKeyMintDevice implementations must support
+ * the value 2^16+1 and may support other reasonable values. If no exponent is specified or if
+ * the specified exponent is not supported, key generation must fail with
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
+ *
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT = (5 << 28) | 200, /* TagType:ULONG */
+
+ // Tag 201 reserved
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID is specified during key generation to indicate that an attestation
+ * certificate for the generated key should contain an application-scoped and time-bounded
+ * device-unique ID. See Tag::UNIQUE_ID.
+ *
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID = (7 << 28) | 202, /* TagType:BOOL */
+
+ /**
+ * TODO(seleneh) this tag needs to be deleted from all codes.
+ *
+ * Tag::BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS specifies the necessary system environment conditions for the
+ * generated key to be used. Possible values are defined by the KeyBlobUsageRequirements enum.
+ *
+ * This tag is specified by the caller during key generation or import to require that the key
+ * is usable in the specified condition. If the caller specifies Tag::BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS
+ * with value KeyBlobUsageRequirements::STANDALONE the IKeyMintDevice must return a key blob
+ * that can be used without file system support. This is critical for devices with encrypted
+ * disks, where the file system may not be available until after a KeyMint key is used to
+ * decrypt the disk.
+ *
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS = (1 << 28) | 301, /* TagType:ENUM */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::BOOTLOADER_ONLY specifies only the bootloader can use the key.
+ *
+ * Any attempt to use a key with Tag::BOOTLOADER_ONLY from the Android system must fail with
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.
+ *
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ BOOTLOADER_ONLY = (7 << 28) | 302, /* TagType:BOOL */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE specifies that the key has rollback resistance, meaning that when
+ * deleted with deleteKey() or deleteAllKeys(), the key is guaranteed to be permanently deleted
+ * and unusable. It's possible that keys without this tag could be deleted and then restored
+ * from backup.
+ *
+ * This tag is specified by the caller during key generation or import to require. If the
+ * IKeyMintDevice cannot guarantee rollback resistance for the specified key, it must return
+ * ErrorCode::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE. IKeyMintDevice implementations are not
+ * required to support rollback resistance.
+ *
+ * Must be hardwared-enforced.
+ */
+ ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE = (7 << 28) | 303, /* TagType:BOOL */
+
+ // Reserved for future use.
+ HARDWARE_TYPE = (1 << 28) | 304, /* TagType:ENUM */
+
+ /**
+ * Keys tagged with EARLY_BOOT_ONLY may only be used, or created, during early boot, until
+ * IKeyMintDevice::earlyBootEnded() is called.
+ */
+ EARLY_BOOT_ONLY = (7 << 28) | 305, /* TagType:BOOL */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::ACTIVE_DATETIME specifies the date and time at which the key becomes active, in
+ * milliseconds since Jan 1, 1970. If a key with this tag is used prior to the specified date
+ * and time, IKeyMintDevice::begin() must return ErrorCode::KEY_NOT_YET_VALID;
+ *
+ * Need not be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ ACTIVE_DATETIME = (6 << 28) | 400,
+ /* Start of validity. */ /* TagType:DATE */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME specifies the date and time at which the key expires for
+ * signing and encryption purposes. After this time, any attempt to use a key with
+ * KeyPurpose::SIGN or KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT provided to begin() must fail with
+ * ErrorCode::KEY_EXPIRED.
+ *
+ * The value is a 64-bit integer representing milliseconds since January 1, 1970.
+ *
+ * Need not be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME = (6 << 28) | 401, /* TagType:DATE */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME specifies the date and time at which the key expires for
+ * verification and decryption purposes. After this time, any attempt to use a key with
+ * KeyPurpose::VERIFY or KeyPurpose::DECRYPT provided to begin() must fail with
+ * ErrorCode::KEY_EXPIRED.
+ *
+ * The value is a 64-bit integer representing milliseconds since January 1, 1970.
+ *
+ * Need not be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME = (6 << 28) | 402, /* TagType:DATE */
+
+ /**
+ * TODO(seleneh) this tag need to be deleted.
+ *
+ * TODO(seleneh) this tag need to be deleted.
+ *
+ * Tag::MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS specifies the minimum amount of time that elapses between
+ * allowed operations using a key. This can be used to rate-limit uses of keys in contexts
+ * where unlimited use may enable brute force attacks.
+ *
+ * The value is a 32-bit integer representing seconds between allowed operations.
+ *
+ * When a key with this tag is used in an operation, the IKeyMintDevice must start a timer
+ * during the finish() or abort() call. Any call to begin() that is received before the timer
+ * indicates that the interval specified by Tag::MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS has elapsed must fail
+ * with ErrorCode::KEY_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED. This implies that the IKeyMintDevice must keep a
+ * table of use counters for keys with this tag. Because memory is often limited, this table
+ * may have a fixed maximum size and KeyMint may fail operations that attempt to use keys with
+ * this tag when the table is full. The table must acommodate at least 8 in-use keys and
+ * aggressively reuse table slots when key minimum-usage intervals expire. If an operation
+ * fails because the table is full, KeyMint returns ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS.
+ *
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS = (3 << 28) | 403, /* TagType:UINT */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::MAX_USES_PER_BOOT specifies the maximum number of times that a key may be used between
+ * system reboots. This is another mechanism to rate-limit key use.
+ *
+ * The value is a 32-bit integer representing uses per boot.
+ *
+ * When a key with this tag is used in an operation, a key-associated counter must be
+ * incremented during the begin() call. After the key counter has exceeded this value, all
+ * subsequent attempts to use the key must fail with ErrorCode::MAX_OPS_EXCEEDED, until the
+ * device is restarted. This implies that the IKeyMintDevice must keep a table of use
+ * counters for keys with this tag. Because KeyMint memory is often limited, this table can
+ * have a fixed maximum size and KeyMint can fail operations that attempt to use keys with
+ * this tag when the table is full. The table needs to acommodate at least 8 keys. If an
+ * operation fails because the table is full, IKeyMintDevice must
+ * ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS.
+ *
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ MAX_USES_PER_BOOT = (3 << 28) | 404, /* TagType:UINT */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::USER_ID specifies the ID of the Android user that is permitted to use the key.
+ *
+ * Must not be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ USER_ID = (3 << 28) | 501, /* TagType:UINT */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::USER_SECURE_ID specifies that a key may only be used under a particular secure user
+ * authentication state. This tag is mutually exclusive with Tag::NO_AUTH_REQUIRED.
+ *
+ * The value is a 64-bit integer specifying the authentication policy state value which must be
+ * present in the userId or authenticatorId field of a HardwareAuthToken provided to begin(),
+ * update(), or finish(). If a key with Tag::USER_SECURE_ID is used without a HardwareAuthToken
+ * with the matching userId or authenticatorId, the IKeyMintDevice must return
+ * ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED.
+ *
+ * Tag::USER_SECURE_ID interacts with Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT in a very important way. If
+ * Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT is present in the key's characteristics then the key is a "timeout-based"
+ * key, and may only be used if the difference between the current time when begin() is called
+ * and the timestamp in the HardwareAuthToken is less than the value in Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT * 1000
+ * (the multiplier is because Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT is in seconds, but the HardwareAuthToken
+ * timestamp is in milliseconds). Otherwise the IKeyMintDevice must returrn
+ * ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED.
+ *
+ * If Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT is not present, then the key is an "auth-per-operation" key. In this
+ * case, begin() must not require a HardwareAuthToken with appropriate contents. Instead,
+ * update() and finish() must receive a HardwareAuthToken with Tag::USER_SECURE_ID value in
+ * userId or authenticatorId fields, and the current operation's operation handle in the
+ * challenge field. Otherwise the IKeyMintDevice must returrn
+ * ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED.
+ *
+ * This tag is repeatable. If repeated, and any one of the values matches the HardwareAuthToken
+ * as described above, the key is authorized for use. Otherwise the operation must fail with
+ * ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED.
+ *
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ USER_SECURE_ID = (4 << 28) | 502, /* TagType:UINT_REP */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::NO_AUTH_REQUIRED specifies that no authentication is required to use this key. This tag
+ * is mutually exclusive with Tag::USER_SECURE_ID.
+ *
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ NO_AUTH_REQUIRED = (7 << 28) | 503, /* TagType:BOOL */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE specifies the types of user authenticators that may be used to authorize
+ * this key.
+ *
+ * The value is one or more values from HardwareAuthenticatorType, ORed together.
+ *
+ * When IKeyMintDevice is requested to perform an operation with a key with this tag, it must
+ * receive a HardwareAuthToken and one or more bits must be set in both the HardwareAuthToken's
+ * authenticatorType field and the Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE value. That is, it must be true that
+ *
+ * (token.authenticatorType & tag_user_auth_type) != 0
+ *
+ * where token.authenticatorType is the authenticatorType field of the HardwareAuthToken and
+ * tag_user_auth_type is the value of Tag:USER_AUTH_TYPE.
+ *
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ USER_AUTH_TYPE = (1 << 28) | 504, /* TagType:ENUM */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT specifies the time in seconds for which the key is authorized for use,
+ * after user authentication. If
+ * Tag::USER_SECURE_ID is present and this tag is not, then the key requies authentication for
+ * every usage (see begin() for the details of the authentication-per-operation flow).
+ *
+ * The value is a 32-bit integer specifying the time in seconds after a successful
+ * authentication of the user specified by Tag::USER_SECURE_ID with the authentication method
+ * specified by Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE that the key can be used.
+ *
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ AUTH_TIMEOUT = (3 << 28) | 505, /* TagType:UINT */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY specifies that the key may be used after authentication timeout if
+ * device is still on-body (requires on-body sensor).
+ *
+ * Cannot be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY = (7 << 28) | 506, /* TagType:BOOL */
+
+ /**
+ * TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED is an optional feature that specifies that this key must be
+ * unusable except when the user has provided proof of physical presence. Proof of physical
+ * presence must be a signal that cannot be triggered by an attacker who doesn't have one of:
+ *
+ * a) Physical control of the device or
+ *
+ * b) Control of the secure environment that holds the key.
+ *
+ * For instance, proof of user identity may be considered proof of presence if it meets the
+ * requirements. However, proof of identity established in one security domain (e.g. TEE) does
+ * not constitute proof of presence in another security domain (e.g. StrongBox), and no
+ * mechanism analogous to the authentication token is defined for communicating proof of
+ * presence across security domains.
+ *
+ * Some examples:
+ *
+ * A hardware button hardwired to a pin on a StrongBox device in such a way that nothing
+ * other than a button press can trigger the signal constitutes proof of physical presence
+ * for StrongBox keys.
+ *
+ * Fingerprint authentication provides proof of presence (and identity) for TEE keys if the
+ * TEE has exclusive control of the fingerprint scanner and performs fingerprint matching.
+ *
+ * Password authentication does not provide proof of presence to either TEE or StrongBox,
+ * even if TEE or StrongBox does the password matching, because password input is handled by
+ * the non-secure world, which means an attacker who has compromised Android can spoof
+ * password authentication.
+ *
+ * Note that no mechanism is defined for delivering proof of presence to an IKeyMintDevice,
+ * except perhaps as implied by an auth token. This means that KeyMint must be able to check
+ * proof of presence some other way. Further, the proof of presence must be performed between
+ * begin() and the first call to update() or finish(). If the first update() or the finish()
+ * call is made without proof of presence, the keyMint method must return
+ * ErrorCode::PROOF_OF_PRESENCE_REQUIRED and abort the operation. The caller must delay the
+ * update() or finish() call until proof of presence has been provided, which means the caller
+ * must also have some mechanism for verifying that the proof has been provided.
+ *
+ * Only one operation requiring TUP may be in flight at a time. If begin() has already been
+ * called on one key with TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED, and another begin() comes in for that
+ * key or another with TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED, KeyMint must return
+ * ErrorCode::CONCURRENT_PROOF_OF_PRESENCE_REQUESTED.
+ *
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED = (7 << 28) | 507, /* TagType:BOOL */
+
+ /** Tag::TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED is only applicable to keys with KeyPurpose SIGN, and
+ * specifies that this key must not be usable unless the user provides confirmation of the data
+ * to be signed. Confirmation is proven to keyMint via an approval token. See
+ * CONFIRMATION_TOKEN, as well as the ConfirmatinUI HAL.
+ *
+ * If an attempt to use a key with this tag does not have a cryptographically valid
+ * CONFIRMATION_TOKEN provided to finish() or if the data provided to update()/finish() does not
+ * match the data described in the token, keyMint must return NO_USER_CONFIRMATION.
+ *
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED = (7 << 28) | 508, /* TagType:BOOL */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED specifies that the key may only be used when the device is
+ * unlocked.
+ *
+ * Must be software-enforced.
+ */
+ UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED = (7 << 28) | 509, /* TagType:BOOL */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::APPLICATION_ID. When provided to generateKey or importKey, this tag specifies data
+ * that is necessary during all uses of the key. In particular, calls to exportKey() and
+ * getKeyCharacteristics() must provide the same value to the clientId parameter, and calls to
+ * begin must provide this tag and the same associated data as part of the inParams set. If
+ * the correct data is not provided, the method must return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.
+ *
+ * The content of this tag must be bound to the key cryptographically, meaning it must not be
+ * possible for an adversary who has access to all of the secure world secrets but does not have
+ * access to the tag content to decrypt the key without brute-forcing the tag content, which
+ * applications can prevent by specifying sufficiently high-entropy content.
+ *
+ * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
+ */
+ APPLICATION_ID = (9 << 28) | 601, /* TagType:BYTES */
+
+ /*
+ * Semantically unenforceable tags, either because they have no specific meaning or because
+ * they're informational only.
+ */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::APPLICATION_DATA. When provided to generateKey or importKey, this tag specifies data
+ * that is necessary during all uses of the key. In particular, calls to exportKey() and
+ * getKeyCharacteristics() must provide the same value to the appData parameter, and calls to
+ * begin must provide this tag and the same associated data as part of the inParams set. If
+ * the correct data is not provided, the method must return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.
+ *
+ * The content of this tag msut be bound to the key cryptographically, meaning it must not be
+ * possible for an adversary who has access to all of the secure world secrets but does not have
+ * access to the tag content to decrypt the key without brute-forcing the tag content, which
+ * applications can prevent by specifying sufficiently high-entropy content.
+ *
+ * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
+ */
+ APPLICATION_DATA = (9 << 28) | 700, /* TagType:BYTES */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::CREATION_DATETIME specifies the date and time the key was created, in milliseconds since
+ * January 1, 1970. This tag is optional and informational only.
+ *
+ * Tag::CREATED is informational only, and not enforced by anything. Must be in the
+ * software-enforced list, if provided.
+ */
+ CREATION_DATETIME = (6 << 28) | 701, /* TagType:DATE */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::ORIGIN specifies where the key was created, if known. This tag must not be specified
+ * during key generation or import, and must be added to the key characteristics by the
+ * IKeyMintDevice. The possible values are defined in the KeyOrigin enum.
+ *
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ ORIGIN = (1 << 28) | 702, /* TagType:ENUM */
+
+ // 703 is unused.
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::ROOT_OF_TRUST specifies the root of trust associated with the key used by verified boot
+ * to validate the system. It describes the boot key, verified boot state, boot hash, and
+ * whether device is locked. This tag is never provided to or returned from KeyMint in the
+ * key characteristics. It exists only to define the tag for use in the attestation record.
+ *
+ * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
+ */
+ ROOT_OF_TRUST = (9 << 28) | 704, /* TagType:BYTES */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::OS_VERSION specifies the system OS version with which the key may be used. This tag is
+ * never sent to the IKeyMintDevice, but is added to the hardware-enforced authorization list
+ * by the TA. Any attempt to use a key with a Tag::OS_VERSION value different from the
+ * currently-running OS version must cause begin(), getKeyCharacteristics() or exportKey() to
+ * return ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE. See upgradeKey() for details.
+ *
+ * The value of the tag is an integer of the form MMmmss, where MM is the major version number,
+ * mm is the minor version number, and ss is the sub-minor version number. For example, for a
+ * key generated on Android version 4.0.3, the value would be 040003.
+ *
+ * The IKeyMintDevice HAL must read the current OS version from the system property
+ * ro.build.version.release and deliver it to the secure environment when the HAL is first
+ * loaded (mechanism is implementation-defined). The secure environment must not accept another
+ * version until after the next boot. If the content of ro.build.version.release has additional
+ * version information after the sub-minor version number, it must not be included in
+ * Tag::OS_VERSION. If the content is non-numeric, the secure environment must use 0 as the
+ * system version.
+ *
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ OS_VERSION = (3 << 28) | 705, /* TagType:UINT */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::OS_PATCHLEVEL specifies the system security patch level with which the key may be used.
+ * This tag is never sent to the keyMint TA, but is added to the hardware-enforced
+ * authorization list by the TA. Any attempt to use a key with a Tag::OS_PATCHLEVEL value
+ * different from the currently-running system patchlevel must cause begin(),
+ * getKeyCharacteristics() or exportKey() to return ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE. See
+ * upgradeKey() for details.
+ *
+ * The value of the tag is an integer of the form YYYYMM, where YYYY is the four-digit year of
+ * the last update and MM is the two-digit month of the last update. For example, for a key
+ * generated on an Android device last updated in December 2015, the value would be 201512.
+ *
+ * The IKeyMintDevice HAL must read the current system patchlevel from the system property
+ * ro.build.version.security_patch and deliver it to the secure environment when the HAL is
+ * first loaded (mechanism is implementation-defined). The secure environment must not accept
+ * another patchlevel until after the next boot.
+ *
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ OS_PATCHLEVEL = (3 << 28) | 706, /* TagType:UINT */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::UNIQUE_ID specifies a unique, time-based identifier. This tag is never provided to or
+ * returned from KeyMint in the key characteristics. It exists only to define the tag for use
+ * in the attestation record.
+ *
+ * When a key with Tag::INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID is attested, the unique ID is added to the attestation
+ * record. The value is a 128-bit hash that is unique per device and per calling application,
+ * and changes monthly and on most password resets. It is computed with:
+ *
+ * HMAC_SHA256(T || C || R, HBK)
+ *
+ * Where:
+ *
+ * T is the "temporal counter value", computed by dividing the value of
+ * Tag::CREATION_DATETIME by 2592000000, dropping any remainder. T changes every 30 days
+ * (2592000000 = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000).
+ *
+ * C is the value of Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID that is provided to attestKey().
+ *
+ * R is 1 if Tag::RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION was provided to attestKey or 0 if the tag was not
+ * provided.
+ *
+ * HBK is a unique hardware-bound secret known to the secure environment and never revealed
+ * by it. The secret must contain at least 128 bits of entropy and be unique to the
+ * individual device (probabilistic uniqueness is acceptable).
+ *
+ * HMAC_SHA256 is the HMAC function, with SHA-2-256 as the hash.
+ *
+ * The output of the HMAC function must be truncated to 128 bits.
+ *
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ UNIQUE_ID = (9 << 28) | 707, /* TagType:BYTES */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is used to deliver a "challenge" value to the attestKey() method,
+ * which must place the value in the KeyDescription SEQUENCE of the attestation extension. See
+ * attestKey().
+ *
+ * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
+ */
+ ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE = (9 << 28) | 708, /* TagType:BYTES */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID identifies the set of applications which may use a key, used
+ * only with attestKey().
+ *
+ * The content of Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID is a DER-encoded ASN.1 structure, with the
+ * following schema:
+ *
+ * AttestationApplicationId ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * packageInfoRecords SET OF PackageInfoRecord,
+ * signatureDigests SET OF OCTET_STRING,
+ * }
+ *
+ * PackageInfoRecord ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * packageName OCTET_STRING,
+ * version INTEGER,
+ * }
+ *
+ * See system/security/keystore/keystore_attestation_id.cpp for details of construction.
+ * IKeyMintDevice implementers do not need to create or parse the ASN.1 structure, but only
+ * copy the tag value into the attestation record. The DER-encoded string must not exceed 1 KiB
+ * in length.
+ *
+ * Cannot be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID = (9 << 28) | 709, /* TagType:BYTES */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND provides the device's brand name, as returned by Build.BRAND in
+ * Android, to attestKey(). This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
+ * device's identifiers.
+ *
+ * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
+ * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
+ * includes this tag must fail with ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS.
+ *
+ * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
+ */
+ ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND = (9 << 28) | 710, /* TagType:BYTES */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE provides the device's device name, as returned by Build.DEVICE in
+ * Android, to attestKey(). This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
+ * device's identifiers.
+ *
+ * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
+ * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
+ * includes this tag must fail with ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS.
+ *
+ * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
+ */
+ ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE = (9 << 28) | 711, /* TagType:BYTES */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT provides the device's product name, as returned by Build.PRODUCT
+ * in Android, to attestKey(). This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
+ * device's identifiers.
+ *
+ * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
+ * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
+ * includes this tag must fail with ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS.
+ *
+ * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
+ */
+ ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT = (9 << 28) | 712, /* TagType:BYTES */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL the device's serial number. This field must be set only when
+ * requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
+ *
+ * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
+ * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
+ * includes this tag must fail with ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS.
+ *
+ * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
+ */
+ ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL = (9 << 28) | 713, /* TagType:BYTES */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI provides the IMEIs for all radios on the device to attestKey().
+ * This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
+ *
+ * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
+ * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
+ * includes this tag must fail with ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS.
+ *
+ * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
+ */
+ ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI = (9 << 28) | 714, /* TagType:BYTES */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MEID provides the MEIDs for all radios on the device to attestKey().
+ * This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
+ *
+ * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
+ * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
+ * includes this tag must fail with ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS.
+ *
+ * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
+ */
+ ATTESTATION_ID_MEID = (9 << 28) | 715, /* TagType:BYTES */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER provides the device's manufacturer name, as returned by
+ * Build.MANUFACTURER in Android, to attstKey(). This field must be set only when requesting
+ * attestation of the device's identifiers.
+ *
+ * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
+ * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
+ * includes this tag must fail with ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS.
+ *
+ * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
+ */
+ ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER = (9 << 28) | 716, /* TagType:BYTES */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL provides the device's model name, as returned by Build.MODEL in
+ * Android, to attestKey(). This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
+ * device's identifiers.
+ *
+ * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
+ * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
+ * includes this tag must fail with ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS.
+ *
+ * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
+ */
+ ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL = (9 << 28) | 717, /* TagType:BYTES */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL specifies the vendor image security patch level with which the key may
+ * be used. This tag is never sent to the keyMint TA, but is added to the hardware-enforced
+ * authorization list by the TA. Any attempt to use a key with a Tag::VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL value
+ * different from the currently-running system patchlevel must cause begin(),
+ * getKeyCharacteristics() or exportKey() to return ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE. See
+ * upgradeKey() for details.
+ *
+ * The value of the tag is an integer of the form YYYYMMDD, where YYYY is the four-digit year of
+ * the last update, MM is the two-digit month and DD is the two-digit day of the last
+ * update. For example, for a key generated on an Android device last updated on June 5, 2018,
+ * the value would be 20180605.
+ *
+ * The IKeyMintDevice HAL must read the current vendor patchlevel from the system property
+ * ro.vendor.build.security_patch and deliver it to the secure environment when the HAL is first
+ * loaded (mechanism is implementation-defined). The secure environment must not accept another
+ * patchlevel until after the next boot.
+ *
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL = (3 << 28) | 718, /* TagType:UINT */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::BOOT_PATCHLEVEL specifies the boot image (kernel) security patch level with which the
+ * key may be used. This tag is never sent to the keyMint TA, but is added to the
+ * hardware-enforced authorization list by the TA. Any attempt to use a key with a
+ * Tag::BOOT_PATCHLEVEL value different from the currently-running system patchlevel must
+ * cause begin(), getKeyCharacteristics() or exportKey() to return
+ * ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE. See upgradeKey() for details.
+ *
+ * The value of the tag is an integer of the form YYYYMMDD, where YYYY is the four-digit year of
+ * the last update, MM is the two-digit month and DD is the two-digit day of the last
+ * update. For example, for a key generated on an Android device last updated on June 5, 2018,
+ * the value would be 20180605. If the day is not known, 00 may be substituted.
+ *
+ * During each boot, the bootloader must provide the patch level of the boot image to the secure
+ * envirionment (mechanism is implementation-defined).
+ *
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
+ */
+ BOOT_PATCHLEVEL = (3 << 28) | 719, /* TagType:UINT */
+
+ /**
+ * DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION is an argument to IKeyMintDevice::attestKey(). It indicates that
+ * attestation using a device-unique key is requested, rather than a batch key. When a
+ * device-unique key is used, only the attestation certificate is returned; no additional
+ * chained certificates are provided. It's up to the caller to recognize the device-unique
+ * signing key. Only SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX IKeyMintDevices may support device-unique
+ * attestations. SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT IKeyMintDevices must return
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT if they receive DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION.
+ * SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX IKeyMintDevices need not support DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION, and
+ * return ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS if they do not support it.
+ *
+ * IKeyMintDevice implementations that support device-unique attestation MUST add the
+ * DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION tag to device-unique attestations.
+ */
+ DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION = (7 << 28) | 720, /* TagType:BOOL */
+
+ /**
+ * IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY is never used by IKeyMintDevice, is not a valid argument to key
+ * generation or any operation, is never returned by any method and is never used in a key
+ * attestation. It is used in attestations produced by the IIdentityCredential HAL when that
+ * HAL attests to Credential Keys. IIdentityCredential produces KeyMint-style attestations.
+ */
+ IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY = (7 << 28) | 721, /* TagType:BOOL */
+
+ /**
+ * To prevent keys from being compromised if an attacker acquires read access to system / kernel
+ * memory, some inline encryption hardware supports protecting storage encryption keys in
+ * hardware without software having access to or the ability to set the plaintext keys.
+ * Instead, software only sees wrapped version of these keys.
+ *
+ * STORAGE_KEY is used to denote that a key generated or imported is a key used for storage
+ * encryption. Keys of this type can either be generated or imported or secure imported using
+ * keyMint. exportKey() can be used to re-wrap storage key with a per-boot ephemeral key
+ * wrapped key once the key characteristics are enforced.
+ *
+ * Keys with this tag cannot be used for any operation within keyMint.
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION is returned when a key with Tag::STORAGE_KEY is provided to
+ * begin().
+ */
+ STORAGE_KEY = (7 << 28) | 722, /* TagType:BOOL */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::ASSOCIATED_DATA Provides "associated data" for AES-GCM encryption or decryption. This
+ * tag is provided to update and specifies data that is not encrypted/decrypted, but is used in
+ * computing the GCM tag.
+ *
+ * Must never appear KeyCharacteristics.
+ */
+ ASSOCIATED_DATA = (9 << 28) | 1000, /* TagType:BYTES */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::NONCE is used to provide or return a nonce or Initialization Vector (IV) for AES-GCM,
+ * AES-CBC, AES-CTR, or 3DES-CBC encryption or decryption. This tag is provided to begin during
+ * encryption and decryption operations. It is only provided to begin if the key has
+ * Tag::CALLER_NONCE. If not provided, an appropriate nonce or IV must be randomly generated by
+ * KeyMint and returned from begin.
+ *
+ * The value is a blob, an arbitrary-length array of bytes. Allowed lengths depend on the mode:
+ * GCM nonces are 12 bytes in length; AES-CBC and AES-CTR IVs are 16 bytes in length, 3DES-CBC
+ * IVs are 8 bytes in length.
+ *
+ * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
+ */
+ NONCE = (9 << 28) | 1001, /* TagType:BYTES */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::MAC_LENGTH provides the requested length of a MAC or GCM authentication tag, in bits.
+ *
+ * The value is the MAC length in bits. It must be a multiple of 8 and at least as large as the
+ * value of Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH associated with the key. Otherwise, begin() must return
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_MAC_LENGTH.
+ *
+ * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
+ */
+ MAC_LENGTH = (3 << 28) | 1003, /* TagType:UINT */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION specifies whether the device has been factory reset since the
+ * last unique ID rotation. Used for key attestation.
+ *
+ * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
+ */
+ RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION = (7 << 28) | 1004, /* TagType:BOOL */
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::CONFIRMATION_TOKEN is used to deliver a cryptographic token proving that the user
+ * confirmed a signing request. The content is a full-length HMAC-SHA256 value. See the
+ * ConfirmationUI HAL for details of token computation.
+ *
+ * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
+ */
+ CONFIRMATION_TOKEN = (9 << 28) | 1005, /* TagType:BYTES */
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/TagType.aidl b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/TagType.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fb50b10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/TagType.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+
+/**
+ * TagType classifies Tags in Tag.aidl into various groups of data.
+ */
+@VintfStability
+@Backing(type="int")
+enum TagType {
+ /** Invalid type, used to designate a tag as uninitialized. */
+ INVALID = 0 << 28,
+ /** Enumeration value. */
+ ENUM = 1 << 28,
+ /** Repeatable enumeration value. */
+ ENUM_REP = 2 << 28,
+ /** 32-bit unsigned integer. */
+ UINT = 3 << 28,
+ /** Repeatable 32-bit unsigned integer. */
+ UINT_REP = 4 << 28,
+ /** 64-bit unsigned integer. */
+ ULONG = 5 << 28,
+ /** 64-bit unsigned integer representing a date and time, in milliseconds since 1 Jan 1970. */
+ DATE = 6 << 28,
+ /** Boolean. If a tag with this type is present, the value is "true". If absent, "false". */
+ BOOL = 7 << 28,
+ /** Byte string containing an arbitrary-length integer, big-endian ordering. */
+ BIGNUM = 8 << 28,
+ /** Byte string */
+ BYTES = 9 << 28,
+ /** Repeatable 64-bit unsigned integer */
+ ULONG_REP = 10 << 28,
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/Timestamp.aidl b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/Timestamp.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7c882c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/Timestamp.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+
+/**
+ * Time in milliseconds since some arbitrary point in time. Time must be monotonically increasing,
+ * and a secure environment's notion of "current time" must not repeat until the Android device
+ * reboots, or until at least 50 million years have elapsed (note that this requirement is satisfied
+ * by setting the clock to zero during each boot, and then counting time accurately).
+ */
+@VintfStability
+parcelable Timestamp {
+ long milliSeconds;
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/VerificationToken.aidl b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/VerificationToken.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..736c0e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/keymint/VerificationToken.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymint;
+
+import android.hardware.keymint.SecurityLevel;
+import android.hardware.keymint.Timestamp;
+
+/**
+ * VerificationToken instances are used for secure environments to authenticate one another.
+ *
+ * This version of the parcelable currently don't use the parametersVerified field since it's not
+ * needed for time-based verification. This can be added in a later version, if needed.
+ */
+@VintfStability
+parcelable VerificationToken {
+ /**
+ * The operation handle, used to ensure freshness.
+ */
+ long challenge;
+
+ /**
+ * The current time of the secure environment that generates the VerificationToken. This can be
+ * checked against auth tokens generated by the same secure environment, which avoids needing to
+ * synchronize clocks.
+ */
+ Timestamp timestamp;
+
+ /**
+ * SecurityLevel of the secure environment that generated the token.
+ */
+ SecurityLevel securityLevel;
+
+ /**
+ * 32-byte HMAC-SHA256 of the above values, computed as:
+ *
+ * HMAC(H,
+ * "Auth Verification" || challenge || timestamp || securityLevel || parametersVerified)
+ *
+ * where:
+ *
+ * ``HMAC'' is the shared HMAC key (see computeSharedHmac() in IKeyMint).
+ *
+ * ``||'' represents concatenation
+ *
+ * The representation of challenge and timestamp is as 64-bit unsigned integers in big-endian
+ * order. securityLevel is represented as a 32-bit unsigned integer in big-endian order.
+ *
+ * If parametersVerified is non-empty, the representation of parametersVerified is an ASN.1 DER
+ * encoded representation of the values. The ASN.1 schema used is the AuthorizationList schema
+ * from the Keystore attestation documentation. If parametersVerified is empty, it is simply
+ * omitted from the HMAC computation.
+ */
+ byte[] mac;
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/default/Android.bp b/keymint/aidl/default/Android.bp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..539ca47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/default/Android.bp
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+cc_binary {
+ name: "android.hardware.keymint@1.0-service",
+ relative_install_path: "hw",
+ init_rc: ["android.hardware.keymint@1.0-service.rc"],
+ vintf_fragments: ["android.hardware.keymint@1.0-service.xml"],
+ vendor: true,
+ cflags: [
+ "-Wall",
+ "-Wextra",
+ ],
+ shared_libs: [
+ "android.hardware.keymint-ndk_platform",
+ "libbase",
+ "libbinder_ndk",
+ "libcppbor",
+ "libcrypto",
+ "liblog",
+ "libkeymaster_portable",
+ "libkeymint1",
+ "libpuresoftkeymasterdevice",
+ "libutils",
+ ],
+ srcs: [
+ "service.cpp",
+ ],
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/default/android.hardware.keymint@1.0-service.rc b/keymint/aidl/default/android.hardware.keymint@1.0-service.rc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..92dce88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/default/android.hardware.keymint@1.0-service.rc
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+service vendor.keymint-default /vendor/bin/hw/android.hardware.keymint@1.0-service
+ class early_hal
+ user nobody
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/default/android.hardware.keymint@1.0-service.xml b/keymint/aidl/default/android.hardware.keymint@1.0-service.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3935b5a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/default/android.hardware.keymint@1.0-service.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+<manifest version="1.0" type="device">
+ <hal format="aidl">
+ <name>android.hardware.keymint</name>
+ <fqname>IKeyMintDevice/default</fqname>
+ </hal>
+</manifest>
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/default/service.cpp b/keymint/aidl/default/service.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ca5555e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/default/service.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020, The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#define LOG_TAG "android.hardware.keymint1-service"
+
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <android/binder_manager.h>
+#include <android/binder_process.h>
+
+#include <AndroidKeyMint1Device.h>
+#include <keymaster/soft_keymaster_logger.h>
+
+using aidl::android::hardware::keymint::SecurityLevel;
+using aidl::android::hardware::keymint::V1_0::AndroidKeyMint1Device;
+
+int main() {
+ // Zero threads seems like a useless pool, but below we'll join this thread to it, increasing
+ // the pool size to 1.
+ ABinderProcess_setThreadPoolMaxThreadCount(0);
+ std::shared_ptr<AndroidKeyMint1Device> km5 =
+ ndk::SharedRefBase::make<AndroidKeyMint1Device>(SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE);
+
+ keymaster::SoftKeymasterLogger logger;
+ const auto instanceName = std::string(AndroidKeyMint1Device::descriptor) + "/default";
+ LOG(INFO) << "instance: " << instanceName;
+ binder_status_t status =
+ AServiceManager_addService(km5->asBinder().get(), instanceName.c_str());
+ CHECK(status == STATUS_OK);
+
+ ABinderProcess_joinThreadPool();
+ return EXIT_FAILURE; // should not reach
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp b/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9ee8239
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+//
+// Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+//
+
+cc_test {
+ name: "VtsAidlKeyMintV1_0TargetTest",
+ defaults: [
+ "VtsHalTargetTestDefaults",
+ "use_libaidlvintf_gtest_helper_static",
+ ],
+ srcs: [
+ "keyMint1Test.cpp",
+ "VerificationTokenTest.cpp",
+ ],
+ shared_libs: [
+ "libbinder",
+ "libcrypto",
+ "libkeymint1",
+ "libkeymintSupport",
+ ],
+ static_libs: [
+ "android.hardware.keymint-cpp",
+ "libcppbor",
+ "libkeyMint1VtsTestUtil",
+ ],
+ test_suites: [
+ "general-tests",
+ "vts",
+ ],
+}
+
+cc_test_library {
+ name: "libkeyMint1VtsTestUtil",
+ defaults: [
+ "VtsHalTargetTestDefaults",
+ "use_libaidlvintf_gtest_helper_static",
+ ],
+ srcs: [
+ "KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp",
+ ],
+ export_include_dirs: [
+ ".",
+ ],
+ shared_libs: [
+ "libbinder",
+ "libcrypto",
+ "libkeymint1",
+ "libkeymintSupport",
+ ],
+ static_libs: [
+ "android.hardware.keymint-cpp",
+ "libcppbor",
+ ],
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AndroidTest.xml b/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AndroidTest.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..43e7a8a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AndroidTest.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<!-- Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+
+ Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+ http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+
+ Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ limitations under the License.
+-->
+<configuration description="Runs VtsAidlKeyMintV1_0TargetTest.">
+ <option name="test-suite-tag" value="apct" />
+ <option name="test-suite-tag" value="apct-native" />
+
+ <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.RootTargetPreparer">
+ </target_preparer>
+
+ <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.PushFilePreparer">
+ <option name="cleanup" value="true" />
+ <option name="push" value="VtsAidlKeyMintV1_0TargetTest->/data/local/tmp/VtsAidlKeyMintV1_0TargetTest" />
+ </target_preparer>
+
+ <test class="com.android.tradefed.testtype.GTest" >
+ <option name="native-test-device-path" value="/data/local/tmp" />
+ <option name="module-name" value="VtsAidlKeyMintV1_0TargetTest" />
+ <option name="native-test-timeout" value="900000"/>
+ </test>
+</configuration>
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp b/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0546149
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,756 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "KeyMintAidlTestBase.h"
+
+#include <chrono>
+#include <vector>
+
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
+
+#include <keymintSupport/key_param_output.h>
+#include <keymintSupport/keymint_utils.h>
+
+namespace android {
+namespace hardware {
+namespace keymint {
+
+using namespace std::literals::chrono_literals;
+using std::endl;
+using std::optional;
+
+::std::ostream& operator<<(::std::ostream& os, const AuthorizationSet& set) {
+ if (set.size() == 0)
+ os << "(Empty)" << ::std::endl;
+ else {
+ os << "\n";
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < set.size(); ++i) os << set[i] << ::std::endl;
+ }
+ return os;
+}
+
+namespace test {
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::GetReturnErrorCode(Status result) {
+ if (result.isOk()) return ErrorCode::OK;
+
+ if (result.exceptionCode() == binder::Status::EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC) {
+ return static_cast<ErrorCode>(result.serviceSpecificErrorCode());
+ }
+
+ return ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
+}
+
+void KeyMintAidlTestBase::InitializeKeyMint(sp<IKeyMintDevice> keyMint) {
+ ASSERT_NE(keyMint, nullptr);
+ keymint_ = keyMint;
+
+ KeyMintHardwareInfo info;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(keymint_->getHardwareInfo(&info).isOk());
+
+ securityLevel_ = info.securityLevel;
+ name_.assign(info.keyMintName.begin(), info.keyMintName.end());
+ author_.assign(info.keyMintAuthorName.begin(), info.keyMintAuthorName.end());
+
+ os_version_ = getOsVersion();
+ os_patch_level_ = getOsPatchlevel();
+}
+
+void KeyMintAidlTestBase::SetUp() {
+ InitializeKeyMint(
+ android::waitForDeclaredService<IKeyMintDevice>(String16(GetParam().c_str())));
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::GenerateKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc,
+ vector<uint8_t>* keyBlob, KeyCharacteristics* keyChar) {
+ EXPECT_NE(keyBlob, nullptr) << "Key blob pointer must not be null. Test bug";
+ EXPECT_NE(keyChar, nullptr)
+ << "Previous characteristics not deleted before generating key. Test bug.";
+
+ // Aidl does not clear these output parameters if the function returns
+ // error. This is different from hal where output parameter is always
+ // cleared due to hal returning void. So now we need to do our own clearing
+ // of the output variables prior to calling keyMint aidl libraries.
+ keyBlob->clear();
+ keyChar->softwareEnforced.clear();
+ keyChar->hardwareEnforced.clear();
+ certChain_.clear();
+
+ Status result;
+ ByteArray blob;
+
+ result = keymint_->generateKey(key_desc.vector_data(), &blob, keyChar, &certChain_);
+
+ // On result, blob & characteristics should be empty.
+ if (result.isOk()) {
+ if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE) {
+ EXPECT_GT(keyChar->hardwareEnforced.size(), 0);
+ }
+ EXPECT_GT(keyChar->softwareEnforced.size(), 0);
+ // TODO(seleneh) in a later version where we return @nullable
+ // single Certificate, check non-null single certificate is always
+ // non-empty.
+ *keyBlob = blob.data;
+ }
+
+ return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::GenerateKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc) {
+ return GenerateKey(key_desc, &key_blob_, &key_characteristics_);
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::ImportKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc, KeyFormat format,
+ const string& key_material, vector<uint8_t>* key_blob,
+ KeyCharacteristics* key_characteristics) {
+ Status result;
+
+ certChain_.clear();
+ key_characteristics->softwareEnforced.clear();
+ key_characteristics->hardwareEnforced.clear();
+ key_blob->clear();
+
+ ByteArray blob;
+ result = keymint_->importKey(key_desc.vector_data(), format,
+ vector<uint8_t>(key_material.begin(), key_material.end()), &blob,
+ key_characteristics, &certChain_);
+
+ if (result.isOk()) {
+ if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE) {
+ EXPECT_GT(key_characteristics->hardwareEnforced.size(), 0);
+ }
+ EXPECT_GT(key_characteristics->softwareEnforced.size(), 0);
+ *key_blob = blob.data;
+ }
+
+ return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::ImportKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc, KeyFormat format,
+ const string& key_material) {
+ return ImportKey(key_desc, format, key_material, &key_blob_, &key_characteristics_);
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::ImportWrappedKey(string wrapped_key, string wrapping_key,
+ const AuthorizationSet& wrapping_key_desc,
+ string masking_key,
+ const AuthorizationSet& unwrapping_params) {
+ Status result;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(wrapping_key_desc, KeyFormat::PKCS8, wrapping_key));
+
+ ByteArray outBlob;
+ key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced.clear();
+ key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced.clear();
+
+ result = keymint_->importWrappedKey(vector<uint8_t>(wrapped_key.begin(), wrapped_key.end()),
+ key_blob_,
+ vector<uint8_t>(masking_key.begin(), masking_key.end()),
+ unwrapping_params.vector_data(), 0 /* passwordSid */,
+ 0 /* biometricSid */, &outBlob, &key_characteristics_);
+
+ if (result.isOk()) {
+ key_blob_ = outBlob.data;
+ if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE) {
+ EXPECT_GT(key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced.size(), 0);
+ }
+ EXPECT_GT(key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced.size(), 0);
+ }
+
+ return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::DeleteKey(vector<uint8_t>* key_blob, bool keep_key_blob) {
+ Status result = keymint_->deleteKey(*key_blob);
+ if (!keep_key_blob) {
+ *key_blob = vector<uint8_t>();
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.serviceSpecificErrorCode() << endl;
+ return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::DeleteKey(bool keep_key_blob) {
+ return DeleteKey(&key_blob_, keep_key_blob);
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::DeleteAllKeys() {
+ Status result = keymint_->deleteAllKeys();
+ EXPECT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.serviceSpecificErrorCode() << endl;
+ return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
+}
+
+void KeyMintAidlTestBase::CheckedDeleteKey(vector<uint8_t>* key_blob, bool keep_key_blob) {
+ ErrorCode result = DeleteKey(key_blob, keep_key_blob);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::OK || result == ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED) << result << endl;
+}
+
+void KeyMintAidlTestBase::CheckedDeleteKey() {
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob_);
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::Begin(KeyPurpose purpose, const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob,
+ const AuthorizationSet& in_params,
+ AuthorizationSet* out_params, sp<IKeyMintOperation>& op) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("Begin");
+ Status result;
+ BeginResult out;
+ result = keymint_->begin(purpose, key_blob, in_params.vector_data(), HardwareAuthToken(), &out);
+
+ if (result.isOk()) {
+ *out_params = out.params;
+ challenge_ = out.challenge;
+ op = out.operation;
+ }
+
+ return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::Begin(KeyPurpose purpose, const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob,
+ const AuthorizationSet& in_params,
+ AuthorizationSet* out_params) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("Begin");
+ Status result;
+ BeginResult out;
+
+ result = keymint_->begin(purpose, key_blob, in_params.vector_data(), HardwareAuthToken(), &out);
+
+ if (result.isOk()) {
+ *out_params = out.params;
+ challenge_ = out.challenge;
+ op_ = out.operation;
+ }
+
+ return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::Begin(KeyPurpose purpose, const AuthorizationSet& in_params,
+ AuthorizationSet* out_params) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("Begin");
+ EXPECT_EQ(nullptr, op_);
+ return Begin(purpose, key_blob_, in_params, out_params);
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::Begin(KeyPurpose purpose, const AuthorizationSet& in_params) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("Begin");
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ ErrorCode result = Begin(purpose, in_params, &out_params);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(out_params.empty());
+ return result;
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::Update(const AuthorizationSet& in_params, const string& input,
+ AuthorizationSet* out_params, string* output,
+ int32_t* input_consumed) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("Update");
+
+ Status result;
+ EXPECT_NE(op_, nullptr);
+ if (!op_) {
+ return ErrorCode::UNEXPECTED_NULL_POINTER;
+ }
+
+ KeyParameterArray key_params;
+ key_params.params = in_params.vector_data();
+
+ KeyParameterArray in_keyParams;
+ in_keyParams.params = in_params.vector_data();
+
+ optional<KeyParameterArray> out_keyParams;
+ optional<ByteArray> o_put;
+ result = op_->update(in_keyParams, vector<uint8_t>(input.begin(), input.end()), {}, {},
+ &out_keyParams, &o_put, input_consumed);
+
+ if (result.isOk()) {
+ if (o_put) {
+ output->append(o_put->data.begin(), o_put->data.end());
+ }
+
+ if (out_keyParams) {
+ out_params->push_back(AuthorizationSet(out_keyParams->params));
+ }
+ }
+
+ return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::Update(const string& input, string* out, int32_t* input_consumed) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("Update");
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ ErrorCode result =
+ Update(AuthorizationSet() /* in_params */, input, &out_params, out, input_consumed);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(out_params.empty());
+ return result;
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::Finish(const AuthorizationSet& in_params, const string& input,
+ const string& signature, AuthorizationSet* out_params,
+ string* output) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("Finish");
+ Status result;
+
+ EXPECT_NE(op_, nullptr);
+ if (!op_) {
+ return ErrorCode::UNEXPECTED_NULL_POINTER;
+ }
+
+ KeyParameterArray key_params;
+ key_params.params = in_params.vector_data();
+
+ KeyParameterArray in_keyParams;
+ in_keyParams.params = in_params.vector_data();
+
+ optional<KeyParameterArray> out_keyParams;
+ optional<vector<uint8_t>> o_put;
+
+ vector<uint8_t> oPut;
+ result = op_->finish(in_keyParams, vector<uint8_t>(input.begin(), input.end()),
+ vector<uint8_t>(signature.begin(), signature.end()), {}, {},
+ &out_keyParams, &oPut);
+
+ if (result.isOk()) {
+ if (out_keyParams) {
+ out_params->push_back(AuthorizationSet(out_keyParams->params));
+ }
+
+ output->append(oPut.begin(), oPut.end());
+ }
+
+ op_.clear(); // So dtor doesn't Abort().
+ return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::Finish(const string& message, string* output) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("Finish");
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ string finish_output;
+ ErrorCode result = Finish(AuthorizationSet() /* in_params */, message, "" /* signature */,
+ &out_params, output);
+ if (result != ErrorCode::OK) {
+ return result;
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, out_params.size());
+ return result;
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::Finish(const string& message, const string& signature,
+ string* output) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("Finish");
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ ErrorCode result =
+ Finish(AuthorizationSet() /* in_params */, message, signature, &out_params, output);
+
+ if (result != ErrorCode::OK) {
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, out_params.size());
+ return result;
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::Abort(const sp<IKeyMintOperation>& op) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("Abort");
+
+ EXPECT_NE(op, nullptr);
+ if (!op) {
+ return ErrorCode::UNEXPECTED_NULL_POINTER;
+ }
+
+ Status retval = op->abort();
+ EXPECT_TRUE(retval.isOk());
+ return static_cast<ErrorCode>(retval.serviceSpecificErrorCode());
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::Abort() {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("Abort");
+
+ EXPECT_NE(op_, nullptr);
+ if (!op_) {
+ return ErrorCode::UNEXPECTED_NULL_POINTER;
+ }
+
+ Status retval = op_->abort();
+ return static_cast<ErrorCode>(retval.serviceSpecificErrorCode());
+}
+
+void KeyMintAidlTestBase::AbortIfNeeded() {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("AbortIfNeeded");
+ if (op_) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Abort());
+ op_.clear();
+ }
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::ProcessMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, KeyPurpose operation,
+ const string& message, const AuthorizationSet& in_params,
+ AuthorizationSet* out_params) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("ProcessMessage");
+ AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
+ ErrorCode result = Begin(operation, key_blob, in_params, &begin_out_params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
+ if (result != ErrorCode::OK) {
+ return "";
+ }
+
+ string output;
+ int32_t consumed = 0;
+ AuthorizationSet update_params;
+ AuthorizationSet update_out_params;
+ result = Update(update_params, message, &update_out_params, &output, &consumed);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
+ if (result != ErrorCode::OK) {
+ return "";
+ }
+
+ string unused;
+ AuthorizationSet finish_params;
+ AuthorizationSet finish_out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Finish(finish_params, message.substr(consumed), unused, &finish_out_params, &output));
+
+ out_params->push_back(begin_out_params);
+ out_params->push_back(finish_out_params);
+ return output;
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::SignMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, const string& message,
+ const AuthorizationSet& params) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("SignMessage");
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ string signature = ProcessMessage(key_blob, KeyPurpose::SIGN, message, params, &out_params);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(out_params.empty());
+ return signature;
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::SignMessage(const string& message, const AuthorizationSet& params) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("SignMessage");
+ return SignMessage(key_blob_, message, params);
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::MacMessage(const string& message, Digest digest, size_t mac_length) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("MacMessage");
+ return SignMessage(
+ key_blob_, message,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, mac_length));
+}
+
+void KeyMintAidlTestBase::CheckHmacTestVector(const string& key, const string& message,
+ Digest digest, const string& expected_mac) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("CheckHmacTestVector");
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .HmacKey(key.size() * 8)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, expected_mac.size() * 8)
+ .Digest(digest),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, key));
+ string signature = MacMessage(message, digest, expected_mac.size() * 8);
+ EXPECT_EQ(expected_mac, signature)
+ << "Test vector didn't match for key of size " << key.size() << " message of size "
+ << message.size() << " and digest " << digest;
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+}
+
+void KeyMintAidlTestBase::CheckAesCtrTestVector(const string& key, const string& nonce,
+ const string& message,
+ const string& expected_ciphertext) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("CheckAesCtrTestVector");
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(key.size() * 8)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CTR)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CALLER_NONCE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, key));
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, nonce.data(), nonce.size())
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CTR)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(key_blob_, message, params, &out_params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(expected_ciphertext, ciphertext);
+}
+
+void KeyMintAidlTestBase::CheckTripleDesTestVector(KeyPurpose purpose, BlockMode block_mode,
+ PaddingMode padding_mode, const string& key,
+ const string& iv, const string& input,
+ const string& expected_output) {
+ auto authset = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(key.size() * 7)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(padding_mode);
+ if (iv.size()) authset.Authorization(TAG_CALLER_NONCE);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(authset, KeyFormat::RAW, key));
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob_.size(), 0U);
+
+ auto begin_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(block_mode).Padding(padding_mode);
+ if (iv.size()) begin_params.Authorization(TAG_NONCE, iv.data(), iv.size());
+ AuthorizationSet output_params;
+ string output = ProcessMessage(key_blob_, purpose, input, begin_params, &output_params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(expected_output, output);
+}
+
+void KeyMintAidlTestBase::VerifyMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, const string& message,
+ const string& signature, const AuthorizationSet& params) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("VerifyMessage");
+ AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY, key_blob, params, &begin_out_params));
+
+ string output;
+ AuthorizationSet update_params;
+ AuthorizationSet update_out_params;
+ int32_t consumed;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Update(update_params, message, &update_out_params, &output, &consumed));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(output.empty());
+ EXPECT_GT(consumed, 0U);
+
+ string unused;
+ AuthorizationSet finish_params;
+ AuthorizationSet finish_out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(finish_params, message.substr(consumed), signature,
+ &finish_out_params, &output));
+ op_.clear();
+ EXPECT_TRUE(output.empty());
+}
+
+void KeyMintAidlTestBase::VerifyMessage(const string& message, const string& signature,
+ const AuthorizationSet& params) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("VerifyMessage");
+ VerifyMessage(key_blob_, message, signature, params);
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::EncryptMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, const string& message,
+ const AuthorizationSet& in_params,
+ AuthorizationSet* out_params) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("EncryptMessage");
+ return ProcessMessage(key_blob, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, message, in_params, out_params);
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::EncryptMessage(const string& message, const AuthorizationSet& params,
+ AuthorizationSet* out_params) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("EncryptMessage");
+ return EncryptMessage(key_blob_, message, params, out_params);
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::EncryptMessage(const string& message, const AuthorizationSet& params) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("EncryptMessage");
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(out_params.empty()) << "Output params should be empty. Contained: " << out_params;
+ return ciphertext;
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::EncryptMessage(const string& message, BlockMode block_mode,
+ PaddingMode padding) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("EncryptMessage");
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(block_mode).Padding(padding);
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(out_params.empty()) << "Output params should be empty. Contained: " << out_params;
+ return ciphertext;
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::EncryptMessage(const string& message, BlockMode block_mode,
+ PaddingMode padding, vector<uint8_t>* iv_out) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("EncryptMessage");
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(block_mode).Padding(padding);
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1U, out_params.size());
+ auto ivVal = out_params.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ivVal.isOk());
+ if (ivVal.isOk()) *iv_out = ivVal.value();
+ return ciphertext;
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::EncryptMessage(const string& message, BlockMode block_mode,
+ PaddingMode padding, const vector<uint8_t>& iv_in) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("EncryptMessage");
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, iv_in);
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
+ return ciphertext;
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::EncryptMessage(const string& message, BlockMode block_mode,
+ PaddingMode padding, uint8_t mac_length_bits,
+ const vector<uint8_t>& iv_in) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("EncryptMessage");
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, mac_length_bits)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, iv_in);
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
+ return ciphertext;
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::DecryptMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob,
+ const string& ciphertext,
+ const AuthorizationSet& params) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("DecryptMessage");
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ string plaintext =
+ ProcessMessage(key_blob, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, ciphertext, params, &out_params);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(out_params.empty());
+ return plaintext;
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::DecryptMessage(const string& ciphertext,
+ const AuthorizationSet& params) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("DecryptMessage");
+ return DecryptMessage(key_blob_, ciphertext, params);
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::DecryptMessage(const string& ciphertext, BlockMode block_mode,
+ PaddingMode padding_mode, const vector<uint8_t>& iv) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("DecryptMessage");
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, iv);
+ return DecryptMessage(key_blob_, ciphertext, params);
+}
+
+std::pair<ErrorCode, vector<uint8_t>> KeyMintAidlTestBase::UpgradeKey(
+ const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob) {
+ std::pair<ErrorCode, vector<uint8_t>> retval;
+ vector<uint8_t> outKeyBlob;
+ Status result = keymint_->upgradeKey(key_blob, vector<KeyParameter>(), &outKeyBlob);
+ ErrorCode errorcode = GetReturnErrorCode(result);
+ retval = std::tie(errorcode, outKeyBlob);
+
+ return retval;
+}
+vector<uint32_t> KeyMintAidlTestBase::ValidKeySizes(Algorithm algorithm) {
+ switch (algorithm) {
+ case Algorithm::RSA:
+ switch (SecLevel()) {
+ case SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE:
+ case SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT:
+ return {2048, 3072, 4096};
+ case SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX:
+ return {2048};
+ default:
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "Invalid security level " << uint32_t(SecLevel());
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case Algorithm::EC:
+ switch (SecLevel()) {
+ case SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE:
+ case SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT:
+ return {224, 256, 384, 521};
+ case SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX:
+ return {256};
+ default:
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "Invalid security level " << uint32_t(SecLevel());
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case Algorithm::AES:
+ return {128, 256};
+ case Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES:
+ return {168};
+ case Algorithm::HMAC: {
+ vector<uint32_t> retval((512 - 64) / 8 + 1);
+ uint32_t size = 64 - 8;
+ std::generate(retval.begin(), retval.end(), [&]() { return (size += 8); });
+ return retval;
+ }
+ default:
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "Invalid Algorithm: " << algorithm;
+ return {};
+ }
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "Should be impossible to get here";
+ return {};
+}
+
+vector<uint32_t> KeyMintAidlTestBase::InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm algorithm) {
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+ switch (algorithm) {
+ case Algorithm::RSA:
+ return {3072, 4096};
+ case Algorithm::EC:
+ return {224, 384, 521};
+ case Algorithm::AES:
+ return {192};
+ default:
+ return {};
+ }
+ }
+ return {};
+}
+
+vector<EcCurve> KeyMintAidlTestBase::ValidCurves() {
+ if (securityLevel_ == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+ return {EcCurve::P_256};
+ } else {
+ return {EcCurve::P_224, EcCurve::P_256, EcCurve::P_384, EcCurve::P_521};
+ }
+}
+
+vector<EcCurve> KeyMintAidlTestBase::InvalidCurves() {
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT) return {};
+ CHECK(SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX);
+ return {EcCurve::P_224, EcCurve::P_384, EcCurve::P_521};
+}
+
+vector<Digest> KeyMintAidlTestBase::ValidDigests(bool withNone, bool withMD5) {
+ switch (SecLevel()) {
+ case SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE:
+ case SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT:
+ if (withNone) {
+ if (withMD5)
+ return {Digest::NONE, Digest::MD5, Digest::SHA1,
+ Digest::SHA_2_224, Digest::SHA_2_256, Digest::SHA_2_384,
+ Digest::SHA_2_512};
+ else
+ return {Digest::NONE, Digest::SHA1, Digest::SHA_2_224,
+ Digest::SHA_2_256, Digest::SHA_2_384, Digest::SHA_2_512};
+ } else {
+ if (withMD5)
+ return {Digest::MD5, Digest::SHA1, Digest::SHA_2_224,
+ Digest::SHA_2_256, Digest::SHA_2_384, Digest::SHA_2_512};
+ else
+ return {Digest::SHA1, Digest::SHA_2_224, Digest::SHA_2_256, Digest::SHA_2_384,
+ Digest::SHA_2_512};
+ }
+ break;
+ case SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX:
+ if (withNone)
+ return {Digest::NONE, Digest::SHA_2_256};
+ else
+ return {Digest::SHA_2_256};
+ break;
+ default:
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "Invalid security level " << uint32_t(SecLevel());
+ break;
+ }
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "Should be impossible to get here";
+ return {};
+}
+
+} // namespace test
+} // namespace keymint
+} // namespace hardware
+} // namespace android
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h b/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2948c41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef VTS_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST_UTILS_H
+#define VTS_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST_UTILS_H
+
+#pragma once
+
+#include <aidl/Gtest.h>
+#include <aidl/Vintf.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/ErrorCode.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.h>
+#include <binder/IServiceManager.h>
+#include <binder/ProcessState.h>
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+
+#include <keymintSupport/authorization_set.h>
+
+namespace android {
+namespace hardware {
+namespace keymint {
+namespace test {
+
+using ::android::sp;
+using binder::Status;
+using ::std::shared_ptr;
+using ::std::string;
+using ::std::vector;
+
+constexpr uint64_t kOpHandleSentinel = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF;
+
+::std::ostream& operator<<(::std::ostream& os, const AuthorizationSet& set);
+
+class KeyMintAidlTestBase : public ::testing::TestWithParam<string> {
+ public:
+ void SetUp() override;
+ void TearDown() override {
+ if (key_blob_.size()) {
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+ }
+ AbortIfNeeded();
+ }
+
+ void InitializeKeyMint(sp<IKeyMintDevice> keyMint);
+ IKeyMintDevice& keyMint() { return *keymint_; }
+ uint32_t os_version() { return os_version_; }
+ uint32_t os_patch_level() { return os_patch_level_; }
+
+ ErrorCode GetReturnErrorCode(Status result);
+ ErrorCode GenerateKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc, vector<uint8_t>* key_blob,
+ KeyCharacteristics* key_characteristics);
+
+ ErrorCode GenerateKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc);
+
+ ErrorCode ImportKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc, KeyFormat format,
+ const string& key_material, vector<uint8_t>* key_blob,
+ KeyCharacteristics* key_characteristics);
+ ErrorCode ImportKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc, KeyFormat format,
+ const string& key_material);
+
+ ErrorCode ImportWrappedKey(string wrapped_key, string wrapping_key,
+ const AuthorizationSet& wrapping_key_desc, string masking_key,
+ const AuthorizationSet& unwrapping_params);
+
+ ErrorCode DeleteKey(vector<uint8_t>* key_blob, bool keep_key_blob = false);
+ ErrorCode DeleteKey(bool keep_key_blob = false);
+
+ ErrorCode DeleteAllKeys();
+
+ void CheckedDeleteKey(vector<uint8_t>* key_blob, bool keep_key_blob = false);
+ void CheckedDeleteKey();
+
+ ErrorCode Begin(KeyPurpose purpose, const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob,
+ const AuthorizationSet& in_params, AuthorizationSet* out_params,
+ sp<IKeyMintOperation>& op);
+ ErrorCode Begin(KeyPurpose purpose, const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob,
+ const AuthorizationSet& in_params, AuthorizationSet* out_params);
+ ErrorCode Begin(KeyPurpose purpose, const AuthorizationSet& in_params,
+ AuthorizationSet* out_params);
+ ErrorCode Begin(KeyPurpose purpose, const AuthorizationSet& in_params);
+
+ ErrorCode Update(const AuthorizationSet& in_params, const string& input,
+ AuthorizationSet* out_params, string* output, int32_t* input_consumed);
+ ErrorCode Update(const string& input, string* out, int32_t* input_consumed);
+
+ ErrorCode Finish(const AuthorizationSet& in_params, const string& input,
+ const string& signature, AuthorizationSet* out_params, string* output);
+ ErrorCode Finish(const string& message, string* output);
+ ErrorCode Finish(const string& message, const string& signature, string* output);
+ ErrorCode Finish(string* output) { return Finish(string(), output); }
+
+ ErrorCode Abort();
+ ErrorCode Abort(const sp<IKeyMintOperation>& op);
+ void AbortIfNeeded();
+
+ string ProcessMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, KeyPurpose operation,
+ const string& message, const AuthorizationSet& in_params,
+ AuthorizationSet* out_params);
+
+ string SignMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, const string& message,
+ const AuthorizationSet& params);
+ string SignMessage(const string& message, const AuthorizationSet& params);
+
+ string MacMessage(const string& message, Digest digest, size_t mac_length);
+
+ void CheckHmacTestVector(const string& key, const string& message, Digest digest,
+ const string& expected_mac);
+
+ void CheckAesCtrTestVector(const string& key, const string& nonce, const string& message,
+ const string& expected_ciphertext);
+
+ void CheckTripleDesTestVector(KeyPurpose purpose, BlockMode block_mode,
+ PaddingMode padding_mode, const string& key, const string& iv,
+ const string& input, const string& expected_output);
+
+ void VerifyMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, const string& message,
+ const string& signature, const AuthorizationSet& params);
+ void VerifyMessage(const string& message, const string& signature,
+ const AuthorizationSet& params);
+
+ string EncryptMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, const string& message,
+ const AuthorizationSet& in_params, AuthorizationSet* out_params);
+ string EncryptMessage(const string& message, const AuthorizationSet& params,
+ AuthorizationSet* out_params);
+ string EncryptMessage(const string& message, const AuthorizationSet& params);
+ string EncryptMessage(const string& message, BlockMode block_mode, PaddingMode padding);
+ string EncryptMessage(const string& message, BlockMode block_mode, PaddingMode padding,
+ vector<uint8_t>* iv_out);
+ string EncryptMessage(const string& message, BlockMode block_mode, PaddingMode padding,
+ const vector<uint8_t>& iv_in);
+ string EncryptMessage(const string& message, BlockMode block_mode, PaddingMode padding,
+ uint8_t mac_length_bits, const vector<uint8_t>& iv_in);
+
+ string DecryptMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, const string& ciphertext,
+ const AuthorizationSet& params);
+ string DecryptMessage(const string& ciphertext, const AuthorizationSet& params);
+ string DecryptMessage(const string& ciphertext, BlockMode block_mode, PaddingMode padding_mode,
+ const vector<uint8_t>& iv);
+
+ std::pair<ErrorCode, vector<uint8_t>> UpgradeKey(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob);
+
+ bool IsSecure() { return securityLevel_ != SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE; }
+ SecurityLevel SecLevel() { return securityLevel_; }
+
+ vector<uint32_t> ValidKeySizes(Algorithm algorithm);
+ vector<uint32_t> InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm algorithm);
+
+ vector<EcCurve> ValidCurves();
+ vector<EcCurve> InvalidCurves();
+
+ vector<Digest> ValidDigests(bool withNone, bool withMD5);
+
+ static vector<string> build_params() {
+ auto params = android::getAidlHalInstanceNames(IKeyMintDevice::descriptor);
+ return params;
+ }
+
+ sp<IKeyMintOperation> op_;
+ vector<Certificate> certChain_;
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob_;
+ KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics_;
+
+ private:
+ sp<IKeyMintDevice> keymint_;
+ uint32_t os_version_;
+ uint32_t os_patch_level_;
+
+ SecurityLevel securityLevel_;
+ string name_;
+ string author_;
+ long challenge_;
+};
+
+#define INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(name) \
+ INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(PerInstance, name, \
+ testing::ValuesIn(KeyMintAidlTestBase::build_params()), \
+ android::PrintInstanceNameToString)
+
+} // namespace test
+} // namespace keymint
+} // namespace hardware
+} // namespace android
+
+#endif // VTS_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST_UTILS_H
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VerificationTokenTest.cpp b/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VerificationTokenTest.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bd0942b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VerificationTokenTest.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "KeyMintAidlTestBase.h"
+
+namespace android {
+namespace hardware {
+namespace keymint {
+namespace test {
+
+class VerificationTokenTest : public KeyMintAidlTestBase {
+ protected:
+ struct VerifyAuthorizationResult {
+ ErrorCode error;
+ VerificationToken token;
+ };
+
+ VerifyAuthorizationResult verifyAuthorization(uint64_t operationHandle,
+ const HardwareAuthToken& authToken) {
+ VerifyAuthorizationResult result;
+
+ Status err;
+ err = keyMint().verifyAuthorization(operationHandle, //
+ authToken, //
+ &result.token);
+
+ result.error = GetReturnErrorCode(err);
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ uint64_t getTime() {
+ struct timespec timespec;
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, ×pec));
+ return timespec.tv_sec * 1000 + timespec.tv_nsec / 1000000;
+ }
+
+ int sleep_ms(uint32_t milliseconds) {
+ struct timespec sleep_time = {static_cast<time_t>(milliseconds / 1000),
+ static_cast<long>(milliseconds % 1000) * 1000000};
+ while (sleep_time.tv_sec || sleep_time.tv_nsec) {
+ if (nanosleep(&sleep_time /* to wait */,
+ &sleep_time /* remaining (on interrruption) */) == 0) {
+ sleep_time = {};
+ } else {
+ if (errno != EINTR) return errno;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+};
+
+/*
+ * VerificationTokens exist to facilitate cross-KeyMint verification of requirements. As
+ * such, the precise capabilities required will vary depending on the specific vendor
+ * implementations. Essentially, VerificationTokens are a "hook" to enable vendor
+ * implementations to communicate, so the precise usage is defined by those vendors. The only
+ * thing we really can test is that tokens can be created by TEE keyMints, and that the
+ * timestamps increase as expected.
+ */
+TEST_P(VerificationTokenTest, TestCreation) {
+ auto result1 = verifyAuthorization(1 /* operation handle */, HardwareAuthToken());
+ auto result1_time = getTime();
+
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+ // StrongBox should not implement verifyAuthorization.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED, result1.error);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result1.error);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1U, result1.token.challenge);
+ EXPECT_EQ(SecLevel(), result1.token.securityLevel);
+ EXPECT_GT(result1.token.timestamp.milliSeconds, 0U);
+
+ constexpr uint32_t time_to_sleep = 200;
+ sleep_ms(time_to_sleep);
+
+ auto result2 = verifyAuthorization(2 /* operation handle */, HardwareAuthToken());
+
+ auto result2_time = getTime();
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result2.error);
+ EXPECT_EQ(2U, result2.token.challenge);
+ EXPECT_EQ(SecLevel(), result2.token.securityLevel);
+
+ auto host_time_delta = result2_time - result1_time;
+
+ EXPECT_GE(host_time_delta, time_to_sleep)
+ << "We slept for " << time_to_sleep << " ms, the clock must have advanced by that much";
+ EXPECT_LE(host_time_delta, time_to_sleep + 20)
+ << "The verifyAuthorization call took " << (host_time_delta - time_to_sleep)
+ << " ms? That's awful!";
+
+ auto km_time_delta =
+ result2.token.timestamp.milliSeconds - result1.token.timestamp.milliSeconds;
+
+ // If not too much else is going on on the system, the time delta should be quite close. Allow
+ // 2 ms of slop just to avoid test flakiness.
+ //
+ // TODO(swillden): see if we can output values so they can be gathered across many runs and
+ // report if times aren't nearly always <1ms apart.
+ EXPECT_LE(host_time_delta, km_time_delta + 2);
+ EXPECT_LE(km_time_delta, host_time_delta + 2);
+ ASSERT_EQ(result1.token.mac.size(), result2.token.mac.size());
+ ASSERT_NE(0,
+ memcmp(result1.token.mac.data(), result2.token.mac.data(), result1.token.mac.size()));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test that the mac changes when the time stamp changes. This is does not guarantee that the time
+ * stamp is included in the mac but on failure we know that it is not. Other than in the test
+ * case above we call verifyAuthorization with the exact same set of parameters.
+ */
+TEST_P(VerificationTokenTest, MacChangesOnChangingTimestamp) {
+ auto result1 = verifyAuthorization(0 /* operation handle */, HardwareAuthToken());
+ auto result1_time = getTime();
+
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+ // StrongBox should not implement verifyAuthorization.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED, result1.error);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result1.error);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, result1.token.challenge);
+ EXPECT_EQ(SecLevel(), result1.token.securityLevel);
+ EXPECT_GT(result1.token.timestamp.milliSeconds, 0U);
+
+ constexpr uint32_t time_to_sleep = 200;
+ sleep_ms(time_to_sleep);
+
+ auto result2 = verifyAuthorization(0 /* operation handle */, HardwareAuthToken());
+ // ASSERT_TRUE(result2.callSuccessful);
+ auto result2_time = getTime();
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result2.error);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, result2.token.challenge);
+ EXPECT_EQ(SecLevel(), result2.token.securityLevel);
+
+ auto host_time_delta = result2_time - result1_time;
+
+ EXPECT_GE(host_time_delta, time_to_sleep)
+ << "We slept for " << time_to_sleep << " ms, the clock must have advanced by that much";
+ EXPECT_LE(host_time_delta, time_to_sleep + 20)
+ << "The verifyAuthorization call took " << (host_time_delta - time_to_sleep)
+ << " ms? That's awful!";
+
+ auto km_time_delta =
+ result2.token.timestamp.milliSeconds - result1.token.timestamp.milliSeconds;
+
+ EXPECT_LE(host_time_delta, km_time_delta + 2);
+ EXPECT_LE(km_time_delta, host_time_delta + 2);
+ ASSERT_EQ(result1.token.mac.size(), result2.token.mac.size());
+ ASSERT_NE(0,
+ memcmp(result1.token.mac.data(), result2.token.mac.data(), result1.token.mac.size()));
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(VerificationTokenTest);
+
+} // namespace test
+} // namespace keymint
+} // namespace hardware
+} // namespace android
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/keyMint1Test.cpp b/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/keyMint1Test.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c2fa2f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/keyMint1Test.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,4069 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#define LOG_TAG "keymint_5_test"
+#include <cutils/log.h>
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <iostream>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include <cutils/properties.h>
+
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/KeyFormat.h>
+
+#include <keymintSupport/attestation_record.h>
+#include <keymintSupport/key_param_output.h>
+#include <keymintSupport/openssl_utils.h>
+
+#include "KeyMintAidlTestBase.h"
+
+static bool arm_deleteAllKeys = false;
+static bool dump_Attestations = false;
+
+using android::hardware::keymint::AuthorizationSet;
+using android::hardware::keymint::KeyCharacteristics;
+using android::hardware::keymint::KeyFormat;
+
+namespace android {
+namespace hardware {
+
+namespace keymint {
+
+bool operator==(const keymint::AuthorizationSet& a, const keymint::AuthorizationSet& b) {
+ return a.size() == b.size() && std::equal(a.begin(), a.end(), b.begin());
+}
+} // namespace keymint
+} // namespace hardware
+} // namespace android
+
+namespace std {
+
+using namespace android::hardware::keymint;
+
+template <>
+struct std::equal_to<KeyCharacteristics> {
+ bool operator()(const KeyCharacteristics& a, const KeyCharacteristics& b) const {
+ // This isn't very efficient. Oh, well.
+ AuthorizationSet a_sw(a.softwareEnforced);
+ AuthorizationSet b_sw(b.softwareEnforced);
+ AuthorizationSet a_tee(b.hardwareEnforced);
+ AuthorizationSet b_tee(b.hardwareEnforced);
+
+ a_sw.Sort();
+ b_sw.Sort();
+ a_tee.Sort();
+ b_tee.Sort();
+
+ return ((a_sw == b_sw) && (a_tee == b_tee));
+ }
+};
+
+} // namespace std
+
+namespace android {
+namespace hardware {
+namespace keymint {
+namespace test {
+namespace {
+
+template <TagType tag_type, Tag tag, typename ValueT>
+bool contains(vector<KeyParameter>& set, TypedTag<tag_type, tag> ttag, ValueT expected_value) {
+ auto it = std::find_if(set.begin(), set.end(), [&](const KeyParameter& param) {
+ return param.tag == tag && accessTagValue(ttag, param) == expected_value;
+ });
+ return (it != set.end());
+}
+
+template <TagType tag_type, Tag tag>
+bool contains(vector<KeyParameter>& set, TypedTag<tag_type, tag>) {
+ auto it = std::find_if(set.begin(), set.end(),
+ [&](const KeyParameter& param) { return param.tag == tag; });
+ return (it != set.end());
+}
+
+constexpr char hex_value[256] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
+ 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, // '0'..'9'
+ 0, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, // 'A'..'F'
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
+ 0, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, // 'a'..'f'
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+
+string hex2str(string a) {
+ string b;
+ size_t num = a.size() / 2;
+ b.resize(num);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+ b[i] = (hex_value[a[i * 2] & 0xFF] << 4) + (hex_value[a[i * 2 + 1] & 0xFF]);
+ }
+ return b;
+}
+
+string rsa_key =
+ hex2str("30820275020100300d06092a864886f70d01010105000482025f3082025b"
+ "02010002818100c6095409047d8634812d5a218176e45c41d60a75b13901"
+ "f234226cffe776521c5a77b9e389417b71c0b6a44d13afe4e4a2805d46c9"
+ "da2935adb1ff0c1f24ea06e62b20d776430a4d435157233c6f916783c30e"
+ "310fcbd89b85c2d56771169785ac12bca244abda72bfb19fc44d27c81e1d"
+ "92de284f4061edfd99280745ea6d2502030100010281801be0f04d9cae37"
+ "18691f035338308e91564b55899ffb5084d2460e6630257e05b3ceab0297"
+ "2dfabcd6ce5f6ee2589eb67911ed0fac16e43a444b8c861e544a05933657"
+ "72f8baf6b22fc9e3c5f1024b063ac080a7b2234cf8aee8f6c47bbf4fd3ac"
+ "e7240290bef16c0b3f7f3cdd64ce3ab5912cf6e32f39ab188358afcccd80"
+ "81024100e4b49ef50f765d3b24dde01aceaaf130f2c76670a91a61ae08af"
+ "497b4a82be6dee8fcdd5e3f7ba1cfb1f0c926b88f88c92bfab137fba2285"
+ "227b83c342ff7c55024100ddabb5839c4c7f6bf3d4183231f005b31aa58a"
+ "ffdda5c79e4cce217f6bc930dbe563d480706c24e9ebfcab28a6cdefd324"
+ "b77e1bf7251b709092c24ff501fd91024023d4340eda3445d8cd26c14411"
+ "da6fdca63c1ccd4b80a98ad52b78cc8ad8beb2842c1d280405bc2f6c1bea"
+ "214a1d742ab996b35b63a82a5e470fa88dbf823cdd02401b7b57449ad30d"
+ "1518249a5f56bb98294d4b6ac12ffc86940497a5a5837a6cf946262b4945"
+ "26d328c11e1126380fde04c24f916dec250892db09a6d77cdba351024077"
+ "62cd8f4d050da56bd591adb515d24d7ccd32cca0d05f866d583514bd7324"
+ "d5f33645e8ed8b4a1cb3cc4a1d67987399f2a09f5b3fb68c88d5e5d90ac3"
+ "3492d6");
+
+string ec_256_key =
+ hex2str("308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30"
+ "6b0201010420737c2ecd7b8d1940bf2930aa9b4ed3ff941eed09366bc032"
+ "99986481f3a4d859a14403420004bf85d7720d07c25461683bc648b4778a"
+ "9a14dd8a024e3bdd8c7ddd9ab2b528bbc7aa1b51f14ebbbb0bd0ce21bcc4"
+ "1c6eb00083cf3376d11fd44949e0b2183bfe");
+
+string ec_521_key =
+ hex2str("3081EE020100301006072A8648CE3D020106052B810400230481D63081D3"
+ "02010104420011458C586DB5DAA92AFAB03F4FE46AA9D9C3CE9A9B7A006A"
+ "8384BEC4C78E8E9D18D7D08B5BCFA0E53C75B064AD51C449BAE0258D54B9"
+ "4B1E885DED08ED4FB25CE9A1818903818600040149EC11C6DF0FA122C6A9"
+ "AFD9754A4FA9513A627CA329E349535A5629875A8ADFBE27DCB932C05198"
+ "6377108D054C28C6F39B6F2C9AF81802F9F326B842FF2E5F3C00AB7635CF"
+ "B36157FC0882D574A10D839C1A0C049DC5E0D775E2EE50671A208431BB45"
+ "E78E70BEFE930DB34818EE4D5C26259F5C6B8E28A652950F9F88D7B4B2C9"
+ "D9");
+
+string ec_256_key_rfc5915 =
+ hex2str("308193020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107047930"
+ "770201010420782370a8c8ce5537baadd04dcff079c8158cfa9c67b818b3"
+ "8e8d21c9fa750c1da00a06082a8648ce3d030107a14403420004e2cc561e"
+ "e701da0ad0ef0d176bb0c919d42e79c393fdc1bd6c4010d85cf2cf8e68c9"
+ "05464666f98dad4f01573ba81078b3428570a439ba3229fbc026c550682f");
+
+string ec_256_key_sec1 =
+ hex2str("308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30"
+ "6b0201010420782370a8c8ce5537baadd04dcff079c8158cfa9c67b818b3"
+ "8e8d21c9fa750c1da14403420004e2cc561ee701da0ad0ef0d176bb0c919"
+ "d42e79c393fdc1bd6c4010d85cf2cf8e68c905464666f98dad4f01573ba8"
+ "1078b3428570a439ba3229fbc026c550682f");
+
+struct RSA_Delete {
+ void operator()(RSA* p) { RSA_free(p); }
+};
+
+/* TODO(seleneh) add attestation verification codes like verify_chain() and
+ * attestation tests after we decided on the keymint 1 attestation changes.
+ */
+
+std::string make_string(const uint8_t* data, size_t length) {
+ return std::string(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(data), length);
+}
+
+template <size_t N>
+std::string make_string(const uint8_t (&a)[N]) {
+ return make_string(a, N);
+}
+
+class AidlBuf : public vector<uint8_t> {
+ typedef vector<uint8_t> super;
+
+ public:
+ AidlBuf() {}
+ AidlBuf(const super& other) : super(other) {}
+ AidlBuf(super&& other) : super(std::move(other)) {}
+ explicit AidlBuf(const std::string& other) : AidlBuf() { *this = other; }
+
+ AidlBuf& operator=(const super& other) {
+ super::operator=(other);
+ return *this;
+ }
+
+ AidlBuf& operator=(super&& other) {
+ super::operator=(std::move(other));
+ return *this;
+ }
+
+ AidlBuf& operator=(const string& other) {
+ resize(other.size());
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < other.size(); ++i) {
+ (*this)[i] = static_cast<uint8_t>(other[i]);
+ }
+ return *this;
+ }
+
+ string to_string() const { return string(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(data()), size()); }
+};
+
+} // namespace
+
+class NewKeyGenerationTest : public KeyMintAidlTestBase {
+ protected:
+ void CheckBaseParams(const KeyCharacteristics& keyCharacteristics) {
+ // TODO(swillden): Distinguish which params should be in which auth list.
+
+ AuthorizationSet auths(keyCharacteristics.hardwareEnforced);
+ auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(keyCharacteristics.softwareEnforced));
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::VERIFY));
+
+ // Verify that App ID, App data and ROT are NOT included.
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST));
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_APPLICATION_ID));
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA));
+
+ // Check that some unexpected tags/values are NOT present.
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT));
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT));
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, 301U));
+
+ // Now check that unspecified, defaulted tags are correct.
+ EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_CREATION_DATETIME));
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version()))
+ << "OS version is " << os_version() << " key reported "
+ << auths.GetTagValue(TAG_OS_VERSION);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level()))
+ << "OS patch level is " << os_patch_level() << " key reported "
+ << auths.GetTagValue(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL);
+ }
+};
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.Rsa
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint can generate all required RSA key sizes, and that the resulting keys
+ * have correct characteristics.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, Rsa) {
+ for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(key_size, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+ CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+
+ AuthorizationSet crypto_params;
+ if (IsSecure()) {
+ crypto_params = key_characteristics.hardwareEnforced;
+ } else {
+ crypto_params = key_characteristics.softwareEnforced;
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+ << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 65537U));
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.NoInvalidRsaSizes
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint cannot generate any RSA key sizes that are designated as invalid.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, NoInvalidRsaSizes) {
+ for (auto key_size : InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(key_size, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.RsaNoDefaultSize
+ *
+ * Verifies that failing to specify a key size for RSA key generation returns
+ * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, RsaNoDefaultSize) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA)
+ .Authorization(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 3U)
+ .SigningKey()));
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.Ecdsa
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint can generate all required EC key sizes, and that the resulting keys
+ * have correct characteristics.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, Ecdsa) {
+ for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC)) {
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().EcdsaSigningKey(key_size).Digest(Digest::NONE),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+ CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+
+ AuthorizationSet crypto_params;
+ if (IsSecure()) {
+ crypto_params = key_characteristics.hardwareEnforced;
+ } else {
+ crypto_params = key_characteristics.softwareEnforced;
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+ << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaDefaultSize
+ *
+ * Verifies that failing to specify a key size for EC key generation returns
+ * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaDefaultSize) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC)
+ .SigningKey()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaInvalidSize
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying an invalid key size for EC key generation returns
+ * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaInvalidSize) {
+ for (auto key_size : InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC)) {
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().EcdsaSigningKey(key_size).Digest(Digest::NONE),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder().EcdsaSigningKey(190).Digest(Digest::NONE)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaMismatchKeySize
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying mismatched key size and curve for EC key generation returns
+ * INVALID_ARGUMENT.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaMismatchKeySize) {
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(224)
+ .Authorization(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaAllValidSizes
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint supports all required EC key sizes.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaAllValidSizes) {
+ auto valid_sizes = ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC);
+ for (size_t size : valid_sizes) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder().EcdsaSigningKey(size).Digest(Digest::NONE)))
+ << "Failed to generate size: " << size;
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaInvalidCurves
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint does not support any curve designated as unsupported.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaAllValidCurves) {
+ Digest digest;
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+ digest = Digest::SHA_2_256;
+ } else {
+ digest = Digest::SHA_2_512;
+ }
+ for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder().EcdsaSigningKey(curve).Digest(digest)))
+ << "Failed to generate key on curve: " << curve;
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.Hmac
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint supports all required digests, and that the resulting keys have correct
+ * characteristics.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, Hmac) {
+ for (auto digest : ValidDigests(false /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */)) {
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics;
+ constexpr size_t key_size = 128;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().HmacKey(key_size).Digest(digest).Authorization(
+ TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+ CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+
+ AuthorizationSet hardwareEnforced = key_characteristics.hardwareEnforced;
+ AuthorizationSet softwareEnforced = key_characteristics.softwareEnforced;
+ if (IsSecure()) {
+ EXPECT_TRUE(hardwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(hardwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+ << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_TRUE(softwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(softwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+ << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+ }
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.HmacCheckKeySizes
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint supports all key sizes, and rejects all invalid key sizes.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, HmacCheckKeySizes) {
+ for (size_t key_size = 0; key_size <= 512; ++key_size) {
+ if (key_size < 64 || key_size % 8 != 0) {
+ // To keep this test from being very slow, we only test a random fraction of
+ // non-byte key sizes. We test only ~10% of such cases. Since there are 392 of
+ // them, we expect to run ~40 of them in each run.
+ if (key_size % 8 == 0 || random() % 10 == 0) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .HmacKey(key_size)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 256)))
+ << "HMAC key size " << key_size << " invalid";
+ }
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .HmacKey(key_size)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 256)))
+ << "Failed to generate HMAC key of size " << key_size;
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.HmacCheckMinMacLengths
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint supports all required MAC lengths and rejects all invalid lengths. This
+ * test is probabilistic in order to keep the runtime down, but any failure prints out the
+ * specific MAC length that failed, so reproducing a failed run will be easy.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, HmacCheckMinMacLengths) {
+ for (size_t min_mac_length = 0; min_mac_length <= 256; ++min_mac_length) {
+ if (min_mac_length < 64 || min_mac_length % 8 != 0) {
+ // To keep this test from being very long, we only test a random fraction of
+ // non-byte lengths. We test only ~10% of such cases. Since there are 172 of them,
+ // we expect to run ~17 of them in each run.
+ if (min_mac_length % 8 == 0 || random() % 10 == 0) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MIN_MAC_LENGTH,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .HmacKey(128)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, min_mac_length)))
+ << "HMAC min mac length " << min_mac_length << " invalid.";
+ }
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .HmacKey(128)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, min_mac_length)))
+ << "Failed to generate HMAC key with min MAC length " << min_mac_length;
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.HmacMultipleDigests
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint rejects HMAC key generation with multiple specified digest algorithms.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, HmacMultipleDigests) {
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .HmacKey(128)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA1)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.HmacDigestNone
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint rejects HMAC key generation with no digest or Digest::NONE
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, HmacDigestNone) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder().HmacKey(128).Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH,
+ 128)));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .HmacKey(128)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(NewKeyGenerationTest);
+
+typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase SigningOperationsTest;
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that raw RSA signature operations succeed.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaSuccess) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)));
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+ string signature = SignMessage(
+ message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaUseRequiresCorrectAppIdAppData
+ *
+ * Verifies that using an RSA key requires the correct app ID/data.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaUseRequiresCorrectAppIdAppData) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, "clientid")
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, "appdata")));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ AbortIfNeeded();
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, "clientid")));
+ AbortIfNeeded();
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, "appdata")));
+ AbortIfNeeded();
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, "appdata")
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, "clientid")));
+ AbortIfNeeded();
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaPssSha256Success
+ *
+ * Verifies that RSA-PSS signature operations succeed.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaPssSha256Success) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)));
+ // Use large message, which won't work without digesting.
+ string message(1024, 'a');
+ string signature = SignMessage(
+ message,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaPaddingNoneDoesNotAllowOther
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint rejects signature operations that specify a padding mode when the key
+ * supports only unpadded operations.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaPaddingNoneDoesNotAllowOther) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+ string signature;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.NoUserConfirmation
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint rejects signing operations for keys with
+ * TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED and no valid confirmation token
+ * presented.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, NoUserConfirmation) {
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(1024, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED)));
+
+ const string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ string signature;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::NO_USER_CONFIRMATION, Finish(message, &signature));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaPkcs1Sha256Success
+ *
+ * Verifies that digested RSA-PKCS1 signature operations succeed.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaPkcs1Sha256Success) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
+ string message(1024, 'a');
+ string signature = SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaPkcs1NoDigestSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that undigested RSA-PKCS1 signature operations succeed.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaPkcs1NoDigestSuccess) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
+ string message(53, 'a');
+ string signature = SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaPkcs1NoDigestTooLarge
+ *
+ * Verifies that undigested RSA-PKCS1 signature operations fail with the correct error code when
+ * given a too-long message.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaPkcs1NoDigestTooLong) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
+ string message(257, 'a');
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
+ string signature;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, &signature));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaPssSha512TooSmallKey
+ *
+ * Verifies that undigested RSA-PSS signature operations fail with the correct error code when
+ * used with a key that is too small for the message.
+ *
+ * A PSS-padded message is of length salt_size + digest_size + 16 (sizes in bits), and the
+ * keymint specification requires that salt_size == digest_size, so the message will be
+ * digest_size * 2 +
+ * 16. Such a message can only be signed by a given key if the key is at least that size. This
+ * test uses SHA512, which has a digest_size == 512, so the message size is 1040 bits, too large
+ * for a 1024-bit key.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaPssSha512TooSmallKey) {
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(1024, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_512)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_512)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaNoPaddingTooLong
+ *
+ * Verifies that raw RSA signature operations fail with the correct error code when
+ * given a too-long message.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaNoPaddingTooLong) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
+ // One byte too long
+ string message(2048 / 8 + 1, 'a');
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
+ string result;
+ ErrorCode finish_error_code = Finish(message, &result);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(finish_error_code == ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ||
+ finish_error_code == ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+
+ // Very large message that should exceed the transfer buffer size of any reasonable TEE.
+ message = string(128 * 1024, 'a');
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
+ finish_error_code = Finish(message, &result);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(finish_error_code == ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ||
+ finish_error_code == ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaAbort
+ *
+ * Verifies that operations can be aborted correctly. Uses an RSA signing operation for the
+ * test, but the behavior should be algorithm and purpose-independent.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaAbort) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Abort());
+
+ // Another abort should fail
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE, Abort());
+
+ // Set to sentinel, so TearDown() doesn't try to abort again.
+ op_.clear();
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaUnsupportedPadding
+ *
+ * Verifies that RSA operations fail with the correct error (but key gen succeeds) when used
+ * with a padding mode inappropriate for RSA.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaUnsupportedPadding) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256 /* supported digest */)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
+ ASSERT_EQ(
+ ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaPssNoDigest
+ *
+ * Verifies that RSA PSS operations fail when no digest is used. PSS requires a digest.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaNoDigest) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)));
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaPssNoDigest
+ *
+ * Verifies that RSA operations fail when no padding mode is specified. PaddingMode::NONE is
+ * supported in some cases (as validated in other tests), but a mode must be specified.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaNoPadding) {
+ // Padding must be specified
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .SigningKey()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)));
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaShortMessage
+ *
+ * Verifies that raw RSA signatures succeed with a message shorter than the key size.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaTooShortMessage) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ // Barely shorter
+ string message(2048 / 8 - 1, 'a');
+ SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
+
+ // Much shorter
+ message = "a";
+ SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaSignWithEncryptionKey
+ *
+ * Verifies that RSA encryption keys cannot be used to sign.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaSignWithEncryptionKey) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaSignTooLargeMessage
+ *
+ * Verifies that attempting a raw signature of a message which is the same length as the key,
+ * but numerically larger than the public modulus, fails with the correct error.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaSignTooLargeMessage) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ // Largest possible message will always be larger than the public modulus.
+ string message(2048 / 8, static_cast<char>(0xff));
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ string signature;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT, Finish(message, &signature));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.EcdsaAllSizesAndHashes
+ *
+ * Verifies that ECDSA operations succeed with all possible key sizes and hashes.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, EcdsaAllSizesAndHashes) {
+ for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC)) {
+ for (auto digest : ValidDigests(false /* withNone */, false /* withMD5 */)) {
+ ErrorCode error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(key_size)
+ .Digest(digest));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error) << "Failed to generate ECDSA key with size " << key_size
+ << " and digest " << digest;
+ if (error != ErrorCode::OK) continue;
+
+ string message(1024, 'a');
+ if (digest == Digest::NONE) message.resize(key_size / 8);
+ SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest));
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.EcdsaAllCurves
+ *
+ * Verifies that ECDSA operations succeed with all possible curves.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, EcdsaAllCurves) {
+ for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
+ ErrorCode error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error) << "Failed to generate ECDSA key with curve " << curve;
+ if (error != ErrorCode::OK) continue;
+
+ string message(1024, 'a');
+ SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256));
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.EcdsaNoDigestHugeData
+ *
+ * Verifies that ECDSA operations support very large messages, even without digesting. This
+ * should work because ECDSA actually only signs the leftmost L_n bits of the message, however
+ * large it may be. Not using digesting is a bad idea, but in some cases digesting is done by
+ * the framework.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, EcdsaNoDigestHugeData) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)));
+ string message(1 * 1024, 'a');
+ SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.EcUseRequiresCorrectAppIdAppData
+ *
+ * Verifies that using an EC key requires the correct app ID/data.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, EcUseRequiresCorrectAppIdAppData) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, "clientid")
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, "appdata")));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE)));
+ AbortIfNeeded();
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, "clientid")));
+ AbortIfNeeded();
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, "appdata")));
+ AbortIfNeeded();
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, "appdata")
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, "clientid")));
+ AbortIfNeeded();
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.AesEcbSign
+ *
+ * Verifies that attempts to use AES keys to sign fail in the correct way.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, AesEcbSign) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .SigningKey()
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)));
+
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSet() /* in_params */, &out_params));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY, AuthorizationSet() /* in_params */, &out_params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.HmacAllDigests
+ *
+ * Verifies that HMAC works with all digests.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, HmacAllDigests) {
+ for (auto digest : ValidDigests(false /* withNone */, false /* withMD5 */)) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .HmacKey(128)
+ .Digest(digest)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 160)))
+ << "Failed to create HMAC key with digest " << digest;
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+ string signature = MacMessage(message, digest, 160);
+ EXPECT_EQ(160U / 8U, signature.size())
+ << "Failed to sign with HMAC key with digest " << digest;
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.HmacSha256TooLargeMacLength
+ *
+ * Verifies that HMAC fails in the correct way when asked to generate a MAC larger than the
+ * digest size.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, HmacSha256TooLargeMacLength) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .HmacKey(128)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 256)));
+ AuthorizationSet output_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MAC_LENGTH, Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 264),
+ &output_params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.HmacSha256TooSmallMacLength
+ *
+ * Verifies that HMAC fails in the correct way when asked to generate a MAC smaller than the
+ * specified minimum MAC length.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, HmacSha256TooSmallMacLength) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .HmacKey(128)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+ AuthorizationSet output_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_MAC_LENGTH, Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 120),
+ &output_params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.HmacRfc4231TestCase3
+ *
+ * Validates against the test vectors from RFC 4231 test case 3.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, HmacRfc4231TestCase3) {
+ string key(20, 0xaa);
+ string message(50, 0xdd);
+ uint8_t sha_224_expected[] = {
+ 0x7f, 0xb3, 0xcb, 0x35, 0x88, 0xc6, 0xc1, 0xf6, 0xff, 0xa9, 0x69, 0x4d, 0x7d, 0x6a,
+ 0xd2, 0x64, 0x93, 0x65, 0xb0, 0xc1, 0xf6, 0x5d, 0x69, 0xd1, 0xec, 0x83, 0x33, 0xea,
+ };
+ uint8_t sha_256_expected[] = {
+ 0x77, 0x3e, 0xa9, 0x1e, 0x36, 0x80, 0x0e, 0x46, 0x85, 0x4d, 0xb8,
+ 0xeb, 0xd0, 0x91, 0x81, 0xa7, 0x29, 0x59, 0x09, 0x8b, 0x3e, 0xf8,
+ 0xc1, 0x22, 0xd9, 0x63, 0x55, 0x14, 0xce, 0xd5, 0x65, 0xfe,
+ };
+ uint8_t sha_384_expected[] = {
+ 0x88, 0x06, 0x26, 0x08, 0xd3, 0xe6, 0xad, 0x8a, 0x0a, 0xa2, 0xac, 0xe0,
+ 0x14, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x6f, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x35, 0xd9, 0x47, 0xac, 0x9f, 0xeb,
+ 0xe8, 0x3e, 0xf4, 0xe5, 0x59, 0x66, 0x14, 0x4b, 0x2a, 0x5a, 0xb3, 0x9d,
+ 0xc1, 0x38, 0x14, 0xb9, 0x4e, 0x3a, 0xb6, 0xe1, 0x01, 0xa3, 0x4f, 0x27,
+ };
+ uint8_t sha_512_expected[] = {
+ 0xfa, 0x73, 0xb0, 0x08, 0x9d, 0x56, 0xa2, 0x84, 0xef, 0xb0, 0xf0, 0x75, 0x6c,
+ 0x89, 0x0b, 0xe9, 0xb1, 0xb5, 0xdb, 0xdd, 0x8e, 0xe8, 0x1a, 0x36, 0x55, 0xf8,
+ 0x3e, 0x33, 0xb2, 0x27, 0x9d, 0x39, 0xbf, 0x3e, 0x84, 0x82, 0x79, 0xa7, 0x22,
+ 0xc8, 0x06, 0xb4, 0x85, 0xa4, 0x7e, 0x67, 0xc8, 0x07, 0xb9, 0x46, 0xa3, 0x37,
+ 0xbe, 0xe8, 0x94, 0x26, 0x74, 0x27, 0x88, 0x59, 0xe1, 0x32, 0x92, 0xfb,
+ };
+
+ CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_256, make_string(sha_256_expected));
+ if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+ CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_224, make_string(sha_224_expected));
+ CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_384, make_string(sha_384_expected));
+ CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_512, make_string(sha_512_expected));
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.HmacRfc4231TestCase5
+ *
+ * Validates against the test vectors from RFC 4231 test case 5.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, HmacRfc4231TestCase5) {
+ string key(20, 0x0c);
+ string message = "Test With Truncation";
+
+ uint8_t sha_224_expected[] = {
+ 0x0e, 0x2a, 0xea, 0x68, 0xa9, 0x0c, 0x8d, 0x37,
+ 0xc9, 0x88, 0xbc, 0xdb, 0x9f, 0xca, 0x6f, 0xa8,
+ };
+ uint8_t sha_256_expected[] = {
+ 0xa3, 0xb6, 0x16, 0x74, 0x73, 0x10, 0x0e, 0xe0,
+ 0x6e, 0x0c, 0x79, 0x6c, 0x29, 0x55, 0x55, 0x2b,
+ };
+ uint8_t sha_384_expected[] = {
+ 0x3a, 0xbf, 0x34, 0xc3, 0x50, 0x3b, 0x2a, 0x23,
+ 0xa4, 0x6e, 0xfc, 0x61, 0x9b, 0xae, 0xf8, 0x97,
+ };
+ uint8_t sha_512_expected[] = {
+ 0x41, 0x5f, 0xad, 0x62, 0x71, 0x58, 0x0a, 0x53,
+ 0x1d, 0x41, 0x79, 0xbc, 0x89, 0x1d, 0x87, 0xa6,
+ };
+
+ CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_256, make_string(sha_256_expected));
+ if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+ CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_224, make_string(sha_224_expected));
+ CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_384, make_string(sha_384_expected));
+ CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_512, make_string(sha_512_expected));
+ }
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(SigningOperationsTest);
+
+typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase VerificationOperationsTest;
+
+/*
+ * VerificationOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that a simple RSA signature/verification sequence succeeds.
+ */
+TEST_P(VerificationOperationsTest, RsaSuccess) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+ string signature = SignMessage(
+ message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
+ VerifyMessage(message, signature,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
+}
+
+/*
+ * VerificationOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies RSA signature/verification for all padding modes and digests.
+ */
+TEST_P(VerificationOperationsTest, RsaAllPaddingsAndDigests) {
+ auto authorizations = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(ValidDigests(true /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */))
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN);
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(authorizations));
+
+ string message(128, 'a');
+ string corrupt_message(message);
+ ++corrupt_message[corrupt_message.size() / 2];
+
+ for (auto padding :
+ {PaddingMode::NONE, PaddingMode::RSA_PSS, PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN}) {
+ for (auto digest : ValidDigests(true /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */)) {
+ if (padding == PaddingMode::NONE && digest != Digest::NONE) {
+ // Digesting only makes sense with padding.
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (padding == PaddingMode::RSA_PSS && digest == Digest::NONE) {
+ // PSS requires digesting.
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ string signature =
+ SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding));
+ VerifyMessage(message, signature,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding));
+
+ /* TODO(seleneh) add exportkey tests back later when we have decided on
+ * the new api.
+ if (digest != Digest::NONE) {
+ // Verify with OpenSSL.
+ vector<uint8_t> pubkey;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ExportKey(KeyFormat::X509, &pubkey));
+
+ const uint8_t* p = pubkey.data();
+ EVP_PKEY_Ptr pkey(d2i_PUBKEY(nullptr, &p, pubkey.size()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(pkey.get());
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX digest_ctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&digest_ctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX* pkey_ctx;
+ const EVP_MD* md = openssl_digest(digest);
+ ASSERT_NE(md, nullptr);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&digest_ctx, &pkey_ctx, md,
+ nullptr, pkey.get()));
+
+ switch (padding) {
+ case PaddingMode::RSA_PSS:
+ EXPECT_GT(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkey_ctx,
+ RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING), 0); EXPECT_GT(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkey_ctx,
+ EVP_MD_size(md)), 0); break; case PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN:
+ // PKCS1 is the default; don't need to set anything.
+ break;
+ default:
+ FAIL();
+ break;
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&digest_ctx, message.data(),
+ message.size())); EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&digest_ctx,
+ reinterpret_cast<const
+ uint8_t*>(signature.data()), signature.size())); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&digest_ctx);
+ }
+ */
+
+ // Corrupt signature shouldn't verify.
+ string corrupt_signature(signature);
+ ++corrupt_signature[corrupt_signature.size() / 2];
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding)));
+ string result;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(message, corrupt_signature, &result));
+
+ // Corrupt message shouldn't verify
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding)));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(corrupt_message, signature, &result));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * VerificationOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies ECDSA signature/verification for all digests and curves.
+ */
+TEST_P(VerificationOperationsTest, EcdsaAllDigestsAndCurves) {
+ auto digests = ValidDigests(true /* withNone */, false /* withMD5 */);
+
+ string message = "1234567890";
+ string corrupt_message = "2234567890";
+ for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
+ ErrorCode error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
+ .Digest(digests));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error) << "Failed to generate key for EC curve " << curve;
+ if (error != ErrorCode::OK) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ for (auto digest : digests) {
+ string signature = SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest));
+ VerifyMessage(message, signature, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest));
+
+ /* TODO(seleneh) add exportkey tests back later when we have decided on
+ * the new api.
+
+ // Verify with OpenSSL
+ if (digest != Digest::NONE) {
+ vector<uint8_t> pubkey;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ExportKey(KeyFormat::X509, &pubkey))
+ << curve << ' ' << digest;
+
+ const uint8_t* p = pubkey.data();
+ EVP_PKEY_Ptr pkey(d2i_PUBKEY(nullptr, &p, pubkey.size()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(pkey.get());
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX digest_ctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&digest_ctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX* pkey_ctx;
+ const EVP_MD* md = openssl_digest(digest);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&digest_ctx, &pkey_ctx, md,
+ nullptr, pkey.get()))
+ << curve << ' ' << digest;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&digest_ctx, message.data(),
+ message.size()))
+ << curve << ' ' << digest;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(1,
+ EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&digest_ctx,
+ reinterpret_cast<const
+ uint8_t*>(signature.data()), signature.size()))
+ << curve << ' ' << digest;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&digest_ctx);
+ }
+ */
+ // Corrupt signature shouldn't verify.
+ string corrupt_signature(signature);
+ ++corrupt_signature[corrupt_signature.size() / 2];
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest)))
+ << curve << ' ' << digest;
+
+ string result;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(message, corrupt_signature, &result))
+ << curve << ' ' << digest;
+
+ // Corrupt message shouldn't verify
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest)))
+ << curve << ' ' << digest;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(corrupt_message, signature, &result))
+ << curve << ' ' << digest;
+ }
+
+ auto rc = DeleteKey();
+ ASSERT_TRUE(rc == ErrorCode::OK || rc == ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * VerificationOperationsTest.HmacSigningKeyCannotVerify
+ *
+ * Verifies HMAC signing and verification, but that a signing key cannot be used to verify.
+ */
+TEST_P(VerificationOperationsTest, HmacSigningKeyCannotVerify) {
+ string key_material = "HelloThisIsAKey";
+
+ vector<uint8_t> signing_key, verification_key;
+ KeyCharacteristics signing_key_chars, verification_key_chars;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 160),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, key_material, &signing_key, &signing_key_chars));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::VERIFY)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 160),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, key_material, &verification_key, &verification_key_chars));
+
+ string message = "This is a message.";
+ string signature = SignMessage(
+ signing_key, message,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 160));
+
+ // Signing key should not work.
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY, signing_key,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256), &out_params));
+
+ // Verification key should work.
+ VerifyMessage(verification_key, message, signature,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256));
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&signing_key);
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&verification_key);
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(VerificationOperationsTest);
+
+typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase ExportKeyTest;
+
+/*
+ * ExportKeyTest.RsaUnsupportedKeyFormat
+ *
+ * Verifies that attempting to export RSA keys in PKCS#8 format fails with the correct error.
+ */
+// TODO(seleneh) add ExportKey to GenerateKey
+// check result
+
+class ImportKeyTest : public KeyMintAidlTestBase {
+ public:
+ template <TagType tag_type, Tag tag, typename ValueT>
+ void CheckCryptoParam(TypedTag<tag_type, tag> ttag, ValueT expected) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("CheckCryptoParam");
+ if (IsSecure()) {
+ EXPECT_TRUE(contains(key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced, ttag, expected))
+ << "Tag " << tag << " with value " << expected << " not found";
+ EXPECT_FALSE(contains(key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced, ttag))
+ << "Tag " << tag << " found";
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_TRUE(contains(key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced, ttag, expected))
+ << "Tag " << tag << " with value " << expected << " not found";
+ EXPECT_FALSE(contains(key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced, ttag))
+ << "Tag " << tag << " found";
+ }
+ }
+
+ void CheckOrigin() {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("CheckOrigin");
+ if (IsSecure()) {
+ EXPECT_TRUE(contains(key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced, TAG_ORIGIN,
+ KeyOrigin::IMPORTED));
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_TRUE(contains(key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced, TAG_ORIGIN,
+ KeyOrigin::IMPORTED));
+ }
+ }
+};
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.RsaSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing and using an RSA key pair works correctly.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, RsaSuccess) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaSigningKey(1024, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS),
+ KeyFormat::PKCS8, rsa_key));
+
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 1024U);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 65537U);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::RSA_PSS);
+ CheckOrigin();
+
+ string message(1024 / 8, 'a');
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS);
+ string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
+ VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.RsaKeySizeMismatch
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing an RSA key pair with a size that doesn't match the key fails in the
+ * correct way.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, RsaKeySizeMismatch) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH,
+ ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048 /* Doesn't match key */, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
+ KeyFormat::PKCS8, rsa_key));
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.RsaPublicExponentMismatch
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing an RSA key pair with a public exponent that doesn't match the key
+ * fails in the correct way.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, RsaPublicExponentMismatch) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH,
+ ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(1024, 3 /* Doesn't match key */)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
+ KeyFormat::PKCS8, rsa_key));
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.EcdsaSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing and using an ECDSA P-256 key pair works correctly.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaSuccess) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256),
+ KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key));
+
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 256U);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256);
+
+ CheckOrigin();
+
+ string message(32, 'a');
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
+ string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
+ VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.EcdsaP256RFC5915Success
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing and using an ECDSA P-256 key pair encoded using RFC5915 works
+ * correctly.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaP256RFC5915Success) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256),
+ KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key_rfc5915));
+
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 256U);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256);
+
+ CheckOrigin();
+
+ string message(32, 'a');
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
+ string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
+ VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.EcdsaP256SEC1Success
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing and using an ECDSA P-256 key pair encoded using SEC1 works correctly.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaP256SEC1Success) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256),
+ KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key_sec1));
+
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 256U);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256);
+
+ CheckOrigin();
+
+ string message(32, 'a');
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
+ string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
+ VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.Ecdsa521Success
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing and using an ECDSA P-521 key pair works correctly.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, Ecdsa521Success) {
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(521)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256),
+ KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_521_key));
+
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 521U);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_521);
+ CheckOrigin();
+
+ string message(32, 'a');
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
+ string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
+ VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.EcdsaSizeMismatch
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing an ECDSA key pair with a size that doesn't match the key fails in the
+ * correct way.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaSizeMismatch) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH,
+ ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(224 /* Doesn't match key */)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE),
+ KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key));
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.EcdsaCurveMismatch
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing an ECDSA key pair with a curve that doesn't match the key fails in
+ * the correct way.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaCurveMismatch) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH,
+ ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_224 /* Doesn't match key */)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE),
+ KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key));
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.AesSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing and using an AES key works.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, AesSuccess) {
+ string key = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(key.size() * 8)
+ .EcbMode()
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, key));
+
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::AES);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 128U);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB);
+ CheckOrigin();
+
+ string message = "Hello World!";
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.AesSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing and using an HMAC key works.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, HmacKeySuccess) {
+ string key = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .HmacKey(key.size() * 8)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 256),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, key));
+
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 128U);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
+ CheckOrigin();
+
+ string message = "Hello World!";
+ string signature = MacMessage(message, Digest::SHA_2_256, 256);
+ VerifyMessage(message, signature, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256));
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(ImportKeyTest);
+
+auto wrapped_key = hex2str(
+ "3082017902010004820100934bf94e2aa28a3f83c9f79297250262fbe3276b5a1c91159bbfa3ef8957aac8"
+ "4b59b30b455a79c2973480823d8b3863c3deef4a8e243590268d80e18751a0e130f67ce6a1ace9f79b95e0"
+ "97474febc981195b1d13a69086c0863f66a7b7fdb48792227b1ac5e2489febdf087ab5486483033a6f001c"
+ "a5d1ec1e27f5c30f4cec2642074a39ae68aee552e196627a8e3d867e67a8c01b11e75f13cca0a97ab668b5"
+ "0cda07a8ecb7cd8e3dd7009c9636534f6f239cffe1fc8daa466f78b676c7119efb96bce4e69ca2a25d0b34"
+ "ed9c3ff999b801597d5220e307eaa5bee507fb94d1fa69f9e519b2de315bac92c36f2ea1fa1df4478c0dde"
+ "deae8c70e0233cd098040cd796b02c370f1fa4cc0124f1302e0201033029a1083106020100020101a20302"
+ "0120a30402020100a4053103020101a6053103020140bf83770205000420ccd540855f833a5e1480bfd2d3"
+ "6faf3aeee15df5beabe2691bc82dde2a7aa910041064c9f689c60ff6223ab6e6999e0eb6e5");
+
+auto wrapped_key_masked = hex2str(
+ "3082017902010004820100aad93ed5924f283b4bb5526fbe7a1412f9d9749ec30db9062b29e574a8546f33"
+ "c88732452f5b8e6a391ee76c39ed1712c61d8df6213dec1cffbc17a8c6d04c7b30893d8daa9b2015213e21"
+ "946821553207f8f9931c4caba23ed3bee28b36947e47f10e0a5c3dc51c988a628daad3e5e1f4005e79c2d5"
+ "a96c284b4b8d7e4948f331e5b85dd5a236f85579f3ea1d1b848487470bdb0ab4f81a12bee42c99fe0df4be"
+ "e3759453e69ad1d68a809ce06b949f7694a990429b2fe81e066ff43e56a21602db70757922a4bcc23ab89f"
+ "1e35da77586775f423e519c2ea394caf48a28d0c8020f1dcf6b3a68ec246f615ae96dae9a079b1f6eb9590"
+ "33c1af5c125fd94168040c6d9721d08589581ab49204a3302e0201033029a1083106020100020101a20302"
+ "0120a30402020100a4053103020101a6053103020140bf83770205000420a61c6e247e25b3e6e69aa78eb0"
+ "3c2d4ac20d1f99a9a024a76f35c8e2cab9b68d04102560c70109ae67c030f00b98b512a670");
+
+auto wrapping_key = hex2str(
+ "308204be020100300d06092a864886f70d0101010500048204a8308204a40201000282010100aec367931d"
+ "8900ce56b0067f7d70e1fc653f3f34d194c1fed50018fb43db937b06e673a837313d56b1c725150a3fef86"
+ "acbddc41bb759c2854eae32d35841efb5c18d82bc90a1cb5c1d55adf245b02911f0b7cda88c421ff0ebafe"
+ "7c0d23be312d7bd5921ffaea1347c157406fef718f682643e4e5d33c6703d61c0cf7ac0bf4645c11f5c137"
+ "4c3886427411c449796792e0bef75dec858a2123c36753e02a95a96d7c454b504de385a642e0dfc3e60ac3"
+ "a7ee4991d0d48b0172a95f9536f02ba13cecccb92b727db5c27e5b2f5cec09600b286af5cf14c42024c61d"
+ "dfe71c2a8d7458f185234cb00e01d282f10f8fc6721d2aed3f4833cca2bd8fa62821dd5502030100010282"
+ "0100431447b6251908112b1ee76f99f3711a52b6630960046c2de70de188d833f8b8b91e4d785caeeeaf4f"
+ "0f74414e2cda40641f7fe24f14c67a88959bdb27766df9e710b630a03adc683b5d2c43080e52bee71e9eae"
+ "b6de297a5fea1072070d181c822bccff087d63c940ba8a45f670feb29fb4484d1c95e6d2579ba02aae0a00"
+ "900c3ebf490e3d2cd7ee8d0e20c536e4dc5a5097272888cddd7e91f228b1c4d7474c55b8fcd618c4a957bb"
+ "ddd5ad7407cc312d8d98a5caf7e08f4a0d6b45bb41c652659d5a5ba05b663737a8696281865ba20fbdd7f8"
+ "51e6c56e8cbe0ddbbf24dc03b2d2cb4c3d540fb0af52e034a2d06698b128e5f101e3b51a34f8d8b4f86181"
+ "02818100de392e18d682c829266cc3454e1d6166242f32d9a1d10577753e904ea7d08bff841be5bac82a16"
+ "4c5970007047b8c517db8f8f84e37bd5988561bdf503d4dc2bdb38f885434ae42c355f725c9a60f91f0788"
+ "e1f1a97223b524b5357fdf72e2f696bab7d78e32bf92ba8e1864eab1229e91346130748a6e3c124f9149d7"
+ "1c743502818100c95387c0f9d35f137b57d0d65c397c5e21cc251e47008ed62a542409c8b6b6ac7f8967b3"
+ "863ca645fcce49582a9aa17349db6c4a95affdae0dae612e1afac99ed39a2d934c880440aed8832f984316"
+ "3a47f27f392199dc1202f9a0f9bd08308007cb1e4e7f58309366a7de25f7c3c9b880677c068e1be936e812"
+ "88815252a8a102818057ff8ca1895080b2cae486ef0adfd791fb0235c0b8b36cd6c136e52e4085f4ea5a06"
+ "3212a4f105a3764743e53281988aba073f6e0027298e1c4378556e0efca0e14ece1af76ad0b030f27af6f0"
+ "ab35fb73a060d8b1a0e142fa2647e93b32e36d8282ae0a4de50ab7afe85500a16f43a64719d6e2b9439823"
+ "719cd08bcd03178102818100ba73b0bb28e3f81e9bd1c568713b101241acc607976c4ddccc90e65b6556ca"
+ "31516058f92b6e09f3b160ff0e374ec40d78ae4d4979fde6ac06a1a400c61dd31254186af30b22c10582a8"
+ "a43e34fe949c5f3b9755bae7baa7b7b7a6bd03b38cef55c86885fc6c1978b9cee7ef33da507c9df6b9277c"
+ "ff1e6aaa5d57aca528466102818100c931617c77829dfb1270502be9195c8f2830885f57dba869536811e6"
+ "864236d0c4736a0008a145af36b8357a7c3d139966d04c4e00934ea1aede3bb6b8ec841dc95e3f579751e2"
+ "bfdfe27ae778983f959356210723287b0affcc9f727044d48c373f1babde0724fa17a4fd4da0902c7c9b9b"
+ "f27ba61be6ad02dfddda8f4e6822");
+
+string zero_masking_key =
+ hex2str("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000");
+string masking_key = hex2str("D796B02C370F1FA4CC0124F14EC8CBEBE987E825246265050F399A51FD477DFC");
+
+class ImportWrappedKeyTest : public KeyMintAidlTestBase {};
+
+TEST_P(ImportWrappedKeyTest, Success) {
+ auto wrapping_key_desc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
+ .Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::WRAP_KEY);
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ ImportWrappedKey(wrapped_key, wrapping_key, wrapping_key_desc, zero_masking_key,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)));
+
+ string message = "Hello World!";
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+TEST_P(ImportWrappedKeyTest, SuccessMasked) {
+ auto wrapping_key_desc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
+ .Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::WRAP_KEY);
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ ImportWrappedKey(wrapped_key_masked, wrapping_key, wrapping_key_desc, masking_key,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)));
+}
+
+TEST_P(ImportWrappedKeyTest, WrongMask) {
+ auto wrapping_key_desc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
+ .Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::WRAP_KEY);
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(
+ ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED,
+ ImportWrappedKey(wrapped_key_masked, wrapping_key, wrapping_key_desc, zero_masking_key,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)));
+}
+
+TEST_P(ImportWrappedKeyTest, WrongPurpose) {
+ auto wrapping_key_desc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP);
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(
+ ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE,
+ ImportWrappedKey(wrapped_key_masked, wrapping_key, wrapping_key_desc, zero_masking_key,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)));
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(ImportWrappedKeyTest);
+
+typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase EncryptionOperationsTest;
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaNoPaddingSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that raw RSA encryption works.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaNoPaddingSuccess) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ string message = string(2048 / 8, 'a');
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext1.size());
+
+ string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext2.size());
+
+ // Unpadded RSA is deterministic
+ EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaNoPaddingShortMessage
+ *
+ * Verifies that raw RSA encryption of short messages works.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaNoPaddingShortMessage) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ string message = "1";
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext.size());
+
+ string expected_plaintext = string(2048U / 8 - 1, 0) + message;
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(expected_plaintext, plaintext);
+
+ // Degenerate case, encrypting a numeric 1 yields 0x00..01 as the ciphertext.
+ message = static_cast<char>(1);
+ ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext.size());
+ EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext, string(2048U / 8 - 1, 0) + message);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaNoPaddingTooLong
+ *
+ * Verifies that raw RSA encryption of too-long messages fails in the expected way.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaNoPaddingTooLong) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ string message(2048 / 8 + 1, 'a');
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+
+ string result;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, &result));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaNoPaddingTooLarge
+ *
+ * Verifies that raw RSA encryption of too-large (numerically) messages fails in the expected
+ * way.
+ */
+// TODO(seleneh) add RsaNoPaddingTooLarge test back after decided and implemented new
+// version of ExportKey inside generateKey
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations work, with all digests.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepSuccess) {
+ auto digests = ValidDigests(false /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */);
+
+ size_t key_size = 2048; // Need largish key for SHA-512 test.
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(key_size, 65537)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
+ .Digest(digests)));
+
+ string message = "Hello";
+
+ for (auto digest : digests) {
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP);
+ string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ if (HasNonfatalFailure()) std::cout << "-->" << digest << std::endl;
+ EXPECT_EQ(key_size / 8, ciphertext1.size());
+
+ string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(key_size / 8, ciphertext2.size());
+
+ // OAEP randomizes padding so every result should be different (with astronomically high
+ // probability).
+ EXPECT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
+
+ string plaintext1 = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext1) << "RSA-OAEP failed with digest " << digest;
+ string plaintext2 = DecryptMessage(ciphertext2, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext2) << "RSA-OAEP failed with digest " << digest;
+
+ // Decrypting corrupted ciphertext should fail.
+ size_t offset_to_corrupt = random() % ciphertext1.size();
+ char corrupt_byte;
+ do {
+ corrupt_byte = static_cast<char>(random() % 256);
+ } while (corrupt_byte == ciphertext1[offset_to_corrupt]);
+ ciphertext1[offset_to_corrupt] = corrupt_byte;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
+ string result;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR, Finish(ciphertext1, &result));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, result.size());
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepInvalidDigest
+ *
+ * Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to operate
+ * without a digest.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepInvalidDigest) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)));
+ string message = "Hello World!";
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP).Digest(Digest::NONE);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepInvalidDigest
+ *
+ * Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to decrypt
+ * with a different digest than was used to encrypt.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepDecryptWithWrongDigest) {
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(1024, 65537)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_224, Digest::SHA_2_256)));
+ string message = "Hello World!";
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(
+ message,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_224).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)));
+ string result;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR, Finish(ciphertext, &result));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, result.size());
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepTooLarge
+ *
+ * Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to encrypt a
+ * too-large message.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepTooLarge) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)));
+ constexpr size_t digest_size = 256 /* SHA_2_256 */ / 8;
+ constexpr size_t oaep_overhead = 2 * digest_size + 2;
+ string message(2048 / 8 - oaep_overhead + 1, 'a');
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)));
+ string result;
+ ErrorCode error = Finish(message, &result);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(error == ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH || error == ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, result.size());
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaPkcs1Success
+ *
+ * Verifies that RSA PKCS encryption/decrypts works.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaPkcs1Success) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT)));
+
+ string message = "Hello World!";
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT);
+ string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext1.size());
+
+ string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext2.size());
+
+ // PKCS1 v1.5 randomizes padding so every result should be different.
+ EXPECT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
+
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+
+ // Decrypting corrupted ciphertext should fail.
+ size_t offset_to_corrupt = random() % ciphertext1.size();
+ char corrupt_byte;
+ do {
+ corrupt_byte = static_cast<char>(random() % 256);
+ } while (corrupt_byte == ciphertext1[offset_to_corrupt]);
+ ciphertext1[offset_to_corrupt] = corrupt_byte;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
+ string result;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR, Finish(ciphertext1, &result));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, result.size());
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaPkcs1TooLarge
+ *
+ * Verifies that RSA PKCS encryption fails in the correct way when the mssage is too large.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaPkcs1TooLarge) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT)));
+ string message(2048 / 8 - 10, 'a');
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+ string result;
+ ErrorCode error = Finish(message, &result);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(error == ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH || error == ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, result.size());
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.EcdsaEncrypt
+ *
+ * Verifies that attempting to use ECDSA keys to encrypt fails in the correct way.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, EcdsaEncrypt) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)));
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.HmacEncrypt
+ *
+ * Verifies that attempting to use HMAC keys to encrypt fails in the correct way.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, HmacEncrypt) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .HmacKey(128)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbRoundTripSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES ECB mode works.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbRoundTripSuccess) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob_.size(), 0U);
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+
+ // Two-block message.
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+ string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext1.size());
+
+ string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(string(message), params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext2.size());
+
+ // ECB is deterministic.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
+
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbRoundTripSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES encryption fails in the correct way when an unauthorized mode is specified.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesWrongMode) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob_.size(), 0U);
+
+ // Two-block message.
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+ EXPECT_EQ(
+ ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesWrongPurpose
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES encryption fails in the correct way when an unauthorized purpose is
+ * specified.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesWrongPurpose) {
+ auto err = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, err) << "Got " << err;
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob_.size(), 0U);
+
+ err = Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE, err) << "Got " << err;
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ err = Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE, err) << "Got " << err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbNoPaddingWrongInputSize
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES encryption fails in the correct way when provided an input that is not a
+ * multiple of the block size and no padding is specified.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbNoPaddingWrongInputSize) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ // Message is slightly shorter than two blocks.
+ string message(16 * 2 - 1, 'a');
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+ string ciphertext;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, &ciphertext));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, ciphertext.size());
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbPkcs7Padding
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES PKCS7 padding works for any message length.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbPkcs7Padding) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+
+ // Try various message lengths; all should work.
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
+ string message(i, 'a');
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(i + 16 - (i % 16), ciphertext.size());
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbWrongPadding
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES enryption fails in the correct way when an unauthorized padding mode is
+ * specified.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbWrongPadding) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+
+ // Try various message lengths; all should fail
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
+ string message(i, 'a');
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbPkcs7PaddingCorrupted
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES decryption fails in the correct way when the padding is corrupted.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbPkcs7PaddingCorrupted) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+
+ string message = "a";
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(16U, ciphertext.size());
+ EXPECT_NE(ciphertext, message);
+ ++ciphertext[ciphertext.size() / 2];
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
+ string plaintext;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, &plaintext));
+}
+
+vector<uint8_t> CopyIv(const AuthorizationSet& set) {
+ auto iv = set.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(iv.isOk());
+ return iv.value();
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCtrRoundTripSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES CTR mode works.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesCtrRoundTripSuccess) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CTR)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CTR).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+
+ string message = "123";
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
+ vector<uint8_t> iv1 = CopyIv(out_params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(16U, iv1.size());
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext1.size());
+
+ out_params.Clear();
+ string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
+ vector<uint8_t> iv2 = CopyIv(out_params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(16U, iv2.size());
+
+ // IVs should be random, so ciphertexts should differ.
+ EXPECT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
+
+ auto params_iv1 =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorizations(params).Authorization(TAG_NONCE, iv1);
+ auto params_iv2 =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorizations(params).Authorization(TAG_NONCE, iv2);
+
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, params_iv1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+ plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext2, params_iv2);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+
+ // Using the wrong IV will result in a "valid" decryption, but the data will be garbage.
+ plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, params_iv2);
+ EXPECT_NE(message, plaintext);
+ plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext2, params_iv1);
+ EXPECT_NE(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesIncremental
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES works, all modes, when provided data in various size increments.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesIncremental) {
+ auto block_modes = {
+ BlockMode::ECB,
+ BlockMode::CBC,
+ BlockMode::CTR,
+ BlockMode::GCM,
+ };
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .BlockMode(block_modes)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+
+ for (int increment = 1; increment <= 240; ++increment) {
+ for (auto block_mode : block_modes) {
+ string message(240, 'a');
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128) /* for GCM */;
+
+ AuthorizationSet output_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params, &output_params));
+
+ string ciphertext;
+ int32_t input_consumed;
+ string to_send;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < message.size(); i += increment) {
+ to_send.append(message.substr(i, increment));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(to_send, &ciphertext, &input_consumed));
+ EXPECT_EQ(to_send.length(), input_consumed);
+ to_send = to_send.substr(input_consumed);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, to_send.length());
+
+ switch (block_mode) {
+ case BlockMode::ECB:
+ case BlockMode::CBC:
+ // Implementations must take as many blocks as possible, leaving less
+ // than a block.
+ EXPECT_LE(to_send.length(), 16U);
+ break;
+ case BlockMode::GCM:
+ case BlockMode::CTR:
+ // Implementations must always take all the data.
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, to_send.length());
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(to_send, &ciphertext)) << "Error sending " << to_send;
+
+ switch (block_mode) {
+ case BlockMode::GCM:
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size() + 16, ciphertext.size());
+ break;
+ case BlockMode::CTR:
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext.size());
+ break;
+ case BlockMode::CBC:
+ case BlockMode::ECB:
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size() + message.size() % 16, ciphertext.size());
+ break;
+ }
+
+ auto iv = output_params.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE);
+ switch (block_mode) {
+ case BlockMode::CBC:
+ case BlockMode::GCM:
+ case BlockMode::CTR:
+ ASSERT_TRUE(iv.isOk()) << "No IV for block mode " << block_mode;
+ EXPECT_EQ(block_mode == BlockMode::GCM ? 12U : 16U, iv.value().size());
+ params.push_back(TAG_NONCE, iv.value());
+ break;
+
+ case BlockMode::ECB:
+ EXPECT_FALSE(iv.isOk()) << "ECB mode should not generate IV";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params))
+ << "Decrypt begin() failed for block mode " << block_mode;
+
+ string plaintext;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < ciphertext.size(); i += increment) {
+ to_send.append(ciphertext.substr(i, increment));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(to_send, &plaintext, &input_consumed));
+ to_send = to_send.substr(input_consumed);
+ }
+ ErrorCode error = Finish(to_send, &plaintext);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error) << "Decryption failed for block mode " << block_mode
+ << " and increment " << increment;
+ if (error == ErrorCode::OK) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(message, plaintext) << "Decryption didn't match for block mode "
+ << block_mode << " and increment " << increment;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+struct AesCtrSp80038aTestVector {
+ const char* key;
+ const char* nonce;
+ const char* plaintext;
+ const char* ciphertext;
+};
+
+// These test vectors are taken from
+// http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf, section F.5.
+static const AesCtrSp80038aTestVector kAesCtrSp80038aTestVectors[] = {
+ // AES-128
+ {
+ "2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c",
+ "f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff",
+ "6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51"
+ "30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710",
+ "874d6191b620e3261bef6864990db6ce9806f66b7970fdff8617187bb9fffdff"
+ "5ae4df3edbd5d35e5b4f09020db03eab1e031dda2fbe03d1792170a0f3009cee",
+ },
+ // AES-192
+ {
+ "8e73b0f7da0e6452c810f32b809079e562f8ead2522c6b7b",
+ "f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff",
+ "6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51"
+ "30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710",
+ "1abc932417521ca24f2b0459fe7e6e0b090339ec0aa6faefd5ccc2c6f4ce8e94"
+ "1e36b26bd1ebc670d1bd1d665620abf74f78a7f6d29809585a97daec58c6b050",
+ },
+ // AES-256
+ {
+ "603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d77811f352c073b6108d72d9810a30914dff4",
+ "f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff",
+ "6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51"
+ "30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710",
+ "601ec313775789a5b7a7f504bbf3d228f443e3ca4d62b59aca84e990cacaf5c5"
+ "2b0930daa23de94ce87017ba2d84988ddfc9c58db67aada613c2dd08457941a6",
+ },
+};
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCtrSp80038aTestVector
+ *
+ * Verifies AES CTR implementation against SP800-38A test vectors.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesCtrSp80038aTestVector) {
+ std::vector<uint32_t> InvalidSizes = InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+ const AesCtrSp80038aTestVector& test(kAesCtrSp80038aTestVectors[i]);
+ const string key = hex2str(test.key);
+ if (std::find(InvalidSizes.begin(), InvalidSizes.end(), (key.size() * 8)) !=
+ InvalidSizes.end())
+ continue;
+ const string nonce = hex2str(test.nonce);
+ const string plaintext = hex2str(test.plaintext);
+ const string ciphertext = hex2str(test.ciphertext);
+ CheckAesCtrTestVector(key, nonce, plaintext, ciphertext);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCtrIncompatiblePaddingMode
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint rejects use of CTR mode with PKCS7 padding in the correct way.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesCtrIncompatiblePaddingMode) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CTR)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CTR).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCtrInvalidCallerNonce
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint fails correctly when the user supplies an incorrect-size nonce.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesCtrInvalidCallerNonce) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CTR)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CALLER_NONCE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CTR)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, AidlBuf(string(1, 'a')));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_NONCE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+
+ params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CTR)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, AidlBuf(string(15, 'a')));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_NONCE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+
+ params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CTR)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, AidlBuf(string(17, 'a')));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_NONCE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCtrInvalidCallerNonce
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint fails correctly when the user supplies an incorrect-size nonce.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesCbcRoundTripSuccess) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ // Two-block message.
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
+ vector<uint8_t> iv1 = CopyIv(out_params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext1.size());
+
+ out_params.Clear();
+
+ string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
+ vector<uint8_t> iv2 = CopyIv(out_params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext2.size());
+
+ // IVs should be random, so ciphertexts should differ.
+ EXPECT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
+
+ params.push_back(TAG_NONCE, iv1);
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCallerNonce
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES caller-provided nonces work correctly.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesCallerNonce) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CALLER_NONCE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+
+ // Don't specify nonce, should get a random one.
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext.size());
+ EXPECT_EQ(16U, out_params.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE).value().size());
+
+ params.push_back(TAG_NONCE, out_params.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE).value());
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+
+ // Now specify a nonce, should also work.
+ params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, AidlBuf("abcdefghijklmnop"));
+ out_params.Clear();
+ ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
+
+ // Decrypt with correct nonce.
+ plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+
+ // Try with wrong nonce.
+ params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, AidlBuf("aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"));
+ plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
+ EXPECT_NE(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCallerNonceProhibited
+ *
+ * Verifies that caller-provided nonces are not permitted when not specified in the key
+ * authorizations.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesCallerNonceProhibited) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+
+ // Don't specify nonce, should get a random one.
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext.size());
+ EXPECT_EQ(16U, out_params.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE).value().size());
+
+ params.push_back(TAG_NONCE, out_params.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE).value());
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+
+ // Now specify a nonce, should fail
+ params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, AidlBuf("abcdefghijklmnop"));
+ out_params.Clear();
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params, &out_params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmRoundTripSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES GCM mode works.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmRoundTripSuccess) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+
+ string aad = "foobar";
+ string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
+
+ auto begin_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+
+ auto update_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, aad.data(), aad.size());
+
+ // Encrypt
+ AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params))
+ << "Begin encrypt";
+ string ciphertext;
+ AuthorizationSet update_out_params;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(update_params, message, "", &update_out_params, &ciphertext));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ciphertext.length(), message.length() + 16);
+
+ // Grab nonce
+ begin_params.push_back(begin_out_params);
+
+ // Decrypt.
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, begin_params)) << "Begin decrypt";
+ string plaintext;
+ int32_t input_consumed;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Update(update_params, ciphertext, &update_out_params, &plaintext, &input_consumed));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext.size(), input_consumed);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish("", &plaintext));
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.length(), plaintext.length());
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmRoundTripWithDelaySuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES GCM mode works, even when there's a long delay
+ * between operations.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmRoundTripWithDelaySuccess) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+
+ string aad = "foobar";
+ string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
+
+ auto begin_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+
+ auto update_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, aad.data(), aad.size());
+
+ // Encrypt
+ AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params))
+ << "Begin encrypt";
+ string ciphertext;
+ AuthorizationSet update_out_params;
+ sleep(5);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(update_params, message, "", &update_out_params, &ciphertext));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ciphertext.length(), message.length() + 16);
+
+ // Grab nonce
+ begin_params.push_back(begin_out_params);
+
+ // Decrypt.
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, begin_params)) << "Begin decrypt";
+ string plaintext;
+ int32_t input_consumed;
+ sleep(5);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Update(update_params, ciphertext, &update_out_params, &plaintext, &input_consumed));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext.size(), input_consumed);
+ sleep(5);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish("", &plaintext));
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.length(), plaintext.length());
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmDifferentNonces
+ *
+ * Verifies that encrypting the same data with different nonces produces different outputs.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmDifferentNonces) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CALLER_NONCE)));
+
+ string aad = "foobar";
+ string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
+ string nonce1 = "000000000000";
+ string nonce2 = "111111111111";
+ string nonce3 = "222222222222";
+
+ string ciphertext1 =
+ EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::GCM, PaddingMode::NONE, 128, AidlBuf(nonce1));
+ string ciphertext2 =
+ EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::GCM, PaddingMode::NONE, 128, AidlBuf(nonce2));
+ string ciphertext3 =
+ EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::GCM, PaddingMode::NONE, 128, AidlBuf(nonce3));
+
+ ASSERT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
+ ASSERT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext3);
+ ASSERT_NE(ciphertext2, ciphertext3);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmTooShortTag
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES GCM mode fails correctly when a too-short tag length is specified.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmTooShortTag) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+ string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 96);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_MAC_LENGTH, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmTooShortTagOnDecrypt
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES GCM mode fails correctly when a too-short tag is provided to decryption.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmTooShortTagOnDecrypt) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+ string aad = "foobar";
+ string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+
+ auto finish_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, aad.data(), aad.size());
+
+ // Encrypt
+ AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params, &begin_out_params));
+ EXPECT_EQ(1U, begin_out_params.size());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(begin_out_params.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE).isOk());
+
+ AuthorizationSet finish_out_params;
+ string ciphertext;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Finish(finish_params, message, "" /* signature */, &finish_out_params, &ciphertext));
+
+ params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorizations(begin_out_params)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 96);
+
+ // Decrypt.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_MAC_LENGTH, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmCorruptKey
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES GCM mode fails correctly when the decryption key is incorrect.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmCorruptKey) {
+ const uint8_t nonce_bytes[] = {
+ 0xb7, 0x94, 0x37, 0xae, 0x08, 0xff, 0x35, 0x5d, 0x7d, 0x8a, 0x4d, 0x0f,
+ };
+ string nonce = make_string(nonce_bytes);
+ const uint8_t ciphertext_bytes[] = {
+ 0xb3, 0xf6, 0x79, 0x9e, 0x8f, 0x93, 0x26, 0xf2, 0xdf, 0x1e, 0x80, 0xfc,
+ 0xd2, 0xcb, 0x16, 0xd7, 0x8c, 0x9d, 0xc7, 0xcc, 0x14, 0xbb, 0x67, 0x78,
+ 0x62, 0xdc, 0x6c, 0x63, 0x9b, 0x3a, 0x63, 0x38, 0xd2, 0x4b, 0x31, 0x2d,
+ 0x39, 0x89, 0xe5, 0x92, 0x0b, 0x5d, 0xbf, 0xc9, 0x76, 0x76, 0x5e, 0xfb,
+ 0xfe, 0x57, 0xbb, 0x38, 0x59, 0x40, 0xa7, 0xa4, 0x3b, 0xdf, 0x05, 0xbd,
+ 0xda, 0xe3, 0xc9, 0xd6, 0xa2, 0xfb, 0xbd, 0xfc, 0xc0, 0xcb, 0xa0,
+ };
+ string ciphertext = make_string(ciphertext_bytes);
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, nonce.data(), nonce.size());
+
+ auto import_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CALLER_NONCE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+
+ // Import correct key and decrypt
+ const uint8_t key_bytes[] = {
+ 0xba, 0x76, 0x35, 0x4f, 0x0a, 0xed, 0x6e, 0x8d,
+ 0x91, 0xf4, 0x5c, 0x4f, 0xf5, 0xa0, 0x62, 0xdb,
+ };
+ string key = make_string(key_bytes);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(import_params, KeyFormat::RAW, key));
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+
+ // Corrupt key and attempt to decrypt
+ key[0] = 0;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(import_params, KeyFormat::RAW, key));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(ciphertext, &plaintext));
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmAadNoData
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES GCM mode works when provided additional authenticated data, but no data to
+ * encrypt.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmAadNoData) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+
+ string aad = "1234567890123456";
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+
+ auto finish_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, aad.data(), aad.size());
+
+ // Encrypt
+ AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params, &begin_out_params));
+ string ciphertext;
+ AuthorizationSet finish_out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(finish_params, "" /* input */, "" /* signature */,
+ &finish_out_params, &ciphertext));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(finish_out_params.empty());
+
+ // Grab nonce
+ params.push_back(begin_out_params);
+
+ // Decrypt.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
+ string plaintext;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(finish_params, ciphertext, "" /* signature */,
+ &finish_out_params, &plaintext));
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(finish_out_params.empty());
+
+ EXPECT_EQ("", plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmMultiPartAad
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES GCM mode works when provided additional authenticated data in multiple
+ * chunks.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmMultiPartAad) {
+ const size_t tag_bits = 128;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+
+ string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
+ auto begin_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, tag_bits);
+ AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
+
+ auto update_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, "foo", (size_t)3);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params));
+
+ // No data, AAD only.
+ string ciphertext;
+ int32_t input_consumed;
+ AuthorizationSet update_out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(update_params, "" /* input */, &update_out_params, &ciphertext,
+ &input_consumed));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, input_consumed);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, ciphertext.size());
+ EXPECT_TRUE(update_out_params.empty());
+
+ // AAD and data.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Update(update_params, message, &update_out_params, &ciphertext, &input_consumed));
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), input_consumed);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(update_out_params.empty());
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish("" /* input */, &ciphertext));
+ // Expect 128-bit (16-byte) tag appended to ciphertext.
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size() + (tag_bits >> 3), ciphertext.size());
+
+ // Grab nonce.
+ begin_params.push_back(begin_out_params);
+
+ // Decrypt
+ update_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, "foofoo", (size_t)6);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, begin_params));
+ string plaintext;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(update_params, ciphertext, "" /* signature */,
+ &update_out_params, &plaintext));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(update_out_params.empty());
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmAadOutOfOrder
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES GCM mode fails correctly when given AAD after data to encipher.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmAadOutOfOrder) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+
+ string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
+ auto begin_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+ AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
+
+ auto update_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, "foo", (size_t)3);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params));
+
+ // No data, AAD only.
+ string ciphertext;
+ int32_t input_consumed;
+ AuthorizationSet update_out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(update_params, "" /* input */, &update_out_params, &ciphertext,
+ &input_consumed));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, input_consumed);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, ciphertext.size());
+ EXPECT_TRUE(update_out_params.empty());
+
+ // AAD and data.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Update(update_params, message, &update_out_params, &ciphertext, &input_consumed));
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), input_consumed);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(update_out_params.empty());
+
+ // More AAD
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG,
+ Update(update_params, "", &update_out_params, &ciphertext, &input_consumed));
+
+ op_.clear();
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmBadAad
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES GCM decryption fails correctly when additional authenticated date is wrong.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmBadAad) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+ auto begin_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+
+ auto finish_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, "foobar", (size_t)6);
+
+ // Encrypt
+ AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params));
+ string ciphertext;
+ AuthorizationSet finish_out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Finish(finish_params, message, "" /* signature */, &finish_out_params, &ciphertext));
+
+ // Grab nonce
+ begin_params.push_back(begin_out_params);
+
+ finish_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA,
+ "barfoo" /* Wrong AAD */, (size_t)6);
+
+ // Decrypt.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params));
+ string plaintext;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(finish_params, ciphertext, "" /* signature */,
+ &finish_out_params, &plaintext));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmWrongNonce
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES GCM decryption fails correctly when the nonce is incorrect.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmWrongNonce) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+ auto begin_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+
+ auto finish_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, "foobar", (size_t)6);
+
+ // Encrypt
+ AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params));
+ string ciphertext;
+ AuthorizationSet finish_out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Finish(finish_params, message, "" /* signature */, &finish_out_params, &ciphertext));
+
+ // Wrong nonce
+ begin_params.push_back(TAG_NONCE, AidlBuf("123456789012"));
+
+ // Decrypt.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params));
+ string plaintext;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(finish_params, ciphertext, "" /* signature */,
+ &finish_out_params, &plaintext));
+
+ // With wrong nonce, should have gotten garbage plaintext (or none).
+ EXPECT_NE(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmCorruptTag
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES GCM decryption fails correctly when the tag is wrong.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmCorruptTag) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+
+ string aad = "1234567890123456";
+ string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+
+ auto finish_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, aad.data(), aad.size());
+
+ // Encrypt
+ AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params, &begin_out_params));
+ string ciphertext;
+ AuthorizationSet finish_out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Finish(finish_params, message, "" /* signature */, &finish_out_params, &ciphertext));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(finish_out_params.empty());
+
+ // Corrupt tag
+ ++(*ciphertext.rbegin());
+
+ // Grab nonce
+ params.push_back(begin_out_params);
+
+ // Decrypt.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
+ string plaintext;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(finish_params, ciphertext, "" /* signature */,
+ &finish_out_params, &plaintext));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(finish_out_params.empty());
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesEcbRoundTripSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that 3DES is basically functional.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesEcbRoundTripSuccess) {
+ auto auths = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(auths));
+ // Two-block message.
+ string message = "1234567890123456";
+ auto inParams = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, inParams);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext1.size());
+
+ string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(string(message), inParams);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext2.size());
+
+ // ECB is deterministic.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
+
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, inParams);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesEcbNotAuthorized
+ *
+ * Verifies that CBC keys reject ECB usage.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesEcbNotAuthorized) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ auto inParams = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, inParams));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesEcbPkcs7Padding
+ *
+ * Tests ECB mode with PKCS#7 padding, various message sizes.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesEcbPkcs7Padding) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
+ string message(i, 'a');
+ auto inParams =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, inParams);
+ EXPECT_EQ(i + 8 - (i % 8), ciphertext.size());
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, inParams);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesEcbNoPaddingKeyWithPkcs7Padding
+ *
+ * Verifies that keys configured for no padding reject PKCS7 padding
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesEcbNoPaddingKeyWithPkcs7Padding) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
+ auto inParams =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, inParams));
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesEcbPkcs7PaddingCorrupted
+ *
+ * Verifies that corrupted padding is detected.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesEcbPkcs7PaddingCorrupted) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
+
+ string message = "a";
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::ECB, PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+ EXPECT_EQ(8U, ciphertext.size());
+ EXPECT_NE(ciphertext, message);
+ ++ciphertext[ciphertext.size() / 2];
+
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder begin_params;
+ begin_params.push_back(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB);
+ begin_params.push_back(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, begin_params));
+ string plaintext;
+ int32_t input_consumed;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(ciphertext, &plaintext, &input_consumed));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext.size(), input_consumed);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT, Finish(&plaintext));
+}
+
+struct TripleDesTestVector {
+ const char* name;
+ const KeyPurpose purpose;
+ const BlockMode block_mode;
+ const PaddingMode padding_mode;
+ const char* key;
+ const char* iv;
+ const char* input;
+ const char* output;
+};
+
+// These test vectors are from NIST CAVP, plus a few custom variants to test padding, since all
+// of the NIST vectors are multiples of the block size.
+static const TripleDesTestVector kTripleDesTestVectors[] = {
+ {
+ "TECBMMT3 Encrypt 0", KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, BlockMode::ECB, PaddingMode::NONE,
+ "a2b5bc67da13dc92cd9d344aa238544a0e1fa79ef76810cd", // key
+ "", // IV
+ "329d86bdf1bc5af4", // input
+ "d946c2756d78633f", // output
+ },
+ {
+ "TECBMMT3 Encrypt 1", KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, BlockMode::ECB, PaddingMode::NONE,
+ "49e692290d2a5e46bace79b9648a4c5d491004c262dc9d49", // key
+ "", // IV
+ "6b1540781b01ce1997adae102dbf3c5b", // input
+ "4d0dc182d6e481ac4a3dc6ab6976ccae", // output
+ },
+ {
+ "TECBMMT3 Decrypt 0", KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, BlockMode::ECB, PaddingMode::NONE,
+ "52daec2ac7dc1958377392682f37860b2cc1ea2304bab0e9", // key
+ "", // IV
+ "6daad94ce08acfe7", // input
+ "660e7d32dcc90e79", // output
+ },
+ {
+ "TECBMMT3 Decrypt 1", KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, BlockMode::ECB, PaddingMode::NONE,
+ "7f8fe3d3f4a48394fb682c2919926d6ddfce8932529229ce", // key
+ "", // IV
+ "e9653a0a1f05d31b9acd12d73aa9879d", // input
+ "9b2ae9d998efe62f1b592e7e1df8ff38", // output
+ },
+ {
+ "TCBCMMT3 Encrypt 0", KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE,
+ "b5cb1504802326c73df186e3e352a20de643b0d63ee30e37", // key
+ "43f791134c5647ba", // IV
+ "dcc153cef81d6f24", // input
+ "92538bd8af18d3ba", // output
+ },
+ {
+ "TCBCMMT3 Encrypt 1", KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE,
+ "a49d7564199e97cb529d2c9d97bf2f98d35edf57ba1f7358", // key
+ "c2e999cb6249023c", // IV
+ "c689aee38a301bb316da75db36f110b5", // input
+ "e9afaba5ec75ea1bbe65506655bb4ecb", // output
+ },
+ {
+ "TCBCMMT3 Encrypt 1 PKCS7 variant", KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, BlockMode::CBC,
+ PaddingMode::PKCS7,
+ "a49d7564199e97cb529d2c9d97bf2f98d35edf57ba1f7358", // key
+ "c2e999cb6249023c", // IV
+ "c689aee38a301bb316da75db36f110b500", // input
+ "e9afaba5ec75ea1bbe65506655bb4ecb825aa27ec0656156", // output
+ },
+ {
+ "TCBCMMT3 Encrypt 1 PKCS7 decrypted", KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, BlockMode::CBC,
+ PaddingMode::PKCS7,
+ "a49d7564199e97cb529d2c9d97bf2f98d35edf57ba1f7358", // key
+ "c2e999cb6249023c", // IV
+ "e9afaba5ec75ea1bbe65506655bb4ecb825aa27ec0656156", // input
+ "c689aee38a301bb316da75db36f110b500", // output
+ },
+ {
+ "TCBCMMT3 Decrypt 0", KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE,
+ "5eb6040d46082c7aa7d06dfd08dfeac8c18364c1548c3ba1", // key
+ "41746c7e442d3681", // IV
+ "c53a7b0ec40600fe", // input
+ "d4f00eb455de1034", // output
+ },
+ {
+ "TCBCMMT3 Decrypt 1", KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE,
+ "5b1cce7c0dc1ec49130dfb4af45785ab9179e567f2c7d549", // key
+ "3982bc02c3727d45", // IV
+ "6006f10adef52991fcc777a1238bbb65", // input
+ "edae09288e9e3bc05746d872b48e3b29", // output
+ },
+};
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesTestVector
+ *
+ * Verifies that NIST (plus a few extra) test vectors produce the correct results.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesTestVector) {
+ constexpr size_t num_tests = sizeof(kTripleDesTestVectors) / sizeof(TripleDesTestVector);
+ for (auto* test = kTripleDesTestVectors; test < kTripleDesTestVectors + num_tests; ++test) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(test->name);
+ CheckTripleDesTestVector(test->purpose, test->block_mode, test->padding_mode,
+ hex2str(test->key), hex2str(test->iv), hex2str(test->input),
+ hex2str(test->output));
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesCbcRoundTripSuccess
+ *
+ * Validates CBC mode functionality.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcRoundTripSuccess) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob_.size(), 0U);
+
+ // Two-block message.
+ string message = "1234567890123456";
+ vector<uint8_t> iv1;
+ string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, &iv1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext1.size());
+
+ vector<uint8_t> iv2;
+ string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, &iv2);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext2.size());
+
+ // IVs should be random, so ciphertexts should differ.
+ EXPECT_NE(iv1, iv2);
+ EXPECT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
+
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, iv1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesCallerIv
+ *
+ * Validates that 3DES keys can allow caller-specified IVs, and use them correctly.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCallerIv) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CALLER_NONCE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ string message = "1234567890123456";
+ vector<uint8_t> iv;
+ // Don't specify IV, should get a random one.
+ string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, &iv);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext1.size());
+ EXPECT_EQ(8U, iv.size());
+
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, iv);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+
+ // Now specify an IV, should also work.
+ iv = AidlBuf("abcdefgh");
+ string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, iv);
+
+ // Decrypt with correct IV.
+ plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext2, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, iv);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+
+ // Now try with wrong IV.
+ plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext2, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, AidlBuf("aaaaaaaa"));
+ EXPECT_NE(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCallerNonceProhibited.
+ *
+ * Verifies that 3DES keys without TAG_CALLER_NONCE do not allow caller-specified IVS.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCallerNonceProhibited) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+ vector<uint8_t> iv;
+ // Don't specify nonce, should get a random one.
+ string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, &iv);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext1.size());
+ EXPECT_EQ(8U, iv.size());
+
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, iv);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+
+ // Now specify a nonce, should fail.
+ auto input_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, AidlBuf("abcdefgh"))
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ AuthorizationSet output_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, input_params, &output_params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesCbcNotAuthorized
+ *
+ * Verifies that 3DES ECB-only keys do not allow CBC usage.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcNotAuthorized) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ // Two-block message.
+ string message = "1234567890123456";
+ auto begin_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesCbcNoPaddingWrongInputSize
+ *
+ * Verifies that unpadded CBC operations reject inputs that are not a multiple of block size.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcNoPaddingWrongInputSize) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ // Message is slightly shorter than two blocks.
+ string message = "123456789012345";
+
+ auto begin_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ AuthorizationSet output_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &output_params));
+ string ciphertext;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, "", &ciphertext));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcPkcs7Padding.
+ *
+ * Verifies that PKCS7 padding works correctly in CBC mode.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcPkcs7Padding) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
+
+ // Try various message lengths; all should work.
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
+ string message(i, 'a');
+ vector<uint8_t> iv;
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::PKCS7, &iv);
+ EXPECT_EQ(i + 8 - (i % 8), ciphertext.size());
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::PKCS7, iv);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesCbcNoPaddingKeyWithPkcs7Padding
+ *
+ * Verifies that a key that requires PKCS7 padding cannot be used in unpadded mode.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcNoPaddingKeyWithPkcs7Padding) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ // Try various message lengths; all should fail.
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
+ auto begin_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params));
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesCbcPkcs7PaddingCorrupted
+ *
+ * Verifies that corrupted PKCS7 padding is rejected during decryption.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcPkcs7PaddingCorrupted) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
+
+ string message = "a";
+ vector<uint8_t> iv;
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::PKCS7, &iv);
+ EXPECT_EQ(8U, ciphertext.size());
+ EXPECT_NE(ciphertext, message);
+ ++ciphertext[ciphertext.size() / 2];
+
+ auto begin_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, iv);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, begin_params));
+ string plaintext;
+ int32_t input_consumed;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(ciphertext, &plaintext, &input_consumed));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext.size(), input_consumed);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT, Finish(&plaintext));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcIncrementalNoPadding.
+ *
+ * Verifies that 3DES CBC works with many different input sizes.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcIncrementalNoPadding) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ int increment = 7;
+ string message(240, 'a');
+ AuthorizationSet input_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ AuthorizationSet output_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, input_params, &output_params));
+
+ string ciphertext;
+ int32_t input_consumed;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < message.size(); i += increment)
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Update(message.substr(i, increment), &ciphertext, &input_consumed));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(&ciphertext));
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext.size());
+
+ // Move TAG_NONCE into input_params
+ input_params = output_params;
+ input_params.push_back(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CBC);
+ input_params.push_back(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::NONE);
+ output_params.Clear();
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, input_params, &output_params));
+ string plaintext;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < ciphertext.size(); i += increment)
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Update(ciphertext.substr(i, increment), &plaintext, &input_consumed));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(&plaintext));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext.size(), plaintext.size());
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(EncryptionOperationsTest);
+
+typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase MaxOperationsTest;
+
+/*
+ * MaxOperationsTest.TestLimitAes
+ *
+ * Verifies that the max uses per boot tag works correctly with AES keys.
+ */
+TEST_P(MaxOperationsTest, TestLimitAes) {
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .EcbMode()
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAX_USES_PER_BOOT, 3)));
+
+ string message = "1234567890123456";
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().EcbMode().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+
+ EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EncryptMessage(message, params);
+
+ // Fourth time should fail.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::KEY_MAX_OPS_EXCEEDED, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * MaxOperationsTest.TestLimitAes
+ *
+ * Verifies that the max uses per boot tag works correctly with RSA keys.
+ */
+TEST_P(MaxOperationsTest, TestLimitRsa) {
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaSigningKey(1024, 65537)
+ .NoDigestOrPadding()
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAX_USES_PER_BOOT, 3)));
+
+ string message = "1234567890123456";
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().NoDigestOrPadding();
+
+ SignMessage(message, params);
+ SignMessage(message, params);
+ SignMessage(message, params);
+
+ // Fourth time should fail.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::KEY_MAX_OPS_EXCEEDED, Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, params));
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(MaxOperationsTest);
+
+typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase AddEntropyTest;
+
+/*
+ * AddEntropyTest.AddEntropy
+ *
+ * Verifies that the addRngEntropy method doesn't blow up. There's no way to test that entropy
+ * is actually added.
+ */
+TEST_P(AddEntropyTest, AddEntropy) {
+ string data = "foo";
+ EXPECT_TRUE(keyMint().addRngEntropy(vector<uint8_t>(data.begin(), data.end())).isOk());
+}
+
+/*
+ * AddEntropyTest.AddEmptyEntropy
+ *
+ * Verifies that the addRngEntropy method doesn't blow up when given an empty buffer.
+ */
+TEST_P(AddEntropyTest, AddEmptyEntropy) {
+ EXPECT_TRUE(keyMint().addRngEntropy(AidlBuf()).isOk());
+}
+
+/*
+ * AddEntropyTest.AddLargeEntropy
+ *
+ * Verifies that the addRngEntropy method doesn't blow up when given a largish amount of data.
+ */
+TEST_P(AddEntropyTest, AddLargeEntropy) {
+ EXPECT_TRUE(keyMint().addRngEntropy(AidlBuf(string(2 * 1024, 'a'))).isOk());
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(AddEntropyTest);
+
+typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase AttestationTest;
+
+/*
+ * AttestationTest.RsaAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that attesting to RSA keys works and generates the expected output.
+ */
+// TODO(seleneh) add attestation tests back after decided on the new attestation
+// behavior under generateKey and importKey
+
+typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase KeyDeletionTest;
+
+/**
+ * KeyDeletionTest.DeleteKey
+ *
+ * This test checks that if rollback protection is implemented, DeleteKey invalidates a formerly
+ * valid key blob.
+ */
+TEST_P(KeyDeletionTest, DeleteKey) {
+ auto error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(error == ErrorCode::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE || error == ErrorCode::OK);
+
+ // Delete must work if rollback protection is implemented
+ if (error == ErrorCode::OK) {
+ AuthorizationSet hardwareEnforced(key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(hardwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, DeleteKey(true /* keep key blob */));
+
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+ AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
+ &begin_out_params));
+ AbortIfNeeded();
+ key_blob_ = AidlBuf();
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * KeyDeletionTest.DeleteInvalidKey
+ *
+ * This test checks that the HAL excepts invalid key blobs..
+ */
+TEST_P(KeyDeletionTest, DeleteInvalidKey) {
+ // Generate key just to check if rollback protection is implemented
+ auto error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(error == ErrorCode::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE || error == ErrorCode::OK);
+
+ // Delete must work if rollback protection is implemented
+ if (error == ErrorCode::OK) {
+ AuthorizationSet hardwareEnforced(key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(hardwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE));
+
+ // Delete the key we don't care about the result at this point.
+ DeleteKey();
+
+ // Now create an invalid key blob and delete it.
+ key_blob_ = AidlBuf("just some garbage data which is not a valid key blob");
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, DeleteKey());
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * KeyDeletionTest.DeleteAllKeys
+ *
+ * This test is disarmed by default. To arm it use --arm_deleteAllKeys.
+ *
+ * BEWARE: This test has serious side effects. All user keys will be lost! This includes
+ * FBE/FDE encryption keys, which means that the device will not even boot until after the
+ * device has been wiped manually (e.g., fastboot flashall -w), and new FBE/FDE keys have
+ * been provisioned. Use this test only on dedicated testing devices that have no valuable
+ * credentials stored in Keystore/Keymint.
+ */
+TEST_P(KeyDeletionTest, DeleteAllKeys) {
+ if (!arm_deleteAllKeys) return;
+ auto error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(error == ErrorCode::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE || error == ErrorCode::OK);
+
+ // Delete must work if rollback protection is implemented
+ if (error == ErrorCode::OK) {
+ AuthorizationSet hardwareEnforced(key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(hardwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, DeleteAllKeys());
+
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+ AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
+ &begin_out_params));
+ AbortIfNeeded();
+ key_blob_ = AidlBuf();
+ }
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(KeyDeletionTest);
+
+using UpgradeKeyTest = KeyMintAidlTestBase;
+
+/*
+ * UpgradeKeyTest.UpgradeKey
+ *
+ * Verifies that calling upgrade key on an up-to-date key works (i.e. does nothing).
+ */
+TEST_P(UpgradeKeyTest, UpgradeKey) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)));
+
+ auto result = UpgradeKey(key_blob_);
+
+ // Key doesn't need upgrading. Should get okay, but no new key blob.
+ EXPECT_EQ(result, std::make_pair(ErrorCode::OK, vector<uint8_t>()));
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(UpgradeKeyTest);
+
+using ClearOperationsTest = KeyMintAidlTestBase;
+
+/*
+ * ClearSlotsTest.TooManyOperations
+ *
+ * Verifies that TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS is returned after the max number of
+ * operations are started without being finished or aborted. Also verifies
+ * that aborting the operations clears the operations.
+ *
+ */
+TEST_P(ClearOperationsTest, TooManyOperations) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ constexpr size_t max_operations = 100; // set to arbituary large number
+ sp<IKeyMintOperation> op_handles[max_operations];
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ ErrorCode result;
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < max_operations; i++) {
+ result = Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, key_blob_, params, &out_params, op_handles[i]);
+ if (ErrorCode::OK != result) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS, result);
+ // Try again just in case there's a weird overflow bug
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, key_blob_, params, &out_params));
+ for (size_t j = 0; j < i; j++) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Abort(op_handles[j]))
+ << "Aboort failed for i = " << j << std::endl;
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, key_blob_, params, &out_params));
+ AbortIfNeeded();
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(ClearOperationsTest);
+
+typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase TransportLimitTest;
+
+/*
+ * TransportLimitTest.FinishInput
+ *
+ * Verifies that passing input data to finish succeeds as expected.
+ */
+TEST_P(TransportLimitTest, LargeFinishInput) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ for (int msg_size = 8 /* 256 bytes */; msg_size <= 11 /* 2 KiB */; msg_size++) {
+ auto cipher_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, cipher_params, &out_params));
+
+ string plain_message = std::string(1 << msg_size, 'x');
+ string encrypted_message;
+ auto rc = Finish(plain_message, &encrypted_message);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, rc);
+ EXPECT_EQ(plain_message.size(), encrypted_message.size())
+ << "Encrypt finish returned OK, but did not consume all of the given input";
+ cipher_params.push_back(out_params);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, cipher_params));
+
+ string decrypted_message;
+ rc = Finish(encrypted_message, &decrypted_message);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, rc);
+ EXPECT_EQ(plain_message.size(), decrypted_message.size())
+ << "Decrypt finish returned OK, did not consume all of the given input";
+ }
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(TransportLimitTest);
+
+} // namespace test
+} // namespace keymint
+} // namespace hardware
+} // namespace android
+
+int main(int argc, char** argv) {
+ ::testing::InitGoogleTest(&argc, argv);
+ for (int i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
+ if (argv[i][0] == '-') {
+ if (std::string(argv[i]) == "--arm_deleteAllKeys") {
+ arm_deleteAllKeys = true;
+ }
+ if (std::string(argv[i]) == "--dump_attestations") {
+ dump_Attestations = true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ int status = RUN_ALL_TESTS();
+ ALOGI("Test result = %d", status);
+ return status;
+}
diff --git a/keymint/support/Android.bp b/keymint/support/Android.bp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..432416e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/support/Android.bp
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+//
+// Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+//
+
+cc_library {
+ name: "libkeymintSupport",
+ cflags: [
+ "-Wall",
+ "-Wextra",
+ "-Werror",
+ ],
+ srcs: [
+ "attestation_record.cpp",
+ "authorization_set.cpp",
+ "keymint_utils.cpp",
+ "key_param_output.cpp",
+ ],
+ export_include_dirs: [
+ "include",
+ ],
+ shared_libs: [
+ "android.hardware.keymint-cpp",
+ "libbase",
+ "libcrypto",
+ "libutils",
+ ],
+}
diff --git a/keymint/support/OWNERS b/keymint/support/OWNERS
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a93b171
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/support/OWNERS
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+jbires@google.com
+jdanis@google.com
+seleneh@google.com
+swillden@google.com
diff --git a/keymint/support/attestation_record.cpp b/keymint/support/attestation_record.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e565974
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/support/attestation_record.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include <keymintSupport/attestation_record.h>
+
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/Tag.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/TagType.h>
+
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include <keymintSupport/authorization_set.h>
+#include <keymintSupport/openssl_utils.h>
+
+#define AT __FILE__ ":" << __LINE__
+
+namespace android {
+namespace hardware {
+namespace keymint {
+
+struct stack_st_ASN1_TYPE_Delete {
+ void operator()(stack_st_ASN1_TYPE* p) { sk_ASN1_TYPE_free(p); }
+};
+
+struct ASN1_STRING_Delete {
+ void operator()(ASN1_STRING* p) { ASN1_STRING_free(p); }
+};
+
+struct ASN1_TYPE_Delete {
+ void operator()(ASN1_TYPE* p) { ASN1_TYPE_free(p); }
+};
+
+#define ASN1_INTEGER_SET STACK_OF(ASN1_INTEGER)
+
+typedef struct km_root_of_trust {
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* verified_boot_key;
+ ASN1_BOOLEAN device_locked;
+ ASN1_ENUMERATED* verified_boot_state;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* verified_boot_hash;
+} KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST;
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST, verified_boot_key, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST, device_locked, ASN1_BOOLEAN),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST, verified_boot_state, ASN1_ENUMERATED),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST, verified_boot_hash, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST);
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST);
+
+typedef struct km_auth_list {
+ ASN1_INTEGER_SET* purpose;
+ ASN1_INTEGER* algorithm;
+ ASN1_INTEGER* key_size;
+ ASN1_INTEGER_SET* digest;
+ ASN1_INTEGER_SET* padding;
+ ASN1_INTEGER* ec_curve;
+ ASN1_INTEGER* rsa_public_exponent;
+ ASN1_INTEGER* active_date_time;
+ ASN1_INTEGER* origination_expire_date_time;
+ ASN1_INTEGER* usage_expire_date_time;
+ ASN1_NULL* no_auth_required;
+ ASN1_INTEGER* user_auth_type;
+ ASN1_INTEGER* auth_timeout;
+ ASN1_NULL* allow_while_on_body;
+ ASN1_NULL* all_applications;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* application_id;
+ ASN1_INTEGER* creation_date_time;
+ ASN1_INTEGER* origin;
+ ASN1_NULL* rollback_resistance;
+ KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST* root_of_trust;
+ ASN1_INTEGER* os_version;
+ ASN1_INTEGER* os_patchlevel;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_application_id;
+ ASN1_NULL* trusted_user_presence_required;
+ ASN1_NULL* trusted_confirmation_required;
+ ASN1_NULL* unlocked_device_required;
+ ASN1_INTEGER* vendor_patchlevel;
+ ASN1_INTEGER* boot_patchlevel;
+ ASN1_NULL* early_boot_only;
+ ASN1_NULL* device_unique_attestation;
+ ASN1_NULL* storage_key;
+ ASN1_NULL* identity_credential;
+} KM_AUTH_LIST;
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(KM_AUTH_LIST) = {
+ ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, purpose, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_PURPOSE.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, algorithm, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ALGORITHM.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, key_size, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_KEY_SIZE.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, digest, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_DIGEST.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, padding, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_PADDING.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, ec_curve, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_EC_CURVE.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rsa_public_exponent, ASN1_INTEGER,
+ TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rollback_resistance, ASN1_NULL,
+ TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, active_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, origination_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
+ TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, usage_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
+ TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, no_auth_required, ASN1_NULL, TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, user_auth_type, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, auth_timeout, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, allow_while_on_body, ASN1_NULL,
+ TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, trusted_user_presence_required, ASN1_NULL,
+ TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, trusted_confirmation_required, ASN1_NULL,
+ TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, unlocked_device_required, ASN1_NULL,
+ TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, creation_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
+ TAG_CREATION_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, origin, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ORIGIN.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, root_of_trust, KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST, TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_version, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_VERSION.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, vendor_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER,
+ TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, boot_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_application_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, early_boot_only, ASN1_NULL, TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, device_unique_attestation, ASN1_NULL,
+ TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, storage_key, ASN1_NULL, TAG_STORAGE_KEY.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, identity_credential, ASN1_NULL,
+ TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY.maskedTag()),
+
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(KM_AUTH_LIST);
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KM_AUTH_LIST);
+
+typedef struct km_key_description {
+ ASN1_INTEGER* attestation_version;
+ ASN1_ENUMERATED* attestation_security_level;
+ ASN1_INTEGER* keymint_version;
+ ASN1_ENUMERATED* keymint_security_level;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_challenge;
+ KM_AUTH_LIST* software_enforced;
+ KM_AUTH_LIST* tee_enforced;
+ ASN1_INTEGER* unique_id;
+} KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION;
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION, attestation_version, ASN1_INTEGER),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION, attestation_security_level, ASN1_ENUMERATED),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION, keymint_version, ASN1_INTEGER),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION, keymint_security_level, ASN1_ENUMERATED),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION, attestation_challenge, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION, unique_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION, software_enforced, KM_AUTH_LIST),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION, tee_enforced, KM_AUTH_LIST),
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION);
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION);
+
+template <Tag tag>
+void copyAuthTag(const stack_st_ASN1_INTEGER* stack, TypedTag<TagType::ENUM_REP, tag> ttag,
+ AuthorizationSet* auth_list) {
+ typedef typename TypedTag2ValueType<decltype(ttag)>::type ValueT;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_INTEGER_num(stack); ++i) {
+ auth_list->push_back(
+ ttag, static_cast<ValueT>(ASN1_INTEGER_get(sk_ASN1_INTEGER_value(stack, i))));
+ }
+}
+
+template <Tag tag>
+void copyAuthTag(const ASN1_INTEGER* asn1_int, TypedTag<TagType::ENUM, tag> ttag,
+ AuthorizationSet* auth_list) {
+ typedef typename TypedTag2ValueType<decltype(ttag)>::type ValueT;
+ if (!asn1_int) return;
+ auth_list->push_back(ttag, static_cast<ValueT>(ASN1_INTEGER_get(asn1_int)));
+}
+
+template <Tag tag>
+void copyAuthTag(const ASN1_INTEGER* asn1_int, TypedTag<TagType::UINT, tag> ttag,
+ AuthorizationSet* auth_list) {
+ if (!asn1_int) return;
+ auth_list->push_back(ttag, ASN1_INTEGER_get(asn1_int));
+}
+
+BIGNUM* construct_uint_max() {
+ BIGNUM* value = BN_new();
+ BIGNUM_Ptr one(BN_new());
+ BN_one(one.get());
+ BN_lshift(value, one.get(), 32);
+ return value;
+}
+
+uint64_t BignumToUint64(BIGNUM* num) {
+ static_assert((sizeof(BN_ULONG) == sizeof(uint32_t)) || (sizeof(BN_ULONG) == sizeof(uint64_t)),
+ "This implementation only supports 32 and 64-bit BN_ULONG");
+ if (sizeof(BN_ULONG) == sizeof(uint32_t)) {
+ BIGNUM_Ptr uint_max(construct_uint_max());
+ BIGNUM_Ptr hi(BN_new()), lo(BN_new());
+ BN_CTX_Ptr ctx(BN_CTX_new());
+ BN_div(hi.get(), lo.get(), num, uint_max.get(), ctx.get());
+ return static_cast<uint64_t>(BN_get_word(hi.get())) << 32 | BN_get_word(lo.get());
+ } else if (sizeof(BN_ULONG) == sizeof(uint64_t)) {
+ return BN_get_word(num);
+ } else {
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+template <Tag tag>
+void copyAuthTag(const ASN1_INTEGER* asn1_int, TypedTag<TagType::ULONG, tag> ttag,
+ AuthorizationSet* auth_list) {
+ if (!asn1_int) return;
+ BIGNUM_Ptr num(ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(asn1_int, nullptr));
+ auth_list->push_back(ttag, BignumToUint64(num.get()));
+}
+
+template <Tag tag>
+void copyAuthTag(const ASN1_INTEGER* asn1_int, TypedTag<TagType::DATE, tag> ttag,
+ AuthorizationSet* auth_list) {
+ if (!asn1_int) return;
+ BIGNUM_Ptr num(ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(asn1_int, nullptr));
+ auth_list->push_back(ttag, BignumToUint64(num.get()));
+}
+
+template <Tag tag>
+void copyAuthTag(const ASN1_NULL* asn1_null, TypedTag<TagType::BOOL, tag> ttag,
+ AuthorizationSet* auth_list) {
+ if (!asn1_null) return;
+ auth_list->push_back(ttag);
+}
+
+template <Tag tag>
+void copyAuthTag(const ASN1_OCTET_STRING* asn1_string, TypedTag<TagType::BYTES, tag> ttag,
+ AuthorizationSet* auth_list) {
+ if (!asn1_string) return;
+ vector<uint8_t> buf(asn1_string->data, asn1_string->data + asn1_string->length);
+ auth_list->push_back(ttag, buf);
+}
+
+// Extract the values from the specified ASN.1 record and place them in auth_list.
+static ErrorCode extract_auth_list(const KM_AUTH_LIST* record, AuthorizationSet* auth_list) {
+ if (!record) return ErrorCode::OK;
+
+ copyAuthTag(record->active_date_time, TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->algorithm, TAG_ALGORITHM, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->application_id, TAG_APPLICATION_ID, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->auth_timeout, TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->creation_date_time, TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->digest, TAG_DIGEST, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->ec_curve, TAG_EC_CURVE, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->key_size, TAG_KEY_SIZE, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->no_auth_required, TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->origin, TAG_ORIGIN, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->origination_expire_date_time, TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->os_patchlevel, TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->os_version, TAG_OS_VERSION, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->padding, TAG_PADDING, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->purpose, TAG_PURPOSE, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->rollback_resistance, TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->rsa_public_exponent, TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->usage_expire_date_time, TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->user_auth_type, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_application_id, TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->vendor_patchlevel, TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->boot_patchlevel, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->trusted_user_presence_required, TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED,
+ auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->trusted_confirmation_required, TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED,
+ auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->unlocked_device_required, TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->early_boot_only, TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->device_unique_attestation, TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->storage_key, TAG_STORAGE_KEY, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->identity_credential, TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY, auth_list);
+
+ return ErrorCode::OK;
+}
+
+MAKE_OPENSSL_PTR_TYPE(KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION)
+
+// Parse the DER-encoded attestation record, placing the results in keymint_version,
+// attestation_challenge, software_enforced, tee_enforced and unique_id.
+ErrorCode parse_attestation_record(const uint8_t* asn1_key_desc, size_t asn1_key_desc_len,
+ uint32_t* attestation_version, //
+ SecurityLevel* attestation_security_level,
+ uint32_t* keymint_version, SecurityLevel* keymint_security_level,
+ vector<uint8_t>* attestation_challenge,
+ AuthorizationSet* software_enforced,
+ AuthorizationSet* tee_enforced, //
+ vector<uint8_t>* unique_id) {
+ const uint8_t* p = asn1_key_desc;
+ KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION_Ptr record(d2i_KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION(nullptr, &p, asn1_key_desc_len));
+ if (!record.get()) return ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
+
+ *attestation_version = ASN1_INTEGER_get(record->attestation_version);
+ *attestation_security_level =
+ static_cast<SecurityLevel>(ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(record->attestation_security_level));
+ *keymint_version = ASN1_INTEGER_get(record->keymint_version);
+ *keymint_security_level =
+ static_cast<SecurityLevel>(ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(record->keymint_security_level));
+
+ auto& chall = record->attestation_challenge;
+ attestation_challenge->resize(chall->length);
+ memcpy(attestation_challenge->data(), chall->data, chall->length);
+ auto& uid = record->unique_id;
+ unique_id->resize(uid->length);
+ memcpy(unique_id->data(), uid->data, uid->length);
+
+ ErrorCode error = extract_auth_list(record->software_enforced, software_enforced);
+ if (error != ErrorCode::OK) return error;
+
+ return extract_auth_list(record->tee_enforced, tee_enforced);
+}
+
+ErrorCode parse_root_of_trust(const uint8_t* asn1_key_desc, size_t asn1_key_desc_len,
+ vector<uint8_t>* verified_boot_key,
+ keymint_verified_boot_t* verified_boot_state, bool* device_locked,
+ vector<uint8_t>* verified_boot_hash) {
+ if (!verified_boot_key || !verified_boot_state || !device_locked || !verified_boot_hash) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << AT << "null pointer input(s)";
+ return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ const uint8_t* p = asn1_key_desc;
+ KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION_Ptr record(d2i_KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION(nullptr, &p, asn1_key_desc_len));
+ if (!record.get()) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Failed record parsing";
+ return ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST* root_of_trust = nullptr;
+ if (record->tee_enforced && record->tee_enforced->root_of_trust) {
+ root_of_trust = record->tee_enforced->root_of_trust;
+ } else if (record->software_enforced && record->software_enforced->root_of_trust) {
+ root_of_trust = record->software_enforced->root_of_trust;
+ } else {
+ LOG(ERROR) << AT << " Failed root of trust parsing";
+ return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ if (!root_of_trust->verified_boot_key) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << AT << " Failed verified boot key parsing";
+ return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+
+ auto& vb_key = root_of_trust->verified_boot_key;
+ verified_boot_key->resize(vb_key->length);
+ memcpy(verified_boot_key->data(), vb_key->data, vb_key->length);
+
+ *verified_boot_state = static_cast<keymint_verified_boot_t>(
+ ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(root_of_trust->verified_boot_state));
+ if (!verified_boot_state) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << AT << " Failed verified boot state parsing";
+ return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+
+ *device_locked = root_of_trust->device_locked;
+ if (!device_locked) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << AT << " Failed device locked parsing";
+ return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+
+ auto& vb_hash = root_of_trust->verified_boot_hash;
+ if (!vb_hash) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << AT << " Failed verified boot hash parsing";
+ return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ verified_boot_hash->resize(vb_hash->length);
+ memcpy(verified_boot_hash->data(), vb_hash->data, vb_hash->length);
+ return ErrorCode::OK; // KM_ERROR_OK;
+}
+
+} // namespace keymint
+} // namespace hardware
+} // namespace android
diff --git a/keymint/support/authorization_set.cpp b/keymint/support/authorization_set.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9fc4e13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/support/authorization_set.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,529 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include <keymintSupport/authorization_set.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <sstream>
+
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/Algorithm.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/BlockMode.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/Digest.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/KeyParameter.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/KeyPurpose.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/TagType.h>
+
+namespace android {
+namespace hardware {
+namespace keymint {
+
+void AuthorizationSet::Sort() {
+ std::sort(data_.begin(), data_.end());
+}
+
+void AuthorizationSet::Deduplicate() {
+ if (data_.empty()) return;
+
+ Sort();
+ std::vector<KeyParameter> result;
+
+ auto curr = data_.begin();
+ auto prev = curr++;
+ for (; curr != data_.end(); ++prev, ++curr) {
+ if (prev->tag == Tag::INVALID) continue;
+
+ if (*prev != *curr) {
+ result.push_back(std::move(*prev));
+ }
+ }
+ result.push_back(std::move(*prev));
+
+ std::swap(data_, result);
+}
+
+void AuthorizationSet::Union(const AuthorizationSet& other) {
+ data_.insert(data_.end(), other.data_.begin(), other.data_.end());
+ Deduplicate();
+}
+
+void AuthorizationSet::Subtract(const AuthorizationSet& other) {
+ Deduplicate();
+
+ auto i = other.begin();
+ while (i != other.end()) {
+ int pos = -1;
+ do {
+ pos = find(i->tag, pos);
+ if (pos != -1 && (*i == data_[pos])) {
+ data_.erase(data_.begin() + pos);
+ break;
+ }
+ } while (pos != -1);
+ ++i;
+ }
+}
+
+void AuthorizationSet::Filter(std::function<bool(const KeyParameter&)> doKeep) {
+ std::vector<KeyParameter> result;
+ for (auto& param : data_) {
+ if (doKeep(param)) {
+ result.push_back(std::move(param));
+ }
+ }
+ std::swap(data_, result);
+}
+
+KeyParameter& AuthorizationSet::operator[](int at) {
+ return data_[at];
+}
+
+const KeyParameter& AuthorizationSet::operator[](int at) const {
+ return data_[at];
+}
+
+void AuthorizationSet::Clear() {
+ data_.clear();
+}
+
+size_t AuthorizationSet::GetTagCount(Tag tag) const {
+ size_t count = 0;
+ for (int pos = -1; (pos = find(tag, pos)) != -1;) ++count;
+ return count;
+}
+
+int AuthorizationSet::find(Tag tag, int begin) const {
+ auto iter = data_.begin() + (1 + begin);
+
+ while (iter != data_.end() && iter->tag != tag) ++iter;
+
+ if (iter != data_.end()) return iter - data_.begin();
+ return -1;
+}
+
+bool AuthorizationSet::erase(int index) {
+ auto pos = data_.begin() + index;
+ if (pos != data_.end()) {
+ data_.erase(pos);
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+NullOr<const KeyParameter&> AuthorizationSet::GetEntry(Tag tag) const {
+ int pos = find(tag);
+ if (pos == -1) return {};
+ return data_[pos];
+}
+
+/**
+ * Persistent format is:
+ * | 32 bit indirect_size |
+ * --------------------------------
+ * | indirect_size bytes of data | this is where the blob data is stored
+ * --------------------------------
+ * | 32 bit element_count | number of entries
+ * | 32 bit elements_size | total bytes used by entries (entries have variable length)
+ * --------------------------------
+ * | elementes_size bytes of data | where the elements are stored
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Persistent format of blobs and bignums:
+ * | 32 bit tag |
+ * | 32 bit blob_length |
+ * | 32 bit indirect_offset |
+ */
+
+struct OutStreams {
+ std::ostream& indirect;
+ std::ostream& elements;
+ size_t skipped;
+};
+
+OutStreams& serializeParamValue(OutStreams& out, const vector<uint8_t>& blob) {
+ uint32_t buffer;
+
+ // write blob_length
+ auto blob_length = blob.size();
+ if (blob_length > std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max()) {
+ out.elements.setstate(std::ios_base::badbit);
+ return out;
+ }
+ buffer = blob_length;
+ out.elements.write(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&buffer), sizeof(uint32_t));
+
+ // write indirect_offset
+ auto offset = out.indirect.tellp();
+ if (offset < 0 || offset > std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max() ||
+ uint32_t(offset) + uint32_t(blob_length) < uint32_t(offset)) { // overflow check
+ out.elements.setstate(std::ios_base::badbit);
+ return out;
+ }
+ buffer = offset;
+ out.elements.write(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&buffer), sizeof(uint32_t));
+
+ // write blob to indirect stream
+ if (blob_length) out.indirect.write(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&blob[0]), blob_length);
+
+ return out;
+}
+
+template <typename T>
+OutStreams& serializeParamValue(OutStreams& out, const T& value) {
+ out.elements.write(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&value), sizeof(T));
+ return out;
+}
+
+OutStreams& serialize(TAG_INVALID_t&&, OutStreams& out, const KeyParameter&) {
+ // skip invalid entries.
+ ++out.skipped;
+ return out;
+}
+template <typename T>
+OutStreams& serialize(T ttag, OutStreams& out, const KeyParameter& param) {
+ out.elements.write(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(¶m.tag), sizeof(int32_t));
+ return serializeParamValue(out, accessTagValue(ttag, param));
+}
+
+template <typename... T>
+struct choose_serializer;
+template <typename... Tags>
+struct choose_serializer<MetaList<Tags...>> {
+ static OutStreams& serialize(OutStreams& out, const KeyParameter& param) {
+ return choose_serializer<Tags...>::serialize(out, param);
+ }
+};
+
+template <>
+struct choose_serializer<> {
+ static OutStreams& serialize(OutStreams& out, const KeyParameter& param) {
+ LOG(WARNING) << "Trying to serialize unknown tag " << unsigned(param.tag)
+ << ". Did you forget to add it to all_tags_t?";
+ ++out.skipped;
+ return out;
+ }
+};
+
+template <TagType tag_type, Tag tag, typename... Tail>
+struct choose_serializer<android::hardware::keymint::TypedTag<tag_type, tag>, Tail...> {
+ static OutStreams& serialize(OutStreams& out, const KeyParameter& param) {
+ if (param.tag == tag) {
+ return android::hardware::keymint::serialize(TypedTag<tag_type, tag>(), out, param);
+ } else {
+ return choose_serializer<Tail...>::serialize(out, param);
+ }
+ }
+};
+
+OutStreams& serialize(OutStreams& out, const KeyParameter& param) {
+ return choose_serializer<all_tags_t>::serialize(out, param);
+}
+
+std::ostream& serialize(std::ostream& out, const std::vector<KeyParameter>& params) {
+ std::stringstream indirect;
+ std::stringstream elements;
+ OutStreams streams = {indirect, elements, 0};
+ for (const auto& param : params) {
+ serialize(streams, param);
+ }
+ if (indirect.bad() || elements.bad()) {
+ out.setstate(std::ios_base::badbit);
+ return out;
+ }
+ auto pos = indirect.tellp();
+ if (pos < 0 || pos > std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max()) {
+ out.setstate(std::ios_base::badbit);
+ return out;
+ }
+ uint32_t indirect_size = pos;
+ pos = elements.tellp();
+ if (pos < 0 || pos > std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max()) {
+ out.setstate(std::ios_base::badbit);
+ return out;
+ }
+ uint32_t elements_size = pos;
+ uint32_t element_count = params.size() - streams.skipped;
+
+ out.write(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&indirect_size), sizeof(uint32_t));
+
+ pos = out.tellp();
+ if (indirect_size) out << indirect.rdbuf();
+ assert(out.tellp() - pos == indirect_size);
+
+ out.write(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&element_count), sizeof(uint32_t));
+ out.write(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&elements_size), sizeof(uint32_t));
+
+ pos = out.tellp();
+ if (elements_size) out << elements.rdbuf();
+ assert(out.tellp() - pos == elements_size);
+
+ return out;
+}
+
+struct InStreams {
+ std::istream& indirect;
+ std::istream& elements;
+ size_t invalids;
+};
+
+InStreams& deserializeParamValue(InStreams& in, vector<uint8_t>* blob) {
+ uint32_t blob_length = 0;
+ uint32_t offset = 0;
+ in.elements.read(reinterpret_cast<char*>(&blob_length), sizeof(uint32_t));
+ blob->resize(blob_length);
+ in.elements.read(reinterpret_cast<char*>(&offset), sizeof(uint32_t));
+ in.indirect.seekg(offset);
+ in.indirect.read(reinterpret_cast<char*>(&(*blob)[0]), blob->size());
+ return in;
+}
+
+template <typename T>
+InStreams& deserializeParamValue(InStreams& in, T* value) {
+ in.elements.read(reinterpret_cast<char*>(value), sizeof(T));
+ return in;
+}
+
+InStreams& deserialize(TAG_INVALID_t&&, InStreams& in, KeyParameter*) {
+ // there should be no invalid KeyParameters but if handle them as zero sized.
+ ++in.invalids;
+ return in;
+}
+
+template <typename T>
+InStreams& deserialize(T&& ttag, InStreams& in, KeyParameter* param) {
+ return deserializeParamValue(in, &accessTagValue(ttag, *param));
+}
+
+template <typename... T>
+struct choose_deserializer;
+template <typename... Tags>
+struct choose_deserializer<MetaList<Tags...>> {
+ static InStreams& deserialize(InStreams& in, KeyParameter* param) {
+ return choose_deserializer<Tags...>::deserialize(in, param);
+ }
+};
+template <>
+struct choose_deserializer<> {
+ static InStreams& deserialize(InStreams& in, KeyParameter*) {
+ // encountered an unknown tag -> fail parsing
+ in.elements.setstate(std::ios_base::badbit);
+ return in;
+ }
+};
+template <TagType tag_type, Tag tag, typename... Tail>
+struct choose_deserializer<TypedTag<tag_type, tag>, Tail...> {
+ static InStreams& deserialize(InStreams& in, KeyParameter* param) {
+ if (param->tag == tag) {
+ return android::hardware::keymint::deserialize(TypedTag<tag_type, tag>(), in, param);
+ } else {
+ return choose_deserializer<Tail...>::deserialize(in, param);
+ }
+ }
+};
+
+InStreams& deserialize(InStreams& in, KeyParameter* param) {
+ in.elements.read(reinterpret_cast<char*>(¶m->tag), sizeof(Tag));
+ return choose_deserializer<all_tags_t>::deserialize(in, param);
+}
+
+std::istream& deserialize(std::istream& in, std::vector<KeyParameter>* params) {
+ uint32_t indirect_size = 0;
+ in.read(reinterpret_cast<char*>(&indirect_size), sizeof(uint32_t));
+ std::string indirect_buffer(indirect_size, '\0');
+ if (indirect_buffer.size() != indirect_size) {
+ in.setstate(std::ios_base::badbit);
+ return in;
+ }
+ in.read(&indirect_buffer[0], indirect_buffer.size());
+
+ uint32_t element_count = 0;
+ in.read(reinterpret_cast<char*>(&element_count), sizeof(uint32_t));
+ uint32_t elements_size = 0;
+ in.read(reinterpret_cast<char*>(&elements_size), sizeof(uint32_t));
+
+ std::string elements_buffer(elements_size, '\0');
+ if (elements_buffer.size() != elements_size) {
+ in.setstate(std::ios_base::badbit);
+ return in;
+ }
+ in.read(&elements_buffer[0], elements_buffer.size());
+
+ if (in.bad()) return in;
+
+ // TODO write one-shot stream buffer to avoid copying here
+ std::stringstream indirect(indirect_buffer);
+ std::stringstream elements(elements_buffer);
+ InStreams streams = {indirect, elements, 0};
+
+ params->resize(element_count);
+
+ for (uint32_t i = 0; i < element_count; ++i) {
+ deserialize(streams, &(*params)[i]);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * There are legacy blobs which have invalid tags in them due to a bug during serialization.
+ * This makes sure that invalid tags are filtered from the result before it is returned.
+ */
+ if (streams.invalids > 0) {
+ std::vector<KeyParameter> filtered(element_count - streams.invalids);
+ auto ifiltered = filtered.begin();
+ for (auto& p : *params) {
+ if (p.tag != Tag::INVALID) {
+ *ifiltered++ = std::move(p);
+ }
+ }
+ *params = std::move(filtered);
+ }
+ return in;
+}
+
+void AuthorizationSet::Serialize(std::ostream* out) const {
+ serialize(*out, data_);
+}
+
+void AuthorizationSet::Deserialize(std::istream* in) {
+ deserialize(*in, &data_);
+}
+
+AuthorizationSetBuilder& AuthorizationSetBuilder::RsaKey(uint32_t key_size,
+ uint64_t public_exponent) {
+ Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA);
+ Authorization(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size);
+ Authorization(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, public_exponent);
+ return *this;
+}
+
+AuthorizationSetBuilder& AuthorizationSetBuilder::EcdsaKey(uint32_t key_size) {
+ Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC);
+ Authorization(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size);
+ return *this;
+}
+
+AuthorizationSetBuilder& AuthorizationSetBuilder::EcdsaKey(EcCurve curve) {
+ Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC);
+ Authorization(TAG_EC_CURVE, curve);
+ return *this;
+}
+
+AuthorizationSetBuilder& AuthorizationSetBuilder::AesKey(uint32_t key_size) {
+ Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::AES);
+ return Authorization(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size);
+}
+
+AuthorizationSetBuilder& AuthorizationSetBuilder::TripleDesKey(uint32_t key_size) {
+ Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES);
+ return Authorization(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size);
+}
+
+AuthorizationSetBuilder& AuthorizationSetBuilder::HmacKey(uint32_t key_size) {
+ Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC);
+ Authorization(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size);
+ return SigningKey();
+}
+
+AuthorizationSetBuilder& AuthorizationSetBuilder::RsaSigningKey(uint32_t key_size,
+ uint64_t public_exponent) {
+ RsaKey(key_size, public_exponent);
+ return SigningKey();
+}
+
+AuthorizationSetBuilder& AuthorizationSetBuilder::RsaEncryptionKey(uint32_t key_size,
+ uint64_t public_exponent) {
+ RsaKey(key_size, public_exponent);
+ return EncryptionKey();
+}
+
+AuthorizationSetBuilder& AuthorizationSetBuilder::EcdsaSigningKey(uint32_t key_size) {
+ EcdsaKey(key_size);
+ return SigningKey();
+}
+
+AuthorizationSetBuilder& AuthorizationSetBuilder::EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve curve) {
+ EcdsaKey(curve);
+ return SigningKey();
+}
+
+AuthorizationSetBuilder& AuthorizationSetBuilder::AesEncryptionKey(uint32_t key_size) {
+ AesKey(key_size);
+ return EncryptionKey();
+}
+
+AuthorizationSetBuilder& AuthorizationSetBuilder::TripleDesEncryptionKey(uint32_t key_size) {
+ TripleDesKey(key_size);
+ return EncryptionKey();
+}
+
+AuthorizationSetBuilder& AuthorizationSetBuilder::SigningKey() {
+ Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN);
+ return Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::VERIFY);
+}
+
+AuthorizationSetBuilder& AuthorizationSetBuilder::EncryptionKey() {
+ Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT);
+ return Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT);
+}
+
+AuthorizationSetBuilder& AuthorizationSetBuilder::NoDigestOrPadding() {
+ Authorization(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::NONE);
+ return Authorization(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::NONE);
+}
+
+AuthorizationSetBuilder& AuthorizationSetBuilder::EcbMode() {
+ return Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB);
+}
+
+AuthorizationSetBuilder& AuthorizationSetBuilder::GcmModeMinMacLen(uint32_t minMacLength) {
+ return BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, minMacLength);
+}
+
+AuthorizationSetBuilder& AuthorizationSetBuilder::GcmModeMacLen(uint32_t macLength) {
+ return BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, macLength);
+}
+
+AuthorizationSetBuilder& AuthorizationSetBuilder::BlockMode(
+ std::initializer_list<android::hardware::keymint::BlockMode> blockModes) {
+ for (auto mode : blockModes) {
+ push_back(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, mode);
+ }
+ return *this;
+}
+
+AuthorizationSetBuilder& AuthorizationSetBuilder::Digest(
+ std::vector<android::hardware::keymint::Digest> digests) {
+ for (auto digest : digests) {
+ push_back(TAG_DIGEST, digest);
+ }
+ return *this;
+}
+
+AuthorizationSetBuilder& AuthorizationSetBuilder::Padding(
+ std::initializer_list<PaddingMode> paddingModes) {
+ for (auto paddingMode : paddingModes) {
+ push_back(TAG_PADDING, paddingMode);
+ }
+ return *this;
+}
+
+} // namespace keymint
+} // namespace hardware
+} // namespace android
diff --git a/keymint/support/include/keymintSupport/attestation_record.h b/keymint/support/include/keymintSupport/attestation_record.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a69789
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/support/include/keymintSupport/attestation_record.h
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#pragma once
+
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/ErrorCode.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.h>
+
+#include <keymintSupport/attestation_record.h>
+#include <keymintSupport/authorization_set.h>
+#include <keymintSupport/openssl_utils.h>
+
+namespace android {
+namespace hardware {
+namespace keymint {
+
+using android::hardware::keymint::KeyParameter;
+using android::hardware::keymint::Tag;
+using android::hardware::keymint::TAG_ALGORITHM;
+
+class AuthorizationSet;
+
+/**
+ * The OID for Android attestation records. For the curious, it breaks down as follows:
+ *
+ * 1 = ISO
+ * 3 = org
+ * 6 = DoD (Huh? OIDs are weird.)
+ * 1 = IANA
+ * 4 = Private
+ * 1 = Enterprises
+ * 11129 = Google
+ * 2 = Google security
+ * 1 = certificate extension
+ * 17 = Android attestation extension.
+ */
+static const char kAttestionRecordOid[] = "1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.1.17";
+
+enum keymint_verified_boot_t {
+ KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_VERIFIED = 0,
+ KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_SELF_SIGNED = 1,
+ KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_UNVERIFIED = 2,
+ KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_FAILED = 3,
+};
+
+struct RootOfTrust {
+ SecurityLevel security_level;
+ vector<uint8_t> verified_boot_key;
+ vector<uint8_t> verified_boot_hash;
+ keymint_verified_boot_t verified_boot_state;
+ bool device_locked;
+};
+
+struct AttestationRecord {
+ RootOfTrust root_of_trust;
+ uint32_t attestation_version;
+ SecurityLevel attestation_security_level;
+ uint32_t keymint_version;
+ SecurityLevel keymint_security_level;
+ std::vector<uint8_t> attestation_challenge;
+ AuthorizationSet software_enforced;
+ AuthorizationSet hardware_enforced;
+ std::vector<uint8_t> unique_id;
+};
+
+ErrorCode parse_attestation_record(const uint8_t* asn1_key_desc, size_t asn1_key_desc_len,
+ uint32_t* attestation_version, //
+ SecurityLevel* attestation_security_level,
+ uint32_t* keymint_version, SecurityLevel* keymint_security_level,
+ std::vector<uint8_t>* attestation_challenge,
+ AuthorizationSet* software_enforced,
+ AuthorizationSet* tee_enforced, //
+ std::vector<uint8_t>* unique_id);
+
+ErrorCode parse_root_of_trust(const uint8_t* asn1_key_desc, size_t asn1_key_desc_len,
+ std::vector<uint8_t>* verified_boot_key,
+ keymint_verified_boot_t* verified_boot_state, bool* device_locked,
+ std::vector<uint8_t>* verified_boot_hash);
+
+} // namespace keymint
+} // namespace hardware
+} // namespace android
diff --git a/keymint/support/include/keymintSupport/authorization_set.h b/keymint/support/include/keymintSupport/authorization_set.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..141426a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/support/include/keymintSupport/authorization_set.h
@@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef SYSTEM_SECURITY_KEYSTORE_KM4_AUTHORIZATION_SET_H_
+#define SYSTEM_SECURITY_KEYSTORE_KM4_AUTHORIZATION_SET_H_
+
+#include <vector>
+
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/BlockMode.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/Digest.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/EcCurve.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/PaddingMode.h>
+
+#include <keymintSupport/keymint_tags.h>
+
+namespace android {
+namespace hardware {
+namespace keymint {
+
+using android::hardware::keymint::BlockMode;
+using android::hardware::keymint::Digest;
+using android::hardware::keymint::EcCurve;
+using android::hardware::keymint::PaddingMode;
+
+using std::vector;
+
+class AuthorizationSetBuilder;
+
+/**
+ * An ordered collection of KeyParameters. It provides memory ownership and some convenient
+ * functionality for sorting, deduplicating, joining, and subtracting sets of KeyParameters.
+ * For serialization, wrap the backing store of this structure in a vector<KeyParameter>.
+ */
+class AuthorizationSet {
+ public:
+ typedef KeyParameter value_type;
+
+ /**
+ * Construct an empty, dynamically-allocated, growable AuthorizationSet.
+ */
+ AuthorizationSet(){};
+
+ // Copy constructor.
+ AuthorizationSet(const AuthorizationSet& other) : data_(other.data_) {}
+
+ // Move constructor.
+ AuthorizationSet(AuthorizationSet&& other) noexcept : data_(std::move(other.data_)) {}
+
+ // Constructor from vector<KeyParameter>
+ AuthorizationSet(const vector<KeyParameter>& other) { *this = other; }
+
+ // Copy assignment.
+ AuthorizationSet& operator=(const AuthorizationSet& other) {
+ data_ = other.data_;
+ return *this;
+ }
+
+ // Move assignment.
+ AuthorizationSet& operator=(AuthorizationSet&& other) noexcept {
+ data_ = std::move(other.data_);
+ return *this;
+ }
+
+ AuthorizationSet& operator=(const vector<KeyParameter>& other) {
+ if (other.size() > 0) {
+ data_.resize(other.size());
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < data_.size(); ++i) {
+ /* This makes a deep copy even of embedded blobs.
+ * See assignment operator/copy constructor of vector.*/
+ data_[i] = other[i];
+ }
+ }
+ return *this;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Clear existing authorization set data
+ */
+ void Clear();
+
+ ~AuthorizationSet() = default;
+
+ /**
+ * Returns the size of the set.
+ */
+ size_t size() const { return data_.size(); }
+
+ /**
+ * Returns true if the set is empty.
+ */
+ bool empty() const { return size() == 0; }
+
+ /**
+ * Returns the data in the set, directly. Be careful with this.
+ */
+ const KeyParameter* data() const { return data_.data(); }
+
+ /**
+ * Sorts the set
+ */
+ void Sort();
+
+ /**
+ * Sorts the set and removes duplicates (inadvertently duplicating tags is easy to do with the
+ * AuthorizationSetBuilder).
+ */
+ void Deduplicate();
+
+ /**
+ * Adds all elements from \p set that are not already present in this AuthorizationSet. As a
+ * side-effect, if \p set is not null this AuthorizationSet will end up sorted.
+ */
+ void Union(const AuthorizationSet& set);
+
+ /**
+ * Removes all elements in \p set from this AuthorizationSet.
+ */
+ void Subtract(const AuthorizationSet& set);
+
+ /**
+ * Returns the offset of the next entry that matches \p tag, starting from the element after \p
+ * begin. If not found, returns -1.
+ */
+ int find(Tag tag, int begin = -1) const;
+
+ /**
+ * Removes the entry at the specified index. Returns true if successful, false if the index was
+ * out of bounds.
+ */
+ bool erase(int index);
+
+ /**
+ * Returns iterator (pointer) to beginning of elems array, to enable STL-style iteration
+ */
+ std::vector<KeyParameter>::const_iterator begin() const { return data_.begin(); }
+
+ /**
+ * Returns iterator (pointer) one past end of elems array, to enable STL-style iteration
+ */
+ std::vector<KeyParameter>::const_iterator end() const { return data_.end(); }
+
+ /**
+ * Modifies this Authorization set such that it only keeps the entries for which doKeep
+ * returns true.
+ */
+ void Filter(std::function<bool(const KeyParameter&)> doKeep);
+ /**
+ * Returns the nth element of the set.
+ * Like for std::vector::operator[] there is no range check performed. Use of out of range
+ * indices is undefined.
+ */
+ KeyParameter& operator[](int n);
+
+ /**
+ * Returns the nth element of the set.
+ * Like for std::vector::operator[] there is no range check performed. Use of out of range
+ * indices is undefined.
+ */
+ const KeyParameter& operator[](int n) const;
+
+ /**
+ * Returns true if the set contains at least one instance of \p tag
+ */
+ bool Contains(Tag tag) const { return find(tag) != -1; }
+
+ template <TagType tag_type, Tag tag, typename ValueT>
+ bool Contains(TypedTag<tag_type, tag> ttag, const ValueT& value) const {
+ for (const auto& param : data_) {
+ auto entry = authorizationValue(ttag, param);
+ if (entry.isOk() && static_cast<ValueT>(entry.value()) == value) return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+ }
+ /**
+ * Returns the number of \p tag entries.
+ */
+ size_t GetTagCount(Tag tag) const;
+
+ template <typename T>
+ inline NullOr<const typename TypedTag2ValueType<T>::type&> GetTagValue(T tag) const {
+ auto entry = GetEntry(tag);
+ if (entry.isOk()) return authorizationValue(tag, entry.value());
+ return {};
+ }
+
+ void push_back(const KeyParameter& param) { data_.push_back(param); }
+ void push_back(KeyParameter&& param) { data_.push_back(std::move(param)); }
+ void push_back(const AuthorizationSet& set) {
+ for (auto& entry : set) {
+ push_back(entry);
+ }
+ }
+ void push_back(AuthorizationSet&& set) {
+ std::move(set.begin(), set.end(), std::back_inserter(*this));
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Append the tag and enumerated value to the set.
+ * "val" may be exactly one parameter unless a boolean parameter is added.
+ * In this case "val" is omitted. This condition is checked at compile time by Authorization()
+ */
+ template <typename TypedTagT, typename... Value>
+ void push_back(TypedTagT tag, Value&&... val) {
+ push_back(Authorization(tag, std::forward<Value>(val)...));
+ }
+
+ template <typename Iterator>
+ void append(Iterator begin, Iterator end) {
+ while (begin != end) {
+ push_back(*begin);
+ ++begin;
+ }
+ }
+
+ vector<KeyParameter> vector_data() const {
+ vector<KeyParameter> result(begin(), end());
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ void Serialize(std::ostream* out) const;
+ void Deserialize(std::istream* in);
+
+ private:
+ NullOr<const KeyParameter&> GetEntry(Tag tag) const;
+
+ std::vector<KeyParameter> data_;
+};
+
+class AuthorizationSetBuilder : public AuthorizationSet {
+ public:
+ template <typename TagType, typename... ValueType>
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& Authorization(TagType ttag, ValueType&&... value) {
+ push_back(ttag, std::forward<ValueType>(value)...);
+ return *this;
+ }
+
+ template <Tag tag>
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& Authorization(TypedTag<TagType::BYTES, tag> ttag, const uint8_t* data,
+ size_t data_length) {
+ vector<uint8_t> new_blob(data, data + data_length);
+ push_back(ttag, new_blob);
+ return *this;
+ }
+
+ template <Tag tag>
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& Authorization(TypedTag<TagType::BYTES, tag> ttag, const char* data,
+ size_t data_length) {
+ return Authorization(ttag, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(data), data_length);
+ }
+
+ template <Tag tag>
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& Authorization(TypedTag<TagType::BYTES, tag> ttag, char* data,
+ size_t data_length) {
+ return Authorization(ttag, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(data), data_length);
+ }
+
+ template <Tag tag, size_t size>
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& Authorization(TypedTag<TagType::BYTES, tag> ttag,
+ const char (&data)[size]) {
+ return Authorization(ttag, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&data[0]),
+ size - 1); // drop the terminating '\0'
+ }
+
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& Authorizations(const AuthorizationSet& set) {
+ for (const auto& entry : set) {
+ push_back(entry);
+ }
+ return *this;
+ }
+
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& RsaKey(uint32_t key_size, uint64_t public_exponent);
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& EcdsaKey(uint32_t key_size);
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& EcdsaKey(EcCurve curve);
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& AesKey(uint32_t key_size);
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& TripleDesKey(uint32_t key_size);
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& HmacKey(uint32_t key_size);
+
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& RsaSigningKey(uint32_t key_size, uint64_t public_exponent);
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& RsaEncryptionKey(uint32_t key_size, uint64_t public_exponent);
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& EcdsaSigningKey(uint32_t key_size);
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve curve);
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& AesEncryptionKey(uint32_t key_size);
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& TripleDesEncryptionKey(uint32_t key_size);
+
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& SigningKey();
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& EncryptionKey();
+
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& NoDigestOrPadding();
+
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& EcbMode();
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& GcmModeMinMacLen(uint32_t minMacLength);
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& GcmModeMacLen(uint32_t macLength);
+
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& BlockMode(std::initializer_list<BlockMode> blockModes);
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& Digest(std::vector<Digest> digests);
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& Padding(std::initializer_list<PaddingMode> paddings);
+
+ template <typename... T>
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& BlockMode(T&&... a) {
+ return BlockMode({std::forward<T>(a)...});
+ }
+ template <typename... T>
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& Digest(T&&... a) {
+ return Digest({std::forward<T>(a)...});
+ }
+ template <typename... T>
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder& Padding(T&&... a) {
+ return Padding({std::forward<T>(a)...});
+ }
+};
+
+} // namespace keymint
+} // namespace hardware
+} // namespace android
+
+#endif // SYSTEM_SECURITY_KEYSTORE_KM4_AUTHORIZATION_SET_H_
diff --git a/keymint/support/include/keymintSupport/key_param_output.h b/keymint/support/include/keymintSupport/key_param_output.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a35a981
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/support/include/keymintSupport/key_param_output.h
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2017 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HARDWARE_INTERFACES_KEYMINT_SUPPORT_INCLUDE_KEY_PARAM_OUTPUT_H_
+#define HARDWARE_INTERFACES_KEYMINT_SUPPORT_INCLUDE_KEY_PARAM_OUTPUT_H_
+
+#include <iostream>
+#include <vector>
+
+#include "keymint_tags.h"
+
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/Algorithm.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/BlockMode.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/Digest.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/EcCurve.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/ErrorCode.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/HardwareAuthenticatorType.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/KeyCharacteristics.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/KeyOrigin.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/KeyParameter.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/KeyPurpose.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/PaddingMode.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/SecurityLevel.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/Tag.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/TagType.h>
+
+namespace android {
+namespace hardware {
+namespace keymint {
+
+using namespace ::android::hardware::keymint;
+
+inline ::std::ostream& operator<<(::std::ostream& os, Algorithm value) {
+ return os << toString(value);
+}
+
+inline ::std::ostream& operator<<(::std::ostream& os, BlockMode value) {
+ return os << toString(value);
+}
+
+inline ::std::ostream& operator<<(::std::ostream& os, Digest value) {
+ return os << toString(value);
+}
+
+inline ::std::ostream& operator<<(::std::ostream& os, EcCurve value) {
+ return os << toString(value);
+}
+
+inline ::std::ostream& operator<<(::std::ostream& os, ErrorCode value) {
+ return os << toString(value);
+}
+
+inline ::std::ostream& operator<<(::std::ostream& os, KeyOrigin value) {
+ return os << toString(value);
+}
+
+inline ::std::ostream& operator<<(::std::ostream& os, PaddingMode value) {
+ return os << toString(value);
+}
+
+inline ::std::ostream& operator<<(::std::ostream& os, SecurityLevel value) {
+ return os << toString(value);
+}
+
+template <typename ValueT>
+::std::ostream& operator<<(::std::ostream& os, const NullOr<ValueT>& value) {
+ if (!value.isOk()) {
+ os << "(value not present)";
+ } else {
+ os << value.value();
+ }
+ return os;
+}
+
+::std::ostream& operator<<(::std::ostream& os, const ::std::vector<KeyParameter>& set);
+::std::ostream& operator<<(::std::ostream& os, const KeyParameter& param);
+
+inline ::std::ostream& operator<<(::std::ostream& os, const KeyCharacteristics& value) {
+ return os << "SW: " << value.softwareEnforced << ::std::endl
+ << "HW: " << value.hardwareEnforced << ::std::endl;
+}
+
+inline ::std::ostream& operator<<(::std::ostream& os, KeyPurpose value) {
+ return os << toString(value);
+}
+
+inline ::std::ostream& operator<<(::std::ostream& os, Tag tag) {
+ return os << toString(tag);
+}
+
+} // namespace keymint
+} // namespace hardware
+} // namespace android
+
+#endif // HARDWARE_INTERFACES_KEYMINT_SUPPORT_INCLUDE_KEY_PARAM_OUTPUT_H_
diff --git a/keymint/support/include/keymintSupport/keymint_tags.h b/keymint/support/include/keymintSupport/keymint_tags.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f1060a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/support/include/keymintSupport/keymint_tags.h
@@ -0,0 +1,414 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HARDWARE_INTERFACES_KEYMINT_SUPPORT_INCLUDE_KEYMINT_TAGS_H_
+#define HARDWARE_INTERFACES_KEYMINT_SUPPORT_INCLUDE_KEYMINT_TAGS_H_
+
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/Algorithm.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/BlockMode.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/Digest.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/EcCurve.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/HardwareAuthenticatorType.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/KeyOrigin.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/KeyParameter.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/KeyPurpose.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/PaddingMode.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/SecurityLevel.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/Tag.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/TagType.h>
+
+namespace android::hardware::keymint {
+
+using android::hardware::keymint::KeyParameter;
+using android::hardware::keymint::Tag;
+using android::hardware::keymint::TagType;
+
+// The following create the numeric values that KM_TAG_PADDING and KM_TAG_DIGEST used to have. We
+// need these old values to be able to support old keys that use them.
+// TODO(seleneh) we should delete this code when we stop supporting keymaster1
+// and deletes it.
+static const int32_t KM_TAG_DIGEST_OLD = static_cast<int32_t>(TagType::ENUM) | 5;
+static const int32_t KM_TAG_PADDING_OLD = static_cast<int32_t>(TagType::ENUM) | 7;
+
+constexpr TagType typeFromTag(Tag tag) {
+ return static_cast<TagType>(static_cast<uint32_t>(tag) & static_cast<uint32_t>(0xf0000000));
+}
+
+/**
+ * TypedTag is a templatized version of Tag, which provides compile-time checking of
+ * keymint tag types. Instances are convertible to Tag, so they can be used wherever
+ * Tag is expected, and because they encode the tag type it's possible to create
+ * function overloads that only operate on tags with a particular type.
+ */
+template <TagType tag_type, Tag tag>
+struct TypedTag {
+ inline TypedTag() {
+ // Ensure that it's impossible to create a TypedTag instance whose 'tag' doesn't have type
+ // 'tag_type'. Attempting to instantiate a tag with the wrong type will result in a compile
+ // error (no match for template specialization StaticAssert<false>), with no run-time cost.
+ static_assert(typeFromTag(tag) == tag_type, "mismatch between tag and tag_type");
+ }
+ operator Tag() const { return tag; }
+ int32_t maskedTag() { return static_cast<uint32_t>(tag) & 0x0FFFFFFF; }
+};
+
+template <Tag tag>
+struct Tag2TypedTag {
+ typedef TypedTag<typeFromTag(tag), tag> type;
+};
+
+#define DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(name) \
+ typedef typename Tag2TypedTag<Tag::name>::type TAG_##name##_t; \
+ static TAG_##name##_t TAG_##name;
+
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(ACTIVE_DATETIME);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(ALGORITHM);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(APPLICATION_DATA);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(APPLICATION_ID);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(ASSOCIATED_DATA);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(AUTH_TIMEOUT);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(BLOCK_MODE);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(BOOTLOADER_ONLY);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(BOOT_PATCHLEVEL);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(CALLER_NONCE);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(CONFIRMATION_TOKEN);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(CREATION_DATETIME);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(DIGEST);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(EARLY_BOOT_ONLY);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(EC_CURVE);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(HARDWARE_TYPE);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(INVALID);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(KEY_SIZE);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(MAC_LENGTH);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(MAX_USES_PER_BOOT);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(MIN_MAC_LENGTH);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(NONCE);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(NO_AUTH_REQUIRED);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(ORIGIN);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(OS_PATCHLEVEL);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(OS_VERSION);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(PADDING);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(PURPOSE);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(ROOT_OF_TRUST);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(STORAGE_KEY);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(UNIQUE_ID);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(USER_AUTH_TYPE);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(USER_ID);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(USER_SECURE_ID);
+DECLARE_TYPED_TAG(VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL);
+
+template <typename... Elems>
+struct MetaList {};
+
+using all_tags_t = MetaList<
+ TAG_INVALID_t, TAG_KEY_SIZE_t, TAG_MAC_LENGTH_t, TAG_CALLER_NONCE_t, TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH_t,
+ TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT_t, TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID_t, TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME_t,
+ TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME_t, TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME_t,
+ TAG_MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS_t, TAG_MAX_USES_PER_BOOT_t, TAG_USER_ID_t, TAG_USER_SECURE_ID_t,
+ TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED_t, TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT_t, TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY_t,
+ TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED_t, TAG_APPLICATION_ID_t, TAG_APPLICATION_DATA_t,
+ TAG_CREATION_DATETIME_t, TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_t, TAG_HARDWARE_TYPE_t,
+ TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST_t, TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA_t, TAG_NONCE_t, TAG_BOOTLOADER_ONLY_t,
+ TAG_OS_VERSION_t, TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL_t, TAG_UNIQUE_ID_t, TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE_t,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID_t, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND_t, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE_t,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT_t, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER_t, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL_t,
+ TAG_RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION_t, TAG_PURPOSE_t, TAG_ALGORITHM_t, TAG_BLOCK_MODE_t,
+ TAG_DIGEST_t, TAG_PADDING_t, TAG_ORIGIN_t, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE_t, TAG_EC_CURVE_t,
+ TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL_t, TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL_t, TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED_t,
+ TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED_t>;
+
+template <typename TypedTagType>
+struct TypedTag2ValueType;
+
+#define MAKE_TAG_VALUE_ACCESSOR(tag_type, field_name) \
+ template <Tag tag> \
+ struct TypedTag2ValueType<TypedTag<tag_type, tag>> { \
+ typedef decltype(static_cast<KeyParameter*>(nullptr)->field_name) type; \
+ }; \
+ template <Tag tag> \
+ inline auto accessTagValue(TypedTag<tag_type, tag>, const KeyParameter& param) \
+ ->const decltype(param.field_name)& { \
+ return param.field_name; \
+ } \
+ template <Tag tag> \
+ inline auto accessTagValue(TypedTag<tag_type, tag>, KeyParameter& param) \
+ ->decltype(param.field_name)& { \
+ return param.field_name; \
+ }
+
+MAKE_TAG_VALUE_ACCESSOR(TagType::ULONG, longInteger)
+MAKE_TAG_VALUE_ACCESSOR(TagType::ULONG_REP, longInteger)
+MAKE_TAG_VALUE_ACCESSOR(TagType::DATE, longInteger)
+MAKE_TAG_VALUE_ACCESSOR(TagType::UINT, integer)
+MAKE_TAG_VALUE_ACCESSOR(TagType::UINT_REP, integer)
+MAKE_TAG_VALUE_ACCESSOR(TagType::BOOL, boolValue)
+MAKE_TAG_VALUE_ACCESSOR(TagType::BYTES, blob)
+MAKE_TAG_VALUE_ACCESSOR(TagType::BIGNUM, blob)
+
+// TODO(seleneh) change these MAKE_TAG_ENUM_VALUE_ACCESSOR back to the 2 parameter
+// version when aidl supports union
+#define MAKE_TAG_ENUM_VALUE_ACCESSOR(typed_tag, field_name, field_type) \
+ template <> \
+ struct TypedTag2ValueType<decltype(typed_tag)> { \
+ typedef field_type type; \
+ }; \
+ inline auto accessTagValue(decltype(typed_tag), const KeyParameter& param) \
+ ->const field_type& { \
+ return *reinterpret_cast<const field_type*>(¶m.field_name); \
+ } \
+ inline auto accessTagValue(decltype(typed_tag), KeyParameter& param)->field_type& { \
+ return *reinterpret_cast<field_type*>(¶m.field_name); \
+ }
+
+MAKE_TAG_ENUM_VALUE_ACCESSOR(TAG_ALGORITHM, integer, Algorithm)
+MAKE_TAG_ENUM_VALUE_ACCESSOR(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, integer, BlockMode)
+MAKE_TAG_ENUM_VALUE_ACCESSOR(TAG_DIGEST, integer, Digest)
+MAKE_TAG_ENUM_VALUE_ACCESSOR(TAG_EC_CURVE, integer, EcCurve)
+MAKE_TAG_ENUM_VALUE_ACCESSOR(TAG_ORIGIN, integer, KeyOrigin)
+MAKE_TAG_ENUM_VALUE_ACCESSOR(TAG_PADDING, integer, PaddingMode)
+MAKE_TAG_ENUM_VALUE_ACCESSOR(TAG_PURPOSE, integer, KeyPurpose)
+MAKE_TAG_ENUM_VALUE_ACCESSOR(TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, integer, HardwareAuthenticatorType)
+MAKE_TAG_ENUM_VALUE_ACCESSOR(TAG_HARDWARE_TYPE, integer, SecurityLevel)
+
+template <TagType tag_type, Tag tag, typename ValueT>
+inline KeyParameter makeKeyParameter(TypedTag<tag_type, tag> ttag, ValueT&& value) {
+ KeyParameter param;
+ param.tag = tag;
+ param.longInteger = 0;
+ accessTagValue(ttag, param) = std::forward<ValueT>(value);
+ return param;
+}
+
+// the boolean case
+template <Tag tag>
+inline KeyParameter makeKeyParameter(TypedTag<TagType::BOOL, tag>) {
+ KeyParameter param;
+ param.tag = tag;
+ param.boolValue = true;
+ return param;
+}
+
+template <typename... Pack>
+struct FirstOrNoneHelper;
+template <typename First>
+struct FirstOrNoneHelper<First> {
+ typedef First type;
+};
+template <>
+struct FirstOrNoneHelper<> {
+ struct type {};
+};
+
+template <typename... Pack>
+using FirstOrNone = typename FirstOrNoneHelper<Pack...>::type;
+
+template <TagType tag_type, Tag tag, typename... Args>
+inline KeyParameter Authorization(TypedTag<tag_type, tag> ttag, Args&&... args) {
+ static_assert(tag_type != TagType::BOOL || (sizeof...(args) == 0),
+ "TagType::BOOL Authorizations do not take parameters. Presence is truth.");
+ static_assert(tag_type == TagType::BOOL || (sizeof...(args) == 1),
+ "Authorization other then TagType::BOOL take exactly one parameter.");
+ static_assert(
+ tag_type == TagType::BOOL ||
+ std::is_convertible<
+ std::remove_cv_t<std::remove_reference_t<FirstOrNone<Args...>>>,
+ typename TypedTag2ValueType<TypedTag<tag_type, tag>>::type>::value,
+ "Invalid argument type for given tag.");
+
+ return makeKeyParameter(ttag, std::forward<Args>(args)...);
+}
+
+/**
+ * This class wraps a (mostly return) value and stores whether or not the wrapped value is valid out
+ * of band. Note that if the wrapped value is a reference it is unsafe to access the value if
+ * !isOk(). If the wrapped type is a pointer or value and !isOk(), it is still safe to access the
+ * wrapped value. In this case the pointer will be NULL though, and the value will be default
+ * constructed.
+ *
+ * TODO(seleneh) replace this with std::optional.
+ */
+template <typename ValueT>
+class NullOr {
+ using internal_t = std::conditional_t<std::is_lvalue_reference<ValueT>::value,
+ std::remove_reference_t<ValueT>*, ValueT>;
+
+ struct pointer_initializer {
+ static std::nullptr_t init() { return nullptr; }
+ };
+ struct value_initializer {
+ static ValueT init() { return ValueT(); }
+ };
+ struct value_pointer_deref_t {
+ static ValueT& deref(ValueT& v) { return v; }
+ };
+ struct reference_deref_t {
+ static auto& deref(internal_t v) { return *v; }
+ };
+ using initializer_t = std::conditional_t<std::is_lvalue_reference<ValueT>::value ||
+ std::is_pointer<ValueT>::value,
+ pointer_initializer, value_initializer>;
+ using deref_t = std::conditional_t<std::is_lvalue_reference<ValueT>::value, reference_deref_t,
+ value_pointer_deref_t>;
+
+ public:
+ NullOr() : value_(initializer_t::init()), null_(true) {}
+ template <typename T>
+ NullOr(T&& value, typename std::enable_if<
+ !std::is_lvalue_reference<ValueT>::value &&
+ std::is_same<std::decay_t<ValueT>, std::decay_t<T>>::value,
+ int>::type = 0)
+ : value_(std::forward<ValueT>(value)), null_(false) {}
+ template <typename T>
+ NullOr(T& value, typename std::enable_if<
+ std::is_lvalue_reference<ValueT>::value &&
+ std::is_same<std::decay_t<ValueT>, std::decay_t<T>>::value,
+ int>::type = 0)
+ : value_(&value), null_(false) {}
+
+ bool isOk() const { return !null_; }
+
+ const ValueT& value() const& { return deref_t::deref(value_); }
+ ValueT& value() & { return deref_t::deref(value_); }
+ ValueT&& value() && { return std::move(deref_t::deref(value_)); }
+
+ private:
+ internal_t value_;
+ bool null_;
+};
+
+template <typename T>
+std::remove_reference_t<T> NullOrOr(T&& v) {
+ if (v.isOk()) return v;
+ return {};
+}
+
+template <typename Head, typename... Tail>
+std::remove_reference_t<Head> NullOrOr(Head&& head, Tail&&... tail) {
+ if (head.isOk()) return head;
+ return NullOrOr(std::forward<Tail>(tail)...);
+}
+
+template <typename Default, typename Wrapped>
+std::remove_reference_t<Wrapped> defaultOr(NullOr<Wrapped>&& optional, Default&& def) {
+ static_assert(std::is_convertible<std::remove_reference_t<Default>,
+ std::remove_reference_t<Wrapped>>::value,
+ "Type of default value must match the type wrapped by NullOr");
+ if (optional.isOk()) return optional.value();
+ return def;
+}
+
+template <TagType tag_type, Tag tag>
+inline NullOr<const typename TypedTag2ValueType<TypedTag<tag_type, tag>>::type&> authorizationValue(
+ TypedTag<tag_type, tag> ttag, const KeyParameter& param) {
+ if (tag != param.tag) return {};
+ return accessTagValue(ttag, param);
+}
+
+} // namespace android::hardware::keymint
+
+namespace std {
+
+using namespace android::hardware::keymint;
+
+// Aidl generates KeyParameter operator<, >, ==, != for cpp translation but not ndk
+// translations. So we cannot straight forward overload these operators.
+// However we need our custom comparison for KeyParameters. So we will
+// overload std::less, equal_to instead.
+template <>
+struct std::less<KeyParameter> {
+ bool operator()(const KeyParameter& a, const KeyParameter& b) const {
+ if (a.tag != b.tag) return a.tag < b.tag;
+ int retval;
+ switch (typeFromTag(a.tag)) {
+ case TagType::INVALID:
+ case TagType::BOOL:
+ return false;
+ case TagType::ENUM:
+ case TagType::ENUM_REP:
+ case TagType::UINT:
+ case TagType::UINT_REP:
+ return a.integer < b.integer;
+ case TagType::ULONG:
+ case TagType::ULONG_REP:
+ case TagType::DATE:
+ return a.longInteger < b.longInteger;
+ case TagType::BIGNUM:
+ case TagType::BYTES:
+ // Handle the empty cases.
+ if (a.blob.size() == 0) return b.blob.size() != 0;
+ if (b.blob.size() == 0) return false;
+ retval = memcmp(&a.blob[0], &b.blob[0], std::min(a.blob.size(), b.blob.size()));
+ // if one is the prefix of the other the longer wins
+ if (retval == 0) return a.blob.size() < b.blob.size();
+ // Otherwise a is less if a is less.
+ else
+ return retval < 0;
+ }
+ return false;
+ }
+};
+
+template <>
+struct std::equal_to<KeyParameter> {
+ bool operator()(const KeyParameter& a, const KeyParameter& b) const {
+ if (a.tag != b.tag) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ switch (typeFromTag(a.tag)) {
+ case TagType::INVALID:
+ case TagType::BOOL:
+ return true;
+ case TagType::ENUM:
+ case TagType::ENUM_REP:
+ case TagType::UINT:
+ case TagType::UINT_REP:
+ return a.integer == b.integer;
+ case TagType::ULONG:
+ case TagType::ULONG_REP:
+ case TagType::DATE:
+ return a.longInteger == b.longInteger;
+ case TagType::BIGNUM:
+ case TagType::BYTES:
+ if (a.blob.size() != b.blob.size()) return false;
+ return a.blob.size() == 0 || memcmp(&a.blob[0], &b.blob[0], a.blob.size()) == 0;
+ }
+ return false;
+ }
+};
+
+} // namespace std
+
+#endif // HARDWARE_INTERFACES_KEYMINT_SUPPORT_INCLUDE_KEYMINT_TAGS_H_
diff --git a/keymint/support/include/keymintSupport/keymint_utils.h b/keymint/support/include/keymintSupport/keymint_utils.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aa1e93b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/support/include/keymintSupport/keymint_utils.h
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#pragma once
+
+#ifndef HARDWARE_INTERFACES_KEYMINT_10_SUPPORT_KEYMINT_UTILS_H_
+#define HARDWARE_INTERFACES_KEYMINT_10_SUPPORT_KEYMINT_UTILS_H_
+
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/HardwareAuthToken.h>
+
+namespace android {
+namespace hardware {
+namespace keymint {
+
+using std::vector;
+
+inline static std::vector<uint8_t> blob2vector(const uint8_t* data, const size_t length) {
+ std::vector<uint8_t> result(data, data + length);
+ return result;
+}
+
+inline static std::vector<uint8_t> blob2vector(const std::string& value) {
+ vector<uint8_t> result(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(value.data()),
+ reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(value.data()) + value.size());
+ return result;
+}
+
+HardwareAuthToken vector2AuthToken(const vector<uint8_t>& buffer);
+vector<uint8_t> authToken2vector(const HardwareAuthToken& token);
+
+uint32_t getOsVersion();
+uint32_t getOsPatchlevel();
+
+} // namespace keymint
+} // namespace hardware
+} // namespace android
+
+#endif // HARDWARE_INTERFACES_KEYMINT_10_SUPPORT_KEYMINT_UTILS_H_
diff --git a/keymint/support/include/keymintSupport/openssl_utils.h b/keymint/support/include/keymintSupport/openssl_utils.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..39633ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/support/include/keymintSupport/openssl_utils.h
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2017 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HARDWARE_INTERFACES_KEYMINT_1_0_SUPPORT_OPENSSL_UTILS_H_
+#define HARDWARE_INTERFACES_KEYMINT_1_0_SUPPORT_OPENSSL_UTILS_H_
+
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/Digest.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+template <typename T, void (*F)(T*)>
+struct UniquePtrDeleter {
+ void operator()(T* p) const { F(p); }
+};
+
+typedef UniquePtrDeleter<EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_free> EVP_PKEY_Delete;
+
+#define MAKE_OPENSSL_PTR_TYPE(type) \
+ typedef std::unique_ptr<type, UniquePtrDeleter<type, type##_free>> type##_Ptr;
+
+MAKE_OPENSSL_PTR_TYPE(ASN1_OBJECT)
+MAKE_OPENSSL_PTR_TYPE(EVP_PKEY)
+MAKE_OPENSSL_PTR_TYPE(RSA)
+MAKE_OPENSSL_PTR_TYPE(X509)
+MAKE_OPENSSL_PTR_TYPE(BN_CTX)
+
+typedef std::unique_ptr<BIGNUM, UniquePtrDeleter<BIGNUM, BN_free>> BIGNUM_Ptr;
+
+inline const EVP_MD* openssl_digest(android::hardware::keymint::Digest digest) {
+ switch (digest) {
+ case android::hardware::keymint::Digest::NONE:
+ return nullptr;
+ case android::hardware::keymint::Digest::MD5:
+ return EVP_md5();
+ case android::hardware::keymint::Digest::SHA1:
+ return EVP_sha1();
+ case android::hardware::keymint::Digest::SHA_2_224:
+ return EVP_sha224();
+ case android::hardware::keymint::Digest::SHA_2_256:
+ return EVP_sha256();
+ case android::hardware::keymint::Digest::SHA_2_384:
+ return EVP_sha384();
+ case android::hardware::keymint::Digest::SHA_2_512:
+ return EVP_sha512();
+ }
+ return nullptr;
+}
+
+#endif // HARDWARE_INTERFACES_KEYMINT_1_0_SUPPORT_OPENSSL_UTILS_H_
diff --git a/keymint/support/key_param_output.cpp b/keymint/support/key_param_output.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e33558
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/support/key_param_output.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2017 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include <keymintSupport/key_param_output.h>
+
+#include <keymintSupport/keymint_tags.h>
+
+#include <iomanip>
+
+namespace android {
+namespace hardware {
+namespace keymint {
+
+using ::std::endl;
+using ::std::ostream;
+
+ostream& operator<<(ostream& os, const ::std::vector<KeyParameter>& set) {
+ if (set.size() == 0) {
+ os << "(Empty)" << endl;
+ } else {
+ os << "\n";
+ for (const auto& elem : set) os << elem << endl;
+ }
+ return os;
+}
+
+// TODO(seleneh) update this to a parsing that looks at each tags individually
+// such as ALGORITHM BLOCK_MODE when aidl union support is added.
+ostream& operator<<(ostream& os, const KeyParameter& param) {
+ os << param.tag << ": ";
+ switch (typeFromTag(param.tag)) {
+ case TagType::INVALID:
+ return os << " Invalid";
+ case TagType::ENUM_REP:
+ case TagType::ENUM:
+ case TagType::UINT_REP:
+ case TagType::UINT:
+ return os << param.integer;
+ case TagType::ULONG_REP:
+ case TagType::ULONG:
+ case TagType::DATE:
+ return os << param.longInteger;
+ case TagType::BOOL:
+ return os << "true";
+ case TagType::BIGNUM:
+ os << " Bignum: ";
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < param.blob.size(); ++i) {
+ os << std::hex << ::std::setw(2) << static_cast<int>(param.blob[i]) << ::std::dec;
+ }
+ return os;
+ case TagType::BYTES:
+ os << " Bytes: ";
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < param.blob.size(); ++i) {
+ os << ::std::hex << ::std::setw(2) << static_cast<int>(param.blob[i]) << ::std::dec;
+ }
+ return os;
+ }
+ return os << "UNKNOWN TAG TYPE!";
+}
+
+} // namespace keymint
+} // namespace hardware
+} // namespace android
diff --git a/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp b/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fd57cf5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include <regex.h>
+
+#include <android-base/properties.h>
+#include <hardware/hw_auth_token.h>
+#include <keymintSupport/keymint_utils.h>
+
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+namespace android::hardware::keymint {
+
+namespace {
+
+constexpr char kPlatformVersionProp[] = "ro.build.version.release";
+constexpr char kPlatformVersionRegex[] = "^([0-9]{1,2})(\\.([0-9]{1,2}))?(\\.([0-9]{1,2}))?";
+constexpr size_t kMajorVersionMatch = 1;
+constexpr size_t kMinorVersionMatch = 3;
+constexpr size_t kSubminorVersionMatch = 5;
+constexpr size_t kPlatformVersionMatchCount = kSubminorVersionMatch + 1;
+
+constexpr char kPlatformPatchlevelProp[] = "ro.build.version.security_patch";
+constexpr char kPlatformPatchlevelRegex[] = "^([0-9]{4})-([0-9]{2})-[0-9]{2}$";
+constexpr size_t kYearMatch = 1;
+constexpr size_t kMonthMatch = 2;
+constexpr size_t kPlatformPatchlevelMatchCount = kMonthMatch + 1;
+
+uint32_t match_to_uint32(const char* expression, const regmatch_t& match) {
+ if (match.rm_so == -1) return 0;
+
+ size_t len = match.rm_eo - match.rm_so;
+ std::string s(expression + match.rm_so, len);
+ return std::stoul(s);
+}
+
+std::string wait_and_get_property(const char* prop) {
+ std::string prop_value;
+ while (!::android::base::WaitForPropertyCreation(prop))
+ ;
+ prop_value = ::android::base::GetProperty(prop, "" /* default */);
+ return prop_value;
+}
+
+} // anonymous namespace
+
+uint32_t getOsVersion(const char* version_str) {
+ regex_t regex;
+ if (regcomp(®ex, kPlatformVersionRegex, REG_EXTENDED)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ regmatch_t matches[kPlatformVersionMatchCount];
+ int not_match =
+ regexec(®ex, version_str, kPlatformVersionMatchCount, matches, 0 /* flags */);
+ regfree(®ex);
+ if (not_match) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ uint32_t major = match_to_uint32(version_str, matches[kMajorVersionMatch]);
+ uint32_t minor = match_to_uint32(version_str, matches[kMinorVersionMatch]);
+ uint32_t subminor = match_to_uint32(version_str, matches[kSubminorVersionMatch]);
+
+ return (major * 100 + minor) * 100 + subminor;
+}
+
+uint32_t getOsVersion() {
+ std::string version = wait_and_get_property(kPlatformVersionProp);
+ return getOsVersion(version.c_str());
+}
+
+uint32_t getOsPatchlevel(const char* patchlevel_str) {
+ regex_t regex;
+ if (regcomp(®ex, kPlatformPatchlevelRegex, REG_EXTENDED) != 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ regmatch_t matches[kPlatformPatchlevelMatchCount];
+ int not_match =
+ regexec(®ex, patchlevel_str, kPlatformPatchlevelMatchCount, matches, 0 /* flags */);
+ regfree(®ex);
+ if (not_match) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ uint32_t year = match_to_uint32(patchlevel_str, matches[kYearMatch]);
+ uint32_t month = match_to_uint32(patchlevel_str, matches[kMonthMatch]);
+
+ if (month < 1 || month > 12) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return year * 100 + month;
+}
+
+uint32_t getOsPatchlevel() {
+ std::string patchlevel = wait_and_get_property(kPlatformPatchlevelProp);
+ return getOsPatchlevel(patchlevel.c_str());
+}
+
+} // namespace android::hardware::keymint