diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/default/Android.bp b/security/keymint/aidl/default/Android.bp
index 953630b..d815ff7 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/default/Android.bp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/default/Android.bp
@@ -7,39 +7,29 @@
     default_applicable_licenses: ["hardware_interfaces_license"],
 }
 
-cc_binary {
+rust_binary {
     name: "android.hardware.security.keymint-service",
     relative_install_path: "hw",
+    vendor: true,
     init_rc: ["android.hardware.security.keymint-service.rc"],
     vintf_fragments: [
         "android.hardware.security.keymint-service.xml",
         "android.hardware.security.sharedsecret-service.xml",
         "android.hardware.security.secureclock-service.xml",
     ],
-    vendor: true,
-    cflags: [
-        "-Wall",
-        "-Wextra",
-    ],
     defaults: [
-        "keymint_use_latest_hal_aidl_ndk_shared",
-    ],
-    shared_libs: [
-        "android.hardware.security.rkp-V3-ndk",
-        "android.hardware.security.sharedsecret-V1-ndk",
-        "android.hardware.security.secureclock-V1-ndk",
-        "libbase",
-        "libbinder_ndk",
-        "libcppbor_external",
-        "libcrypto",
-        "libkeymaster_portable",
-        "libkeymint",
-        "liblog",
-        "libpuresoftkeymasterdevice",
-        "libutils",
+        "keymint_use_latest_hal_aidl_rust",
     ],
     srcs: [
-        "service.cpp",
+        "main.rs",
+    ],
+    rustlibs: [
+        "libandroid_logger",
+        "libbinder_rs",
+        "liblog_rust",
+        "libkmr_hal",
+        "libkmr_hal_nonsecure",
+        "libkmr_ta_nonsecure",
     ],
     required: [
         "android.hardware.hardware_keystore.xml",
@@ -52,3 +42,39 @@
     vendor: true,
     src: "android.hardware.hardware_keystore.xml",
 }
+
+rust_library {
+    name: "libkmr_hal_nonsecure",
+    crate_name: "kmr_hal_nonsecure",
+    vendor_available: true,
+    lints: "android",
+    rustlibs: [
+        "libbinder_rs",
+        "libhex",
+        "liblibc",
+        "liblog_rust",
+        "libkmr_hal",
+        "libkmr_wire",
+    ],
+    srcs: ["hal/lib.rs"],
+
+}
+
+rust_library {
+    name: "libkmr_ta_nonsecure",
+    crate_name: "kmr_ta_nonsecure",
+    vendor_available: true,
+    host_supported: true,
+    lints: "android",
+    rustlibs: [
+        "libhex",
+        "liblibc",
+        "liblog_rust",
+        "libkmr_common",
+        "libkmr_crypto_boring",
+        "libkmr_ta",
+        "libkmr_wire",
+    ],
+    srcs: ["ta/lib.rs"],
+
+}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/default/hal/lib.rs b/security/keymint/aidl/default/hal/lib.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..621f077
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/default/hal/lib.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2023 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+//! KeyMint helper functions that are only suitable for non-secure environments
+//! such as Cuttlefish.
+
+use kmr_hal::env::get_property;
+use log::error;
+
+/// Populate attestation ID information based on properties (where available).
+/// Retrieving the serial number requires SELinux permission.
+pub fn attestation_id_info() -> kmr_wire::AttestationIdInfo {
+    let prop = |name| {
+        get_property(name)
+            .unwrap_or_else(|_| format!("{} unavailable", name))
+            .as_bytes()
+            .to_vec()
+    };
+    kmr_wire::AttestationIdInfo {
+        brand: prop("ro.product.brand"),
+        device: prop("ro.product.device"),
+        product: prop("ro.product.name"),
+        serial: prop("ro.serialno"),
+        manufacturer: prop("ro.product.manufacturer"),
+        model: prop("ro.product.model"),
+        // Currently modem_simulator always returns one fixed value. See `handleGetIMEI` in
+        // device/google/cuttlefish/host/commands/modem_simulator/misc_service.cpp for more details.
+        // TODO(b/263188546): Use device-specific IMEI values when available.
+        imei: b"867400022047199".to_vec(),
+        imei2: b"867400022047199".to_vec(),
+        meid: vec![],
+    }
+}
+
+/// Get boot information based on system properties.
+pub fn get_boot_info() -> kmr_wire::SetBootInfoRequest {
+    // No access to a verified boot key.
+    let verified_boot_key = vec![0; 32];
+    let vbmeta_digest = get_property("ro.boot.vbmeta.digest").unwrap_or_else(|_| "00".repeat(32));
+    let verified_boot_hash = hex::decode(&vbmeta_digest).unwrap_or_else(|_e| {
+        error!("failed to parse hex data in '{}'", vbmeta_digest);
+        vec![0; 32]
+    });
+    let device_boot_locked = match get_property("ro.boot.vbmeta.device_state")
+        .unwrap_or_else(|_| "no-prop".to_string())
+        .as_str()
+    {
+        "locked" => true,
+        "unlocked" => false,
+        v => {
+            error!("Unknown device_state '{}', treating as unlocked", v);
+            false
+        }
+    };
+    let verified_boot_state = match get_property("ro.boot.verifiedbootstate")
+        .unwrap_or_else(|_| "no-prop".to_string())
+        .as_str()
+    {
+        "green" => 0,  // Verified
+        "yellow" => 1, // SelfSigned
+        "orange" => 2, // Unverified,
+        "red" => 3,    // Failed,
+        v => {
+            error!("Unknown boot state '{}', treating as Unverified", v);
+            2
+        }
+    };
+
+    // Attempt to get the boot patchlevel from a system property.  This requires an SELinux
+    // permission, so fall back to re-using the OS patchlevel if this can't be done.
+    let boot_patchlevel_prop = get_property("ro.vendor.boot_security_patch").unwrap_or_else(|e| {
+        error!("Failed to retrieve boot patchlevel: {:?}", e);
+        get_property(kmr_hal::env::OS_PATCHLEVEL_PROPERTY)
+            .unwrap_or_else(|_| "1970-09-19".to_string())
+    });
+    let boot_patchlevel =
+        kmr_hal::env::extract_patchlevel(&boot_patchlevel_prop).unwrap_or(19700919);
+
+    kmr_wire::SetBootInfoRequest {
+        verified_boot_key,
+        device_boot_locked,
+        verified_boot_state,
+        verified_boot_hash,
+        boot_patchlevel,
+    }
+}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/default/main.rs b/security/keymint/aidl/default/main.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ea432d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/default/main.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2023 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+//! Default implementation of the KeyMint HAL and related HALs.
+//!
+//! This implementation of the HAL is only intended to allow testing and policy compliance.  A real
+//! implementation **must be implemented in a secure environment**.
+
+use kmr_hal::SerializedChannel;
+use kmr_hal_nonsecure::{attestation_id_info, get_boot_info};
+use log::{debug, error, info};
+use std::ops::DerefMut;
+use std::sync::{mpsc, Arc, Mutex};
+
+/// Name of KeyMint binder device instance.
+static SERVICE_INSTANCE: &str = "default";
+
+static KM_SERVICE_NAME: &str = "android.hardware.security.keymint.IKeyMintDevice";
+static RPC_SERVICE_NAME: &str = "android.hardware.security.keymint.IRemotelyProvisionedComponent";
+static CLOCK_SERVICE_NAME: &str = "android.hardware.security.secureclock.ISecureClock";
+static SECRET_SERVICE_NAME: &str = "android.hardware.security.sharedsecret.ISharedSecret";
+
+/// Local error type for failures in the HAL service.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+struct HalServiceError(String);
+
+impl From<String> for HalServiceError {
+    fn from(s: String) -> Self {
+        Self(s)
+    }
+}
+
+fn main() {
+    if let Err(e) = inner_main() {
+        panic!("HAL service failed: {:?}", e);
+    }
+}
+
+fn inner_main() -> Result<(), HalServiceError> {
+    // Initialize Android logging.
+    android_logger::init_once(
+        android_logger::Config::default()
+            .with_tag("keymint-hal-nonsecure")
+            .with_max_level(log::LevelFilter::Info)
+            .with_log_buffer(android_logger::LogId::System),
+    );
+    // Redirect panic messages to logcat.
+    std::panic::set_hook(Box::new(|panic_info| {
+        error!("{}", panic_info);
+    }));
+
+    info!("Insecure KeyMint HAL service is starting.");
+
+    info!("Starting thread pool now.");
+    binder::ProcessState::start_thread_pool();
+
+    // Create a TA in-process, which acts as a local channel for communication.
+    let channel = Arc::new(Mutex::new(LocalTa::new()));
+
+    let km_service = kmr_hal::keymint::Device::new_as_binder(channel.clone());
+    let service_name = format!("{}/{}", KM_SERVICE_NAME, SERVICE_INSTANCE);
+    binder::add_service(&service_name, km_service.as_binder()).map_err(|e| {
+        HalServiceError(format!(
+            "Failed to register service {} because of {:?}.",
+            service_name, e
+        ))
+    })?;
+
+    let rpc_service = kmr_hal::rpc::Device::new_as_binder(channel.clone());
+    let service_name = format!("{}/{}", RPC_SERVICE_NAME, SERVICE_INSTANCE);
+    binder::add_service(&service_name, rpc_service.as_binder()).map_err(|e| {
+        HalServiceError(format!(
+            "Failed to register service {} because of {:?}.",
+            service_name, e
+        ))
+    })?;
+
+    let clock_service = kmr_hal::secureclock::Device::new_as_binder(channel.clone());
+    let service_name = format!("{}/{}", CLOCK_SERVICE_NAME, SERVICE_INSTANCE);
+    binder::add_service(&service_name, clock_service.as_binder()).map_err(|e| {
+        HalServiceError(format!(
+            "Failed to register service {} because of {:?}.",
+            service_name, e
+        ))
+    })?;
+
+    let secret_service = kmr_hal::sharedsecret::Device::new_as_binder(channel.clone());
+    let service_name = format!("{}/{}", SECRET_SERVICE_NAME, SERVICE_INSTANCE);
+    binder::add_service(&service_name, secret_service.as_binder()).map_err(|e| {
+        HalServiceError(format!(
+            "Failed to register service {} because of {:?}.",
+            service_name, e
+        ))
+    })?;
+
+    info!("Successfully registered KeyMint HAL services.");
+
+    // Let the TA know information about the boot environment. In a real device this
+    // is communicated directly from the bootloader to the TA, but here we retrieve
+    // the information from system properties and send from the HAL service.
+    let boot_req = get_boot_info();
+    debug!("boot/HAL->TA: boot info is {:?}", boot_req);
+    kmr_hal::send_boot_info(channel.lock().unwrap().deref_mut(), boot_req)
+        .map_err(|e| HalServiceError(format!("Failed to send boot info: {:?}", e)))?;
+
+    // Let the TA know information about the userspace environment.
+    if let Err(e) = kmr_hal::send_hal_info(channel.lock().unwrap().deref_mut()) {
+        error!("Failed to send HAL info: {:?}", e);
+    }
+
+    // Let the TA know about attestation IDs. (In a real device these would be pre-provisioned into
+    // the TA.)
+    let attest_ids = attestation_id_info();
+    if let Err(e) = kmr_hal::send_attest_ids(channel.lock().unwrap().deref_mut(), attest_ids) {
+        error!("Failed to send attestation ID info: {:?}", e);
+    }
+
+    info!("Successfully registered KeyMint HAL services.");
+    binder::ProcessState::join_thread_pool();
+    info!("KeyMint HAL service is terminating."); // should not reach here
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Implementation of the KeyMint TA that runs locally in-process (and which is therefore
+/// insecure).
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct LocalTa {
+    in_tx: mpsc::Sender<Vec<u8>>,
+    out_rx: mpsc::Receiver<Vec<u8>>,
+}
+
+impl LocalTa {
+    /// Create a new instance.
+    pub fn new() -> Self {
+        // Create a pair of channels to communicate with the TA thread.
+        let (in_tx, in_rx) = mpsc::channel();
+        let (out_tx, out_rx) = mpsc::channel();
+
+        // The TA code expects to run single threaded, so spawn a thread to run it in.
+        std::thread::spawn(move || {
+            let mut ta = kmr_ta_nonsecure::build_ta();
+            loop {
+                let req_data: Vec<u8> = in_rx.recv().expect("failed to receive next req");
+                let rsp_data = ta.process(&req_data);
+                out_tx.send(rsp_data).expect("failed to send out rsp");
+            }
+        });
+        Self { in_tx, out_rx }
+    }
+}
+
+impl SerializedChannel for LocalTa {
+    const MAX_SIZE: usize = usize::MAX;
+
+    fn execute(&mut self, req_data: &[u8]) -> binder::Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        self.in_tx
+            .send(req_data.to_vec())
+            .expect("failed to send in request");
+        Ok(self.out_rx.recv().expect("failed to receive response"))
+    }
+}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/default/service.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/default/service.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 10cbf07..0000000
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/default/service.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 2020, The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#define LOG_TAG "android.hardware.security.keymint-service"
-
-#include <android-base/logging.h>
-#include <android/binder_manager.h>
-#include <android/binder_process.h>
-
-#include <AndroidKeyMintDevice.h>
-#include <AndroidRemotelyProvisionedComponentDevice.h>
-#include <AndroidSecureClock.h>
-#include <AndroidSharedSecret.h>
-#include <keymaster/soft_keymaster_logger.h>
-
-using aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::AndroidKeyMintDevice;
-using aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::AndroidRemotelyProvisionedComponentDevice;
-using aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::SecurityLevel;
-using aidl::android::hardware::security::secureclock::AndroidSecureClock;
-using aidl::android::hardware::security::sharedsecret::AndroidSharedSecret;
-
-template <typename T, class... Args>
-std::shared_ptr<T> addService(Args&&... args) {
-    std::shared_ptr<T> ser = ndk::SharedRefBase::make<T>(std::forward<Args>(args)...);
-    auto instanceName = std::string(T::descriptor) + "/default";
-    LOG(INFO) << "adding keymint service instance: " << instanceName;
-    binder_status_t status =
-            AServiceManager_addService(ser->asBinder().get(), instanceName.c_str());
-    CHECK_EQ(status, STATUS_OK);
-    return ser;
-}
-
-int main() {
-    // The global logger object required by keymaster's logging macros in keymaster/logger.h.
-    keymaster::SoftKeymasterLogger km_logger;
-    // Zero threads seems like a useless pool, but below we'll join this thread to it, increasing
-    // the pool size to 1.
-    ABinderProcess_setThreadPoolMaxThreadCount(0);
-    // Add Keymint Service
-    std::shared_ptr<AndroidKeyMintDevice> keyMint =
-            addService<AndroidKeyMintDevice>(SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE);
-    // Add Secure Clock Service
-    addService<AndroidSecureClock>(keyMint);
-    // Add Shared Secret Service
-    addService<AndroidSharedSecret>(keyMint);
-    // Add Remotely Provisioned Component Service
-    addService<AndroidRemotelyProvisionedComponentDevice>(keyMint);
-    ABinderProcess_joinThreadPool();
-    return EXIT_FAILURE;  // should not reach
-}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/default/ta/attest.rs b/security/keymint/aidl/default/ta/attest.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1ce2066
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/default/ta/attest.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
+//
+// Copyright (C) 2022 The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+//! Attestation keys and certificates.
+//!
+//! Hard-coded keys and certs copied from system/keymaster/context/soft_attestation_cert.cpp
+
+use kmr_common::{
+    crypto::ec, crypto::rsa, crypto::CurveType, crypto::KeyMaterial, wire::keymint,
+    wire::keymint::EcCurve, Error,
+};
+use kmr_ta::device::{RetrieveCertSigningInfo, SigningAlgorithm, SigningKeyType};
+
+/// RSA attestation private key in PKCS#1 format.
+///
+/// Decoded contents (using [der2ascii](https://github.com/google/der-ascii)):
+///
+/// ```
+/// SEQUENCE {
+///   INTEGER { 0 }
+///   INTEGER { `00c08323dc56881bb8302069f5b08561c6eebe7f05e2f5a842048abe8b47be76feaef25cf29b2afa3200141601429989a15fcfc6815eb363583c2fd2f20be4983283dd814b16d7e185417ae54abc296a3a6db5c004083b68c556c1f02339916419864d50b74d40aeca484c77356c895a0c275abfac499d5d7d2362f29c5e02e871` }
+///   INTEGER { 65537 }
+///   INTEGER { `00be860b0b99a802a6fb1a59438a7bb715065b09a36dc6e9cacc6bf3c02c34d7d79e94c6606428d88c7b7f6577c1cdea64074abe8e7286df1f0811dc9728260868de95d32efc96b6d084ff271a5f60defcc703e7a38e6e29ba9a3c5fc2c28076b6a896af1d34d78828ce9bddb1f34f9c9404430781298e201316725bbdbc993a41` }
+///   INTEGER { `00e1c6d927646c0916ec36826d594983740c21f1b074c4a1a59867c669795c85d3dc464c5b929e94bfb34e0dcc5014b10f13341ab7fdd5f60414d2a326cad41cc5` }
+///   INTEGER { `00da485997785cd5630fb0fd8c5254f98e538e18983aae9e6b7e6a5a7b5d343755b9218ebd40320d28387d789f76fa218bcc2d8b68a5f6418fbbeca5179ab3afbd` }
+///   INTEGER { `50fefc32649559616ed6534e154509329d93a3d810dbe5bdb982292cf78bd8badb8020ae8d57f4b71d05386ffe9e9db271ca3477a34999db76f8e5ece9c0d49d` }
+///   INTEGER { `15b74cf27cceff8bb36bf04d9d8346b09a2f70d2f4439b0f26ac7e03f7e9d1f77d4b915fd29b2823f03acb5d5200e0857ff2a803e93eee96d6235ce95442bc21` }
+///   INTEGER { `0090a745da8970b2cd649660324228c5f82856ffd665ba9a85c8d60f1b8bee717ecd2c72eae01dad86ba7654d4cf45adb5f1f2b31d9f8122cfa5f1a5570f9b2d25` }
+/// }
+/// ```
+const RSA_ATTEST_KEY: &str = concat!(
+    "3082025d02010002818100c08323dc56881bb8302069f5b08561c6eebe7f05e2",
+    "f5a842048abe8b47be76feaef25cf29b2afa3200141601429989a15fcfc6815e",
+    "b363583c2fd2f20be4983283dd814b16d7e185417ae54abc296a3a6db5c00408",
+    "3b68c556c1f02339916419864d50b74d40aeca484c77356c895a0c275abfac49",
+    "9d5d7d2362f29c5e02e871020301000102818100be860b0b99a802a6fb1a5943",
+    "8a7bb715065b09a36dc6e9cacc6bf3c02c34d7d79e94c6606428d88c7b7f6577",
+    "c1cdea64074abe8e7286df1f0811dc9728260868de95d32efc96b6d084ff271a",
+    "5f60defcc703e7a38e6e29ba9a3c5fc2c28076b6a896af1d34d78828ce9bddb1",
+    "f34f9c9404430781298e201316725bbdbc993a41024100e1c6d927646c0916ec",
+    "36826d594983740c21f1b074c4a1a59867c669795c85d3dc464c5b929e94bfb3",
+    "4e0dcc5014b10f13341ab7fdd5f60414d2a326cad41cc5024100da485997785c",
+    "d5630fb0fd8c5254f98e538e18983aae9e6b7e6a5a7b5d343755b9218ebd4032",
+    "0d28387d789f76fa218bcc2d8b68a5f6418fbbeca5179ab3afbd024050fefc32",
+    "649559616ed6534e154509329d93a3d810dbe5bdb982292cf78bd8badb8020ae",
+    "8d57f4b71d05386ffe9e9db271ca3477a34999db76f8e5ece9c0d49d024015b7",
+    "4cf27cceff8bb36bf04d9d8346b09a2f70d2f4439b0f26ac7e03f7e9d1f77d4b",
+    "915fd29b2823f03acb5d5200e0857ff2a803e93eee96d6235ce95442bc210241",
+    "0090a745da8970b2cd649660324228c5f82856ffd665ba9a85c8d60f1b8bee71",
+    "7ecd2c72eae01dad86ba7654d4cf45adb5f1f2b31d9f8122cfa5f1a5570f9b2d",
+    "25",
+);
+
+/// Attestation certificate corresponding to [`RSA_ATTEST_KEY`], signed by the key in
+/// [`RSA_ATTEST_ROOT_CERT`].
+///
+/// Decoded contents:
+///
+/// ```
+/// Certificate:
+///     Data:
+///         Version: 3 (0x2)
+///         Serial Number: 4096 (0x1000)
+///     Signature Algorithm: SHA256-RSA
+///         Issuer: C=US, O=Google, Inc., OU=Android, L=Mountain View, ST=California
+///         Validity:
+///             Not Before: 2016-01-04 12:40:53 +0000 UTC
+///             Not After : 2035-12-30 12:40:53 +0000 UTC
+///         Subject: C=US, O=Google, Inc., OU=Android, ST=California, CN=Android Software Attestation Key
+///         Subject Public Key Info:
+///             Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
+///                 Public Key: (1024 bit)
+///                 Modulus:
+///                     c0:83:23:dc:56:88:1b:b8:30:20:69:f5:b0:85:61:
+///                     c6:ee:be:7f:05:e2:f5:a8:42:04:8a:be:8b:47:be:
+///                     76:fe:ae:f2:5c:f2:9b:2a:fa:32:00:14:16:01:42:
+///                     99:89:a1:5f:cf:c6:81:5e:b3:63:58:3c:2f:d2:f2:
+///                     0b:e4:98:32:83:dd:81:4b:16:d7:e1:85:41:7a:e5:
+///                     4a:bc:29:6a:3a:6d:b5:c0:04:08:3b:68:c5:56:c1:
+///                     f0:23:39:91:64:19:86:4d:50:b7:4d:40:ae:ca:48:
+///                     4c:77:35:6c:89:5a:0c:27:5a:bf:ac:49:9d:5d:7d:
+///                     23:62:f2:9c:5e:02:e8:71:
+///                 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
+///         X509v3 extensions:
+///             X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
+///                 keyid:29faf1accc4dd24c96402775b6b0e932e507fe2e
+///             X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
+///                 keyid:d40c101bf8cd63b9f73952b50e135ca6d7999386
+///             X509v3 Key Usage: critical
+///                 Digital Signature, Certificate Signing
+///             X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
+///                 CA:true, pathlen:0
+///     Signature Algorithm: SHA256-RSA
+///          9e:2d:48:5f:8c:67:33:dc:1a:85:ad:99:d7:50:23:ea:14:ec:
+///          43:b0:e1:9d:ea:c2:23:46:1e:72:b5:19:dc:60:22:e4:a5:68:
+///          31:6c:0b:55:c4:e6:9c:a2:2d:9f:3a:4f:93:6b:31:8b:16:78:
+///          16:0d:88:cb:d9:8b:cc:80:9d:84:f0:c2:27:e3:6b:38:f1:fd:
+///          d1:e7:17:72:31:59:35:7d:96:f3:c5:7f:ab:9d:8f:96:61:26:
+///          4f:b2:be:81:bb:0d:49:04:22:8a:ce:9f:f7:f5:42:2e:25:44:
+///          fa:21:07:12:5a:83:b5:55:ad:18:82:f8:40:14:9b:9c:20:63:
+///          04:7f:
+/// ```
+const RSA_ATTEST_CERT: &str = concat!(
+    "308202b63082021fa00302010202021000300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500",
+    "3063310b30090603550406130255533113301106035504080c0a43616c69666f",
+    "726e69613116301406035504070c0d4d6f756e7461696e205669657731153013",
+    "060355040a0c0c476f6f676c652c20496e632e3110300e060355040b0c07416e",
+    "64726f6964301e170d3136303130343132343035335a170d3335313233303132",
+    "343035335a3076310b30090603550406130255533113301106035504080c0a43",
+    "616c69666f726e696131153013060355040a0c0c476f6f676c652c20496e632e",
+    "3110300e060355040b0c07416e64726f69643129302706035504030c20416e64",
+    "726f696420536f667477617265204174746573746174696f6e204b657930819f",
+    "300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100c08323dc5688",
+    "1bb8302069f5b08561c6eebe7f05e2f5a842048abe8b47be76feaef25cf29b2a",
+    "fa3200141601429989a15fcfc6815eb363583c2fd2f20be4983283dd814b16d7",
+    "e185417ae54abc296a3a6db5c004083b68c556c1f02339916419864d50b74d40",
+    "aeca484c77356c895a0c275abfac499d5d7d2362f29c5e02e8710203010001a3",
+    "663064301d0603551d0e04160414d40c101bf8cd63b9f73952b50e135ca6d799",
+    "9386301f0603551d2304183016801429faf1accc4dd24c96402775b6b0e932e5",
+    "07fe2e30120603551d130101ff040830060101ff020100300e0603551d0f0101",
+    "ff040403020284300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500038181009e2d485f8c67",
+    "33dc1a85ad99d75023ea14ec43b0e19deac223461e72b519dc6022e4a568316c",
+    "0b55c4e69ca22d9f3a4f936b318b1678160d88cbd98bcc809d84f0c227e36b38",
+    "f1fdd1e717723159357d96f3c57fab9d8f9661264fb2be81bb0d4904228ace9f",
+    "f7f5422e2544fa2107125a83b555ad1882f840149b9c2063047f",
+);
+
+/// Attestation self-signed root certificate holding the key that signed [`RSA_ATTEST_CERT`].
+///
+/// Decoded contents:
+///
+/// ```
+/// Certificate:
+///     Data:
+///         Version: 3 (0x2)
+///         Serial Number: 18416584322103887884 (0xff94d9dd9f07c80c)
+///     Signature Algorithm: SHA256-RSA
+///         Issuer: C=US, O=Google, Inc., OU=Android, L=Mountain View, ST=California
+///         Validity:
+///             Not Before: 2016-01-04 12:31:08 +0000 UTC
+///             Not After : 2035-12-30 12:31:08 +0000 UTC
+///         Subject: C=US, O=Google, Inc., OU=Android, L=Mountain View, ST=California
+///         Subject Public Key Info:
+///             Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
+///                 Public Key: (1024 bit)
+///                 Modulus:
+///                     a2:6b:ad:eb:6e:2e:44:61:ef:d5:0e:82:e6:b7:94:
+///                     d1:75:23:1f:77:9b:63:91:63:ff:f7:aa:ff:0b:72:
+///                     47:4e:c0:2c:43:ec:33:7c:d7:ac:ed:40:3e:8c:28:
+///                     a0:66:d5:f7:87:0b:33:97:de:0e:b8:4e:13:40:ab:
+///                     af:a5:27:bf:95:69:a0:31:db:06:52:65:f8:44:59:
+///                     57:61:f0:bb:f2:17:4b:b7:41:80:64:c0:28:0e:8f:
+///                     52:77:8e:db:d2:47:b6:45:e9:19:c8:e9:8b:c3:db:
+///                     c2:91:3f:d7:d7:50:c4:1d:35:66:f9:57:e4:97:96:
+///                     0b:09:ac:ce:92:35:85:9b:
+///                 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
+///         X509v3 extensions:
+///             X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
+///                 keyid:29faf1accc4dd24c96402775b6b0e932e507fe2e
+///             X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
+///                 keyid:29faf1accc4dd24c96402775b6b0e932e507fe2e
+///             X509v3 Key Usage: critical
+///                 Digital Signature, Certificate Signing
+///             X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
+///                 CA:true
+///     Signature Algorithm: SHA256-RSA
+///          4f:72:f3:36:59:8d:0e:c1:b9:74:5b:31:59:f6:f0:8d:25:49:
+///          30:9e:a3:1c:1c:29:d2:45:2d:20:b9:4d:5f:64:b4:e8:80:c7:
+///          78:7a:9c:39:de:a8:b3:f5:bf:2f:70:5f:47:10:5c:c5:e6:eb:
+///          4d:06:99:61:d2:ae:9a:07:ff:f7:7c:b8:ab:eb:9c:0f:24:07:
+///          5e:b1:7f:ba:79:71:fd:4d:5b:9e:df:14:a9:fe:df:ed:7c:c0:
+///          88:5d:f8:dd:9b:64:32:56:d5:35:9a:e2:13:f9:8f:ce:c1:7c:
+///          dc:ef:a4:aa:b2:55:c3:83:a9:2e:fb:5c:f6:62:f5:27:52:17:
+///          be:63:
+/// ```
+const RSA_ATTEST_ROOT_CERT: &str = concat!(
+    "308202a730820210a003020102020900ff94d9dd9f07c80c300d06092a864886",
+    "f70d01010b05003063310b30090603550406130255533113301106035504080c",
+    "0a43616c69666f726e69613116301406035504070c0d4d6f756e7461696e2056",
+    "69657731153013060355040a0c0c476f6f676c652c20496e632e3110300e0603",
+    "55040b0c07416e64726f6964301e170d3136303130343132333130385a170d33",
+    "35313233303132333130385a3063310b30090603550406130255533113301106",
+    "035504080c0a43616c69666f726e69613116301406035504070c0d4d6f756e74",
+    "61696e205669657731153013060355040a0c0c476f6f676c652c20496e632e31",
+    "10300e060355040b0c07416e64726f696430819f300d06092a864886f70d0101",
+    "01050003818d0030818902818100a26badeb6e2e4461efd50e82e6b794d17523",
+    "1f779b639163fff7aaff0b72474ec02c43ec337cd7aced403e8c28a066d5f787",
+    "0b3397de0eb84e1340abafa527bf9569a031db065265f844595761f0bbf2174b",
+    "b7418064c0280e8f52778edbd247b645e919c8e98bc3dbc2913fd7d750c41d35",
+    "66f957e497960b09acce9235859b0203010001a3633061301d0603551d0e0416",
+    "041429faf1accc4dd24c96402775b6b0e932e507fe2e301f0603551d23041830",
+    "16801429faf1accc4dd24c96402775b6b0e932e507fe2e300f0603551d130101",
+    "ff040530030101ff300e0603551d0f0101ff040403020284300d06092a864886",
+    "f70d01010b0500038181004f72f336598d0ec1b9745b3159f6f08d2549309ea3",
+    "1c1c29d2452d20b94d5f64b4e880c7787a9c39dea8b3f5bf2f705f47105cc5e6",
+    "eb4d069961d2ae9a07fff77cb8abeb9c0f24075eb17fba7971fd4d5b9edf14a9",
+    "fedfed7cc0885df8dd9b643256d5359ae213f98fcec17cdcefa4aab255c383a9",
+    "2efb5cf662f5275217be63",
+);
+
+/// EC attestation private key in `ECPrivateKey` format.
+///
+/// Decoded contents (using [der2ascii](https://github.com/google/der-ascii)):
+///
+/// ```
+/// SEQUENCE {
+///   INTEGER { 1 }
+///   OCTET_STRING { `21e086432a15198459cf363a50fc14c9daadf935f527c2dfd71e4d6dbc42e544` }
+///   [0] {
+///     # secp256r1
+///     OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7 }
+///   }
+///   [1] {
+///     BIT_STRING { `00` `04eb9e79f8426359accb2a914c8986cc70ad90669382a9732613feaccbf821274c2174974a2afea5b94d7f66d4e065106635bc53b7a0a3a671583edb3e11ae1014` }
+///   }
+/// }
+/// ```
+const EC_ATTEST_KEY: &str = concat!(
+    "3077020101042021e086432a15198459cf363a50fc14c9daadf935f527c2dfd7",
+    "1e4d6dbc42e544a00a06082a8648ce3d030107a14403420004eb9e79f8426359",
+    "accb2a914c8986cc70ad90669382a9732613feaccbf821274c2174974a2afea5",
+    "b94d7f66d4e065106635bc53b7a0a3a671583edb3e11ae1014",
+);
+
+/// Attestation certificate corresponding to [`EC_ATTEST_KEY`], signed by the key in
+/// [`EC_ATTEST_ROOT_CERT`].
+///
+/// Decoded contents:
+///
+/// ```
+/// Certificate:
+///     Data:
+///         Version: 3 (0x2)
+///         Serial Number: 4097 (0x1001)
+///     Signature Algorithm: ECDSA-SHA256
+///         Issuer: C=US, O=Google, Inc., OU=Android, L=Mountain View, ST=California, CN=Android Keystore Software Attestation Root
+///         Validity:
+///             Not Before: 2016-01-11 00:46:09 +0000 UTC
+///             Not After : 2026-01-08 00:46:09 +0000 UTC
+///         Subject: C=US, O=Google, Inc., OU=Android, ST=California, CN=Android Keystore Software Attestation Intermediate
+///         Subject Public Key Info:
+///             Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
+///                 Public Key: (256 bit)
+///                 pub:
+///                     04:eb:9e:79:f8:42:63:59:ac:cb:2a:91:4c:89:86:
+///                     cc:70:ad:90:66:93:82:a9:73:26:13:fe:ac:cb:f8:
+///                     21:27:4c:21:74:97:4a:2a:fe:a5:b9:4d:7f:66:d4:
+///                     e0:65:10:66:35:bc:53:b7:a0:a3:a6:71:58:3e:db:
+///                     3e:11:ae:10:14:
+///                 ASN1 OID: prime256v1
+///         X509v3 extensions:
+///             X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
+///                 keyid:c8ade9774c45c3a3cf0d1610e479433a215a30cf
+///             X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
+///                 keyid:3ffcacd61ab13a9e8120b8d5251cc565bb1e91a9
+///             X509v3 Key Usage: critical
+///                 Digital Signature, Certificate Signing
+///             X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
+///                 CA:true, pathlen:0
+///     Signature Algorithm: ECDSA-SHA256
+///          30:45:02:20:4b:8a:9b:7b:ee:82:bc:c0:33:87:ae:2f:c0:89:
+///          98:b4:dd:c3:8d:ab:27:2a:45:9f:69:0c:c7:c3:92:d4:0f:8e:
+///          02:21:00:ee:da:01:5d:b6:f4:32:e9:d4:84:3b:62:4c:94:04:
+///          ef:3a:7c:cc:bd:5e:fb:22:bb:e7:fe:b9:77:3f:59:3f:fb:
+/// ```
+const EC_ATTEST_CERT: &str = concat!(
+    "308202783082021ea00302010202021001300a06082a8648ce3d040302308198",
+    "310b30090603550406130255533113301106035504080c0a43616c69666f726e",
+    "69613116301406035504070c0d4d6f756e7461696e2056696577311530130603",
+    "55040a0c0c476f6f676c652c20496e632e3110300e060355040b0c07416e6472",
+    "6f69643133303106035504030c2a416e64726f6964204b657973746f72652053",
+    "6f667477617265204174746573746174696f6e20526f6f74301e170d31363031",
+    "31313030343630395a170d3236303130383030343630395a308188310b300906",
+    "03550406130255533113301106035504080c0a43616c69666f726e6961311530",
+    "13060355040a0c0c476f6f676c652c20496e632e3110300e060355040b0c0741",
+    "6e64726f6964313b303906035504030c32416e64726f6964204b657973746f72",
+    "6520536f667477617265204174746573746174696f6e20496e7465726d656469",
+    "6174653059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004eb9e",
+    "79f8426359accb2a914c8986cc70ad90669382a9732613feaccbf821274c2174",
+    "974a2afea5b94d7f66d4e065106635bc53b7a0a3a671583edb3e11ae1014a366",
+    "3064301d0603551d0e041604143ffcacd61ab13a9e8120b8d5251cc565bb1e91",
+    "a9301f0603551d23041830168014c8ade9774c45c3a3cf0d1610e479433a215a",
+    "30cf30120603551d130101ff040830060101ff020100300e0603551d0f0101ff",
+    "040403020284300a06082a8648ce3d040302034800304502204b8a9b7bee82bc",
+    "c03387ae2fc08998b4ddc38dab272a459f690cc7c392d40f8e022100eeda015d",
+    "b6f432e9d4843b624c9404ef3a7cccbd5efb22bbe7feb9773f593ffb",
+);
+
+/// Attestation self-signed root certificate holding the key that signed [`EC_ATTEST_CERT`].
+///
+/// Decoded contents:
+///
+/// ```
+/// Certificate:
+///     Data:
+///         Version: 3 (0x2)
+///         Serial Number: 11674912229752527703 (0xa2059ed10e435b57)
+///     Signature Algorithm: ECDSA-SHA256
+///         Issuer: C=US, O=Google, Inc., OU=Android, L=Mountain View, ST=California, CN=Android Keystore Software Attestation Root
+///         Validity:
+///             Not Before: 2016-01-11 00:43:50 +0000 UTC
+///             Not After : 2036-01-06 00:43:50 +0000 UTC
+///         Subject: C=US, O=Google, Inc., OU=Android, L=Mountain View, ST=California, CN=Android Keystore Software Attestation Root
+///         Subject Public Key Info:
+///             Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
+///                 Public Key: (256 bit)
+///                 pub:
+///                     04:ee:5d:5e:c7:e1:c0:db:6d:03:a6:7e:e6:b6:1b:
+///                     ec:4d:6a:5d:6a:68:2e:0f:ff:7f:49:0e:7d:77:1f:
+///                     44:22:6d:bd:b1:af:fa:16:cb:c7:ad:c5:77:d2:56:
+///                     9c:aa:b7:b0:2d:54:01:5d:3e:43:2b:2a:8e:d7:4e:
+///                     ec:48:75:41:a4:
+///                 ASN1 OID: prime256v1
+///         X509v3 extensions:
+///             X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
+///                 keyid:c8ade9774c45c3a3cf0d1610e479433a215a30cf
+///             X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
+///                 keyid:c8ade9774c45c3a3cf0d1610e479433a215a30cf
+///             X509v3 Key Usage: critical
+///                 Digital Signature, Certificate Signing
+///             X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
+///                 CA:true
+///     Signature Algorithm: ECDSA-SHA256
+///          30:44:02:20:35:21:a3:ef:8b:34:46:1e:9c:d5:60:f3:1d:58:
+///          89:20:6a:dc:a3:65:41:f6:0d:9e:ce:8a:19:8c:66:48:60:7b:
+///          02:20:4d:0b:f3:51:d9:30:7c:7d:5b:da:35:34:1d:a8:47:1b:
+///          63:a5:85:65:3c:ad:4f:24:a7:e7:4d:af:41:7d:f1:bf:
+/// ```
+const EC_ATTEST_ROOT_CERT: &str = concat!(
+    "3082028b30820232a003020102020900a2059ed10e435b57300a06082a8648ce",
+    "3d040302308198310b30090603550406130255533113301106035504080c0a43",
+    "616c69666f726e69613116301406035504070c0d4d6f756e7461696e20566965",
+    "7731153013060355040a0c0c476f6f676c652c20496e632e3110300e06035504",
+    "0b0c07416e64726f69643133303106035504030c2a416e64726f6964204b6579",
+    "73746f726520536f667477617265204174746573746174696f6e20526f6f7430",
+    "1e170d3136303131313030343335305a170d3336303130363030343335305a30",
+    "8198310b30090603550406130255533113301106035504080c0a43616c69666f",
+    "726e69613116301406035504070c0d4d6f756e7461696e205669657731153013",
+    "060355040a0c0c476f6f676c652c20496e632e3110300e060355040b0c07416e",
+    "64726f69643133303106035504030c2a416e64726f6964204b657973746f7265",
+    "20536f667477617265204174746573746174696f6e20526f6f74305930130607",
+    "2a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004ee5d5ec7e1c0db6d03a67e",
+    "e6b61bec4d6a5d6a682e0fff7f490e7d771f44226dbdb1affa16cbc7adc577d2",
+    "569caab7b02d54015d3e432b2a8ed74eec487541a4a3633061301d0603551d0e",
+    "04160414c8ade9774c45c3a3cf0d1610e479433a215a30cf301f0603551d2304",
+    "1830168014c8ade9774c45c3a3cf0d1610e479433a215a30cf300f0603551d13",
+    "0101ff040530030101ff300e0603551d0f0101ff040403020284300a06082a86",
+    "48ce3d040302034700304402203521a3ef8b34461e9cd560f31d5889206adca3",
+    "6541f60d9ece8a198c6648607b02204d0bf351d9307c7d5bda35341da8471b63",
+    "a585653cad4f24a7e74daf417df1bf",
+);
+
+/// Per-algorithm attestation certificate signing information.
+pub struct CertSignAlgoInfo {
+    key: KeyMaterial,
+    chain: Vec<keymint::Certificate>,
+}
+
+/// Certificate signing information for all asymmetric key types.
+pub struct CertSignInfo {
+    rsa_info: CertSignAlgoInfo,
+    ec_info: CertSignAlgoInfo,
+}
+
+impl CertSignInfo {
+    /// Create a new cert signing impl.
+    pub fn new() -> Self {
+        CertSignInfo {
+            rsa_info: CertSignAlgoInfo {
+                key: KeyMaterial::Rsa(rsa::Key(hex::decode(RSA_ATTEST_KEY).unwrap()).into()),
+                chain: vec![
+                    keymint::Certificate {
+                        encoded_certificate: hex::decode(RSA_ATTEST_CERT).unwrap(),
+                    },
+                    keymint::Certificate {
+                        encoded_certificate: hex::decode(RSA_ATTEST_ROOT_CERT).unwrap(),
+                    },
+                ],
+            },
+            ec_info: CertSignAlgoInfo {
+                key: KeyMaterial::Ec(
+                    EcCurve::P256,
+                    CurveType::Nist,
+                    ec::Key::P256(ec::NistKey(hex::decode(EC_ATTEST_KEY).unwrap())).into(),
+                ),
+                chain: vec![
+                    keymint::Certificate {
+                        encoded_certificate: hex::decode(EC_ATTEST_CERT).unwrap(),
+                    },
+                    keymint::Certificate {
+                        encoded_certificate: hex::decode(EC_ATTEST_ROOT_CERT).unwrap(),
+                    },
+                ],
+            },
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl RetrieveCertSigningInfo for CertSignInfo {
+    fn signing_key(&self, key_type: SigningKeyType) -> Result<KeyMaterial, Error> {
+        Ok(match key_type.algo_hint {
+            SigningAlgorithm::Rsa => self.rsa_info.key.clone(),
+            SigningAlgorithm::Ec => self.ec_info.key.clone(),
+        })
+    }
+
+    fn cert_chain(&self, key_type: SigningKeyType) -> Result<Vec<keymint::Certificate>, Error> {
+        Ok(match key_type.algo_hint {
+            SigningAlgorithm::Rsa => self.rsa_info.chain.clone(),
+            SigningAlgorithm::Ec => self.ec_info.chain.clone(),
+        })
+    }
+}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/default/ta/clock.rs b/security/keymint/aidl/default/ta/clock.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad8509a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/default/ta/clock.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+//
+// Copyright (C) 2022 The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+//! Monotonic clock implementation.
+
+use kmr_common::crypto;
+use std::time::Instant;
+
+/// Monotonic clock.
+pub struct StdClock {
+    start: Instant,
+}
+
+impl StdClock {
+    /// Create new clock instance, holding time since construction.
+    pub fn new() -> Self {
+        Self {
+            start: Instant::now(),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl crypto::MonotonicClock for StdClock {
+    fn now(&self) -> crypto::MillisecondsSinceEpoch {
+        let duration = self.start.elapsed();
+        crypto::MillisecondsSinceEpoch(duration.as_millis().try_into().unwrap())
+    }
+}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/default/ta/lib.rs b/security/keymint/aidl/default/ta/lib.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fe8ad95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/default/ta/lib.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2023 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+//! Local in-process implementation of the KeyMint TA. This is insecure and should
+//! only be used for testing purposes.
+
+// This crate is `std` using, but some of the code uses macros from a `no_std` world.
+extern crate alloc;
+
+use kmr_common::crypto;
+use kmr_crypto_boring::{
+    aes::BoringAes, aes_cmac::BoringAesCmac, des::BoringDes, ec::BoringEc, eq::BoringEq,
+    hmac::BoringHmac, rng::BoringRng, rsa::BoringRsa, sha256::BoringSha256,
+};
+use kmr_ta::device::{
+    BootloaderDone, CsrSigningAlgorithm, Implementation, TrustedPresenceUnsupported,
+};
+use kmr_ta::{HardwareInfo, KeyMintTa, RpcInfo, RpcInfoV3};
+use kmr_wire::keymint::SecurityLevel;
+use kmr_wire::rpc::MINIMUM_SUPPORTED_KEYS_IN_CSR;
+use log::info;
+
+pub mod attest;
+pub mod clock;
+pub mod rpc;
+pub mod soft;
+
+/// Build a set of crypto trait implementations based around BoringSSL and the standard library
+/// clock.
+pub fn boringssl_crypto_impls() -> crypto::Implementation {
+    let rng = BoringRng;
+    let clock = clock::StdClock::new();
+    let rsa = BoringRsa::default();
+    let ec = BoringEc::default();
+    crypto::Implementation {
+        rng: Box::new(rng),
+        clock: Some(Box::new(clock)),
+        compare: Box::new(BoringEq),
+        aes: Box::new(BoringAes),
+        des: Box::new(BoringDes),
+        hmac: Box::new(BoringHmac),
+        rsa: Box::new(rsa),
+        ec: Box::new(ec),
+        ckdf: Box::new(BoringAesCmac),
+        hkdf: Box::new(BoringHmac),
+        sha256: Box::new(BoringSha256),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Build a [`kmr_ta::KeyMintTa`] instance for nonsecure use.
+pub fn build_ta() -> kmr_ta::KeyMintTa {
+    info!("Building NON-SECURE KeyMint Rust TA");
+    let hw_info = HardwareInfo {
+        version_number: 1,
+        security_level: SecurityLevel::TrustedEnvironment,
+        impl_name: "Rust reference implementation",
+        author_name: "Google",
+        unique_id: "NON-SECURE KeyMint TA",
+    };
+    let rpc_sign_algo = CsrSigningAlgorithm::EdDSA;
+    let rpc_info_v3 = RpcInfoV3 {
+        author_name: "Google",
+        unique_id: "NON-SECURE KeyMint TA",
+        fused: false,
+        supported_num_of_keys_in_csr: MINIMUM_SUPPORTED_KEYS_IN_CSR,
+    };
+
+    let sign_info = attest::CertSignInfo::new();
+    let keys: Box<dyn kmr_ta::device::RetrieveKeyMaterial> = Box::new(soft::Keys);
+    let rpc: Box<dyn kmr_ta::device::RetrieveRpcArtifacts> = Box::new(soft::RpcArtifacts::new(
+        soft::Derive::default(),
+        rpc_sign_algo,
+    ));
+    let dev = Implementation {
+        keys,
+        sign_info: Box::new(sign_info),
+        // HAL populates attestation IDs from properties.
+        attest_ids: None,
+        sdd_mgr: None,
+        // `BOOTLOADER_ONLY` keys not supported.
+        bootloader: Box::new(BootloaderDone),
+        // `STORAGE_KEY` keys not supported.
+        sk_wrapper: None,
+        // `TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED` keys not supported
+        tup: Box::new(TrustedPresenceUnsupported),
+        // No support for converting previous implementation's keyblobs.
+        legacy_key: None,
+        rpc,
+    };
+    KeyMintTa::new(
+        hw_info,
+        RpcInfo::V3(rpc_info_v3),
+        boringssl_crypto_impls(),
+        dev,
+    )
+}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/default/ta/rpc.rs b/security/keymint/aidl/default/ta/rpc.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..39da50e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/default/ta/rpc.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
+//
+// Copyright (C) 2022 The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+//! Emulated implementation of device traits for `IRemotelyProvisionedComponent`.
+
+use core::cell::RefCell;
+use kmr_common::crypto::{ec, ec::CoseKeyPurpose, Ec, KeyMaterial};
+use kmr_common::{crypto, explicit, rpc_err, vec_try, Error};
+use kmr_crypto_boring::{ec::BoringEc, hmac::BoringHmac, rng::BoringRng};
+use kmr_ta::device::{
+    CsrSigningAlgorithm, DiceInfo, PubDiceArtifacts, RetrieveRpcArtifacts, RpcV2Req,
+};
+use kmr_wire::coset::{iana, CoseSign1Builder, HeaderBuilder};
+use kmr_wire::keymint::{Digest, EcCurve};
+use kmr_wire::{cbor::value::Value, coset::AsCborValue, rpc, CborError};
+
+/// Trait to encapsulate deterministic derivation of secret data.
+pub trait DeriveBytes {
+    /// Derive `output_len` bytes of data from `context`, deterministically.
+    fn derive_bytes(&self, context: &[u8], output_len: usize) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error>;
+}
+
+/// Common emulated implementation of RPC artifact retrieval.
+pub struct Artifacts<T: DeriveBytes> {
+    derive: T,
+    sign_algo: CsrSigningAlgorithm,
+    // Invariant once populated: `self.dice_info.signing_algorithm` == `self.sign_algo`
+    dice_info: RefCell<Option<DiceInfo>>,
+    // Invariant once populated: `self.bcc_signing_key` is a variant that matches `self.sign_algo`
+    bcc_signing_key: RefCell<Option<ec::Key>>,
+}
+
+impl<T: DeriveBytes> RetrieveRpcArtifacts for Artifacts<T> {
+    fn derive_bytes_from_hbk(
+        &self,
+        _hkdf: &dyn crypto::Hkdf,
+        context: &[u8],
+        output_len: usize,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
+        self.derive.derive_bytes(context, output_len)
+    }
+
+    fn get_dice_info(&self, _test_mode: rpc::TestMode) -> Result<DiceInfo, Error> {
+        if self.dice_info.borrow().is_none() {
+            let (dice_info, priv_key) = self.generate_dice_artifacts(rpc::TestMode(false))?;
+            *self.dice_info.borrow_mut() = Some(dice_info);
+            *self.bcc_signing_key.borrow_mut() = Some(priv_key);
+        }
+
+        Ok(self
+            .dice_info
+            .borrow()
+            .as_ref()
+            .ok_or_else(|| rpc_err!(Failed, "DICE artifacts are not initialized."))?
+            .clone())
+    }
+
+    fn sign_data(
+        &self,
+        ec: &dyn crypto::Ec,
+        data: &[u8],
+        _rpc_v2: Option<RpcV2Req>,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
+        // DICE artifacts should have been initialized via `get_dice_info()` by the time this
+        // method is called.
+        let private_key = self
+            .bcc_signing_key
+            .borrow()
+            .as_ref()
+            .ok_or_else(|| rpc_err!(Failed, "DICE artifacts are not initialized."))?
+            .clone();
+
+        let mut op = ec.begin_sign(private_key.into(), self.signing_digest())?;
+        op.update(data)?;
+        let sig = op.finish()?;
+        crypto::ec::to_cose_signature(self.signing_curve(), sig)
+    }
+}
+
+impl<T: DeriveBytes> Artifacts<T> {
+    /// Constructor.
+    pub fn new(derive: T, sign_algo: CsrSigningAlgorithm) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            derive,
+            sign_algo,
+            dice_info: RefCell::new(None),
+            bcc_signing_key: RefCell::new(None),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Indicate the curve used in signing.
+    fn signing_curve(&self) -> EcCurve {
+        match self.sign_algo {
+            CsrSigningAlgorithm::ES256 => EcCurve::P256,
+            CsrSigningAlgorithm::ES384 => EcCurve::P384,
+            CsrSigningAlgorithm::EdDSA => EcCurve::Curve25519,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Indicate the digest used in signing.
+    fn signing_digest(&self) -> Digest {
+        match self.sign_algo {
+            CsrSigningAlgorithm::ES256 => Digest::Sha256,
+            CsrSigningAlgorithm::ES384 => Digest::Sha384,
+            CsrSigningAlgorithm::EdDSA => Digest::None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Indicate the COSE algorithm value associated with signing.
+    fn signing_cose_algo(&self) -> iana::Algorithm {
+        match self.sign_algo {
+            CsrSigningAlgorithm::ES256 => iana::Algorithm::ES256,
+            CsrSigningAlgorithm::ES384 => iana::Algorithm::ES384,
+            CsrSigningAlgorithm::EdDSA => iana::Algorithm::EdDSA,
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn generate_dice_artifacts(
+        &self,
+        _test_mode: rpc::TestMode,
+    ) -> Result<(DiceInfo, ec::Key), Error> {
+        let ec = BoringEc::default();
+
+        let key_material = match self.sign_algo {
+            CsrSigningAlgorithm::EdDSA => {
+                let secret = self.derive_bytes_from_hbk(&BoringHmac, b"Device Key Seed", 32)?;
+                ec::import_raw_ed25519_key(&secret)
+            }
+            // TODO: generate the *same* key after reboot, by use of the TPM.
+            CsrSigningAlgorithm::ES256 => {
+                ec.generate_nist_key(&mut BoringRng, ec::NistCurve::P256, &[])
+            }
+            CsrSigningAlgorithm::ES384 => {
+                ec.generate_nist_key(&mut BoringRng, ec::NistCurve::P384, &[])
+            }
+        }?;
+        let (pub_cose_key, private_key) = match key_material {
+            KeyMaterial::Ec(curve, curve_type, key) => (
+                key.public_cose_key(
+                    &ec,
+                    curve,
+                    curve_type,
+                    CoseKeyPurpose::Sign,
+                    None, /* no key ID */
+                    rpc::TestMode(false),
+                )?,
+                key,
+            ),
+            _ => {
+                return Err(rpc_err!(
+                    Failed,
+                    "expected the Ec variant of KeyMaterial for the cdi leaf key."
+                ))
+            }
+        };
+
+        let cose_key_cbor = pub_cose_key.to_cbor_value().map_err(CborError::from)?;
+        let cose_key_cbor_data = kmr_ta::rkp::serialize_cbor(&cose_key_cbor)?;
+
+        // Construct `DiceChainEntryPayload`
+        let dice_chain_entry_payload = Value::Map(vec_try![
+            // Issuer
+            (
+                Value::Integer(1.into()),
+                Value::Text(String::from("Issuer"))
+            ),
+            // Subject
+            (
+                Value::Integer(2.into()),
+                Value::Text(String::from("Subject"))
+            ),
+            // Subject public key
+            (
+                Value::Integer((-4670552).into()),
+                Value::Bytes(cose_key_cbor_data)
+            ),
+            // Key Usage field contains a CBOR byte string of the bits which correspond
+            // to `keyCertSign` as per RFC 5280 Section 4.2.1.3 (in little-endian byte order)
+            (
+                Value::Integer((-4670553).into()),
+                Value::Bytes(vec_try![0x20]?)
+            ),
+        ]?);
+        let dice_chain_entry_payload_data = kmr_ta::rkp::serialize_cbor(&dice_chain_entry_payload)?;
+
+        // Construct `DiceChainEntry`
+        let protected = HeaderBuilder::new()
+            .algorithm(self.signing_cose_algo())
+            .build();
+        let dice_chain_entry = CoseSign1Builder::new()
+            .protected(protected)
+            .payload(dice_chain_entry_payload_data)
+            .try_create_signature(&[], |input| {
+                let mut op = ec.begin_sign(private_key.clone(), self.signing_digest())?;
+                op.update(input)?;
+                let sig = op.finish()?;
+                crypto::ec::to_cose_signature(self.signing_curve(), sig)
+            })?
+            .build();
+        let dice_chain_entry_cbor = dice_chain_entry.to_cbor_value().map_err(CborError::from)?;
+
+        // Construct `DiceCertChain`
+        let dice_cert_chain = Value::Array(vec_try![cose_key_cbor, dice_chain_entry_cbor]?);
+        let dice_cert_chain_data = kmr_ta::rkp::serialize_cbor(&dice_cert_chain)?;
+
+        // Construct `UdsCerts` as an empty CBOR map
+        let uds_certs_data = kmr_ta::rkp::serialize_cbor(&Value::Map(Vec::new()))?;
+
+        let pub_dice_artifacts = PubDiceArtifacts {
+            dice_cert_chain: dice_cert_chain_data,
+            uds_certs: uds_certs_data,
+        };
+
+        let dice_info = DiceInfo {
+            pub_dice_artifacts,
+            signing_algorithm: self.sign_algo,
+            rpc_v2_test_cdi_priv: None,
+        };
+
+        Ok((dice_info, explicit!(private_key)?))
+    }
+}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/default/ta/soft.rs b/security/keymint/aidl/default/ta/soft.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5bbe060
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/default/ta/soft.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+//
+// Copyright (C) 2022 The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+//! Software-only trait implementations using fake keys.
+
+use kmr_common::{
+    crypto,
+    crypto::{Hkdf, Rng},
+    Error,
+};
+use kmr_crypto_boring::{hmac::BoringHmac, rng::BoringRng};
+use kmr_ta::device::RetrieveKeyMaterial;
+
+/// Root key retrieval using hard-coded fake keys.
+pub struct Keys;
+
+impl RetrieveKeyMaterial for Keys {
+    fn root_kek(&self, _context: &[u8]) -> Result<crypto::OpaqueOr<crypto::hmac::Key>, Error> {
+        // Matches `MASTER_KEY` in system/keymaster/key_blob_utils/software_keyblobs.cpp
+        Ok(crypto::hmac::Key::new([0; 16].to_vec()).into())
+    }
+    fn kak(&self) -> Result<crypto::OpaqueOr<crypto::aes::Key>, Error> {
+        // Matches `kFakeKeyAgreementKey` in
+        // system/keymaster/km_openssl/soft_keymaster_enforcement.cpp.
+        Ok(crypto::aes::Key::Aes256([0; 32]).into())
+    }
+    fn unique_id_hbk(&self, _ckdf: &dyn crypto::Ckdf) -> Result<crypto::hmac::Key, Error> {
+        // Matches value used in system/keymaster/contexts/pure_soft_keymaster_context.cpp.
+        crypto::hmac::Key::new_from(b"MustBeRandomBits")
+    }
+}
+
+/// Implementation of key derivation using a random fake key.
+pub struct Derive {
+    hbk: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+impl Default for Derive {
+    fn default() -> Self {
+        // Use random data as an emulation of a hardware-backed key.
+        let mut hbk = vec![0; 32];
+        let mut rng = BoringRng;
+        rng.fill_bytes(&mut hbk);
+        Self { hbk }
+    }
+}
+
+impl crate::rpc::DeriveBytes for Derive {
+    fn derive_bytes(&self, context: &[u8], output_len: usize) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
+        BoringHmac.hkdf(&[], &self.hbk, context, output_len)
+    }
+}
+
+/// RPC artifact retrieval using software fake key.
+pub type RpcArtifacts = crate::rpc::Artifacts<Derive>;