diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
index bafe161..e1f65fe 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <memory>
+#include <string>
 #define LOG_TAG "VtsRemotelyProvisionableComponentTests"
 
 #include <AndroidRemotelyProvisionedComponentDevice.h>
@@ -368,82 +369,6 @@
         }
     }
 
-    ErrMsgOr<bytevec> getSessionKey(ErrMsgOr<std::pair<bytevec, bytevec>>& senderPubkey) {
-        if (rpcHardwareInfo.supportedEekCurve == RpcHardwareInfo::CURVE_25519 ||
-            rpcHardwareInfo.supportedEekCurve == RpcHardwareInfo::CURVE_NONE) {
-            return x25519_HKDF_DeriveKey(testEekChain_.last_pubkey, testEekChain_.last_privkey,
-                                         senderPubkey->first, false /* senderIsA */);
-        } else {
-            return ECDH_HKDF_DeriveKey(testEekChain_.last_pubkey, testEekChain_.last_privkey,
-                                       senderPubkey->first, false /* senderIsA */);
-        }
-    }
-
-    void checkProtectedData(const DeviceInfo& deviceInfo, const cppbor::Array& keysToSign,
-                            const bytevec& keysToSignMac, const ProtectedData& protectedData,
-                            std::vector<BccEntryData>* bccOutput = nullptr) {
-        auto [parsedProtectedData, _, protDataErrMsg] = cppbor::parse(protectedData.protectedData);
-        ASSERT_TRUE(parsedProtectedData) << protDataErrMsg;
-        ASSERT_TRUE(parsedProtectedData->asArray());
-        ASSERT_EQ(parsedProtectedData->asArray()->size(), kCoseEncryptEntryCount);
-
-        auto senderPubkey = getSenderPubKeyFromCoseEncrypt(parsedProtectedData);
-        ASSERT_TRUE(senderPubkey) << senderPubkey.message();
-        EXPECT_EQ(senderPubkey->second, eekId_);
-
-        auto sessionKey = getSessionKey(senderPubkey);
-        ASSERT_TRUE(sessionKey) << sessionKey.message();
-
-        auto protectedDataPayload =
-                decryptCoseEncrypt(*sessionKey, parsedProtectedData.get(), bytevec{} /* aad */);
-        ASSERT_TRUE(protectedDataPayload) << protectedDataPayload.message();
-
-        auto [parsedPayload, __, payloadErrMsg] = cppbor::parse(*protectedDataPayload);
-        ASSERT_TRUE(parsedPayload) << "Failed to parse payload: " << payloadErrMsg;
-        ASSERT_TRUE(parsedPayload->asArray());
-        // Strongbox may contain additional certificate chain.
-        EXPECT_LE(parsedPayload->asArray()->size(), 3U);
-
-        auto& signedMac = parsedPayload->asArray()->get(0);
-        auto& bcc = parsedPayload->asArray()->get(1);
-        ASSERT_TRUE(signedMac && signedMac->asArray());
-        ASSERT_TRUE(bcc && bcc->asArray());
-
-        // BCC is [ pubkey, + BccEntry]
-        auto bccContents = validateBcc(bcc->asArray());
-        ASSERT_TRUE(bccContents) << "\n" << bccContents.message() << "\n" << prettyPrint(bcc.get());
-        ASSERT_GT(bccContents->size(), 0U);
-
-        auto deviceInfoResult =
-                parseAndValidateDeviceInfo(deviceInfo.deviceInfo, provisionable_.get());
-        ASSERT_TRUE(deviceInfoResult) << deviceInfoResult.message();
-        std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Map> deviceInfoMap = deviceInfoResult.moveValue();
-        auto& signingKey = bccContents->back().pubKey;
-        auto macKey = verifyAndParseCoseSign1(signedMac->asArray(), signingKey,
-                                              cppbor::Array()  // SignedMacAad
-                                                      .add(challenge_)
-                                                      .add(std::move(deviceInfoMap))
-                                                      .add(keysToSignMac)
-                                                      .encode());
-        ASSERT_TRUE(macKey) << macKey.message();
-
-        auto coseMac0 = cppbor::Array()
-                                .add(cppbor::Map()  // protected
-                                             .add(ALGORITHM, HMAC_256)
-                                             .canonicalize()
-                                             .encode())
-                                .add(cppbor::Map())        // unprotected
-                                .add(keysToSign.encode())  // payload (keysToSign)
-                                .add(keysToSignMac);       // tag
-
-        auto macPayload = verifyAndParseCoseMac0(&coseMac0, *macKey);
-        ASSERT_TRUE(macPayload) << macPayload.message();
-
-        if (bccOutput) {
-            *bccOutput = std::move(*bccContents);
-        }
-    }
-
     bytevec eekId_;
     size_t testEekLength_;
     EekChain testEekChain_;
@@ -470,7 +395,10 @@
                 &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
         ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
 
-        checkProtectedData(deviceInfo, cppbor::Array(), keysToSignMac, protectedData);
+        auto result = verifyProductionProtectedData(
+                deviceInfo, cppbor::Array(), keysToSignMac, protectedData, testEekChain_, eekId_,
+                rpcHardwareInfo.supportedEekCurve, provisionable_.get(), challenge_);
+        ASSERT_TRUE(result) << result.message();
     }
 }
 
@@ -492,22 +420,24 @@
             &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
     ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
 
-    std::vector<BccEntryData> firstBcc;
-    checkProtectedData(deviceInfo, /*keysToSign=*/cppbor::Array(), keysToSignMac, protectedData,
-                       &firstBcc);
+    auto firstBcc = verifyProductionProtectedData(
+            deviceInfo, /*keysToSign=*/cppbor::Array(), keysToSignMac, protectedData, testEekChain_,
+            eekId_, rpcHardwareInfo.supportedEekCurve, provisionable_.get(), challenge_);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(firstBcc) << firstBcc.message();
 
     status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
             testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
             &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
     ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
 
-    std::vector<BccEntryData> secondBcc;
-    checkProtectedData(deviceInfo, /*keysToSign=*/cppbor::Array(), keysToSignMac, protectedData,
-                       &secondBcc);
+    auto secondBcc = verifyProductionProtectedData(
+            deviceInfo, /*keysToSign=*/cppbor::Array(), keysToSignMac, protectedData, testEekChain_,
+            eekId_, rpcHardwareInfo.supportedEekCurve, provisionable_.get(), challenge_);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(secondBcc) << secondBcc.message();
 
     // Verify that none of the keys in the first BCC are repeated in the second one.
-    for (const auto& i : firstBcc) {
-        for (auto& j : secondBcc) {
+    for (const auto& i : *firstBcc) {
+        for (auto& j : *secondBcc) {
             ASSERT_THAT(i.pubKey, testing::Not(testing::ElementsAreArray(j.pubKey)))
                     << "Found a repeated pubkey in two generateCertificateRequest test mode calls";
         }
@@ -550,7 +480,10 @@
                 &keysToSignMac);
         ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
 
-        checkProtectedData(deviceInfo, cborKeysToSign_, keysToSignMac, protectedData);
+        auto result = verifyProductionProtectedData(
+                deviceInfo, cborKeysToSign_, keysToSignMac, protectedData, testEekChain_, eekId_,
+                rpcHardwareInfo.supportedEekCurve, provisionable_.get(), challenge_);
+        ASSERT_TRUE(result) << result.message();
     }
 }
 
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/include/remote_prov/remote_prov_utils.h b/security/keymint/support/include/remote_prov/remote_prov_utils.h
index b1a6880..9ea20ac 100644
--- a/security/keymint/support/include/remote_prov/remote_prov_utils.h
+++ b/security/keymint/support/include/remote_prov/remote_prov_utils.h
@@ -143,10 +143,38 @@
 
 /**
  * Parses a DeviceInfo structure from the given CBOR data. The parsed data is then validated to
- * ensure it is formatted correctly and that it contains the required values for Remote Key
- * Provisioning.
+ * ensure it contains the minimum required data at the time of manufacturing. This is only a
+ * partial validation, as some fields may not be provisioned yet at the time this information
+ * is parsed in the manufacturing process.
  */
-ErrMsgOr<std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Map>> parseAndValidateDeviceInfo(
+ErrMsgOr<std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Map>> parseAndValidateFactoryDeviceInfo(
         const std::vector<uint8_t>& deviceInfoBytes, IRemotelyProvisionedComponent* provisionable);
 
+/**
+ * Parses a DeviceInfo structure from the given CBOR data. The parsed data is then validated to
+ * ensure it is formatted correctly and that it contains the required values for Remote Key
+ * Provisioning. This is a full validation, and assumes the device is provisioned as if it is
+ * suitable for the end user.
+ */
+ErrMsgOr<std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Map>> parseAndValidateProductionDeviceInfo(
+        const std::vector<uint8_t>& deviceInfoBytes, IRemotelyProvisionedComponent* provisionable);
+
+/**
+ * Verify the protected data as if the device is still early in the factory process and may not
+ * have all device identifiers provisioned yet.
+ */
+ErrMsgOr<std::vector<BccEntryData>> verifyFactoryProtectedData(
+        const DeviceInfo& deviceInfo, const cppbor::Array& keysToSign,
+        const std::vector<uint8_t>& keysToSignMac, const ProtectedData& protectedData,
+        const EekChain& eekChain, const std::vector<uint8_t>& eekId, int32_t supportedEekCurve,
+        IRemotelyProvisionedComponent* provisionable, const std::vector<uint8_t>& challenge);
+/**
+ * Verify the protected data as if the device is a final production sample.
+ */
+ErrMsgOr<std::vector<BccEntryData>> verifyProductionProtectedData(
+        const DeviceInfo& deviceInfo, const cppbor::Array& keysToSign,
+        const std::vector<uint8_t>& keysToSignMac, const ProtectedData& protectedData,
+        const EekChain& eekChain, const std::vector<uint8_t>& eekId, int32_t supportedEekCurve,
+        IRemotelyProvisionedComponent* provisionable, const std::vector<uint8_t>& challenge);
+
 }  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::remote_prov
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/remote_prov_utils.cpp b/security/keymint/support/remote_prov_utils.cpp
index a553f16..0651496 100644
--- a/security/keymint/support/remote_prov_utils.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/support/remote_prov_utils.cpp
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@
     return JsonOutput::Ok(Json::writeString(factory, json));
 }
 
-std::string checkMapEntry(const cppbor::Map& devInfo, cppbor::MajorType majorType,
+std::string checkMapEntry(bool isFactory, const cppbor::Map& devInfo, cppbor::MajorType majorType,
                           const std::string& entryName) {
     const std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Item>& val = devInfo.get(entryName);
     if (!val) {
@@ -454,6 +454,9 @@
     if (val->type() != majorType) {
         return entryName + " has the wrong type.\n";
     }
+    if (isFactory) {
+        return "";
+    }
     switch (majorType) {
         case cppbor::TSTR:
             if (val->asTstr()->value().size() <= 0) {
@@ -471,13 +474,17 @@
     return "";
 }
 
-std::string checkMapEntry(const cppbor::Map& devInfo, cppbor::MajorType majorType,
+std::string checkMapEntry(bool isFactory, const cppbor::Map& devInfo, cppbor::MajorType majorType,
                           const std::string& entryName, const cppbor::Array& allowList) {
-    std::string error = checkMapEntry(devInfo, majorType, entryName);
+    std::string error = checkMapEntry(isFactory, devInfo, majorType, entryName);
     if (!error.empty()) {
         return error;
     }
 
+    if (isFactory) {
+        return "";
+    }
+
     const std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Item>& val = devInfo.get(entryName);
     for (auto i = allowList.begin(); i != allowList.end(); ++i) {
         if (**i == *val) {
@@ -488,31 +495,39 @@
 }
 
 ErrMsgOr<std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Map>> parseAndValidateDeviceInfo(
-        const std::vector<uint8_t>& deviceInfoBytes, IRemotelyProvisionedComponent* provisionable) {
-    const cppbor::Array kAllowedVbStates = {"green", "yellow", "orange"};
-    const cppbor::Array kAllowedBootloaderStates = {"locked", "unlocked"};
-    const cppbor::Array kAllowedSecurityLevels = {"tee", "strongbox"};
-    const cppbor::Array kAllowedAttIdStates = {"locked", "open"};
-    const cppbor::Array kAllowedFused = {0, 1};
+        const std::vector<uint8_t>& deviceInfoBytes, IRemotelyProvisionedComponent* provisionable,
+        bool isFactory) {
+    const cppbor::Array kValidVbStates = {"green", "yellow", "orange"};
+    const cppbor::Array kValidBootloaderStates = {"locked", "unlocked"};
+    const cppbor::Array kValidSecurityLevels = {"tee", "strongbox"};
+    const cppbor::Array kValidAttIdStates = {"locked", "open"};
+    const cppbor::Array kValidFused = {0, 1};
 
-    constexpr std::array kAttestationIdEntrySet = {"brand", "manufacturer", "product", "model",
-                                                   "device"};
+    struct AttestationIdEntry {
+        const char* id;
+        bool alwaysValidate;
+    };
+    constexpr AttestationIdEntry kAttestationIdEntrySet[] = {{"brand", false},
+                                                             {"manufacturer", true},
+                                                             {"product", false},
+                                                             {"model", false},
+                                                             {"device", false}};
 
     auto [parsedVerifiedDeviceInfo, ignore1, errMsg] = cppbor::parse(deviceInfoBytes);
     if (!parsedVerifiedDeviceInfo) {
         return errMsg;
     }
 
-    std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Map> deviceInfo(parsedVerifiedDeviceInfo->asMap());
-    if (!deviceInfo) {
+    std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Map> parsed(parsedVerifiedDeviceInfo->asMap());
+    if (!parsed) {
         return "DeviceInfo must be a CBOR map.";
     }
     parsedVerifiedDeviceInfo.release();
 
-    if (deviceInfo->clone()->asMap()->canonicalize().encode() != deviceInfoBytes) {
+    if (parsed->clone()->asMap()->canonicalize().encode() != deviceInfoBytes) {
         return "DeviceInfo ordering is non-canonical.";
     }
-    const std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Item>& version = deviceInfo->get("version");
+    const std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Item>& version = parsed->get("version");
     if (!version) {
         return "Device info is missing version";
     }
@@ -526,14 +541,15 @@
                ") does not match the remotely provisioned component version (" +
                std::to_string(info.versionNumber) + ").";
     }
-    std::string errorString;
+    std::string error;
     switch (version->asUint()->value()) {
         case 2:
-            for (const auto& attId : kAttestationIdEntrySet) {
-                errorString += checkMapEntry(*deviceInfo, cppbor::TSTR, attId);
+            for (const auto& entry : kAttestationIdEntrySet) {
+                error += checkMapEntry(isFactory && !entry.alwaysValidate, *parsed, cppbor::TSTR,
+                                       entry.id);
             }
-            if (!errorString.empty()) {
-                return errorString +
+            if (!error.empty()) {
+                return error +
                        "Attestation IDs are missing or malprovisioned. If this test is being\n"
                        "run against an early proto or EVT build, this error is probably WAI\n"
                        "and indicates that Device IDs were not provisioned in the factory. If\n"
@@ -541,35 +557,181 @@
                        "something is likely wrong with the factory provisioning process.";
             }
             // TODO: Refactor the KeyMint code that validates these fields and include it here.
-            errorString += checkMapEntry(*deviceInfo, cppbor::TSTR, "vb_state", kAllowedVbStates);
-            errorString += checkMapEntry(*deviceInfo, cppbor::TSTR, "bootloader_state",
-                                         kAllowedBootloaderStates);
-            errorString += checkMapEntry(*deviceInfo, cppbor::BSTR, "vbmeta_digest");
-            errorString += checkMapEntry(*deviceInfo, cppbor::UINT, "system_patch_level");
-            errorString += checkMapEntry(*deviceInfo, cppbor::UINT, "boot_patch_level");
-            errorString += checkMapEntry(*deviceInfo, cppbor::UINT, "vendor_patch_level");
-            errorString += checkMapEntry(*deviceInfo, cppbor::UINT, "fused", kAllowedFused);
-            errorString += checkMapEntry(*deviceInfo, cppbor::TSTR, "security_level",
-                                         kAllowedSecurityLevels);
-            if (deviceInfo->get("security_level")->asTstr()->value() == "tee") {
-                errorString += checkMapEntry(*deviceInfo, cppbor::TSTR, "os_version");
+            error += checkMapEntry(isFactory, *parsed, cppbor::TSTR, "vb_state", kValidVbStates);
+            error += checkMapEntry(isFactory, *parsed, cppbor::TSTR, "bootloader_state",
+                                   kValidBootloaderStates);
+            error += checkMapEntry(isFactory, *parsed, cppbor::BSTR, "vbmeta_digest");
+            error += checkMapEntry(isFactory, *parsed, cppbor::UINT, "system_patch_level");
+            error += checkMapEntry(isFactory, *parsed, cppbor::UINT, "boot_patch_level");
+            error += checkMapEntry(isFactory, *parsed, cppbor::UINT, "vendor_patch_level");
+            error += checkMapEntry(isFactory, *parsed, cppbor::UINT, "fused", kValidFused);
+            error += checkMapEntry(isFactory, *parsed, cppbor::TSTR, "security_level",
+                                   kValidSecurityLevels);
+            if (parsed->get("security_level") && parsed->get("security_level")->asTstr() &&
+                parsed->get("security_level")->asTstr()->value() == "tee") {
+                error += checkMapEntry(isFactory, *parsed, cppbor::TSTR, "os_version");
             }
             break;
         case 1:
-            errorString += checkMapEntry(*deviceInfo, cppbor::TSTR, "security_level",
-                                         kAllowedSecurityLevels);
-            errorString +=
-                    checkMapEntry(*deviceInfo, cppbor::TSTR, "att_id_state", kAllowedAttIdStates);
+            error += checkMapEntry(isFactory, *parsed, cppbor::TSTR, "security_level",
+                                   kValidSecurityLevels);
+            error += checkMapEntry(isFactory, *parsed, cppbor::TSTR, "att_id_state",
+                                   kValidAttIdStates);
             break;
         default:
             return "Unrecognized version: " + std::to_string(version->asUint()->value());
     }
 
-    if (!errorString.empty()) {
-        return errorString;
+    if (!error.empty()) {
+        return error;
     }
 
-    return std::move(deviceInfo);
+    return std::move(parsed);
 }
 
-}  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::remote_prov
+ErrMsgOr<std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Map>> parseAndValidateFactoryDeviceInfo(
+        const std::vector<uint8_t>& deviceInfoBytes, IRemotelyProvisionedComponent* provisionable) {
+    return parseAndValidateDeviceInfo(deviceInfoBytes, provisionable, /*isFactory=*/true);
+}
+
+ErrMsgOr<std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Map>> parseAndValidateProductionDeviceInfo(
+        const std::vector<uint8_t>& deviceInfoBytes, IRemotelyProvisionedComponent* provisionable) {
+    return parseAndValidateDeviceInfo(deviceInfoBytes, provisionable, /*isFactory=*/false);
+}
+
+ErrMsgOr<bytevec> getSessionKey(ErrMsgOr<std::pair<bytevec, bytevec>>& senderPubkey,
+                                const EekChain& eekChain, int32_t supportedEekCurve) {
+    if (supportedEekCurve == RpcHardwareInfo::CURVE_25519 ||
+        supportedEekCurve == RpcHardwareInfo::CURVE_NONE) {
+        return x25519_HKDF_DeriveKey(eekChain.last_pubkey, eekChain.last_privkey,
+                                     senderPubkey->first, false /* senderIsA */);
+    } else {
+        return ECDH_HKDF_DeriveKey(eekChain.last_pubkey, eekChain.last_privkey, senderPubkey->first,
+                                   false /* senderIsA */);
+    }
+}
+
+ErrMsgOr<std::vector<BccEntryData>> verifyProtectedData(
+        const DeviceInfo& deviceInfo, const cppbor::Array& keysToSign,
+        const std::vector<uint8_t>& keysToSignMac, const ProtectedData& protectedData,
+        const EekChain& eekChain, const std::vector<uint8_t>& eekId, int32_t supportedEekCurve,
+        IRemotelyProvisionedComponent* provisionable, const std::vector<uint8_t>& challenge,
+        bool isFactory) {
+    auto [parsedProtectedData, _, protDataErrMsg] = cppbor::parse(protectedData.protectedData);
+    if (!parsedProtectedData) {
+        return protDataErrMsg;
+    }
+    if (!parsedProtectedData->asArray()) {
+        return "Protected data is not a CBOR array.";
+    }
+    if (parsedProtectedData->asArray()->size() != kCoseEncryptEntryCount) {
+        return "The protected data COSE_encrypt structure must have " +
+               std::to_string(kCoseEncryptEntryCount) + " entries, but it only has " +
+               std::to_string(parsedProtectedData->asArray()->size());
+    }
+
+    auto senderPubkey = getSenderPubKeyFromCoseEncrypt(parsedProtectedData);
+    if (!senderPubkey) {
+        return senderPubkey.message();
+    }
+    if (senderPubkey->second != eekId) {
+        return "The COSE_encrypt recipient does not match the expected EEK identifier";
+    }
+
+    auto sessionKey = getSessionKey(senderPubkey, eekChain, supportedEekCurve);
+    if (!sessionKey) {
+        return sessionKey.message();
+    }
+
+    auto protectedDataPayload =
+            decryptCoseEncrypt(*sessionKey, parsedProtectedData.get(), bytevec{} /* aad */);
+    if (!protectedDataPayload) {
+        return protectedDataPayload.message();
+    }
+
+    auto [parsedPayload, __, payloadErrMsg] = cppbor::parse(*protectedDataPayload);
+    if (!parsedPayload) {
+        return "Failed to parse payload: " + payloadErrMsg;
+    }
+    if (!parsedPayload->asArray()) {
+        return "The protected data payload must be an Array.";
+    }
+    if (parsedPayload->asArray()->size() != 3U && parsedPayload->asArray()->size() != 2U) {
+        return "The protected data payload must contain SignedMAC and BCC. It may optionally "
+               "contain AdditionalDKSignatures. However, the parsed payload has " +
+               std::to_string(parsedPayload->asArray()->size()) + " entries.";
+    }
+
+    auto& signedMac = parsedPayload->asArray()->get(0);
+    auto& bcc = parsedPayload->asArray()->get(1);
+    if (!signedMac->asArray()) {
+        return "The SignedMAC in the protected data payload is not an Array.";
+    }
+    if (!bcc->asArray()) {
+        return "The BCC in the protected data payload is not an Array.";
+    }
+
+    // BCC is [ pubkey, + BccEntry]
+    auto bccContents = validateBcc(bcc->asArray());
+    if (!bccContents) {
+        return bccContents.message() + "\n" + prettyPrint(bcc.get());
+    }
+    if (bccContents->size() == 0U) {
+        return "The BCC is empty. It must contain at least one entry.";
+    }
+
+    auto deviceInfoResult =
+            parseAndValidateDeviceInfo(deviceInfo.deviceInfo, provisionable, isFactory);
+    if (!deviceInfoResult) {
+        return deviceInfoResult.message();
+    }
+    std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Map> deviceInfoMap = deviceInfoResult.moveValue();
+    auto& signingKey = bccContents->back().pubKey;
+    auto macKey = verifyAndParseCoseSign1(signedMac->asArray(), signingKey,
+                                          cppbor::Array()  // SignedMacAad
+                                                  .add(challenge)
+                                                  .add(std::move(deviceInfoMap))
+                                                  .add(keysToSignMac)
+                                                  .encode());
+    if (!macKey) {
+        return macKey.message();
+    }
+
+    auto coseMac0 = cppbor::Array()
+                            .add(cppbor::Map()  // protected
+                                         .add(ALGORITHM, HMAC_256)
+                                         .canonicalize()
+                                         .encode())
+                            .add(cppbor::Map())        // unprotected
+                            .add(keysToSign.encode())  // payload (keysToSign)
+                            .add(keysToSignMac);       // tag
+
+    auto macPayload = verifyAndParseCoseMac0(&coseMac0, *macKey);
+    if (!macPayload) {
+        return macPayload.message();
+    }
+
+    return *bccContents;
+}
+
+ErrMsgOr<std::vector<BccEntryData>> verifyFactoryProtectedData(
+        const DeviceInfo& deviceInfo, const cppbor::Array& keysToSign,
+        const std::vector<uint8_t>& keysToSignMac, const ProtectedData& protectedData,
+        const EekChain& eekChain, const std::vector<uint8_t>& eekId, int32_t supportedEekCurve,
+        IRemotelyProvisionedComponent* provisionable, const std::vector<uint8_t>& challenge) {
+    return verifyProtectedData(deviceInfo, keysToSign, keysToSignMac, protectedData, eekChain,
+                               eekId, supportedEekCurve, provisionable, challenge,
+                               /*isFactory=*/true);
+}
+
+ErrMsgOr<std::vector<BccEntryData>> verifyProductionProtectedData(
+        const DeviceInfo& deviceInfo, const cppbor::Array& keysToSign,
+        const std::vector<uint8_t>& keysToSignMac, const ProtectedData& protectedData,
+        const EekChain& eekChain, const std::vector<uint8_t>& eekId, int32_t supportedEekCurve,
+        IRemotelyProvisionedComponent* provisionable, const std::vector<uint8_t>& challenge) {
+    return verifyProtectedData(deviceInfo, keysToSign, keysToSignMac, protectedData, eekChain,
+                               eekId, supportedEekCurve, provisionable, challenge,
+                               /*isFactory=*/false);
+}
+
+}  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::remote_prov
\ No newline at end of file