diff --git a/audio/core/all-versions/vts/functional/7.0/PolicyConfig.h b/audio/core/all-versions/vts/functional/7.0/PolicyConfig.h
index c1d5669..f6271ff 100644
--- a/audio/core/all-versions/vts/functional/7.0/PolicyConfig.h
+++ b/audio/core/all-versions/vts/functional/7.0/PolicyConfig.h
@@ -41,15 +41,10 @@
 
 class PolicyConfig {
   public:
-    explicit PolicyConfig(const std::string& configFileName)
-        : mConfigFileName{configFileName},
-          mFilePath{findExistingConfigurationFile(mConfigFileName)},
-          mConfig{xsd::read(mFilePath.c_str())} {
-        init();
-    }
     PolicyConfig(const std::string& configPath, const std::string& configFileName)
         : mConfigFileName{configFileName},
-          mFilePath{configPath + "/" + mConfigFileName},
+          mFilePath{configPath.empty() ? findExistingConfigurationFile(mConfigFileName)
+                                       : configPath + "/" + mConfigFileName},
           mConfig{xsd::read(mFilePath.c_str())} {
         init();
     }
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.0/Android.bp b/neuralnetworks/1.0/Android.bp
index 7bc65ff..8b7af11 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.0/Android.bp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.0/Android.bp
@@ -23,4 +23,8 @@
         "android.hidl.base@1.0",
     ],
     gen_java: false,
+    apex_available: [
+        "//apex_available:platform",
+        "com.android.neuralnetworks",
+    ],
 }
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.1/Android.bp b/neuralnetworks/1.1/Android.bp
index 772e5e6..b93c80c 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.1/Android.bp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.1/Android.bp
@@ -21,4 +21,8 @@
         "android.hidl.base@1.0",
     ],
     gen_java: false,
+    apex_available: [
+        "//apex_available:platform",
+        "com.android.neuralnetworks",
+    ],
 }
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.2/Android.bp b/neuralnetworks/1.2/Android.bp
index 2b83d39..63e0f61 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.2/Android.bp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.2/Android.bp
@@ -28,4 +28,8 @@
         "android.hidl.safe_union@1.0",
     ],
     gen_java: false,
+    apex_available: [
+        "//apex_available:platform",
+        "com.android.neuralnetworks",
+    ],
 }
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.3/Android.bp b/neuralnetworks/1.3/Android.bp
index aa8fc39..c343802 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.3/Android.bp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.3/Android.bp
@@ -29,4 +29,8 @@
         "android.hidl.safe_union@1.0",
     ],
     gen_java: false,
+    apex_available: [
+        "//apex_available:platform",
+        "com.android.neuralnetworks",
+    ],
 }
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl
index 82c8a0d..a4fab55 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl
@@ -126,8 +126,8 @@
      *
      *   o The HMAC field must validate correctly.
      *
-     *   o The challenge field in the auth token must contain the challenge value contained in the
-     *     BeginResult returned from IKeyMintDevice::begin().
+     *   o The challenge field in the timestamp token must contain the challenge value contained in
+     *     the BeginResult returned from IKeyMintDevice::begin().
      *
      * The resulting secure time value is then used to authenticate the HardwareAuthToken. For the
      * auth token to be valid, all of the following has to be true:
@@ -139,9 +139,6 @@
      *
      *   o The key must have a Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE that matches the auth type in the token.
      *
-     *   o The challenge field in the auth token must contain the challenge value contained in the
-     *     BeginResult returned from IKeyMintDevice::begin().
-     *
      *   o The timestamp in the auth token plus the value of the Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT must be greater
      *     than the provided secure timestamp.
 
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp
index 7a4359d..41b161d 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -43,8 +43,11 @@
         "android.hardware.gatekeeper-V1-ndk",
         "android.hardware.security.rkp-V3-ndk",
         "android.hardware.security.secureclock-V1-ndk",
+        "libavb_user",
+        "libavb",
         "libcppbor_external",
         "libcppcose_rkp",
+        "libfs_mgr",
         "libjsoncpp",
         "libkeymint",
         "libkeymint_remote_prov_support",
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/BootloaderStateTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/BootloaderStateTest.cpp
index dff0498..54f187c 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/BootloaderStateTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/BootloaderStateTest.cpp
@@ -21,7 +21,11 @@
 #include <string>
 #include <vector>
 
+#include <android-base/properties.h>
 #include <android/binder_manager.h>
+#include <fstab/fstab.h>
+#include <libavb/libavb.h>
+#include <libavb_user/avb_ops_user.h>
 #include <remote_prov/remote_prov_utils.h>
 
 #include "KeyMintAidlTestBase.h"
@@ -34,50 +38,118 @@
 
 // Since this test needs to talk to KeyMint HAL, it can only run as root. Thus,
 // bootloader can not be locked.
-class BootloaderStateTest : public KeyMintAidlTestBase {};
+class BootloaderStateTest : public KeyMintAidlTestBase {
+  public:
+    virtual void SetUp() override {
+        KeyMintAidlTestBase::SetUp();
+
+        // Generate a key with attestation.
+        vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+        AuthorizationSet keyDesc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                           .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                           .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                           .AttestationChallenge("foo")
+                                           .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+                                           .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                           .SetDefaultValidity();
+        auto result = GenerateKey(keyDesc, &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+        // If factory provisioned attestation key is not supported by Strongbox,
+        // then create a key with self-signed attestation and use it as the
+        // attestation key instead.
+        if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX &&
+            result == ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_KEYS_NOT_PROVISIONED) {
+            result = GenerateKeyWithSelfSignedAttestKey(
+                    AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                            .EcdsaKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                            .AttestKey()
+                            .SetDefaultValidity(), /* attest key params */
+                    keyDesc, &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+        }
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
+
+        // Parse attested AVB values.
+        X509_Ptr cert(parse_cert_blob(cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
+        ASSERT_TRUE(cert.get());
+
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attest_rec = get_attestation_record(cert.get());
+        ASSERT_TRUE(attest_rec);
+
+        auto error = parse_root_of_trust(attest_rec->data, attest_rec->length, &attestedVbKey_,
+                                         &attestedVbState_, &attestedBootloaderState_,
+                                         &attestedVbmetaDigest_);
+        ASSERT_EQ(error, ErrorCode::OK);
+    }
+
+    vector<uint8_t> attestedVbKey_;
+    VerifiedBoot attestedVbState_;
+    bool attestedBootloaderState_;
+    vector<uint8_t> attestedVbmetaDigest_;
+};
 
 // Check that attested bootloader state is set to unlocked.
-TEST_P(BootloaderStateTest, IsUnlocked) {
-    // Generate a key with attestation.
-    vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
-    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
-    AuthorizationSet keyDesc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                       .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                       .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
-                                       .AttestationChallenge("foo")
-                                       .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
-                                       .Digest(Digest::NONE)
-                                       .SetDefaultValidity();
-    auto result = GenerateKey(keyDesc, &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
-    // If factory provisioned attestation key is not supported by Strongbox,
-    // then create a key with self-signed attestation and use it as the
-    // attestation key instead.
-    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX &&
-        result == ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_KEYS_NOT_PROVISIONED) {
-        result = GenerateKeyWithSelfSignedAttestKey(
-                AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                        .EcdsaKey(EcCurve::P_256)
-                        .AttestKey()
-                        .SetDefaultValidity(), /* attest key params */
-                keyDesc, &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+TEST_P(BootloaderStateTest, BootloaderIsUnlocked) {
+    ASSERT_FALSE(attestedBootloaderState_)
+            << "This test runs as root. Bootloader must be unlocked.";
+}
+
+// Check that verified boot state is set to "unverified", i.e. "orange".
+TEST_P(BootloaderStateTest, VbStateIsUnverified) {
+    // Unlocked bootloader implies that verified boot state must be "unverified".
+    ASSERT_EQ(attestedVbState_, VerifiedBoot::UNVERIFIED)
+            << "Verified boot state must be \"UNVERIFIED\" aka \"orange\".";
+
+    // AVB spec stipulates that bootloader must set "androidboot.verifiedbootstate" parameter
+    // on the kernel command-line. This parameter is exposed to userspace as
+    // "ro.boot.verifiedbootstate" property.
+    auto vbStateProp = ::android::base::GetProperty("ro.boot.verifiedbootstate", "");
+    ASSERT_EQ(vbStateProp, "orange")
+            << "Verified boot state must be \"UNVERIFIED\" aka \"orange\".";
+}
+
+// Following error codes from avb_slot_data() mean that slot data was loaded
+// (even if verification failed).
+static inline bool avb_slot_data_loaded(AvbSlotVerifyResult result) {
+    switch (result) {
+        case AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_RESULT_OK:
+        case AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_RESULT_ERROR_VERIFICATION:
+        case AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_RESULT_ERROR_ROLLBACK_INDEX:
+        case AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_RESULT_ERROR_PUBLIC_KEY_REJECTED:
+            return true;
+        default:
+            return false;
     }
-    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
+}
 
-    // Parse attested AVB values.
-    X509_Ptr cert(parse_cert_blob(cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
-    ASSERT_TRUE(cert.get());
+// Check that attested vbmeta digest is correct.
+TEST_P(BootloaderStateTest, VbmetaDigest) {
+    AvbSlotVerifyData* avbSlotData;
+    auto suffix = fs_mgr_get_slot_suffix();
+    const char* partitions[] = {nullptr};
+    auto avbOps = avb_ops_user_new();
 
-    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attest_rec = get_attestation_record(cert.get());
-    ASSERT_TRUE(attest_rec);
+    // For VTS, devices run with vendor_boot-debug.img, which is not release key
+    // signed. Use AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_FLAGS_ALLOW_VERIFICATION_ERROR to bypass avb
+    // verification errors. This is OK since we only care about the digest for
+    // this test case.
+    auto result = avb_slot_verify(avbOps, partitions, suffix.c_str(),
+                                  AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_FLAGS_ALLOW_VERIFICATION_ERROR,
+                                  AVB_HASHTREE_ERROR_MODE_EIO, &avbSlotData);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(avb_slot_data_loaded(result)) << "Failed to load avb slot data";
 
-    vector<uint8_t> key;
-    VerifiedBoot attestedVbState;
-    bool attestedBootloaderState;
-    vector<uint8_t> attestedVbmetaDigest;
-    auto error = parse_root_of_trust(attest_rec->data, attest_rec->length, &key, &attestedVbState,
-                                     &attestedBootloaderState, &attestedVbmetaDigest);
-    ASSERT_EQ(error, ErrorCode::OK);
-    ASSERT_FALSE(attestedBootloaderState) << "This test runs as root. Bootloader must be unlocked.";
+    // Unfortunately, bootloader is not required to report the algorithm used
+    // to calculate the digest. There are only two supported options though,
+    // SHA256 and SHA512. Attested VBMeta digest must match one of these.
+    vector<uint8_t> digest256(AVB_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+    vector<uint8_t> digest512(AVB_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+    avb_slot_verify_data_calculate_vbmeta_digest(avbSlotData, AVB_DIGEST_TYPE_SHA256,
+                                                 digest256.data());
+    avb_slot_verify_data_calculate_vbmeta_digest(avbSlotData, AVB_DIGEST_TYPE_SHA512,
+                                                 digest512.data());
+
+    ASSERT_TRUE((attestedVbmetaDigest_ == digest256) || (attestedVbmetaDigest_ == digest512))
+            << "Attested digest does not match computed digest.";
 }
 
 INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(BootloaderStateTest);
diff --git a/security/rkp/README.md b/security/rkp/README.md
index 01c90a8..7477f80 100644
--- a/security/rkp/README.md
+++ b/security/rkp/README.md
@@ -291,6 +291,24 @@
 of a DKCertChain in AdditionalDKSignatures (see
 [CertificateRequest](#certificaterequest)).
 
+#### Mode
+
+The Open Profile for DICE specifies four possible modes with the most important
+mode being `normal`. A certificate must only set the mode to `normal` when all
+of the following conditions are met when loading and verifying the software
+component that is being described by the certificate:
+
+*   verified boot with anti-rollback protection is enabled
+*   only the verified boot authorities for production images are enabled
+*   debug ports, fuses or other debug facilities are disabled
+*   device booted software from the normal primary source e.g. internal flash
+
+If any of these conditions are not met then it is recommended to explicitly
+acknowledge this fact by using the `debug` mode. The mode should never be `not
+configured`.
+
+#### Configuration descriptor
+
 The Open Profile for DICE allows for an arbitrary configuration descriptor. For
 BCC entries, this configuration descriptor is a CBOR map with the following
 optional fields. If no fields are relevant, an empty map should be encoded.