diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp
index f4ba9e7..70f0b8a 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -62,6 +62,36 @@
     static_libs: [
         "android.hardware.security.keymint-V1-ndk_platform",
         "android.hardware.security.secureclock-V1-ndk_platform",
-        "libcppbor",
+        "libcppbor_external",
+    ],
+}
+
+cc_test {
+    name: "VtsHalRemotelyProvisionedComponentTargetTest",
+    defaults: [
+        "VtsHalTargetTestDefaults",
+        "use_libaidlvintf_gtest_helper_static",
+    ],
+    srcs: [
+        "VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp",
+    ],
+    shared_libs: [
+        "libbinder_ndk",
+        "libcppbor_external",
+        "libcrypto",
+        "libkeymaster_portable",
+        "libpuresoftkeymasterdevice",
+    ],
+    static_libs: [
+        "android.hardware.security.keymint-unstable-ndk_platform",
+        "libcppcose",
+        "libgmock_ndk",
+        "libremote_provisioner",
+        "libkeymint",
+        "libkeymint_remote_prov_support",
+    ],
+    test_suites: [
+        "general-tests",
+        "vts",
     ],
 }
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..db53a8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,432 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#define LOG_TAG "VtsRemotelyProvisionableComponentTests"
+
+#include <RemotelyProvisionedComponent.h>
+#include <aidl/Gtest.h>
+#include <aidl/Vintf.h>
+#include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.h>
+#include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/SecurityLevel.h>
+#include <android/binder_manager.h>
+#include <cppbor_parse.h>
+#include <cppcose/cppcose.h>
+#include <gmock/gmock.h>
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+#include <keymaster/keymaster_configuration.h>
+#include <remote_prov/remote_prov_utils.h>
+
+namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test {
+
+using ::std::string;
+using ::std::vector;
+
+namespace {
+
+#define INSTANTIATE_REM_PROV_AIDL_TEST(name)                                         \
+    INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(                                                        \
+            PerInstance, name,                                                       \
+            testing::ValuesIn(VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests::build_params()), \
+            ::android::PrintInstanceNameToString)
+
+using bytevec = std::vector<uint8_t>;
+using testing::MatchesRegex;
+using namespace remote_prov;
+using namespace keymaster;
+
+bytevec string_to_bytevec(const char* s) {
+    const uint8_t* p = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(s);
+    return bytevec(p, p + strlen(s));
+}
+
+}  // namespace
+
+class VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests : public testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
+  public:
+    virtual void SetUp() override {
+        if (AServiceManager_isDeclared(GetParam().c_str())) {
+            ::ndk::SpAIBinder binder(AServiceManager_waitForService(GetParam().c_str()));
+            provisionable_ = IRemotelyProvisionedComponent::fromBinder(binder);
+        }
+        ASSERT_NE(provisionable_, nullptr);
+    }
+
+    static vector<string> build_params() {
+        auto params = ::android::getAidlHalInstanceNames(IRemotelyProvisionedComponent::descriptor);
+        return params;
+    }
+
+  protected:
+    std::shared_ptr<IRemotelyProvisionedComponent> provisionable_;
+};
+
+using GenerateKeyTests = VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests;
+
+INSTANTIATE_REM_PROV_AIDL_TEST(GenerateKeyTests);
+
+/**
+ * Generate and validate a production-mode key.  MAC tag can't be verified.
+ */
+TEST_P(GenerateKeyTests, generateEcdsaP256Key_prodMode) {
+    MacedPublicKey macedPubKey;
+    bytevec privateKeyBlob;
+    bool testMode = false;
+    auto status = provisionable_->generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(testMode, &macedPubKey, &privateKeyBlob);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk());
+
+    auto [coseMac0, _, mac0ParseErr] = cppbor::parse(macedPubKey.macedKey);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(coseMac0) << "COSE Mac0 parse failed " << mac0ParseErr;
+
+    ASSERT_NE(coseMac0->asArray(), nullptr);
+    ASSERT_EQ(coseMac0->asArray()->size(), kCoseMac0EntryCount);
+
+    auto protParms = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0ProtectedParams)->asBstr();
+    ASSERT_NE(protParms, nullptr);
+    ASSERT_EQ(cppbor::prettyPrint(protParms->value()), "{\n  1 : 5,\n}");
+
+    auto unprotParms = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0UnprotectedParams)->asBstr();
+    ASSERT_NE(unprotParms, nullptr);
+    ASSERT_EQ(unprotParms->value().size(), 0);
+
+    auto payload = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0Payload)->asBstr();
+    ASSERT_NE(payload, nullptr);
+    auto [parsedPayload, __, payloadParseErr] = cppbor::parse(payload->value());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(parsedPayload) << "Key parse failed: " << payloadParseErr;
+    EXPECT_THAT(cppbor::prettyPrint(parsedPayload.get()),
+                MatchesRegex("{\n"
+                             "  1 : 2,\n"
+                             "  3 : -7,\n"
+                             "  -1 : 1,\n"
+                             // The regex {(0x[0-9a-f]{2}, ){31}0x[0-9a-f]{2}} matches a sequence of
+                             // 32 hexadecimal bytes, enclosed in braces and separated by commas.
+                             // In this case, some Ed25519 public key.
+                             "  -2 : {(0x[0-9a-f]{2}, ){31}0x[0-9a-f]{2}},\n"
+                             "  -3 : {(0x[0-9a-f]{2}, ){31}0x[0-9a-f]{2}},\n"
+                             "}"));
+
+    auto coseMac0Tag = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0Tag)->asBstr();
+    ASSERT_TRUE(coseMac0Tag);
+    auto extractedTag = coseMac0Tag->value();
+    EXPECT_EQ(extractedTag.size(), 32U);
+
+    // Compare with tag generated with kTestMacKey.  Shouldn't match.
+    auto testTag = cppcose::generateCoseMac0Mac(remote_prov::kTestMacKey, {} /* external_aad */,
+                                                payload->value());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(testTag) << "Tag calculation failed: " << testTag.message();
+
+    EXPECT_NE(*testTag, extractedTag);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate and validate a test-mode key.
+ */
+TEST_P(GenerateKeyTests, generateEcdsaP256Key_testMode) {
+    MacedPublicKey macedPubKey;
+    bytevec privateKeyBlob;
+    bool testMode = true;
+    auto status = provisionable_->generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(testMode, &macedPubKey, &privateKeyBlob);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk());
+
+    auto [coseMac0, _, mac0ParseErr] = cppbor::parse(macedPubKey.macedKey);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(coseMac0) << "COSE Mac0 parse failed " << mac0ParseErr;
+
+    ASSERT_NE(coseMac0->asArray(), nullptr);
+    ASSERT_EQ(coseMac0->asArray()->size(), kCoseMac0EntryCount);
+
+    auto protParms = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0ProtectedParams)->asBstr();
+    ASSERT_NE(protParms, nullptr);
+    ASSERT_EQ(cppbor::prettyPrint(protParms->value()), "{\n  1 : 5,\n}");
+
+    auto unprotParms = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0UnprotectedParams)->asBstr();
+    ASSERT_NE(unprotParms, nullptr);
+    ASSERT_EQ(unprotParms->value().size(), 0);
+
+    auto payload = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0Payload)->asBstr();
+    ASSERT_NE(payload, nullptr);
+    auto [parsedPayload, __, payloadParseErr] = cppbor::parse(payload->value());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(parsedPayload) << "Key parse failed: " << payloadParseErr;
+    EXPECT_THAT(cppbor::prettyPrint(parsedPayload.get()),
+                MatchesRegex("{\n"
+                             "  1 : 2,\n"
+                             "  3 : -7,\n"
+                             "  -1 : 1,\n"
+                             // The regex {(0x[0-9a-f]{2}, ){31}0x[0-9a-f]{2}} matches a sequence of
+                             // 32 hexadecimal bytes, enclosed in braces and separated by commas.
+                             // In this case, some Ed25519 public key.
+                             "  -2 : {(0x[0-9a-f]{2}, ){31}0x[0-9a-f]{2}},\n"
+                             "  -3 : {(0x[0-9a-f]{2}, ){31}0x[0-9a-f]{2}},\n"
+                             "  -70000 : null,\n"
+                             "}"));
+
+    auto coseMac0Tag = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0Tag)->asBstr();
+    ASSERT_TRUE(coseMac0);
+    auto extractedTag = coseMac0Tag->value();
+    EXPECT_EQ(extractedTag.size(), 32U);
+
+    // Compare with tag generated with kTestMacKey.  Should match.
+    auto testTag = cppcose::generateCoseMac0Mac(remote_prov::kTestMacKey, {} /* external_aad */,
+                                                payload->value());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(testTag) << testTag.message();
+
+    EXPECT_EQ(*testTag, extractedTag);
+}
+
+class CertificateRequestTest : public VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests {
+  protected:
+    CertificateRequestTest() : eekId_(string_to_bytevec("eekid")) {
+        auto chain = generateEekChain(3, eekId_);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(chain) << chain.message();
+        if (chain) eekChain_ = chain.moveValue();
+    }
+
+    void generateKeys(bool testMode, size_t numKeys) {
+        keysToSign_ = std::vector<MacedPublicKey>(numKeys);
+        cborKeysToSign_ = cppbor::Array();
+
+        for (auto& key : keysToSign_) {
+            bytevec privateKeyBlob;
+            auto status = provisionable_->generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(testMode, &key, &privateKeyBlob);
+            ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+
+            auto [parsedMacedKey, _, parseErr] = cppbor::parse(key.macedKey);
+            ASSERT_TRUE(parsedMacedKey) << "Failed parsing MACed key: " << parseErr;
+            ASSERT_TRUE(parsedMacedKey->asArray()) << "COSE_Mac0 not an array?";
+            ASSERT_EQ(parsedMacedKey->asArray()->size(), kCoseMac0EntryCount);
+
+            auto& payload = parsedMacedKey->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0Payload);
+            ASSERT_TRUE(payload);
+            ASSERT_TRUE(payload->asBstr());
+
+            cborKeysToSign_.add(cppbor::EncodedItem(payload->asBstr()->value()));
+        }
+    }
+
+    bytevec eekId_;
+    EekChain eekChain_;
+    std::vector<MacedPublicKey> keysToSign_;
+    cppbor::Array cborKeysToSign_;
+};
+
+/**
+ * Generate an empty certificate request in test mode, and decrypt and verify the structure and
+ * content.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, EmptyRequest_testMode) {
+    bool testMode = true;
+    bytevec keysToSignMac;
+    ProtectedData protectedData;
+    auto challenge = randomBytes(32);
+    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(testMode, {} /* keysToSign */,
+                                                             eekChain_.chain, challenge,
+                                                             &keysToSignMac, &protectedData);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+
+    auto [parsedProtectedData, _, protDataErrMsg] = cppbor::parse(protectedData.protectedData);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(parsedProtectedData) << protDataErrMsg;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(parsedProtectedData->asArray());
+    ASSERT_EQ(parsedProtectedData->asArray()->size(), kCoseEncryptEntryCount);
+
+    auto senderPubkey = getSenderPubKeyFromCoseEncrypt(parsedProtectedData);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(senderPubkey) << senderPubkey.message();
+    EXPECT_EQ(senderPubkey->second, eekId_);
+
+    auto sessionKey = x25519_HKDF_DeriveKey(eekChain_.last_pubkey, eekChain_.last_privkey,
+                                            senderPubkey->first, false /* senderIsA */);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(sessionKey) << sessionKey.message();
+
+    auto protectedDataPayload =
+            decryptCoseEncrypt(*sessionKey, parsedProtectedData.get(), bytevec{} /* aad */);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(protectedDataPayload) << protectedDataPayload.message();
+
+    auto [parsedPayload, __, payloadErrMsg] = cppbor::parse(*protectedDataPayload);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(parsedPayload) << "Failed to parse payload: " << payloadErrMsg;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(parsedPayload->asArray());
+    EXPECT_EQ(parsedPayload->asArray()->size(), 2U);
+
+    auto& signedMac = parsedPayload->asArray()->get(0);
+    auto& bcc = parsedPayload->asArray()->get(1);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(signedMac && signedMac->asArray());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(bcc && bcc->asArray());
+
+    // BCC is [ pubkey, + BccEntry]
+    auto bccContents = validateBcc(bcc->asArray());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(bccContents) << "\n" << bccContents.message() << "\n" << prettyPrint(bcc.get());
+    ASSERT_GT(bccContents->size(), 0U);
+
+    auto& signingKey = bccContents->back().pubKey;
+    auto macKey = verifyAndParseCoseSign1(testMode, signedMac->asArray(), signingKey,
+                                          cppbor::Array()          // DeviceInfo
+                                                  .add(challenge)  //
+                                                  .add(cppbor::Map())
+                                                  .encode());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(macKey) << macKey.message();
+
+    auto coseMac0 = cppbor::Array()
+                            .add(cppbor::Map()  // protected
+                                         .add(ALGORITHM, HMAC_256)
+                                         .canonicalize()
+                                         .encode())
+                            .add(cppbor::Bstr())             // unprotected
+                            .add(cppbor::Array().encode())   // payload (keysToSign)
+                            .add(std::move(keysToSignMac));  // tag
+
+    auto macPayload = verifyAndParseCoseMac0(&coseMac0, *macKey);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(macPayload) << macPayload.message();
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate an empty certificate request in prod mode.  Generation will fail because we don't have a
+ * valid GEEK.
+ *
+ * TODO(swillden): Get a valid GEEK and use it so the generation can succeed, though we won't be
+ * able to decrypt.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, EmptyRequest_prodMode) {
+    bool testMode = false;
+    bytevec keysToSignMac;
+    ProtectedData protectedData;
+    auto challenge = randomBytes(32);
+    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(testMode, {} /* keysToSign */,
+                                                             eekChain_.chain, challenge,
+                                                             &keysToSignMac, &protectedData);
+    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk());
+    ASSERT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(), BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_EEK);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate a non-empty certificate request in test mode.  Decrypt, parse and validate the contents.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequest_testMode) {
+    bool testMode = true;
+    generateKeys(testMode, 4 /* numKeys */);
+
+    bytevec keysToSignMac;
+    ProtectedData protectedData;
+    auto challenge = randomBytes(32);
+    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
+            testMode, keysToSign_, eekChain_.chain, challenge, &keysToSignMac, &protectedData);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+
+    auto [parsedProtectedData, _, protDataErrMsg] = cppbor::parse(protectedData.protectedData);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(parsedProtectedData) << protDataErrMsg;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(parsedProtectedData->asArray());
+    ASSERT_EQ(parsedProtectedData->asArray()->size(), kCoseEncryptEntryCount);
+
+    auto senderPubkey = getSenderPubKeyFromCoseEncrypt(parsedProtectedData);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(senderPubkey) << senderPubkey.message();
+    EXPECT_EQ(senderPubkey->second, eekId_);
+
+    auto sessionKey = x25519_HKDF_DeriveKey(eekChain_.last_pubkey, eekChain_.last_privkey,
+                                            senderPubkey->first, false /* senderIsA */);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(sessionKey) << sessionKey.message();
+
+    auto protectedDataPayload =
+            decryptCoseEncrypt(*sessionKey, parsedProtectedData.get(), bytevec{} /* aad */);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(protectedDataPayload) << protectedDataPayload.message();
+
+    auto [parsedPayload, __, payloadErrMsg] = cppbor::parse(*protectedDataPayload);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(parsedPayload) << "Failed to parse payload: " << payloadErrMsg;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(parsedPayload->asArray());
+    EXPECT_EQ(parsedPayload->asArray()->size(), 2U);
+
+    auto& signedMac = parsedPayload->asArray()->get(0);
+    auto& bcc = parsedPayload->asArray()->get(1);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(signedMac && signedMac->asArray());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(bcc);
+
+    auto bccContents = validateBcc(bcc->asArray());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(bccContents) << "\n" << prettyPrint(bcc.get());
+    ASSERT_GT(bccContents->size(), 0U);
+
+    auto& signingKey = bccContents->back().pubKey;
+    auto macKey = verifyAndParseCoseSign1(testMode, signedMac->asArray(), signingKey,
+                                          cppbor::Array()          // DeviceInfo
+                                                  .add(challenge)  //
+                                                  .add(cppbor::Array())
+                                                  .encode());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(macKey) << macKey.message();
+
+    auto coseMac0 = cppbor::Array()
+                            .add(cppbor::Map()  // protected
+                                         .add(ALGORITHM, HMAC_256)
+                                         .canonicalize()
+                                         .encode())
+                            .add(cppbor::Bstr())             // unprotected
+                            .add(cborKeysToSign_.encode())   // payload
+                            .add(std::move(keysToSignMac));  // tag
+
+    auto macPayload = verifyAndParseCoseMac0(&coseMac0, *macKey);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(macPayload) << macPayload.message();
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode.  Must fail because we don't have a valid
+ * GEEK.
+ *
+ * TODO(swillden): Get a valid GEEK and use it so the generation can succeed, though we won't be
+ * able to decrypt.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequest_prodMode) {
+    bool testMode = false;
+    generateKeys(testMode, 4 /* numKeys */);
+
+    bytevec keysToSignMac;
+    ProtectedData protectedData;
+    auto challenge = randomBytes(32);
+    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
+            testMode, keysToSign_, eekChain_.chain, challenge, &keysToSignMac, &protectedData);
+    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk());
+    ASSERT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(), BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_EEK);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate a non-empty certificate request in test mode, with prod keys.  Must fail with
+ * STATUS_PRODUCTION_KEY_IN_TEST_REQUEST.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequest_prodKeyInTestCert) {
+    generateKeys(false /* testMode */, 2 /* numKeys */);
+
+    bytevec keysToSignMac;
+    ProtectedData protectedData;
+    auto challenge = randomBytes(32);
+    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(true /* testMode */, keysToSign_,
+                                                             eekChain_.chain, challenge,
+                                                             &keysToSignMac, &protectedData);
+    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk());
+    ASSERT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(),
+              BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_PRODUCTION_KEY_IN_TEST_REQUEST);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode, with test keys.  Must fail with
+ * STATUS_TEST_KEY_IN_PRODUCTION_REQUEST.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequest_testKeyInProdCert) {
+    generateKeys(true /* testMode */, 2 /* numKeys */);
+
+    bytevec keysToSignMac;
+    ProtectedData protectedData;
+    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
+            false /* testMode */, keysToSign_, eekChain_.chain, randomBytes(32) /* challenge */,
+            &keysToSignMac, &protectedData);
+    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk());
+    ASSERT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(),
+              BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_TEST_KEY_IN_PRODUCTION_REQUEST);
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_REM_PROV_AIDL_TEST(CertificateRequestTest);
+
+}  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test