Merge "VtsBluetooth: Use ASSERT_* to end the test ASAP"
diff --git a/audio/core/all-versions/default/Device.cpp b/audio/core/all-versions/default/Device.cpp
index 70a1a4d..130dfba 100644
--- a/audio/core/all-versions/default/Device.cpp
+++ b/audio/core/all-versions/default/Device.cpp
@@ -360,18 +360,43 @@
return Result::NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
-Return<void> Device::getAudioPort(const AudioPort& port, getAudioPort_cb _hidl_cb) {
- audio_port halPort;
- HidlUtils::audioPortToHal(port, &halPort);
- Result retval = analyzeStatus("get_audio_port", mDevice->get_audio_port(mDevice, &halPort));
+template <typename HalPort>
+Return<void> Device::getAudioPortImpl(const AudioPort& port, getAudioPort_cb _hidl_cb,
+ int (*halGetter)(audio_hw_device_t*, HalPort*),
+ const char* halGetterName) {
+ HalPort halPort;
+ if (status_t status = HidlUtils::audioPortToHal(port, &halPort); status != NO_ERROR) {
+ _hidl_cb(analyzeStatus("audioPortToHal", status), port);
+ return Void();
+ }
+ Result retval = analyzeStatus(halGetterName, halGetter(mDevice, &halPort));
AudioPort resultPort = port;
if (retval == Result::OK) {
- HidlUtils::audioPortFromHal(halPort, &resultPort);
+ if (status_t status = HidlUtils::audioPortFromHal(halPort, &resultPort);
+ status != NO_ERROR) {
+ _hidl_cb(analyzeStatus("audioPortFromHal", status), port);
+ return Void();
+ }
}
_hidl_cb(retval, resultPort);
return Void();
}
+#if MAJOR_VERSION <= 6
+Return<void> Device::getAudioPort(const AudioPort& port, getAudioPort_cb _hidl_cb) {
+ return getAudioPortImpl(port, _hidl_cb, mDevice->get_audio_port, "get_audio_port");
+}
+#else
+Return<void> Device::getAudioPort(const AudioPort& port, getAudioPort_cb _hidl_cb) {
+ if (version() >= AUDIO_DEVICE_API_VERSION_3_2) {
+ // get_audio_port_v7 is mandatory if legacy HAL support this API version.
+ return getAudioPortImpl(port, _hidl_cb, mDevice->get_audio_port_v7, "get_audio_port_v7");
+ } else {
+ return getAudioPortImpl(port, _hidl_cb, mDevice->get_audio_port, "get_audio_port");
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
Return<Result> Device::setAudioPortConfig(const AudioPortConfig& config) {
if (version() >= AUDIO_DEVICE_API_VERSION_3_0) {
struct audio_port_config halPortConfig;
diff --git a/audio/core/all-versions/default/include/core/default/Device.h b/audio/core/all-versions/default/include/core/default/Device.h
index 5851fc9..94cad53 100644
--- a/audio/core/all-versions/default/include/core/default/Device.h
+++ b/audio/core/all-versions/default/include/core/default/Device.h
@@ -153,6 +153,10 @@
std::tuple<Result, AudioPatchHandle> createOrUpdateAudioPatch(
AudioPatchHandle patch, const hidl_vec<AudioPortConfig>& sources,
const hidl_vec<AudioPortConfig>& sinks);
+ template <typename HalPort>
+ Return<void> getAudioPortImpl(const AudioPort& port, getAudioPort_cb _hidl_cb,
+ int (*halGetter)(audio_hw_device_t*, HalPort*),
+ const char* halGetterName);
// Methods from ParametersUtil.
char* halGetParameters(const char* keys) override;
diff --git a/audio/core/all-versions/vts/functional/tests/streamworker_tests.cpp b/audio/core/all-versions/vts/functional/tests/streamworker_tests.cpp
index 75116af..925fd33 100644
--- a/audio/core/all-versions/vts/functional/tests/streamworker_tests.cpp
+++ b/audio/core/all-versions/vts/functional/tests/streamworker_tests.cpp
@@ -33,12 +33,6 @@
// Use nullptr to test error reporting from the worker thread.
explicit TestWorker(TestStream* stream) : mStream(stream) {}
- void ensureWorkerCycled() {
- const size_t cyclesBefore = mWorkerCycles;
- while (mWorkerCycles == cyclesBefore && !hasError()) {
- sched_yield();
- }
- }
size_t getWorkerCycles() const { return mWorkerCycles; }
bool hasWorkerCycleCalled() const { return mWorkerCycles != 0; }
bool hasNoWorkerCycleCalled(useconds_t usec) {
@@ -131,21 +125,21 @@
TEST_P(StreamWorkerTest, Start) {
ASSERT_TRUE(worker.start());
- worker.ensureWorkerCycled();
+ worker.waitForAtLeastOneCycle();
EXPECT_FALSE(worker.hasError());
}
TEST_P(StreamWorkerTest, WorkerError) {
ASSERT_TRUE(worker.start());
stream.error = true;
- worker.ensureWorkerCycled();
+ worker.waitForAtLeastOneCycle();
EXPECT_TRUE(worker.hasError());
EXPECT_TRUE(worker.hasNoWorkerCycleCalled(kWorkerIdleCheckTime));
}
TEST_P(StreamWorkerTest, PauseResume) {
ASSERT_TRUE(worker.start());
- worker.ensureWorkerCycled();
+ worker.waitForAtLeastOneCycle();
EXPECT_FALSE(worker.hasError());
worker.pause();
EXPECT_TRUE(worker.hasNoWorkerCycleCalled(kWorkerIdleCheckTime));
@@ -159,7 +153,7 @@
TEST_P(StreamWorkerTest, StopPaused) {
ASSERT_TRUE(worker.start());
- worker.ensureWorkerCycled();
+ worker.waitForAtLeastOneCycle();
EXPECT_FALSE(worker.hasError());
worker.pause();
worker.stop();
@@ -169,7 +163,7 @@
TEST_P(StreamWorkerTest, PauseAfterErrorIgnored) {
ASSERT_TRUE(worker.start());
stream.error = true;
- worker.ensureWorkerCycled();
+ worker.waitForAtLeastOneCycle();
EXPECT_TRUE(worker.hasError());
worker.pause();
EXPECT_TRUE(worker.hasNoWorkerCycleCalled(kWorkerIdleCheckTime));
@@ -179,7 +173,7 @@
TEST_P(StreamWorkerTest, ResumeAfterErrorIgnored) {
ASSERT_TRUE(worker.start());
stream.error = true;
- worker.ensureWorkerCycled();
+ worker.waitForAtLeastOneCycle();
EXPECT_TRUE(worker.hasError());
worker.resume();
EXPECT_TRUE(worker.hasNoWorkerCycleCalled(kWorkerIdleCheckTime));
@@ -188,14 +182,14 @@
TEST_P(StreamWorkerTest, WorkerErrorOnResume) {
ASSERT_TRUE(worker.start());
- worker.ensureWorkerCycled();
+ worker.waitForAtLeastOneCycle();
EXPECT_FALSE(worker.hasError());
worker.pause();
EXPECT_FALSE(worker.hasError());
stream.error = true;
EXPECT_FALSE(worker.hasError());
worker.resume();
- worker.ensureWorkerCycled();
+ worker.waitForAtLeastOneCycle();
EXPECT_TRUE(worker.hasError());
EXPECT_TRUE(worker.hasNoWorkerCycleCalled(kWorkerIdleCheckTime));
}
diff --git a/audio/effect/all-versions/default/util/EffectUtils.cpp b/audio/effect/all-versions/default/util/EffectUtils.cpp
index b4382dc..1156d21 100644
--- a/audio/effect/all-versions/default/util/EffectUtils.cpp
+++ b/audio/effect/all-versions/default/util/EffectUtils.cpp
@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@
#include "util/EffectUtils.h"
-#define ARRAY_SIZE(a) (sizeof(a) / sizeof(*(a)))
-
using ::android::hardware::audio::common::CPP_VERSION::implementation::HidlUtils;
using ::android::hardware::audio::common::CPP_VERSION::implementation::UuidUtils;
using ::android::hardware::audio::common::utils::EnumBitfield;
@@ -154,6 +152,29 @@
return result;
}
+template <std::size_t N>
+inline hidl_string charBufferFromHal(const char (&halBuf)[N]) {
+ // Even if the original field contains a non-terminated string, hidl_string
+ // adds a NUL terminator.
+ return hidl_string(halBuf, strnlen(halBuf, N));
+}
+
+template <std::size_t N>
+inline status_t charBufferToHal(const hidl_string& str, char (&halBuf)[N], const char* fieldName) {
+ static_assert(N > 0);
+ const size_t halBufChars = N - 1; // Reserve one character for terminating NUL.
+ status_t result = NO_ERROR;
+ size_t strSize = str.size();
+ if (strSize > halBufChars) {
+ ALOGE("%s is too long: %zu (%zu max)", fieldName, strSize, halBufChars);
+ strSize = halBufChars;
+ result = BAD_VALUE;
+ }
+ strncpy(halBuf, str.c_str(), strSize);
+ halBuf[strSize] = '\0';
+ return result;
+}
+
status_t EffectUtils::effectDescriptorFromHal(const effect_descriptor_t& halDescriptor,
EffectDescriptor* descriptor) {
UuidUtils::uuidFromHal(halDescriptor.type, &descriptor->type);
@@ -166,9 +187,8 @@
memcpy(descriptor->implementor.data(), halDescriptor.implementor,
descriptor->implementor.size());
#else
- descriptor->name = hidl_string(halDescriptor.name, ARRAY_SIZE(halDescriptor.name));
- descriptor->implementor =
- hidl_string(halDescriptor.implementor, ARRAY_SIZE(halDescriptor.implementor));
+ descriptor->name = charBufferFromHal(halDescriptor.name);
+ descriptor->implementor = charBufferFromHal(halDescriptor.implementor);
#endif
return NO_ERROR;
}
@@ -186,25 +206,11 @@
memcpy(halDescriptor->implementor, descriptor.implementor.data(),
descriptor.implementor.size());
#else
- // According to 'dumpEffectDescriptor' 'name' and 'implementor' must be NUL-terminated.
- size_t nameSize = descriptor.name.size();
- if (nameSize >= ARRAY_SIZE(halDescriptor->name)) {
- ALOGE("effect name is too long: %zu (%zu max)", nameSize,
- ARRAY_SIZE(halDescriptor->name) - 1);
- nameSize = ARRAY_SIZE(halDescriptor->name) - 1;
- result = BAD_VALUE;
- }
- strncpy(halDescriptor->name, descriptor.name.c_str(), nameSize);
- halDescriptor->name[nameSize] = '\0';
- size_t implementorSize = descriptor.implementor.size();
- if (implementorSize >= ARRAY_SIZE(halDescriptor->implementor)) {
- ALOGE("effect implementor is too long: %zu (%zu max)", implementorSize,
- ARRAY_SIZE(halDescriptor->implementor) - 1);
- implementorSize = ARRAY_SIZE(halDescriptor->implementor) - 1;
- result = BAD_VALUE;
- }
- strncpy(halDescriptor->implementor, descriptor.implementor.c_str(), implementorSize);
- halDescriptor->implementor[implementorSize] = '\0';
+ // According to 'dumpEffectDescriptor', 'name' and 'implementor' must be NUL-terminated.
+ CONVERT_CHECKED(charBufferToHal(descriptor.name, halDescriptor->name, "effect name"), result);
+ CONVERT_CHECKED(charBufferToHal(descriptor.implementor, halDescriptor->implementor,
+ "effect implementor"),
+ result);
#endif
return result;
}
diff --git a/audio/effect/all-versions/default/util/tests/effectutils_tests.cpp b/audio/effect/all-versions/default/util/tests/effectutils_tests.cpp
index f3651de..d021fa0 100644
--- a/audio/effect/all-versions/default/util/tests/effectutils_tests.cpp
+++ b/audio/effect/all-versions/default/util/tests/effectutils_tests.cpp
@@ -154,3 +154,20 @@
EXPECT_EQ(NO_ERROR, EffectUtils::effectDescriptorFromHal(halDesc, &descBack));
EXPECT_EQ(desc, descBack);
}
+
+TEST(EffectUtils, ConvertNameAndImplementor) {
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < EFFECT_STRING_LEN_MAX; ++i) {
+ effect_descriptor_t halDesc{};
+ for (size_t c = 0; c < i; ++c) { // '<' to accommodate NUL terminator.
+ halDesc.name[c] = halDesc.implementor[c] = 'A' + static_cast<char>(c);
+ }
+ EffectDescriptor desc;
+ EXPECT_EQ(NO_ERROR, EffectUtils::effectDescriptorFromHal(halDesc, &desc));
+ effect_descriptor_t halDescBack;
+ EXPECT_EQ(NO_ERROR, EffectUtils::effectDescriptorToHal(desc, &halDescBack));
+ EXPECT_EQ(i, strlen(halDescBack.name));
+ EXPECT_EQ(i, strlen(halDescBack.implementor));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, strcmp(halDesc.name, halDescBack.name));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, strcmp(halDesc.implementor, halDescBack.implementor));
+ }
+}
diff --git a/identity/TEST_MAPPING b/identity/TEST_MAPPING
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f35f4b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/TEST_MAPPING
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+{
+ "presubmit": [
+ {
+ "name": "CtsIdentityTestCases"
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "VtsHalIdentityTargetTest"
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "android.hardware.identity-support-lib-test"
+ }
+ ]
+}
diff --git a/light/2.0/default/Light.cpp b/light/2.0/default/Light.cpp
index 5484d2d..3febf6b 100644
--- a/light/2.0/default/Light.cpp
+++ b/light/2.0/default/Light.cpp
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@
ret = hwModule->methods->open(hwModule, name,
reinterpret_cast<hw_device_t**>(&lightDevice));
if (ret != 0) {
- ALOGE("light_open %s %s failed: %d", LIGHTS_HARDWARE_MODULE_ID, name, ret);
+ ALOGI("light_open %s %s failed: %d", LIGHTS_HARDWARE_MODULE_ID, name, ret);
}
} else {
ALOGE("hw_get_module %s %s failed: %d", LIGHTS_HARDWARE_MODULE_ID, name, ret);
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/ExecutionBurstUtils.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/ExecutionBurstUtils.cpp
index ca3a52c..1bdde1e 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/ExecutionBurstUtils.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/ExecutionBurstUtils.cpp
@@ -520,6 +520,8 @@
}
return packet;
}
+
+ std::this_thread::yield();
}
// If we get to this point, we either stopped polling because it was taking too long or polling
@@ -665,6 +667,8 @@
}
return packet;
}
+
+ std::this_thread::yield();
}
// If we get to this point, we either stopped polling because it was taking too long or polling
diff --git a/power/stats/aidl/Android.bp b/power/stats/aidl/Android.bp
index 454c69a..0dbf9b4 100644
--- a/power/stats/aidl/Android.bp
+++ b/power/stats/aidl/Android.bp
@@ -41,4 +41,5 @@
enabled: true,
},
},
+ host_supported: true,
}
diff --git a/power/stats/aidl/default/PowerStats.cpp b/power/stats/aidl/default/PowerStats.cpp
index 7cf591e..4b771a8 100644
--- a/power/stats/aidl/default/PowerStats.cpp
+++ b/power/stats/aidl/default/PowerStats.cpp
@@ -32,15 +32,19 @@
}
int32_t id = mPowerEntityInfos.size();
+ auto info = p->getInfo();
- for (const auto& [entityName, states] : p->getInfo()) {
+ size_t index = mStateResidencyDataProviders.size();
+ mStateResidencyDataProviders.emplace_back(std::move(p));
+
+ for (const auto& [entityName, states] : info) {
PowerEntity i = {
.id = id++,
.name = entityName,
.states = states,
};
mPowerEntityInfos.emplace_back(i);
- mStateResidencyDataProviders.emplace_back(std::move(p));
+ mStateResidencyDataProviderIndex.emplace_back(index);
}
}
@@ -92,7 +96,8 @@
// Check to see if we already have data for the given id
std::string powerEntityName = mPowerEntityInfos[id].name;
if (stateResidencies.find(powerEntityName) == stateResidencies.end()) {
- mStateResidencyDataProviders[id]->getStateResidencies(&stateResidencies);
+ mStateResidencyDataProviders.at(mStateResidencyDataProviderIndex.at(id))
+ ->getStateResidencies(&stateResidencies);
}
// Append results if we have them
diff --git a/power/stats/aidl/default/PowerStats.h b/power/stats/aidl/default/PowerStats.h
index f4c5e69..91d272d 100644
--- a/power/stats/aidl/default/PowerStats.h
+++ b/power/stats/aidl/default/PowerStats.h
@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@
private:
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<IStateResidencyDataProvider>> mStateResidencyDataProviders;
std::vector<PowerEntity> mPowerEntityInfos;
+ /* Index that maps each power entity id to an entry in mStateResidencyDataProviders */
+ std::vector<size_t> mStateResidencyDataProviderIndex;
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<IEnergyConsumer>> mEnergyConsumers;
std::vector<EnergyConsumer> mEnergyConsumerInfos;
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/OWNERS b/security/keymint/aidl/OWNERS
index 5c79db8..a93b171 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/OWNERS
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/OWNERS
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+jbires@google.com
jdanis@google.com
seleneh@google.com
swillden@google.com
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
index 17aab25..5aa3070 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
@@ -321,8 +321,8 @@
* but `attestationKey` is non-null, the IKeyMintDevice must return
* ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT. If the provided AttestationKey does not contain a key
* blob containing an asymmetric key with KeyPurpose::ATTEST_KEY, the IKeyMintDevice must
- * return ErrorCode::INVALID_PURPOSE. If the provided AttestationKey has an empty issuer
- * subject name, the IKeyMintDevice must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
+ * return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE. If the provided AttestationKey has an empty
+ * issuer subject name, the IKeyMintDevice must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
*
* @return The result of key creation. See KeyCreationResult.aidl.
*/
@@ -360,8 +360,8 @@
* but `attestationKey` is non-null, the IKeyMintDevice must return
* ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT. If the provided AttestationKey does not contain a key
* blob containing an asymmetric key with KeyPurpose::ATTEST_KEY, the IKeyMintDevice must
- * return ErrorCode::INVALID_PURPOSE. If the provided AttestationKey has an empty issuer
- * subject name, the IKeyMintDevice must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
+ * return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE. If the provided AttestationKey has an empty
+ * issuer subject name, the IKeyMintDevice must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
*
* @return The result of key creation. See KeyCreationResult.aidl.
*/
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
index 1cb50ba..1ae6762 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@
* 2 : bstr // KID : EEK ID
* 3 : -25, // Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
* -1 : 4, // Curve : X25519
- * -2 : bstr // Ed25519 public key
+ * -2 : bstr // X25519 public key
* }
*
* EekSignatureInput = [
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@
* in the chain, which implies that it must not attempt to validate the signature.
*
* If testMode is false, the method must validate the chain signatures, and must verify
- * that the public key in the root certifictate is in its pre-configured set of
+ * that the public key in the root certificate is in its pre-configured set of
* authorized EEK root keys. If the public key is not in the database, or if signature
* verification fails, the method must return STATUS_INVALID_EEK.
*
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl
index c589ca1..f3c5477 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl
@@ -53,13 +53,36 @@
/**
* If the generated/imported key is an asymmetric key, `certificateChain` will contain a chain
- * of one or more certificates. If the key parameters provided to the generate/import method
- * contains Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE the first certificate will contain an attestation
- * extension, and will be signed by a factory-installed attestation key and followed by a chain
- * of certificates leading to an authoritative root. If there is no attestation challenge, only
- * one certificate will be returned, and it will be self-signed or contain a fake signature,
- * depending on whether the key has KeyPurpose::SIGN. If the generated key is symmetric,
- * certificateChain will be empty.
+ * of one or more certificates.
+ *
+ * There are a few variations in what is contained in `certificateChain`, depending on whether
+ * the caller requested attestation, whether they provided an attestation key (via the
+ * `attestationKey` parameter of `generateKey()`, `importKey()` or `importWrappedKey()`), and in
+ * the non-attestaion case, whether the key can self-sign.
+ *
+ * 1. Attestation with factory key. If Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is provided and the
+ * `attestationKey` parameter on the generate/import call is null, the returned certificate
+ * chain must contain an attestation certificate signed with a factory-provisioned
+ * attestation key, and the full certificate chain for that factory-provisioned attestation
+ * key.
+ *
+ * 2. Attestation with caller-provided key. If Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is provided and the
+ * `attestationKey` parameter on the generat/import call is non-null and contains the key
+ * blob of a key with KeyPurpose::ATTEST_KEY, the returned certificate chain must contain
+ * only an attestation certificate signed with the specified key. The caller must know the
+ * certificate chain for the provided key.
+ *
+ * 3. Non-attestation with signing key. If Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is not provided and the
+ * generated/imported key has KeyPurpose::SIGN, then the returned certificate chain must
+ * contain only a single self-signed certificate with no attestation extension.
+ *
+ * 4. Non-attestation with non-signing key. If TAG::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is not provided and
+ * the generated/imported key does not have KeyPurpose::SIGN, then the returned certificate
+ * chain must contain only a single certificate with an empty signature and no attestation
+ * extension.
+ *
+ * 5. Symmetric key. If the generated/imported key is symmetric, the certificate chain must be
+ * empty.
*/
Certificate[] certificateChain;
}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/MacedPublicKey.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/MacedPublicKey.aidl
index a26094c..62a48e9 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/MacedPublicKey.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/MacedPublicKey.aidl
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
/**
* key is a COSE_Mac0 structure containing the new public key. It's MACed by a key available
* only to the secure environment, as proof that the public key was generated by that
- * environment. In CDDL, assuming the contained key is an Ed25519 public key:
+ * environment. In CDDL, assuming the contained key is a P-256 public key:
*
* MacedPublicKey = [ // COSE_Mac0
* protected: bstr .cbor { 1 : 5}, // Algorithm : HMAC-256
@@ -36,10 +36,11 @@
* ]
*
* PublicKey = { // COSE_Key
- * 1 : 1, // Key type : octet key pair
- * 3 : -8 // Algorithm : EdDSA
- * -1 : 6, // Curve : Ed25519
+ * 1 : 2, // Key type : EC2
+ * 3 : -8 // Algorithm : ES256
+ * -1 : 6, // Curve : P256
* -2 : bstr // X coordinate, little-endian
+ * -3 : bstr // Y coordinate, little-endian
* ? -70000 : nil // Presence indicates this is a test key. If set, K_mac is
* // all zeros.
* },
@@ -51,7 +52,7 @@
* payload : bstr .cbor PublicKey
* ]
*
- * if a non-Ed25519 public key were contained, the contents of the PublicKey map would change a
+ * if a non-P256 public key were contained, the contents of the PublicKey map would change a
* little; see RFC 8152 for details.
*/
byte[] macedKey;
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl
index 44f316f..5199062 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
* unprotected: {
* 5 : bstr .size 12 // IV
* },
- * ciphertext: bstr, // AES-GCM-128(K, .cbor ProtectedDataPayload)
+ * ciphertext: bstr, // AES-GCM-256(K, .cbor ProtectedDataPayload)
* recipients : [
* [ // COSE_Recipient
* protected : bstr .cbor {
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
index 6243bb9..cde1fc0 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
@@ -249,8 +249,11 @@
HARDWARE_TYPE = (1 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM */ | 304,
/**
- * Keys tagged with EARLY_BOOT_ONLY may only be used, or created, during early boot, until
- * IKeyMintDevice::earlyBootEnded() is called.
+ * Keys tagged with EARLY_BOOT_ONLY may only be used during early boot, until
+ * IKeyMintDevice::earlyBootEnded() is called. Early boot keys may be created after
+ * early boot. Early boot keys may not be imprted at all, if Tag::EARLY_BOOT_ONLY is
+ * provided to IKeyMintDevice::importKey, the import must fail with
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
*/
EARLY_BOOT_ONLY = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 305,
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/default/RemotelyProvisionedComponent.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/default/RemotelyProvisionedComponent.cpp
index 4dbaa05..5b02729 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/default/RemotelyProvisionedComponent.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/default/RemotelyProvisionedComponent.cpp
@@ -46,6 +46,14 @@
namespace {
+// Hard-coded set of acceptable public keys that can act as roots of EEK chains.
+inline const vector<bytevec> kAuthorizedEekRoots = {
+ // TODO(drysdale): replace this random value with real root pubkey(s).
+ {0x5c, 0xea, 0x4b, 0xd2, 0x31, 0x27, 0x15, 0x5e, 0x62, 0x94, 0x70,
+ 0x53, 0x94, 0x43, 0x0f, 0x9a, 0x89, 0xd5, 0xc5, 0x0f, 0x82, 0x9b,
+ 0xcd, 0x10, 0xe0, 0x79, 0xef, 0xf3, 0xfa, 0x40, 0xeb, 0x0a},
+};
+
constexpr auto STATUS_FAILED = RemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_FAILED;
constexpr auto STATUS_INVALID_EEK = RemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_EEK;
constexpr auto STATUS_INVALID_MAC = RemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_MAC;
@@ -135,6 +143,13 @@
"Failed to validate EEK chain: " + cosePubKey.moveMessage());
}
lastPubKey = *std::move(cosePubKey);
+
+ // In prod mode the first pubkey should match a well-known Google public key.
+ if (!testMode && i == 0 &&
+ std::find(kAuthorizedEekRoots.begin(), kAuthorizedEekRoots.end(), lastPubKey) ==
+ kAuthorizedEekRoots.end()) {
+ return Status(STATUS_INVALID_EEK, "Unrecognized root of EEK chain");
+ }
}
auto eek = CoseKey::parseX25519(lastPubKey, true /* requireKid */);
@@ -343,12 +358,13 @@
bcc = bcc_.clone();
}
- deviceInfo->deviceInfo = createDeviceInfo();
+ std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Map> deviceInfoMap = createDeviceInfo();
+ deviceInfo->deviceInfo = deviceInfoMap->encode();
auto signedMac = constructCoseSign1(devicePrivKey /* Signing key */, //
ephemeralMacKey /* Payload */,
cppbor::Array() /* AAD */
.add(challenge)
- .add(deviceInfo->deviceInfo)
+ .add(std::move(deviceInfoMap))
.encode());
if (!signedMac) return Status(signedMac.moveMessage());
@@ -394,8 +410,24 @@
return result;
}
-bytevec RemotelyProvisionedComponent::createDeviceInfo() const {
- return cppbor::Map().encode();
+std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Map> RemotelyProvisionedComponent::createDeviceInfo() const {
+ auto result = std::make_unique<cppbor::Map>(cppbor::Map());
+
+ // The following placeholders show how the DeviceInfo map would be populated.
+ // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("brand"), cppbor::Tstr("Google"));
+ // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("manufacturer"), cppbor::Tstr("Google"));
+ // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("product"), cppbor::Tstr("Fake"));
+ // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("model"), cppbor::Tstr("Imaginary"));
+ // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("board"), cppbor::Tstr("Chess"));
+ // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("vb_state"), cppbor::Tstr("orange"));
+ // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("bootloader_state"), cppbor::Tstr("unlocked"));
+ // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("os_version"), cppbor::Tstr("SC"));
+ // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("system_patch_level"), cppbor::Uint(20210331));
+ // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("boot_patch_level"), cppbor::Uint(20210331));
+ // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("vendor_patch_level"), cppbor::Uint(20210331));
+
+ result->canonicalize();
+ return result;
}
std::pair<bytevec /* privKey */, cppbor::Array /* BCC */>
@@ -417,8 +449,8 @@
.add(1 /* Issuer */, "Issuer")
.add(2 /* Subject */, "Subject")
.add(-4670552 /* Subject Pub Key */, coseKey)
- .add(-4670553 /* Key Usage */,
- std::vector<uint8_t>(0x05) /* Big endian order */)
+ .add(-4670553 /* Key Usage (little-endian order) */,
+ std::vector<uint8_t>{0x20} /* keyCertSign = 1<<5 */)
.canonicalize()
.encode();
auto coseSign1 = constructCoseSign1(privKey, /* signing key */
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/default/RemotelyProvisionedComponent.h b/security/keymint/aidl/default/RemotelyProvisionedComponent.h
index 65b1bbc..8185e26 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/default/RemotelyProvisionedComponent.h
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/default/RemotelyProvisionedComponent.h
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
private:
// TODO(swillden): Move these into an appropriate Context class.
std::vector<uint8_t> deriveBytesFromHbk(const std::string& context, size_t numBytes) const;
- std::vector<uint8_t> createDeviceInfo() const;
+ std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Map> createDeviceInfo() const;
std::pair<std::vector<uint8_t>, cppbor::Array> generateBcc();
std::vector<uint8_t> macKey_ = deriveBytesFromHbk("Key to MAC public keys", 32);
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp
index 991d77a..c1affa6 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -94,11 +94,14 @@
],
static_libs: [
"android.hardware.security.keymint-V1-ndk_platform",
+ "android.hardware.security.secureclock-V1-ndk_platform",
"libcppcose",
"libgmock_ndk",
- "libremote_provisioner",
"libkeymint",
+ "libkeymint_support",
"libkeymint_remote_prov_support",
+ "libkeymint_vts_test_utils",
+ "libremote_provisioner",
],
test_suites: [
"general-tests",
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
index 7e7a466..daa3e18 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
@@ -26,29 +26,6 @@
namespace {
-vector<uint8_t> make_name_from_str(const string& name) {
- X509_NAME_Ptr x509_name(X509_NAME_new());
- EXPECT_TRUE(x509_name.get() != nullptr);
- if (!x509_name) return {};
-
- EXPECT_EQ(1, X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(x509_name.get(), //
- "CN", //
- MBSTRING_ASC,
- reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(name.c_str()),
- -1, // len
- -1, // loc
- 0 /* set */));
-
- int len = i2d_X509_NAME(x509_name.get(), nullptr /* only return length */);
- EXPECT_GT(len, 0);
-
- vector<uint8_t> retval(len);
- uint8_t* p = retval.data();
- i2d_X509_NAME(x509_name.get(), &p);
-
- return retval;
-}
-
bool IsSelfSigned(const vector<Certificate>& chain) {
if (chain.size() != 1) return false;
return ChainSignaturesAreValid(chain);
@@ -230,6 +207,36 @@
}
}
+TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, AttestWithNonAttestKey) {
+ // Create non-attestaton key.
+ AttestationKey non_attest_key;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> non_attest_key_characteristics;
+ vector<Certificate> non_attest_key_cert_chain;
+ ASSERT_EQ(
+ ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256).SetDefaultValidity(),
+ {} /* attestation siging key */, &non_attest_key.keyBlob,
+ &non_attest_key_characteristics, &non_attest_key_cert_chain));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(non_attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(IsSelfSigned(non_attest_key_cert_chain));
+
+ // Attempt to sign attestation with non-attest key.
+ vector<uint8_t> attested_key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
+ vector<Certificate> attested_key_cert_chain;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AttestationChallenge("foo")
+ .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ non_attest_key, &attested_key_blob, &attested_key_characteristics,
+ &attested_key_cert_chain));
+}
+
INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(AttestKeyTest);
} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
index 3e87b6b..ce6f67a 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
@@ -811,30 +811,6 @@
return (found == key_characteristics.end()) ? kEmptyAuthList : found->authorizations;
}
-AuthorizationSet KeyMintAidlTestBase::HwEnforcedAuthorizations(
- const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics) {
- AuthorizationSet authList;
- for (auto& entry : key_characteristics) {
- if (entry.securityLevel == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX ||
- entry.securityLevel == SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT) {
- authList.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
- }
- }
- return authList;
-}
-
-AuthorizationSet KeyMintAidlTestBase::SwEnforcedAuthorizations(
- const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics) {
- AuthorizationSet authList;
- for (auto& entry : key_characteristics) {
- if (entry.securityLevel == SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE ||
- entry.securityLevel == SecurityLevel::KEYSTORE) {
- authList.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
- }
- }
- return authList;
-}
-
ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::UseAesKey(const vector<uint8_t>& aesKeyBlob) {
auto [result, ciphertext] = ProcessMessage(
aesKeyBlob, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, "1234567890123456",
@@ -1046,6 +1022,28 @@
return retval;
}
+AuthorizationSet HwEnforcedAuthorizations(const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics) {
+ AuthorizationSet authList;
+ for (auto& entry : key_characteristics) {
+ if (entry.securityLevel == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX ||
+ entry.securityLevel == SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT) {
+ authList.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
+ }
+ }
+ return authList;
+}
+
+AuthorizationSet SwEnforcedAuthorizations(const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics) {
+ AuthorizationSet authList;
+ for (auto& entry : key_characteristics) {
+ if (entry.securityLevel == SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE ||
+ entry.securityLevel == SecurityLevel::KEYSTORE) {
+ authList.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
+ }
+ }
+ return authList;
+}
+
AssertionResult ChainSignaturesAreValid(const vector<Certificate>& chain) {
std::stringstream cert_data;
@@ -1097,6 +1095,29 @@
return X509_Ptr(d2i_X509(nullptr /* allocate new */, &p, blob.size()));
}
+vector<uint8_t> make_name_from_str(const string& name) {
+ X509_NAME_Ptr x509_name(X509_NAME_new());
+ EXPECT_TRUE(x509_name.get() != nullptr);
+ if (!x509_name) return {};
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(x509_name.get(), //
+ "CN", //
+ MBSTRING_ASC,
+ reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(name.c_str()),
+ -1, // len
+ -1, // loc
+ 0 /* set */));
+
+ int len = i2d_X509_NAME(x509_name.get(), nullptr /* only return length */);
+ EXPECT_GT(len, 0);
+
+ vector<uint8_t> retval(len);
+ uint8_t* p = retval.data();
+ i2d_X509_NAME(x509_name.get(), &p);
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
} // namespace test
} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
index 0aef81b..4d97ea9 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
@@ -252,10 +252,6 @@
const vector<KeyParameter>& SecLevelAuthorizations(
const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics, SecurityLevel securityLevel);
- AuthorizationSet HwEnforcedAuthorizations(
- const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics);
- AuthorizationSet SwEnforcedAuthorizations(
- const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics);
ErrorCode UseAesKey(const vector<uint8_t>& aesKeyBlob);
ErrorCode UseHmacKey(const vector<uint8_t>& hmacKeyBlob);
ErrorCode UseRsaKey(const vector<uint8_t>& rsaKeyBlob);
@@ -280,12 +276,16 @@
const vector<uint8_t>& attestation_cert);
string bin2hex(const vector<uint8_t>& data);
X509_Ptr parse_cert_blob(const vector<uint8_t>& blob);
+vector<uint8_t> make_name_from_str(const string& name);
+AuthorizationSet HwEnforcedAuthorizations(const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics);
+AuthorizationSet SwEnforcedAuthorizations(const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics);
::testing::AssertionResult ChainSignaturesAreValid(const vector<Certificate>& chain);
#define INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(name) \
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(PerInstance, name, \
testing::ValuesIn(KeyMintAidlTestBase::build_params()), \
- ::android::PrintInstanceNameToString)
+ ::android::PrintInstanceNameToString); \
+ GTEST_ALLOW_UNINSTANTIATED_PARAMETERIZED_TEST(name);
} // namespace test
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
index 9b797de..57bc27a 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
@@ -17,18 +17,21 @@
#define LOG_TAG "VtsRemotelyProvisionableComponentTests"
#include <RemotelyProvisionedComponent.h>
-#include <aidl/Gtest.h>
-#include <aidl/Vintf.h>
#include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.h>
#include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/SecurityLevel.h>
#include <android/binder_manager.h>
#include <cppbor_parse.h>
#include <cppcose/cppcose.h>
#include <gmock/gmock.h>
-#include <gtest/gtest.h>
#include <keymaster/keymaster_configuration.h>
+#include <keymint_support/authorization_set.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <remote_prov/remote_prov_utils.h>
+#include "KeyMintAidlTestBase.h"
+
namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test {
using ::std::string;
@@ -52,6 +55,214 @@
return bytevec(p, p + strlen(s));
}
+void p256_pub_key(const vector<uint8_t>& coseKeyData, EVP_PKEY_Ptr* signingKey) {
+ // Extract x and y affine coordinates from the encoded Cose_Key.
+ auto [parsedPayload, __, payloadParseErr] = cppbor::parse(coseKeyData);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(parsedPayload) << "Key parse failed: " << payloadParseErr;
+ auto coseKey = parsedPayload->asMap();
+ const std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Item>& xItem = coseKey->get(cppcose::CoseKey::PUBKEY_X);
+ ASSERT_NE(xItem->asBstr(), nullptr);
+ vector<uint8_t> x = xItem->asBstr()->value();
+ const std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Item>& yItem = coseKey->get(cppcose::CoseKey::PUBKEY_Y);
+ ASSERT_NE(yItem->asBstr(), nullptr);
+ vector<uint8_t> y = yItem->asBstr()->value();
+
+ // Concatenate: 0x04 (uncompressed form marker) | x | y
+ vector<uint8_t> pubKeyData{0x04};
+ pubKeyData.insert(pubKeyData.end(), x.begin(), x.end());
+ pubKeyData.insert(pubKeyData.end(), y.begin(), y.end());
+
+ EC_KEY_Ptr ecKey = EC_KEY_Ptr(EC_KEY_new());
+ ASSERT_NE(ecKey, nullptr);
+ EC_GROUP_Ptr group = EC_GROUP_Ptr(EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1));
+ ASSERT_NE(group, nullptr);
+ ASSERT_EQ(EC_KEY_set_group(ecKey.get(), group.get()), 1);
+ EC_POINT_Ptr point = EC_POINT_Ptr(EC_POINT_new(group.get()));
+ ASSERT_NE(point, nullptr);
+ ASSERT_EQ(EC_POINT_oct2point(group.get(), point.get(), pubKeyData.data(), pubKeyData.size(),
+ nullptr),
+ 1);
+ ASSERT_EQ(EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecKey.get(), point.get()), 1);
+
+ EVP_PKEY_Ptr pubKey = EVP_PKEY_Ptr(EVP_PKEY_new());
+ ASSERT_NE(pubKey, nullptr);
+ EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pubKey.get(), ecKey.release());
+ *signingKey = std::move(pubKey);
+}
+
+void check_cose_key(const vector<uint8_t>& data, bool testMode) {
+ auto [parsedPayload, __, payloadParseErr] = cppbor::parse(data);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(parsedPayload) << "Key parse failed: " << payloadParseErr;
+
+ // The following check assumes that canonical CBOR encoding is used for the COSE_Key.
+ if (testMode) {
+ EXPECT_THAT(cppbor::prettyPrint(parsedPayload.get()),
+ MatchesRegex("{\n"
+ " 1 : 2,\n" // kty: EC2
+ " 3 : -7,\n" // alg: ES256
+ " -1 : 1,\n" // EC id: P256
+ // The regex {(0x[0-9a-f]{2}, ){31}0x[0-9a-f]{2}} matches a
+ // sequence of 32 hexadecimal bytes, enclosed in braces and
+ // separated by commas. In this case, some Ed25519 public key.
+ " -2 : {(0x[0-9a-f]{2}, ){31}0x[0-9a-f]{2}},\n" // pub_x: data
+ " -3 : {(0x[0-9a-f]{2}, ){31}0x[0-9a-f]{2}},\n" // pub_y: data
+ " -70000 : null,\n" // test marker
+ "}"));
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_THAT(cppbor::prettyPrint(parsedPayload.get()),
+ MatchesRegex("{\n"
+ " 1 : 2,\n" // kty: EC2
+ " 3 : -7,\n" // alg: ES256
+ " -1 : 1,\n" // EC id: P256
+ // The regex {(0x[0-9a-f]{2}, ){31}0x[0-9a-f]{2}} matches a
+ // sequence of 32 hexadecimal bytes, enclosed in braces and
+ // separated by commas. In this case, some Ed25519 public key.
+ " -2 : {(0x[0-9a-f]{2}, ){31}0x[0-9a-f]{2}},\n" // pub_x: data
+ " -3 : {(0x[0-9a-f]{2}, ){31}0x[0-9a-f]{2}},\n" // pub_y: data
+ "}"));
+ }
+}
+
+void check_maced_pubkey(const MacedPublicKey& macedPubKey, bool testMode,
+ vector<uint8_t>* payload_value) {
+ auto [coseMac0, _, mac0ParseErr] = cppbor::parse(macedPubKey.macedKey);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(coseMac0) << "COSE Mac0 parse failed " << mac0ParseErr;
+
+ ASSERT_NE(coseMac0->asArray(), nullptr);
+ ASSERT_EQ(coseMac0->asArray()->size(), kCoseMac0EntryCount);
+
+ auto protParms = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0ProtectedParams)->asBstr();
+ ASSERT_NE(protParms, nullptr);
+
+ // Header label:value of 'alg': HMAC-256
+ ASSERT_EQ(cppbor::prettyPrint(protParms->value()), "{\n 1 : 5,\n}");
+
+ auto unprotParms = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0UnprotectedParams)->asMap();
+ ASSERT_NE(unprotParms, nullptr);
+ ASSERT_EQ(unprotParms->size(), 0);
+
+ // The payload is a bstr holding an encoded COSE_Key
+ auto payload = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0Payload)->asBstr();
+ ASSERT_NE(payload, nullptr);
+ check_cose_key(payload->value(), testMode);
+
+ auto coseMac0Tag = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0Tag)->asBstr();
+ ASSERT_TRUE(coseMac0Tag);
+ auto extractedTag = coseMac0Tag->value();
+ EXPECT_EQ(extractedTag.size(), 32U);
+
+ // Compare with tag generated with kTestMacKey. Should only match in test mode
+ auto testTag = cppcose::generateCoseMac0Mac(remote_prov::kTestMacKey, {} /* external_aad */,
+ payload->value());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(testTag) << "Tag calculation failed: " << testTag.message();
+
+ if (testMode) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(*testTag, extractedTag);
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_NE(*testTag, extractedTag);
+ }
+ if (payload_value != nullptr) {
+ *payload_value = payload->value();
+ }
+}
+
+ErrMsgOr<MacedPublicKey> corrupt_maced_key(const MacedPublicKey& macedPubKey) {
+ auto [coseMac0, _, mac0ParseErr] = cppbor::parse(macedPubKey.macedKey);
+ if (!coseMac0 || coseMac0->asArray()->size() != kCoseMac0EntryCount) {
+ return "COSE Mac0 parse failed";
+ }
+ auto protParams = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0ProtectedParams)->asBstr();
+ auto unprotParams = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0UnprotectedParams)->asMap();
+ auto payload = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0Payload)->asBstr();
+ auto tag = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0Tag)->asBstr();
+ if (!protParams || !unprotParams || !payload || !tag) {
+ return "Invalid COSE_Sign1: missing content";
+ }
+ auto corruptMac0 = cppbor::Array();
+ corruptMac0.add(protParams->clone());
+ corruptMac0.add(unprotParams->clone());
+ corruptMac0.add(payload->clone());
+ vector<uint8_t> tagData = tag->value();
+ tagData[0] ^= 0x08;
+ tagData[tagData.size() - 1] ^= 0x80;
+ corruptMac0.add(cppbor::Bstr(tagData));
+
+ return MacedPublicKey{corruptMac0.encode()};
+}
+
+ErrMsgOr<cppbor::Array> corrupt_sig(const cppbor::Array* coseSign1) {
+ if (coseSign1->size() != kCoseSign1EntryCount) {
+ return "Invalid COSE_Sign1, wrong entry count";
+ }
+ const cppbor::Bstr* protectedParams = coseSign1->get(kCoseSign1ProtectedParams)->asBstr();
+ const cppbor::Map* unprotectedParams = coseSign1->get(kCoseSign1UnprotectedParams)->asMap();
+ const cppbor::Bstr* payload = coseSign1->get(kCoseSign1Payload)->asBstr();
+ const cppbor::Bstr* signature = coseSign1->get(kCoseSign1Signature)->asBstr();
+ if (!protectedParams || !unprotectedParams || !payload || !signature) {
+ return "Invalid COSE_Sign1: missing content";
+ }
+
+ auto corruptSig = cppbor::Array();
+ corruptSig.add(protectedParams->clone());
+ corruptSig.add(unprotectedParams->clone());
+ corruptSig.add(payload->clone());
+ vector<uint8_t> sigData = signature->value();
+ sigData[0] ^= 0x08;
+ corruptSig.add(cppbor::Bstr(sigData));
+
+ return std::move(corruptSig);
+}
+
+ErrMsgOr<EekChain> corrupt_sig_chain(const EekChain& eek, int which) {
+ auto [chain, _, parseErr] = cppbor::parse(eek.chain);
+ if (!chain || !chain->asArray()) {
+ return "EekChain parse failed";
+ }
+
+ cppbor::Array* eekChain = chain->asArray();
+ if (which >= eekChain->size()) {
+ return "selected sig out of range";
+ }
+ auto corruptChain = cppbor::Array();
+
+ for (int ii = 0; ii < eekChain->size(); ++ii) {
+ if (ii == which) {
+ auto sig = corrupt_sig(eekChain->get(which)->asArray());
+ if (!sig) {
+ return "Failed to build corrupted signature" + sig.moveMessage();
+ }
+ corruptChain.add(sig.moveValue());
+ } else {
+ corruptChain.add(eekChain->get(ii)->clone());
+ }
+ }
+ return EekChain{corruptChain.encode(), eek.last_pubkey, eek.last_privkey};
+}
+
+string device_suffix(const string& name) {
+ size_t pos = name.find('/');
+ if (pos == string::npos) {
+ return name;
+ }
+ return name.substr(pos + 1);
+}
+
+bool matching_keymint_device(const string& rp_name, std::shared_ptr<IKeyMintDevice>* keyMint) {
+ string rp_suffix = device_suffix(rp_name);
+
+ vector<string> km_names = ::android::getAidlHalInstanceNames(IKeyMintDevice::descriptor);
+ for (const string& km_name : km_names) {
+ // If the suffix of the KeyMint instance equals the suffix of the
+ // RemotelyProvisionedComponent instance, assume they match.
+ if (device_suffix(km_name) == rp_suffix && AServiceManager_isDeclared(km_name.c_str())) {
+ ::ndk::SpAIBinder binder(AServiceManager_waitForService(km_name.c_str()));
+ *keyMint = IKeyMintDevice::fromBinder(binder);
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
} // namespace
class VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests : public testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
@@ -78,7 +289,8 @@
INSTANTIATE_REM_PROV_AIDL_TEST(GenerateKeyTests);
/**
- * Generate and validate a production-mode key. MAC tag can't be verified.
+ * Generate and validate a production-mode key. MAC tag can't be verified, but
+ * the private key blob should be usable in KeyMint operations.
*/
TEST_P(GenerateKeyTests, generateEcdsaP256Key_prodMode) {
MacedPublicKey macedPubKey;
@@ -86,48 +298,72 @@
bool testMode = false;
auto status = provisionable_->generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(testMode, &macedPubKey, &privateKeyBlob);
ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk());
+ vector<uint8_t> coseKeyData;
+ check_maced_pubkey(macedPubKey, testMode, &coseKeyData);
+}
- auto [coseMac0, _, mac0ParseErr] = cppbor::parse(macedPubKey.macedKey);
- ASSERT_TRUE(coseMac0) << "COSE Mac0 parse failed " << mac0ParseErr;
+/**
+ * Generate and validate a production-mode key, then use it as a KeyMint attestation key.
+ */
+TEST_P(GenerateKeyTests, generateAndUseEcdsaP256Key_prodMode) {
+ // See if there is a matching IKeyMintDevice for this IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.
+ std::shared_ptr<IKeyMintDevice> keyMint;
+ if (!matching_keymint_device(GetParam(), &keyMint)) {
+ // No matching IKeyMintDevice.
+ GTEST_SKIP() << "Skipping key use test as no matching KeyMint device found";
+ return;
+ }
+ KeyMintHardwareInfo info;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(keyMint->getHardwareInfo(&info).isOk());
- ASSERT_NE(coseMac0->asArray(), nullptr);
- ASSERT_EQ(coseMac0->asArray()->size(), kCoseMac0EntryCount);
+ MacedPublicKey macedPubKey;
+ bytevec privateKeyBlob;
+ bool testMode = false;
+ auto status = provisionable_->generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(testMode, &macedPubKey, &privateKeyBlob);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk());
+ vector<uint8_t> coseKeyData;
+ check_maced_pubkey(macedPubKey, testMode, &coseKeyData);
- auto protParms = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0ProtectedParams)->asBstr();
- ASSERT_NE(protParms, nullptr);
- ASSERT_EQ(cppbor::prettyPrint(protParms->value()), "{\n 1 : 5,\n}");
+ AttestationKey attestKey;
+ attestKey.keyBlob = std::move(privateKeyBlob);
+ attestKey.issuerSubjectName = make_name_from_str("Android Keystore Key");
- auto unprotParms = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0UnprotectedParams)->asMap();
- ASSERT_NE(unprotParms, nullptr);
- ASSERT_EQ(unprotParms->size(), 0);
+ // Generate an ECDSA key that is attested by the generated P256 keypair.
+ AuthorizationSet keyDesc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .AttestationChallenge("foo")
+ .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+ KeyCreationResult creationResult;
+ auto result = keyMint->generateKey(keyDesc.vector_data(), attestKey, &creationResult);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk());
+ vector<uint8_t> attested_key_blob = std::move(creationResult.keyBlob);
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics =
+ std::move(creationResult.keyCharacteristics);
+ vector<Certificate> attested_key_cert_chain = std::move(creationResult.certificateChain);
+ EXPECT_EQ(attested_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
- auto payload = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0Payload)->asBstr();
- ASSERT_NE(payload, nullptr);
- auto [parsedPayload, __, payloadParseErr] = cppbor::parse(payload->value());
- ASSERT_TRUE(parsedPayload) << "Key parse failed: " << payloadParseErr;
- EXPECT_THAT(cppbor::prettyPrint(parsedPayload.get()),
- MatchesRegex("{\n"
- " 1 : 2,\n"
- " 3 : -7,\n"
- " -1 : 1,\n"
- // The regex {(0x[0-9a-f]{2}, ){31}0x[0-9a-f]{2}} matches a sequence of
- // 32 hexadecimal bytes, enclosed in braces and separated by commas.
- // In this case, some Ed25519 public key.
- " -2 : {(0x[0-9a-f]{2}, ){31}0x[0-9a-f]{2}},\n"
- " -3 : {(0x[0-9a-f]{2}, ){31}0x[0-9a-f]{2}},\n"
- "}"));
+ AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+ AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
+ info.securityLevel,
+ attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
- auto coseMac0Tag = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0Tag)->asBstr();
- ASSERT_TRUE(coseMac0Tag);
- auto extractedTag = coseMac0Tag->value();
- EXPECT_EQ(extractedTag.size(), 32U);
+ // Attestation by itself is not valid (last entry is not self-signed).
+ EXPECT_FALSE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
- // Compare with tag generated with kTestMacKey. Shouldn't match.
- auto testTag = cppcose::generateCoseMac0Mac(remote_prov::kTestMacKey, {} /* external_aad */,
- payload->value());
- ASSERT_TRUE(testTag) << "Tag calculation failed: " << testTag.message();
+ // The signature over the attested key should correspond to the P256 public key.
+ X509_Ptr key_cert(parse_cert_blob(attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(key_cert.get());
+ EVP_PKEY_Ptr signing_pubkey;
+ p256_pub_key(coseKeyData, &signing_pubkey);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(signing_pubkey.get());
- EXPECT_NE(*testTag, extractedTag);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(X509_verify(key_cert.get(), signing_pubkey.get()))
+ << "Verification of attested certificate failed "
+ << "OpenSSL error string: " << ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL);
}
/**
@@ -140,56 +376,20 @@
auto status = provisionable_->generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(testMode, &macedPubKey, &privateKeyBlob);
ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk());
- auto [coseMac0, _, mac0ParseErr] = cppbor::parse(macedPubKey.macedKey);
- ASSERT_TRUE(coseMac0) << "COSE Mac0 parse failed " << mac0ParseErr;
-
- ASSERT_NE(coseMac0->asArray(), nullptr);
- ASSERT_EQ(coseMac0->asArray()->size(), kCoseMac0EntryCount);
-
- auto protParms = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0ProtectedParams)->asBstr();
- ASSERT_NE(protParms, nullptr);
- ASSERT_EQ(cppbor::prettyPrint(protParms->value()), "{\n 1 : 5,\n}");
-
- auto unprotParms = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0UnprotectedParams)->asMap();
- ASSERT_NE(unprotParms, nullptr);
- ASSERT_EQ(unprotParms->size(), 0);
-
- auto payload = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0Payload)->asBstr();
- ASSERT_NE(payload, nullptr);
- auto [parsedPayload, __, payloadParseErr] = cppbor::parse(payload->value());
- ASSERT_TRUE(parsedPayload) << "Key parse failed: " << payloadParseErr;
- EXPECT_THAT(cppbor::prettyPrint(parsedPayload.get()),
- MatchesRegex("{\n"
- " 1 : 2,\n"
- " 3 : -7,\n"
- " -1 : 1,\n"
- // The regex {(0x[0-9a-f]{2}, ){31}0x[0-9a-f]{2}} matches a sequence of
- // 32 hexadecimal bytes, enclosed in braces and separated by commas.
- // In this case, some Ed25519 public key.
- " -2 : {(0x[0-9a-f]{2}, ){31}0x[0-9a-f]{2}},\n"
- " -3 : {(0x[0-9a-f]{2}, ){31}0x[0-9a-f]{2}},\n"
- " -70000 : null,\n"
- "}"));
-
- auto coseMac0Tag = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0Tag)->asBstr();
- ASSERT_TRUE(coseMac0);
- auto extractedTag = coseMac0Tag->value();
- EXPECT_EQ(extractedTag.size(), 32U);
-
- // Compare with tag generated with kTestMacKey. Should match.
- auto testTag = cppcose::generateCoseMac0Mac(remote_prov::kTestMacKey, {} /* external_aad */,
- payload->value());
- ASSERT_TRUE(testTag) << testTag.message();
-
- EXPECT_EQ(*testTag, extractedTag);
+ check_maced_pubkey(macedPubKey, testMode, nullptr);
}
class CertificateRequestTest : public VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests {
protected:
- CertificateRequestTest() : eekId_(string_to_bytevec("eekid")) {
- auto chain = generateEekChain(3, eekId_);
+ CertificateRequestTest() : eekId_(string_to_bytevec("eekid")), challenge_(randomBytes(32)) {
+ generateEek(3);
+ }
+
+ void generateEek(size_t eekLength) {
+ auto chain = generateEekChain(eekLength, eekId_);
EXPECT_TRUE(chain) << chain.message();
if (chain) eekChain_ = chain.moveValue();
+ eekLength_ = eekLength;
}
void generateKeys(bool testMode, size_t numKeys) {
@@ -201,21 +401,76 @@
auto status = provisionable_->generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(testMode, &key, &privateKeyBlob);
ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
- auto [parsedMacedKey, _, parseErr] = cppbor::parse(key.macedKey);
- ASSERT_TRUE(parsedMacedKey) << "Failed parsing MACed key: " << parseErr;
- ASSERT_TRUE(parsedMacedKey->asArray()) << "COSE_Mac0 not an array?";
- ASSERT_EQ(parsedMacedKey->asArray()->size(), kCoseMac0EntryCount);
-
- auto& payload = parsedMacedKey->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0Payload);
- ASSERT_TRUE(payload);
- ASSERT_TRUE(payload->asBstr());
-
- cborKeysToSign_.add(cppbor::EncodedItem(payload->asBstr()->value()));
+ vector<uint8_t> payload_value;
+ check_maced_pubkey(key, testMode, &payload_value);
+ cborKeysToSign_.add(cppbor::EncodedItem(payload_value));
}
}
+ void checkProtectedData(const DeviceInfo& deviceInfo, const cppbor::Array& keysToSign,
+ const bytevec& keysToSignMac, const ProtectedData& protectedData) {
+ auto [parsedProtectedData, _, protDataErrMsg] = cppbor::parse(protectedData.protectedData);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(parsedProtectedData) << protDataErrMsg;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(parsedProtectedData->asArray());
+ ASSERT_EQ(parsedProtectedData->asArray()->size(), kCoseEncryptEntryCount);
+
+ auto senderPubkey = getSenderPubKeyFromCoseEncrypt(parsedProtectedData);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(senderPubkey) << senderPubkey.message();
+ EXPECT_EQ(senderPubkey->second, eekId_);
+
+ auto sessionKey = x25519_HKDF_DeriveKey(eekChain_.last_pubkey, eekChain_.last_privkey,
+ senderPubkey->first, false /* senderIsA */);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(sessionKey) << sessionKey.message();
+
+ auto protectedDataPayload =
+ decryptCoseEncrypt(*sessionKey, parsedProtectedData.get(), bytevec{} /* aad */);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(protectedDataPayload) << protectedDataPayload.message();
+
+ auto [parsedPayload, __, payloadErrMsg] = cppbor::parse(*protectedDataPayload);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(parsedPayload) << "Failed to parse payload: " << payloadErrMsg;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(parsedPayload->asArray());
+ EXPECT_EQ(parsedPayload->asArray()->size(), 2U);
+
+ auto& signedMac = parsedPayload->asArray()->get(0);
+ auto& bcc = parsedPayload->asArray()->get(1);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(signedMac && signedMac->asArray());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(bcc && bcc->asArray());
+
+ // BCC is [ pubkey, + BccEntry]
+ auto bccContents = validateBcc(bcc->asArray());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(bccContents) << "\n" << bccContents.message() << "\n" << prettyPrint(bcc.get());
+ ASSERT_GT(bccContents->size(), 0U);
+
+ auto [deviceInfoMap, __2, deviceInfoErrMsg] = cppbor::parse(deviceInfo.deviceInfo);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(deviceInfoMap) << "Failed to parse deviceInfo: " << deviceInfoErrMsg;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(deviceInfoMap->asMap());
+
+ auto& signingKey = bccContents->back().pubKey;
+ auto macKey = verifyAndParseCoseSign1(/* ignore_signature = */ false, signedMac->asArray(),
+ signingKey,
+ cppbor::Array() // SignedMacAad
+ .add(challenge_)
+ .add(std::move(deviceInfoMap))
+ .encode());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(macKey) << macKey.message();
+
+ auto coseMac0 = cppbor::Array()
+ .add(cppbor::Map() // protected
+ .add(ALGORITHM, HMAC_256)
+ .canonicalize()
+ .encode())
+ .add(cppbor::Map()) // unprotected
+ .add(keysToSign.encode()) // payload (keysToSign)
+ .add(keysToSignMac); // tag
+
+ auto macPayload = verifyAndParseCoseMac0(&coseMac0, *macKey);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(macPayload) << macPayload.message();
+ }
+
bytevec eekId_;
+ size_t eekLength_;
EekChain eekChain_;
+ bytevec challenge_;
std::vector<MacedPublicKey> keysToSign_;
cppbor::Array cborKeysToSign_;
};
@@ -226,66 +481,20 @@
*/
TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, EmptyRequest_testMode) {
bool testMode = true;
- bytevec keysToSignMac;
- DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
- ProtectedData protectedData;
- auto challenge = randomBytes(32);
- auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
- testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, eekChain_.chain, challenge, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,
- &keysToSignMac);
- ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+ for (size_t eekLength : {2, 3, 7}) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "EEK of length " << eekLength);
+ generateEek(eekLength);
- auto [parsedProtectedData, _, protDataErrMsg] = cppbor::parse(protectedData.protectedData);
- ASSERT_TRUE(parsedProtectedData) << protDataErrMsg;
- ASSERT_TRUE(parsedProtectedData->asArray());
- ASSERT_EQ(parsedProtectedData->asArray()->size(), kCoseEncryptEntryCount);
+ bytevec keysToSignMac;
+ DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
+ ProtectedData protectedData;
+ auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
+ testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
+ &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
- auto senderPubkey = getSenderPubKeyFromCoseEncrypt(parsedProtectedData);
- ASSERT_TRUE(senderPubkey) << senderPubkey.message();
- EXPECT_EQ(senderPubkey->second, eekId_);
-
- auto sessionKey = x25519_HKDF_DeriveKey(eekChain_.last_pubkey, eekChain_.last_privkey,
- senderPubkey->first, false /* senderIsA */);
- ASSERT_TRUE(sessionKey) << sessionKey.message();
-
- auto protectedDataPayload =
- decryptCoseEncrypt(*sessionKey, parsedProtectedData.get(), bytevec{} /* aad */);
- ASSERT_TRUE(protectedDataPayload) << protectedDataPayload.message();
-
- auto [parsedPayload, __, payloadErrMsg] = cppbor::parse(*protectedDataPayload);
- ASSERT_TRUE(parsedPayload) << "Failed to parse payload: " << payloadErrMsg;
- ASSERT_TRUE(parsedPayload->asArray());
- EXPECT_EQ(parsedPayload->asArray()->size(), 2U);
-
- auto& signedMac = parsedPayload->asArray()->get(0);
- auto& bcc = parsedPayload->asArray()->get(1);
- ASSERT_TRUE(signedMac && signedMac->asArray());
- ASSERT_TRUE(bcc && bcc->asArray());
-
- // BCC is [ pubkey, + BccEntry]
- auto bccContents = validateBcc(bcc->asArray());
- ASSERT_TRUE(bccContents) << "\n" << bccContents.message() << "\n" << prettyPrint(bcc.get());
- ASSERT_GT(bccContents->size(), 0U);
-
- auto& signingKey = bccContents->back().pubKey;
- auto macKey = verifyAndParseCoseSign1(testMode, signedMac->asArray(), signingKey,
- cppbor::Array() // DeviceInfo
- .add(challenge) //
- .add(cppbor::Map())
- .encode());
- ASSERT_TRUE(macKey) << macKey.message();
-
- auto coseMac0 = cppbor::Array()
- .add(cppbor::Map() // protected
- .add(ALGORITHM, HMAC_256)
- .canonicalize()
- .encode())
- .add(cppbor::Map()) // unprotected
- .add(cppbor::Array().encode()) // payload (keysToSign)
- .add(std::move(keysToSignMac)); // tag
-
- auto macPayload = verifyAndParseCoseMac0(&coseMac0, *macKey);
- ASSERT_TRUE(macPayload) << macPayload.message();
+ checkProtectedData(deviceInfo, cppbor::Array(), keysToSignMac, protectedData);
+ }
}
/**
@@ -297,15 +506,20 @@
*/
TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, EmptyRequest_prodMode) {
bool testMode = false;
- bytevec keysToSignMac;
- DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
- ProtectedData protectedData;
- auto challenge = randomBytes(32);
- auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
- testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, eekChain_.chain, challenge, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,
- &keysToSignMac);
- ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk());
- ASSERT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(), BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_EEK);
+ for (size_t eekLength : {2, 3, 7}) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "EEK of length " << eekLength);
+ generateEek(eekLength);
+
+ bytevec keysToSignMac;
+ DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
+ ProtectedData protectedData;
+ auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
+ testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
+ &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
+ EXPECT_FALSE(status.isOk());
+ EXPECT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(),
+ BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_EEK);
+ }
}
/**
@@ -315,65 +529,20 @@
bool testMode = true;
generateKeys(testMode, 4 /* numKeys */);
- bytevec keysToSignMac;
- DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
- ProtectedData protectedData;
- auto challenge = randomBytes(32);
- auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(testMode, keysToSign_, eekChain_.chain,
- challenge, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,
- &keysToSignMac);
- ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+ for (size_t eekLength : {2, 3, 7}) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "EEK of length " << eekLength);
+ generateEek(eekLength);
- auto [parsedProtectedData, _, protDataErrMsg] = cppbor::parse(protectedData.protectedData);
- ASSERT_TRUE(parsedProtectedData) << protDataErrMsg;
- ASSERT_TRUE(parsedProtectedData->asArray());
- ASSERT_EQ(parsedProtectedData->asArray()->size(), kCoseEncryptEntryCount);
+ bytevec keysToSignMac;
+ DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
+ ProtectedData protectedData;
+ auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
+ testMode, keysToSign_, eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,
+ &keysToSignMac);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
- auto senderPubkey = getSenderPubKeyFromCoseEncrypt(parsedProtectedData);
- ASSERT_TRUE(senderPubkey) << senderPubkey.message();
- EXPECT_EQ(senderPubkey->second, eekId_);
-
- auto sessionKey = x25519_HKDF_DeriveKey(eekChain_.last_pubkey, eekChain_.last_privkey,
- senderPubkey->first, false /* senderIsA */);
- ASSERT_TRUE(sessionKey) << sessionKey.message();
-
- auto protectedDataPayload =
- decryptCoseEncrypt(*sessionKey, parsedProtectedData.get(), bytevec{} /* aad */);
- ASSERT_TRUE(protectedDataPayload) << protectedDataPayload.message();
-
- auto [parsedPayload, __, payloadErrMsg] = cppbor::parse(*protectedDataPayload);
- ASSERT_TRUE(parsedPayload) << "Failed to parse payload: " << payloadErrMsg;
- ASSERT_TRUE(parsedPayload->asArray());
- EXPECT_EQ(parsedPayload->asArray()->size(), 2U);
-
- auto& signedMac = parsedPayload->asArray()->get(0);
- auto& bcc = parsedPayload->asArray()->get(1);
- ASSERT_TRUE(signedMac && signedMac->asArray());
- ASSERT_TRUE(bcc);
-
- auto bccContents = validateBcc(bcc->asArray());
- ASSERT_TRUE(bccContents) << "\n" << prettyPrint(bcc.get());
- ASSERT_GT(bccContents->size(), 0U);
-
- auto& signingKey = bccContents->back().pubKey;
- auto macKey = verifyAndParseCoseSign1(testMode, signedMac->asArray(), signingKey,
- cppbor::Array() // DeviceInfo
- .add(challenge) //
- .add(cppbor::Array())
- .encode());
- ASSERT_TRUE(macKey) << macKey.message();
-
- auto coseMac0 = cppbor::Array()
- .add(cppbor::Map() // protected
- .add(ALGORITHM, HMAC_256)
- .canonicalize()
- .encode())
- .add(cppbor::Map()) // unprotected
- .add(cborKeysToSign_.encode()) // payload
- .add(std::move(keysToSignMac)); // tag
-
- auto macPayload = verifyAndParseCoseMac0(&coseMac0, *macKey);
- ASSERT_TRUE(macPayload) << macPayload.message();
+ checkProtectedData(deviceInfo, cborKeysToSign_, keysToSignMac, protectedData);
+ }
}
/**
@@ -387,13 +556,117 @@
bool testMode = false;
generateKeys(testMode, 4 /* numKeys */);
+ for (size_t eekLength : {2, 3, 7}) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "EEK of length " << eekLength);
+ generateEek(eekLength);
+
+ bytevec keysToSignMac;
+ DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
+ ProtectedData protectedData;
+ auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
+ testMode, keysToSign_, eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,
+ &keysToSignMac);
+ EXPECT_FALSE(status.isOk());
+ EXPECT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(),
+ BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_EEK);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate a non-empty certificate request in test mode, but with the MAC corrupted on the keypair.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequestCorruptMac_testMode) {
+ bool testMode = true;
+ generateKeys(testMode, 1 /* numKeys */);
+ MacedPublicKey keyWithCorruptMac = corrupt_maced_key(keysToSign_[0]).moveValue();
+
bytevec keysToSignMac;
DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
ProtectedData protectedData;
- auto challenge = randomBytes(32);
- auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(testMode, keysToSign_, eekChain_.chain,
- challenge, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,
- &keysToSignMac);
+ auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
+ testMode, {keyWithCorruptMac}, eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,
+ &keysToSignMac);
+ ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+ EXPECT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(), BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_MAC);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode, but with the MAC corrupted on the keypair.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequestCorruptMac_prodMode) {
+ bool testMode = true;
+ generateKeys(testMode, 1 /* numKeys */);
+ MacedPublicKey keyWithCorruptMac = corrupt_maced_key(keysToSign_[0]).moveValue();
+
+ bytevec keysToSignMac;
+ DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
+ ProtectedData protectedData;
+ auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
+ testMode, {keyWithCorruptMac}, eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,
+ &keysToSignMac);
+ ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+ auto rc = status.getServiceSpecificError();
+
+ // TODO(drysdale): drop the INVALID_EEK potential error code when a real GEEK is available.
+ EXPECT_TRUE(rc == BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_EEK ||
+ rc == BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_MAC);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode that has a corrupt EEK chain.
+ * Confirm that the request is rejected.
+ *
+ * TODO(drysdale): Update to use a valid GEEK, so that the test actually confirms that the
+ * implementation is checking signatures.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyCorruptEekRequest_prodMode) {
+ bool testMode = false;
+ generateKeys(testMode, 4 /* numKeys */);
+
+ for (size_t ii = 0; ii < eekLength_; ii++) {
+ auto chain = corrupt_sig_chain(eekChain_, ii);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(chain) << chain.message();
+ EekChain corruptEek = chain.moveValue();
+
+ bytevec keysToSignMac;
+ DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
+ ProtectedData protectedData;
+ auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
+ testMode, keysToSign_, corruptEek.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,
+ &keysToSignMac);
+ ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk());
+ ASSERT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(),
+ BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_EEK);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode that has an incomplete EEK chain.
+ * Confirm that the request is rejected.
+ *
+ * TODO(drysdale): Update to use a valid GEEK, so that the test actually confirms that the
+ * implementation is checking signatures.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyIncompleteEekRequest_prodMode) {
+ bool testMode = false;
+ generateKeys(testMode, 4 /* numKeys */);
+
+ // Build an EEK chain that omits the first self-signed cert.
+ auto truncatedChain = cppbor::Array();
+ auto [chain, _, parseErr] = cppbor::parse(eekChain_.chain);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(chain);
+ auto eekChain = chain->asArray();
+ ASSERT_NE(eekChain, nullptr);
+ for (size_t ii = 1; ii < eekChain->size(); ii++) {
+ truncatedChain.add(eekChain->get(ii)->clone());
+ }
+
+ bytevec keysToSignMac;
+ DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
+ ProtectedData protectedData;
+ auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
+ testMode, keysToSign_, truncatedChain.encode(), challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,
+ &keysToSignMac);
ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk());
ASSERT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(), BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_EEK);
}
@@ -408,9 +681,8 @@
bytevec keysToSignMac;
DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
ProtectedData protectedData;
- auto challenge = randomBytes(32);
auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
- true /* testMode */, keysToSign_, eekChain_.chain, challenge, &deviceInfo,
+ true /* testMode */, keysToSign_, eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
&protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk());
ASSERT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(),
@@ -428,8 +700,8 @@
DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
ProtectedData protectedData;
auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
- false /* testMode */, keysToSign_, eekChain_.chain, randomBytes(32) /* challenge */,
- &deviceInfo, &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
+ false /* testMode */, keysToSign_, eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
+ &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk());
ASSERT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(),
BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_TEST_KEY_IN_PRODUCTION_REQUEST);
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/openssl_utils.h b/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/openssl_utils.h
index a0212aa..dee28ba 100644
--- a/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/openssl_utils.h
+++ b/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/openssl_utils.h
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
MAKE_OPENSSL_PTR_TYPE(BN_CTX)
MAKE_OPENSSL_PTR_TYPE(EC_GROUP)
MAKE_OPENSSL_PTR_TYPE(EC_KEY)
+MAKE_OPENSSL_PTR_TYPE(EC_POINT)
MAKE_OPENSSL_PTR_TYPE(EVP_PKEY)
MAKE_OPENSSL_PTR_TYPE(EVP_PKEY_CTX)
MAKE_OPENSSL_PTR_TYPE(RSA)
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/remote_prov_utils.cpp b/security/keymint/support/remote_prov_utils.cpp
index 3e4f3f7..da10eb2 100644
--- a/security/keymint/support/remote_prov_utils.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/support/remote_prov_utils.cpp
@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@
{} /* AAD */);
if (!coseSign1) return coseSign1.moveMessage();
eekChain.add(coseSign1.moveValue());
+
+ prev_priv_key = priv_key;
}
bytevec pub_key(X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN);
diff --git a/security/secureclock/aidl/vts/functional/SecureClockAidlTest.cpp b/security/secureclock/aidl/vts/functional/SecureClockAidlTest.cpp
index 9ca1ee8..31f4854 100644
--- a/security/secureclock/aidl/vts/functional/SecureClockAidlTest.cpp
+++ b/security/secureclock/aidl/vts/functional/SecureClockAidlTest.cpp
@@ -185,9 +185,11 @@
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(PerInstance, SecureClockAidlTest,
testing::ValuesIn(SecureClockAidlTest::build_params()),
::android::PrintInstanceNameToString);
+GTEST_ALLOW_UNINSTANTIATED_PARAMETERIZED_TEST(SecureClockAidlTest);
+
} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::secureclock::test
int main(int argc, char** argv) {
::testing::InitGoogleTest(&argc, argv);
return RUN_ALL_TESTS();
-}
\ No newline at end of file
+}
diff --git a/tv/cec/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp b/tv/cec/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a2c714
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tv/cec/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+//
+// Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+//
+
+package {
+ // See: http://go/android-license-faq
+ // A large-scale-change added 'default_applicable_licenses' to import
+ // all of the 'license_kinds' from "hardware_interfaces_license"
+ // to get the below license kinds:
+ // SPDX-license-identifier-Apache-2.0
+ default_applicable_licenses: ["hardware_interfaces_license"],
+}
+
+cc_test {
+ name: "VtsHalTvCecV1_0TargetTest",
+ defaults: ["VtsHalTargetTestDefaults"],
+ srcs: ["VtsHalTvCecV1_0TargetTest.cpp"],
+ static_libs: [
+ "android.hardware.tv.cec@1.0",
+ ],
+ test_suites: [
+ "general-tests",
+ "vts",
+ ],
+ disable_framework: true,
+}
diff --git a/tv/cec/1.0/vts/functional/README.md b/tv/cec/1.0/vts/functional/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aecd6a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tv/cec/1.0/vts/functional/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# CEC VTS testing for Android TV devices
+
+Validate HDMI CEC VTS (android.hardware.tv.cec@1.0) functionality.
+
+### Setup:
+
+Running these CEC VTS tests requires an Android playback, TV or audio device connected to the host machine.
+
+
+
+### Building
+
+From the Android root folder, after choosing the lunch combo, use `make vts` to build VTS.
+
+### Automation
+
+On the host machine, ensure that the [software requirements](https://codelabs.developers.google.com/codelabs/android-lab/#2) for python SDK are met.
+
+Given the setup described above you can run tests with any of the following commands:
+
+1. Using vts-tradefed :
+```
+cd $ANDROID_BUILD_TOP/out/host/linux-x86/vts/android-vts/tools
+./vts-tradefed run commandAndExit vts -m VtsHalTvCecV1_0TargetTest
+```
+2. Using atest
+```
+atest VtsHalTvCecV1_0TargetTest
+```
+Note : atest internally handles building as well. To update the test use '-c' (clear cache) option
diff --git a/tv/cec/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvCecV1_0TargetTest.cpp b/tv/cec/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvCecV1_0TargetTest.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7b42689
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tv/cec/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvCecV1_0TargetTest.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#define LOG_TAG "HdmiCec_hal_test"
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
+
+#include <android/hardware/tv/cec/1.0/IHdmiCec.h>
+#include <android/hardware/tv/cec/1.0/types.h>
+#include <utils/Log.h>
+#include <sstream>
+#include <vector>
+
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+#include <hidl/GtestPrinter.h>
+#include <hidl/ServiceManagement.h>
+
+using ::android::sp;
+using ::android::hardware::hidl_death_recipient;
+using ::android::hardware::hidl_vec;
+using ::android::hardware::Return;
+using ::android::hardware::tv::cec::V1_0::CecDeviceType;
+using ::android::hardware::tv::cec::V1_0::CecLogicalAddress;
+using ::android::hardware::tv::cec::V1_0::CecMessage;
+using ::android::hardware::tv::cec::V1_0::HdmiPortInfo;
+using ::android::hardware::tv::cec::V1_0::HdmiPortType;
+using ::android::hardware::tv::cec::V1_0::IHdmiCec;
+using ::android::hardware::tv::cec::V1_0::OptionKey;
+using ::android::hardware::tv::cec::V1_0::Result;
+using ::android::hardware::tv::cec::V1_0::SendMessageResult;
+
+#define CEC_VERSION 0x05
+#define INCORRECT_VENDOR_ID 0x00
+#define TV_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS 0x0000
+
+// The main test class for TV CEC HAL.
+class HdmiCecTest : public ::testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
+ public:
+ void SetUp() override {
+ hdmiCec = IHdmiCec::getService(GetParam());
+ ASSERT_NE(hdmiCec, nullptr);
+ ALOGI("%s: getService() for hdmiCec is %s", __func__,
+ hdmiCec->isRemote() ? "remote" : "local");
+
+ hdmiCec_death_recipient = new HdmiCecDeathRecipient();
+ ASSERT_NE(hdmiCec_death_recipient, nullptr);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(hdmiCec->linkToDeath(hdmiCec_death_recipient, 0).isOk());
+ }
+
+ std::vector<int> getDeviceTypes() {
+ std::vector<int> deviceTypes;
+ FILE* p = popen("getprop ro.hdmi.device_type", "re");
+ if (p) {
+ char* line = NULL;
+ size_t len = 0;
+ if (getline(&line, &len, p) > 0) {
+ std::istringstream stream(line);
+ std::string number{};
+ while (std::getline(stream, number, ',')) {
+ deviceTypes.push_back(stoi(number));
+ }
+ }
+ pclose(p);
+ }
+ return deviceTypes;
+ }
+
+ bool hasDeviceType(CecDeviceType type) {
+ std::vector<int> deviceTypes = getDeviceTypes();
+ for (auto deviceType = deviceTypes.begin(); deviceType != deviceTypes.end(); ++deviceType) {
+ if (*deviceType == (int)type) {
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ class HdmiCecDeathRecipient : public hidl_death_recipient {
+ public:
+ void serviceDied(uint64_t /*cookie*/,
+ const android::wp<::android::hidl::base::V1_0::IBase>& /*who*/) override {
+ FAIL();
+ }
+ };
+
+ sp<IHdmiCec> hdmiCec;
+ sp<HdmiCecDeathRecipient> hdmiCec_death_recipient;
+};
+
+GTEST_ALLOW_UNINSTANTIATED_PARAMETERIZED_TEST(HdmiCecTest);
+INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(
+ PerInstance, HdmiCecTest,
+ testing::ValuesIn(android::hardware::getAllHalInstanceNames(IHdmiCec::descriptor)),
+ android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString);
+
+TEST_P(HdmiCecTest, ClearAddLogicalAddress) {
+ hdmiCec->clearLogicalAddress();
+ Return<Result> ret = hdmiCec->addLogicalAddress(CecLogicalAddress::PLAYBACK_3);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, Result::SUCCESS);
+}
+
+TEST_P(HdmiCecTest, PhysicalAddress) {
+ Result result;
+ uint16_t addr;
+ Return<void> ret = hdmiCec->getPhysicalAddress([&result, &addr](Result res, uint16_t paddr) {
+ result = res;
+ addr = paddr;
+ });
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ret.isOk());
+ EXPECT_EQ(result, Result::SUCCESS);
+ if (!hasDeviceType(CecDeviceType::TV)) {
+ EXPECT_NE(addr, TV_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
+ }
+}
+
+TEST_P(HdmiCecTest, SendMessage) {
+ CecMessage message;
+ message.initiator = CecLogicalAddress::PLAYBACK_1;
+ message.destination = CecLogicalAddress::BROADCAST;
+ message.body.resize(1);
+ message.body[0] = 131;
+ SendMessageResult ret = hdmiCec->sendMessage(message);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, SendMessageResult::SUCCESS);
+}
+
+TEST_P(HdmiCecTest, CecVersion) {
+ Return<int32_t> ret = hdmiCec->getCecVersion();
+ EXPECT_GE(ret, CEC_VERSION);
+}
+
+TEST_P(HdmiCecTest, VendorId) {
+ Return<uint32_t> ret = hdmiCec->getVendorId();
+ EXPECT_NE(ret, INCORRECT_VENDOR_ID);
+}
+
+TEST_P(HdmiCecTest, GetPortInfo) {
+ hidl_vec<HdmiPortInfo> ports;
+ Return<void> ret =
+ hdmiCec->getPortInfo([&ports](hidl_vec<HdmiPortInfo> list) { ports = list; });
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ret.isOk());
+ bool cecSupportedOnDevice = false;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < ports.size(); ++i) {
+ EXPECT_TRUE((ports[i].type == HdmiPortType::OUTPUT) ||
+ (ports[i].type == HdmiPortType::INPUT));
+ if (ports[i].portId == 0) {
+ ALOGW("%s: Port id should start from 1", __func__);
+ }
+ cecSupportedOnDevice = cecSupportedOnDevice | ports[i].cecSupported;
+ }
+ EXPECT_NE(cecSupportedOnDevice, false) << "At least one port should support CEC";
+}
+
+TEST_P(HdmiCecTest, SetOption) {
+ Return<void> ret;
+ ret = hdmiCec->setOption(OptionKey::WAKEUP, false);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ret.isOk());
+ ret = hdmiCec->setOption(OptionKey::ENABLE_CEC, false);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ret.isOk());
+ ret = hdmiCec->setOption(OptionKey::SYSTEM_CEC_CONTROL, true);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ret.isOk());
+ // Restore option keys to their default values
+ ret = hdmiCec->setOption(OptionKey::WAKEUP, true);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ret.isOk());
+ ret = hdmiCec->setOption(OptionKey::ENABLE_CEC, true);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ret.isOk());
+ ret = hdmiCec->setOption(OptionKey::SYSTEM_CEC_CONTROL, false);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ret.isOk());
+}
+
+TEST_P(HdmiCecTest, SetLanguage) {
+ Return<void> ret = hdmiCec->setLanguage("eng");
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ret.isOk());
+}
+
+TEST_P(HdmiCecTest, EnableAudioReturnChannel) {
+ hidl_vec<HdmiPortInfo> ports;
+ Return<void> ret =
+ hdmiCec->getPortInfo([&ports](hidl_vec<HdmiPortInfo> list) { ports = list; });
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ret.isOk());
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < ports.size(); ++i) {
+ if (ports[i].arcSupported) {
+ ret = hdmiCec->enableAudioReturnChannel(ports[i].portId, true);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ret.isOk());
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+TEST_P(HdmiCecTest, IsConnected) {
+ hidl_vec<HdmiPortInfo> ports;
+ Return<void> ret =
+ hdmiCec->getPortInfo([&ports](hidl_vec<HdmiPortInfo> list) { ports = list; });
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ret.isOk());
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < ports.size(); ++i) {
+ Return<bool> ret = hdmiCec->isConnected(ports[i].portId);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ret.isOk());
+ }
+}
diff --git a/tv/cec/1.0/vts/functional/setup.png b/tv/cec/1.0/vts/functional/setup.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a64b86c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tv/cec/1.0/vts/functional/setup.png
Binary files differ
