Revert "Move keymint to android.hardware.security."
Revert "Keystore 2.0 SPI: Move keymint spec to security namespace."
Revert "Keystore 2.0: Move keymint spec to security namespace."
Revert "Keystore 2.0: Move keymint spec to security namespace."
Revert "Move keymint to android.hardware.security."
Revert "Configure CF to start KeyMint service by default."
Revert "Move keymint to android.hardware.security."
Revert "Move keymint to android.hardware.security."
Revert submission 1522123-move_keymint
Reason for revert: Build breakage
Bug: 175345910
Bug: 171429297
Reverted Changes:
Ief0e9884a:Keystore 2.0: Move keymint spec to security namesp...
Idb54e8846:Keystore 2.0: Move keymint spec to security namesp...
I9f70db0e4:Remove references to keymint1
I2b4ce3349:Keystore 2.0 SPI: Move keymint spec to security na...
I2498073aa:Move keymint to android.hardware.security.
I098711e7d:Move keymint to android.hardware.security.
I3ec8d70fe:Configure CF to start KeyMint service by default.
Icbb373c50:Move keymint to android.hardware.security.
I86bccf40e:Move keymint to android.hardware.security.
Change-Id: I160cae568ed6b15698bd0af0b19c6c949528762d
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp b/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9ee8239
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+//
+// Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+//
+
+cc_test {
+ name: "VtsAidlKeyMintV1_0TargetTest",
+ defaults: [
+ "VtsHalTargetTestDefaults",
+ "use_libaidlvintf_gtest_helper_static",
+ ],
+ srcs: [
+ "keyMint1Test.cpp",
+ "VerificationTokenTest.cpp",
+ ],
+ shared_libs: [
+ "libbinder",
+ "libcrypto",
+ "libkeymint1",
+ "libkeymintSupport",
+ ],
+ static_libs: [
+ "android.hardware.keymint-cpp",
+ "libcppbor",
+ "libkeyMint1VtsTestUtil",
+ ],
+ test_suites: [
+ "general-tests",
+ "vts",
+ ],
+}
+
+cc_test_library {
+ name: "libkeyMint1VtsTestUtil",
+ defaults: [
+ "VtsHalTargetTestDefaults",
+ "use_libaidlvintf_gtest_helper_static",
+ ],
+ srcs: [
+ "KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp",
+ ],
+ export_include_dirs: [
+ ".",
+ ],
+ shared_libs: [
+ "libbinder",
+ "libcrypto",
+ "libkeymint1",
+ "libkeymintSupport",
+ ],
+ static_libs: [
+ "android.hardware.keymint-cpp",
+ "libcppbor",
+ ],
+}
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AndroidTest.xml b/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AndroidTest.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..43e7a8a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AndroidTest.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<!-- Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+
+ Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+ http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+
+ Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ limitations under the License.
+-->
+<configuration description="Runs VtsAidlKeyMintV1_0TargetTest.">
+ <option name="test-suite-tag" value="apct" />
+ <option name="test-suite-tag" value="apct-native" />
+
+ <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.RootTargetPreparer">
+ </target_preparer>
+
+ <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.PushFilePreparer">
+ <option name="cleanup" value="true" />
+ <option name="push" value="VtsAidlKeyMintV1_0TargetTest->/data/local/tmp/VtsAidlKeyMintV1_0TargetTest" />
+ </target_preparer>
+
+ <test class="com.android.tradefed.testtype.GTest" >
+ <option name="native-test-device-path" value="/data/local/tmp" />
+ <option name="module-name" value="VtsAidlKeyMintV1_0TargetTest" />
+ <option name="native-test-timeout" value="900000"/>
+ </test>
+</configuration>
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp b/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0546149
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,756 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "KeyMintAidlTestBase.h"
+
+#include <chrono>
+#include <vector>
+
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
+
+#include <keymintSupport/key_param_output.h>
+#include <keymintSupport/keymint_utils.h>
+
+namespace android {
+namespace hardware {
+namespace keymint {
+
+using namespace std::literals::chrono_literals;
+using std::endl;
+using std::optional;
+
+::std::ostream& operator<<(::std::ostream& os, const AuthorizationSet& set) {
+ if (set.size() == 0)
+ os << "(Empty)" << ::std::endl;
+ else {
+ os << "\n";
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < set.size(); ++i) os << set[i] << ::std::endl;
+ }
+ return os;
+}
+
+namespace test {
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::GetReturnErrorCode(Status result) {
+ if (result.isOk()) return ErrorCode::OK;
+
+ if (result.exceptionCode() == binder::Status::EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC) {
+ return static_cast<ErrorCode>(result.serviceSpecificErrorCode());
+ }
+
+ return ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
+}
+
+void KeyMintAidlTestBase::InitializeKeyMint(sp<IKeyMintDevice> keyMint) {
+ ASSERT_NE(keyMint, nullptr);
+ keymint_ = keyMint;
+
+ KeyMintHardwareInfo info;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(keymint_->getHardwareInfo(&info).isOk());
+
+ securityLevel_ = info.securityLevel;
+ name_.assign(info.keyMintName.begin(), info.keyMintName.end());
+ author_.assign(info.keyMintAuthorName.begin(), info.keyMintAuthorName.end());
+
+ os_version_ = getOsVersion();
+ os_patch_level_ = getOsPatchlevel();
+}
+
+void KeyMintAidlTestBase::SetUp() {
+ InitializeKeyMint(
+ android::waitForDeclaredService<IKeyMintDevice>(String16(GetParam().c_str())));
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::GenerateKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc,
+ vector<uint8_t>* keyBlob, KeyCharacteristics* keyChar) {
+ EXPECT_NE(keyBlob, nullptr) << "Key blob pointer must not be null. Test bug";
+ EXPECT_NE(keyChar, nullptr)
+ << "Previous characteristics not deleted before generating key. Test bug.";
+
+ // Aidl does not clear these output parameters if the function returns
+ // error. This is different from hal where output parameter is always
+ // cleared due to hal returning void. So now we need to do our own clearing
+ // of the output variables prior to calling keyMint aidl libraries.
+ keyBlob->clear();
+ keyChar->softwareEnforced.clear();
+ keyChar->hardwareEnforced.clear();
+ certChain_.clear();
+
+ Status result;
+ ByteArray blob;
+
+ result = keymint_->generateKey(key_desc.vector_data(), &blob, keyChar, &certChain_);
+
+ // On result, blob & characteristics should be empty.
+ if (result.isOk()) {
+ if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE) {
+ EXPECT_GT(keyChar->hardwareEnforced.size(), 0);
+ }
+ EXPECT_GT(keyChar->softwareEnforced.size(), 0);
+ // TODO(seleneh) in a later version where we return @nullable
+ // single Certificate, check non-null single certificate is always
+ // non-empty.
+ *keyBlob = blob.data;
+ }
+
+ return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::GenerateKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc) {
+ return GenerateKey(key_desc, &key_blob_, &key_characteristics_);
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::ImportKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc, KeyFormat format,
+ const string& key_material, vector<uint8_t>* key_blob,
+ KeyCharacteristics* key_characteristics) {
+ Status result;
+
+ certChain_.clear();
+ key_characteristics->softwareEnforced.clear();
+ key_characteristics->hardwareEnforced.clear();
+ key_blob->clear();
+
+ ByteArray blob;
+ result = keymint_->importKey(key_desc.vector_data(), format,
+ vector<uint8_t>(key_material.begin(), key_material.end()), &blob,
+ key_characteristics, &certChain_);
+
+ if (result.isOk()) {
+ if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE) {
+ EXPECT_GT(key_characteristics->hardwareEnforced.size(), 0);
+ }
+ EXPECT_GT(key_characteristics->softwareEnforced.size(), 0);
+ *key_blob = blob.data;
+ }
+
+ return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::ImportKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc, KeyFormat format,
+ const string& key_material) {
+ return ImportKey(key_desc, format, key_material, &key_blob_, &key_characteristics_);
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::ImportWrappedKey(string wrapped_key, string wrapping_key,
+ const AuthorizationSet& wrapping_key_desc,
+ string masking_key,
+ const AuthorizationSet& unwrapping_params) {
+ Status result;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(wrapping_key_desc, KeyFormat::PKCS8, wrapping_key));
+
+ ByteArray outBlob;
+ key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced.clear();
+ key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced.clear();
+
+ result = keymint_->importWrappedKey(vector<uint8_t>(wrapped_key.begin(), wrapped_key.end()),
+ key_blob_,
+ vector<uint8_t>(masking_key.begin(), masking_key.end()),
+ unwrapping_params.vector_data(), 0 /* passwordSid */,
+ 0 /* biometricSid */, &outBlob, &key_characteristics_);
+
+ if (result.isOk()) {
+ key_blob_ = outBlob.data;
+ if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE) {
+ EXPECT_GT(key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced.size(), 0);
+ }
+ EXPECT_GT(key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced.size(), 0);
+ }
+
+ return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::DeleteKey(vector<uint8_t>* key_blob, bool keep_key_blob) {
+ Status result = keymint_->deleteKey(*key_blob);
+ if (!keep_key_blob) {
+ *key_blob = vector<uint8_t>();
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.serviceSpecificErrorCode() << endl;
+ return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::DeleteKey(bool keep_key_blob) {
+ return DeleteKey(&key_blob_, keep_key_blob);
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::DeleteAllKeys() {
+ Status result = keymint_->deleteAllKeys();
+ EXPECT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.serviceSpecificErrorCode() << endl;
+ return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
+}
+
+void KeyMintAidlTestBase::CheckedDeleteKey(vector<uint8_t>* key_blob, bool keep_key_blob) {
+ ErrorCode result = DeleteKey(key_blob, keep_key_blob);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::OK || result == ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED) << result << endl;
+}
+
+void KeyMintAidlTestBase::CheckedDeleteKey() {
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob_);
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::Begin(KeyPurpose purpose, const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob,
+ const AuthorizationSet& in_params,
+ AuthorizationSet* out_params, sp<IKeyMintOperation>& op) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("Begin");
+ Status result;
+ BeginResult out;
+ result = keymint_->begin(purpose, key_blob, in_params.vector_data(), HardwareAuthToken(), &out);
+
+ if (result.isOk()) {
+ *out_params = out.params;
+ challenge_ = out.challenge;
+ op = out.operation;
+ }
+
+ return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::Begin(KeyPurpose purpose, const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob,
+ const AuthorizationSet& in_params,
+ AuthorizationSet* out_params) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("Begin");
+ Status result;
+ BeginResult out;
+
+ result = keymint_->begin(purpose, key_blob, in_params.vector_data(), HardwareAuthToken(), &out);
+
+ if (result.isOk()) {
+ *out_params = out.params;
+ challenge_ = out.challenge;
+ op_ = out.operation;
+ }
+
+ return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::Begin(KeyPurpose purpose, const AuthorizationSet& in_params,
+ AuthorizationSet* out_params) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("Begin");
+ EXPECT_EQ(nullptr, op_);
+ return Begin(purpose, key_blob_, in_params, out_params);
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::Begin(KeyPurpose purpose, const AuthorizationSet& in_params) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("Begin");
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ ErrorCode result = Begin(purpose, in_params, &out_params);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(out_params.empty());
+ return result;
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::Update(const AuthorizationSet& in_params, const string& input,
+ AuthorizationSet* out_params, string* output,
+ int32_t* input_consumed) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("Update");
+
+ Status result;
+ EXPECT_NE(op_, nullptr);
+ if (!op_) {
+ return ErrorCode::UNEXPECTED_NULL_POINTER;
+ }
+
+ KeyParameterArray key_params;
+ key_params.params = in_params.vector_data();
+
+ KeyParameterArray in_keyParams;
+ in_keyParams.params = in_params.vector_data();
+
+ optional<KeyParameterArray> out_keyParams;
+ optional<ByteArray> o_put;
+ result = op_->update(in_keyParams, vector<uint8_t>(input.begin(), input.end()), {}, {},
+ &out_keyParams, &o_put, input_consumed);
+
+ if (result.isOk()) {
+ if (o_put) {
+ output->append(o_put->data.begin(), o_put->data.end());
+ }
+
+ if (out_keyParams) {
+ out_params->push_back(AuthorizationSet(out_keyParams->params));
+ }
+ }
+
+ return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::Update(const string& input, string* out, int32_t* input_consumed) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("Update");
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ ErrorCode result =
+ Update(AuthorizationSet() /* in_params */, input, &out_params, out, input_consumed);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(out_params.empty());
+ return result;
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::Finish(const AuthorizationSet& in_params, const string& input,
+ const string& signature, AuthorizationSet* out_params,
+ string* output) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("Finish");
+ Status result;
+
+ EXPECT_NE(op_, nullptr);
+ if (!op_) {
+ return ErrorCode::UNEXPECTED_NULL_POINTER;
+ }
+
+ KeyParameterArray key_params;
+ key_params.params = in_params.vector_data();
+
+ KeyParameterArray in_keyParams;
+ in_keyParams.params = in_params.vector_data();
+
+ optional<KeyParameterArray> out_keyParams;
+ optional<vector<uint8_t>> o_put;
+
+ vector<uint8_t> oPut;
+ result = op_->finish(in_keyParams, vector<uint8_t>(input.begin(), input.end()),
+ vector<uint8_t>(signature.begin(), signature.end()), {}, {},
+ &out_keyParams, &oPut);
+
+ if (result.isOk()) {
+ if (out_keyParams) {
+ out_params->push_back(AuthorizationSet(out_keyParams->params));
+ }
+
+ output->append(oPut.begin(), oPut.end());
+ }
+
+ op_.clear(); // So dtor doesn't Abort().
+ return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::Finish(const string& message, string* output) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("Finish");
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ string finish_output;
+ ErrorCode result = Finish(AuthorizationSet() /* in_params */, message, "" /* signature */,
+ &out_params, output);
+ if (result != ErrorCode::OK) {
+ return result;
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, out_params.size());
+ return result;
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::Finish(const string& message, const string& signature,
+ string* output) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("Finish");
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ ErrorCode result =
+ Finish(AuthorizationSet() /* in_params */, message, signature, &out_params, output);
+
+ if (result != ErrorCode::OK) {
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, out_params.size());
+ return result;
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::Abort(const sp<IKeyMintOperation>& op) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("Abort");
+
+ EXPECT_NE(op, nullptr);
+ if (!op) {
+ return ErrorCode::UNEXPECTED_NULL_POINTER;
+ }
+
+ Status retval = op->abort();
+ EXPECT_TRUE(retval.isOk());
+ return static_cast<ErrorCode>(retval.serviceSpecificErrorCode());
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::Abort() {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("Abort");
+
+ EXPECT_NE(op_, nullptr);
+ if (!op_) {
+ return ErrorCode::UNEXPECTED_NULL_POINTER;
+ }
+
+ Status retval = op_->abort();
+ return static_cast<ErrorCode>(retval.serviceSpecificErrorCode());
+}
+
+void KeyMintAidlTestBase::AbortIfNeeded() {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("AbortIfNeeded");
+ if (op_) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Abort());
+ op_.clear();
+ }
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::ProcessMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, KeyPurpose operation,
+ const string& message, const AuthorizationSet& in_params,
+ AuthorizationSet* out_params) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("ProcessMessage");
+ AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
+ ErrorCode result = Begin(operation, key_blob, in_params, &begin_out_params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
+ if (result != ErrorCode::OK) {
+ return "";
+ }
+
+ string output;
+ int32_t consumed = 0;
+ AuthorizationSet update_params;
+ AuthorizationSet update_out_params;
+ result = Update(update_params, message, &update_out_params, &output, &consumed);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
+ if (result != ErrorCode::OK) {
+ return "";
+ }
+
+ string unused;
+ AuthorizationSet finish_params;
+ AuthorizationSet finish_out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Finish(finish_params, message.substr(consumed), unused, &finish_out_params, &output));
+
+ out_params->push_back(begin_out_params);
+ out_params->push_back(finish_out_params);
+ return output;
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::SignMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, const string& message,
+ const AuthorizationSet& params) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("SignMessage");
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ string signature = ProcessMessage(key_blob, KeyPurpose::SIGN, message, params, &out_params);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(out_params.empty());
+ return signature;
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::SignMessage(const string& message, const AuthorizationSet& params) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("SignMessage");
+ return SignMessage(key_blob_, message, params);
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::MacMessage(const string& message, Digest digest, size_t mac_length) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("MacMessage");
+ return SignMessage(
+ key_blob_, message,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, mac_length));
+}
+
+void KeyMintAidlTestBase::CheckHmacTestVector(const string& key, const string& message,
+ Digest digest, const string& expected_mac) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("CheckHmacTestVector");
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .HmacKey(key.size() * 8)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, expected_mac.size() * 8)
+ .Digest(digest),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, key));
+ string signature = MacMessage(message, digest, expected_mac.size() * 8);
+ EXPECT_EQ(expected_mac, signature)
+ << "Test vector didn't match for key of size " << key.size() << " message of size "
+ << message.size() << " and digest " << digest;
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+}
+
+void KeyMintAidlTestBase::CheckAesCtrTestVector(const string& key, const string& nonce,
+ const string& message,
+ const string& expected_ciphertext) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("CheckAesCtrTestVector");
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(key.size() * 8)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CTR)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CALLER_NONCE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, key));
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, nonce.data(), nonce.size())
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CTR)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(key_blob_, message, params, &out_params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(expected_ciphertext, ciphertext);
+}
+
+void KeyMintAidlTestBase::CheckTripleDesTestVector(KeyPurpose purpose, BlockMode block_mode,
+ PaddingMode padding_mode, const string& key,
+ const string& iv, const string& input,
+ const string& expected_output) {
+ auto authset = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(key.size() * 7)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(padding_mode);
+ if (iv.size()) authset.Authorization(TAG_CALLER_NONCE);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(authset, KeyFormat::RAW, key));
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob_.size(), 0U);
+
+ auto begin_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(block_mode).Padding(padding_mode);
+ if (iv.size()) begin_params.Authorization(TAG_NONCE, iv.data(), iv.size());
+ AuthorizationSet output_params;
+ string output = ProcessMessage(key_blob_, purpose, input, begin_params, &output_params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(expected_output, output);
+}
+
+void KeyMintAidlTestBase::VerifyMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, const string& message,
+ const string& signature, const AuthorizationSet& params) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("VerifyMessage");
+ AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY, key_blob, params, &begin_out_params));
+
+ string output;
+ AuthorizationSet update_params;
+ AuthorizationSet update_out_params;
+ int32_t consumed;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Update(update_params, message, &update_out_params, &output, &consumed));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(output.empty());
+ EXPECT_GT(consumed, 0U);
+
+ string unused;
+ AuthorizationSet finish_params;
+ AuthorizationSet finish_out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(finish_params, message.substr(consumed), signature,
+ &finish_out_params, &output));
+ op_.clear();
+ EXPECT_TRUE(output.empty());
+}
+
+void KeyMintAidlTestBase::VerifyMessage(const string& message, const string& signature,
+ const AuthorizationSet& params) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("VerifyMessage");
+ VerifyMessage(key_blob_, message, signature, params);
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::EncryptMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, const string& message,
+ const AuthorizationSet& in_params,
+ AuthorizationSet* out_params) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("EncryptMessage");
+ return ProcessMessage(key_blob, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, message, in_params, out_params);
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::EncryptMessage(const string& message, const AuthorizationSet& params,
+ AuthorizationSet* out_params) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("EncryptMessage");
+ return EncryptMessage(key_blob_, message, params, out_params);
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::EncryptMessage(const string& message, const AuthorizationSet& params) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("EncryptMessage");
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(out_params.empty()) << "Output params should be empty. Contained: " << out_params;
+ return ciphertext;
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::EncryptMessage(const string& message, BlockMode block_mode,
+ PaddingMode padding) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("EncryptMessage");
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(block_mode).Padding(padding);
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(out_params.empty()) << "Output params should be empty. Contained: " << out_params;
+ return ciphertext;
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::EncryptMessage(const string& message, BlockMode block_mode,
+ PaddingMode padding, vector<uint8_t>* iv_out) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("EncryptMessage");
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(block_mode).Padding(padding);
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1U, out_params.size());
+ auto ivVal = out_params.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ivVal.isOk());
+ if (ivVal.isOk()) *iv_out = ivVal.value();
+ return ciphertext;
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::EncryptMessage(const string& message, BlockMode block_mode,
+ PaddingMode padding, const vector<uint8_t>& iv_in) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("EncryptMessage");
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, iv_in);
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
+ return ciphertext;
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::EncryptMessage(const string& message, BlockMode block_mode,
+ PaddingMode padding, uint8_t mac_length_bits,
+ const vector<uint8_t>& iv_in) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("EncryptMessage");
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, mac_length_bits)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, iv_in);
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
+ return ciphertext;
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::DecryptMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob,
+ const string& ciphertext,
+ const AuthorizationSet& params) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("DecryptMessage");
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ string plaintext =
+ ProcessMessage(key_blob, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, ciphertext, params, &out_params);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(out_params.empty());
+ return plaintext;
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::DecryptMessage(const string& ciphertext,
+ const AuthorizationSet& params) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("DecryptMessage");
+ return DecryptMessage(key_blob_, ciphertext, params);
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::DecryptMessage(const string& ciphertext, BlockMode block_mode,
+ PaddingMode padding_mode, const vector<uint8_t>& iv) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("DecryptMessage");
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, iv);
+ return DecryptMessage(key_blob_, ciphertext, params);
+}
+
+std::pair<ErrorCode, vector<uint8_t>> KeyMintAidlTestBase::UpgradeKey(
+ const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob) {
+ std::pair<ErrorCode, vector<uint8_t>> retval;
+ vector<uint8_t> outKeyBlob;
+ Status result = keymint_->upgradeKey(key_blob, vector<KeyParameter>(), &outKeyBlob);
+ ErrorCode errorcode = GetReturnErrorCode(result);
+ retval = std::tie(errorcode, outKeyBlob);
+
+ return retval;
+}
+vector<uint32_t> KeyMintAidlTestBase::ValidKeySizes(Algorithm algorithm) {
+ switch (algorithm) {
+ case Algorithm::RSA:
+ switch (SecLevel()) {
+ case SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE:
+ case SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT:
+ return {2048, 3072, 4096};
+ case SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX:
+ return {2048};
+ default:
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "Invalid security level " << uint32_t(SecLevel());
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case Algorithm::EC:
+ switch (SecLevel()) {
+ case SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE:
+ case SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT:
+ return {224, 256, 384, 521};
+ case SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX:
+ return {256};
+ default:
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "Invalid security level " << uint32_t(SecLevel());
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case Algorithm::AES:
+ return {128, 256};
+ case Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES:
+ return {168};
+ case Algorithm::HMAC: {
+ vector<uint32_t> retval((512 - 64) / 8 + 1);
+ uint32_t size = 64 - 8;
+ std::generate(retval.begin(), retval.end(), [&]() { return (size += 8); });
+ return retval;
+ }
+ default:
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "Invalid Algorithm: " << algorithm;
+ return {};
+ }
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "Should be impossible to get here";
+ return {};
+}
+
+vector<uint32_t> KeyMintAidlTestBase::InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm algorithm) {
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+ switch (algorithm) {
+ case Algorithm::RSA:
+ return {3072, 4096};
+ case Algorithm::EC:
+ return {224, 384, 521};
+ case Algorithm::AES:
+ return {192};
+ default:
+ return {};
+ }
+ }
+ return {};
+}
+
+vector<EcCurve> KeyMintAidlTestBase::ValidCurves() {
+ if (securityLevel_ == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+ return {EcCurve::P_256};
+ } else {
+ return {EcCurve::P_224, EcCurve::P_256, EcCurve::P_384, EcCurve::P_521};
+ }
+}
+
+vector<EcCurve> KeyMintAidlTestBase::InvalidCurves() {
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT) return {};
+ CHECK(SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX);
+ return {EcCurve::P_224, EcCurve::P_384, EcCurve::P_521};
+}
+
+vector<Digest> KeyMintAidlTestBase::ValidDigests(bool withNone, bool withMD5) {
+ switch (SecLevel()) {
+ case SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE:
+ case SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT:
+ if (withNone) {
+ if (withMD5)
+ return {Digest::NONE, Digest::MD5, Digest::SHA1,
+ Digest::SHA_2_224, Digest::SHA_2_256, Digest::SHA_2_384,
+ Digest::SHA_2_512};
+ else
+ return {Digest::NONE, Digest::SHA1, Digest::SHA_2_224,
+ Digest::SHA_2_256, Digest::SHA_2_384, Digest::SHA_2_512};
+ } else {
+ if (withMD5)
+ return {Digest::MD5, Digest::SHA1, Digest::SHA_2_224,
+ Digest::SHA_2_256, Digest::SHA_2_384, Digest::SHA_2_512};
+ else
+ return {Digest::SHA1, Digest::SHA_2_224, Digest::SHA_2_256, Digest::SHA_2_384,
+ Digest::SHA_2_512};
+ }
+ break;
+ case SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX:
+ if (withNone)
+ return {Digest::NONE, Digest::SHA_2_256};
+ else
+ return {Digest::SHA_2_256};
+ break;
+ default:
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "Invalid security level " << uint32_t(SecLevel());
+ break;
+ }
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "Should be impossible to get here";
+ return {};
+}
+
+} // namespace test
+} // namespace keymint
+} // namespace hardware
+} // namespace android
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h b/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2948c41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef VTS_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST_UTILS_H
+#define VTS_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST_UTILS_H
+
+#pragma once
+
+#include <aidl/Gtest.h>
+#include <aidl/Vintf.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/ErrorCode.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.h>
+#include <binder/IServiceManager.h>
+#include <binder/ProcessState.h>
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+
+#include <keymintSupport/authorization_set.h>
+
+namespace android {
+namespace hardware {
+namespace keymint {
+namespace test {
+
+using ::android::sp;
+using binder::Status;
+using ::std::shared_ptr;
+using ::std::string;
+using ::std::vector;
+
+constexpr uint64_t kOpHandleSentinel = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF;
+
+::std::ostream& operator<<(::std::ostream& os, const AuthorizationSet& set);
+
+class KeyMintAidlTestBase : public ::testing::TestWithParam<string> {
+ public:
+ void SetUp() override;
+ void TearDown() override {
+ if (key_blob_.size()) {
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+ }
+ AbortIfNeeded();
+ }
+
+ void InitializeKeyMint(sp<IKeyMintDevice> keyMint);
+ IKeyMintDevice& keyMint() { return *keymint_; }
+ uint32_t os_version() { return os_version_; }
+ uint32_t os_patch_level() { return os_patch_level_; }
+
+ ErrorCode GetReturnErrorCode(Status result);
+ ErrorCode GenerateKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc, vector<uint8_t>* key_blob,
+ KeyCharacteristics* key_characteristics);
+
+ ErrorCode GenerateKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc);
+
+ ErrorCode ImportKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc, KeyFormat format,
+ const string& key_material, vector<uint8_t>* key_blob,
+ KeyCharacteristics* key_characteristics);
+ ErrorCode ImportKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc, KeyFormat format,
+ const string& key_material);
+
+ ErrorCode ImportWrappedKey(string wrapped_key, string wrapping_key,
+ const AuthorizationSet& wrapping_key_desc, string masking_key,
+ const AuthorizationSet& unwrapping_params);
+
+ ErrorCode DeleteKey(vector<uint8_t>* key_blob, bool keep_key_blob = false);
+ ErrorCode DeleteKey(bool keep_key_blob = false);
+
+ ErrorCode DeleteAllKeys();
+
+ void CheckedDeleteKey(vector<uint8_t>* key_blob, bool keep_key_blob = false);
+ void CheckedDeleteKey();
+
+ ErrorCode Begin(KeyPurpose purpose, const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob,
+ const AuthorizationSet& in_params, AuthorizationSet* out_params,
+ sp<IKeyMintOperation>& op);
+ ErrorCode Begin(KeyPurpose purpose, const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob,
+ const AuthorizationSet& in_params, AuthorizationSet* out_params);
+ ErrorCode Begin(KeyPurpose purpose, const AuthorizationSet& in_params,
+ AuthorizationSet* out_params);
+ ErrorCode Begin(KeyPurpose purpose, const AuthorizationSet& in_params);
+
+ ErrorCode Update(const AuthorizationSet& in_params, const string& input,
+ AuthorizationSet* out_params, string* output, int32_t* input_consumed);
+ ErrorCode Update(const string& input, string* out, int32_t* input_consumed);
+
+ ErrorCode Finish(const AuthorizationSet& in_params, const string& input,
+ const string& signature, AuthorizationSet* out_params, string* output);
+ ErrorCode Finish(const string& message, string* output);
+ ErrorCode Finish(const string& message, const string& signature, string* output);
+ ErrorCode Finish(string* output) { return Finish(string(), output); }
+
+ ErrorCode Abort();
+ ErrorCode Abort(const sp<IKeyMintOperation>& op);
+ void AbortIfNeeded();
+
+ string ProcessMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, KeyPurpose operation,
+ const string& message, const AuthorizationSet& in_params,
+ AuthorizationSet* out_params);
+
+ string SignMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, const string& message,
+ const AuthorizationSet& params);
+ string SignMessage(const string& message, const AuthorizationSet& params);
+
+ string MacMessage(const string& message, Digest digest, size_t mac_length);
+
+ void CheckHmacTestVector(const string& key, const string& message, Digest digest,
+ const string& expected_mac);
+
+ void CheckAesCtrTestVector(const string& key, const string& nonce, const string& message,
+ const string& expected_ciphertext);
+
+ void CheckTripleDesTestVector(KeyPurpose purpose, BlockMode block_mode,
+ PaddingMode padding_mode, const string& key, const string& iv,
+ const string& input, const string& expected_output);
+
+ void VerifyMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, const string& message,
+ const string& signature, const AuthorizationSet& params);
+ void VerifyMessage(const string& message, const string& signature,
+ const AuthorizationSet& params);
+
+ string EncryptMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, const string& message,
+ const AuthorizationSet& in_params, AuthorizationSet* out_params);
+ string EncryptMessage(const string& message, const AuthorizationSet& params,
+ AuthorizationSet* out_params);
+ string EncryptMessage(const string& message, const AuthorizationSet& params);
+ string EncryptMessage(const string& message, BlockMode block_mode, PaddingMode padding);
+ string EncryptMessage(const string& message, BlockMode block_mode, PaddingMode padding,
+ vector<uint8_t>* iv_out);
+ string EncryptMessage(const string& message, BlockMode block_mode, PaddingMode padding,
+ const vector<uint8_t>& iv_in);
+ string EncryptMessage(const string& message, BlockMode block_mode, PaddingMode padding,
+ uint8_t mac_length_bits, const vector<uint8_t>& iv_in);
+
+ string DecryptMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, const string& ciphertext,
+ const AuthorizationSet& params);
+ string DecryptMessage(const string& ciphertext, const AuthorizationSet& params);
+ string DecryptMessage(const string& ciphertext, BlockMode block_mode, PaddingMode padding_mode,
+ const vector<uint8_t>& iv);
+
+ std::pair<ErrorCode, vector<uint8_t>> UpgradeKey(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob);
+
+ bool IsSecure() { return securityLevel_ != SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE; }
+ SecurityLevel SecLevel() { return securityLevel_; }
+
+ vector<uint32_t> ValidKeySizes(Algorithm algorithm);
+ vector<uint32_t> InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm algorithm);
+
+ vector<EcCurve> ValidCurves();
+ vector<EcCurve> InvalidCurves();
+
+ vector<Digest> ValidDigests(bool withNone, bool withMD5);
+
+ static vector<string> build_params() {
+ auto params = android::getAidlHalInstanceNames(IKeyMintDevice::descriptor);
+ return params;
+ }
+
+ sp<IKeyMintOperation> op_;
+ vector<Certificate> certChain_;
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob_;
+ KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics_;
+
+ private:
+ sp<IKeyMintDevice> keymint_;
+ uint32_t os_version_;
+ uint32_t os_patch_level_;
+
+ SecurityLevel securityLevel_;
+ string name_;
+ string author_;
+ long challenge_;
+};
+
+#define INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(name) \
+ INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(PerInstance, name, \
+ testing::ValuesIn(KeyMintAidlTestBase::build_params()), \
+ android::PrintInstanceNameToString)
+
+} // namespace test
+} // namespace keymint
+} // namespace hardware
+} // namespace android
+
+#endif // VTS_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST_UTILS_H
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VerificationTokenTest.cpp b/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VerificationTokenTest.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bd0942b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VerificationTokenTest.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "KeyMintAidlTestBase.h"
+
+namespace android {
+namespace hardware {
+namespace keymint {
+namespace test {
+
+class VerificationTokenTest : public KeyMintAidlTestBase {
+ protected:
+ struct VerifyAuthorizationResult {
+ ErrorCode error;
+ VerificationToken token;
+ };
+
+ VerifyAuthorizationResult verifyAuthorization(uint64_t operationHandle,
+ const HardwareAuthToken& authToken) {
+ VerifyAuthorizationResult result;
+
+ Status err;
+ err = keyMint().verifyAuthorization(operationHandle, //
+ authToken, //
+ &result.token);
+
+ result.error = GetReturnErrorCode(err);
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ uint64_t getTime() {
+ struct timespec timespec;
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, ×pec));
+ return timespec.tv_sec * 1000 + timespec.tv_nsec / 1000000;
+ }
+
+ int sleep_ms(uint32_t milliseconds) {
+ struct timespec sleep_time = {static_cast<time_t>(milliseconds / 1000),
+ static_cast<long>(milliseconds % 1000) * 1000000};
+ while (sleep_time.tv_sec || sleep_time.tv_nsec) {
+ if (nanosleep(&sleep_time /* to wait */,
+ &sleep_time /* remaining (on interrruption) */) == 0) {
+ sleep_time = {};
+ } else {
+ if (errno != EINTR) return errno;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+};
+
+/*
+ * VerificationTokens exist to facilitate cross-KeyMint verification of requirements. As
+ * such, the precise capabilities required will vary depending on the specific vendor
+ * implementations. Essentially, VerificationTokens are a "hook" to enable vendor
+ * implementations to communicate, so the precise usage is defined by those vendors. The only
+ * thing we really can test is that tokens can be created by TEE keyMints, and that the
+ * timestamps increase as expected.
+ */
+TEST_P(VerificationTokenTest, TestCreation) {
+ auto result1 = verifyAuthorization(1 /* operation handle */, HardwareAuthToken());
+ auto result1_time = getTime();
+
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+ // StrongBox should not implement verifyAuthorization.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED, result1.error);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result1.error);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1U, result1.token.challenge);
+ EXPECT_EQ(SecLevel(), result1.token.securityLevel);
+ EXPECT_GT(result1.token.timestamp.milliSeconds, 0U);
+
+ constexpr uint32_t time_to_sleep = 200;
+ sleep_ms(time_to_sleep);
+
+ auto result2 = verifyAuthorization(2 /* operation handle */, HardwareAuthToken());
+
+ auto result2_time = getTime();
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result2.error);
+ EXPECT_EQ(2U, result2.token.challenge);
+ EXPECT_EQ(SecLevel(), result2.token.securityLevel);
+
+ auto host_time_delta = result2_time - result1_time;
+
+ EXPECT_GE(host_time_delta, time_to_sleep)
+ << "We slept for " << time_to_sleep << " ms, the clock must have advanced by that much";
+ EXPECT_LE(host_time_delta, time_to_sleep + 20)
+ << "The verifyAuthorization call took " << (host_time_delta - time_to_sleep)
+ << " ms? That's awful!";
+
+ auto km_time_delta =
+ result2.token.timestamp.milliSeconds - result1.token.timestamp.milliSeconds;
+
+ // If not too much else is going on on the system, the time delta should be quite close. Allow
+ // 2 ms of slop just to avoid test flakiness.
+ //
+ // TODO(swillden): see if we can output values so they can be gathered across many runs and
+ // report if times aren't nearly always <1ms apart.
+ EXPECT_LE(host_time_delta, km_time_delta + 2);
+ EXPECT_LE(km_time_delta, host_time_delta + 2);
+ ASSERT_EQ(result1.token.mac.size(), result2.token.mac.size());
+ ASSERT_NE(0,
+ memcmp(result1.token.mac.data(), result2.token.mac.data(), result1.token.mac.size()));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test that the mac changes when the time stamp changes. This is does not guarantee that the time
+ * stamp is included in the mac but on failure we know that it is not. Other than in the test
+ * case above we call verifyAuthorization with the exact same set of parameters.
+ */
+TEST_P(VerificationTokenTest, MacChangesOnChangingTimestamp) {
+ auto result1 = verifyAuthorization(0 /* operation handle */, HardwareAuthToken());
+ auto result1_time = getTime();
+
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+ // StrongBox should not implement verifyAuthorization.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED, result1.error);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result1.error);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, result1.token.challenge);
+ EXPECT_EQ(SecLevel(), result1.token.securityLevel);
+ EXPECT_GT(result1.token.timestamp.milliSeconds, 0U);
+
+ constexpr uint32_t time_to_sleep = 200;
+ sleep_ms(time_to_sleep);
+
+ auto result2 = verifyAuthorization(0 /* operation handle */, HardwareAuthToken());
+ // ASSERT_TRUE(result2.callSuccessful);
+ auto result2_time = getTime();
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result2.error);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, result2.token.challenge);
+ EXPECT_EQ(SecLevel(), result2.token.securityLevel);
+
+ auto host_time_delta = result2_time - result1_time;
+
+ EXPECT_GE(host_time_delta, time_to_sleep)
+ << "We slept for " << time_to_sleep << " ms, the clock must have advanced by that much";
+ EXPECT_LE(host_time_delta, time_to_sleep + 20)
+ << "The verifyAuthorization call took " << (host_time_delta - time_to_sleep)
+ << " ms? That's awful!";
+
+ auto km_time_delta =
+ result2.token.timestamp.milliSeconds - result1.token.timestamp.milliSeconds;
+
+ EXPECT_LE(host_time_delta, km_time_delta + 2);
+ EXPECT_LE(km_time_delta, host_time_delta + 2);
+ ASSERT_EQ(result1.token.mac.size(), result2.token.mac.size());
+ ASSERT_NE(0,
+ memcmp(result1.token.mac.data(), result2.token.mac.data(), result1.token.mac.size()));
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(VerificationTokenTest);
+
+} // namespace test
+} // namespace keymint
+} // namespace hardware
+} // namespace android
diff --git a/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/keyMint1Test.cpp b/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/keyMint1Test.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c2fa2f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/keyMint1Test.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,4069 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#define LOG_TAG "keymint_5_test"
+#include <cutils/log.h>
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <iostream>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include <cutils/properties.h>
+
+#include <android/hardware/keymint/KeyFormat.h>
+
+#include <keymintSupport/attestation_record.h>
+#include <keymintSupport/key_param_output.h>
+#include <keymintSupport/openssl_utils.h>
+
+#include "KeyMintAidlTestBase.h"
+
+static bool arm_deleteAllKeys = false;
+static bool dump_Attestations = false;
+
+using android::hardware::keymint::AuthorizationSet;
+using android::hardware::keymint::KeyCharacteristics;
+using android::hardware::keymint::KeyFormat;
+
+namespace android {
+namespace hardware {
+
+namespace keymint {
+
+bool operator==(const keymint::AuthorizationSet& a, const keymint::AuthorizationSet& b) {
+ return a.size() == b.size() && std::equal(a.begin(), a.end(), b.begin());
+}
+} // namespace keymint
+} // namespace hardware
+} // namespace android
+
+namespace std {
+
+using namespace android::hardware::keymint;
+
+template <>
+struct std::equal_to<KeyCharacteristics> {
+ bool operator()(const KeyCharacteristics& a, const KeyCharacteristics& b) const {
+ // This isn't very efficient. Oh, well.
+ AuthorizationSet a_sw(a.softwareEnforced);
+ AuthorizationSet b_sw(b.softwareEnforced);
+ AuthorizationSet a_tee(b.hardwareEnforced);
+ AuthorizationSet b_tee(b.hardwareEnforced);
+
+ a_sw.Sort();
+ b_sw.Sort();
+ a_tee.Sort();
+ b_tee.Sort();
+
+ return ((a_sw == b_sw) && (a_tee == b_tee));
+ }
+};
+
+} // namespace std
+
+namespace android {
+namespace hardware {
+namespace keymint {
+namespace test {
+namespace {
+
+template <TagType tag_type, Tag tag, typename ValueT>
+bool contains(vector<KeyParameter>& set, TypedTag<tag_type, tag> ttag, ValueT expected_value) {
+ auto it = std::find_if(set.begin(), set.end(), [&](const KeyParameter& param) {
+ return param.tag == tag && accessTagValue(ttag, param) == expected_value;
+ });
+ return (it != set.end());
+}
+
+template <TagType tag_type, Tag tag>
+bool contains(vector<KeyParameter>& set, TypedTag<tag_type, tag>) {
+ auto it = std::find_if(set.begin(), set.end(),
+ [&](const KeyParameter& param) { return param.tag == tag; });
+ return (it != set.end());
+}
+
+constexpr char hex_value[256] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
+ 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, // '0'..'9'
+ 0, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, // 'A'..'F'
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
+ 0, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, // 'a'..'f'
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+
+string hex2str(string a) {
+ string b;
+ size_t num = a.size() / 2;
+ b.resize(num);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+ b[i] = (hex_value[a[i * 2] & 0xFF] << 4) + (hex_value[a[i * 2 + 1] & 0xFF]);
+ }
+ return b;
+}
+
+string rsa_key =
+ hex2str("30820275020100300d06092a864886f70d01010105000482025f3082025b"
+ "02010002818100c6095409047d8634812d5a218176e45c41d60a75b13901"
+ "f234226cffe776521c5a77b9e389417b71c0b6a44d13afe4e4a2805d46c9"
+ "da2935adb1ff0c1f24ea06e62b20d776430a4d435157233c6f916783c30e"
+ "310fcbd89b85c2d56771169785ac12bca244abda72bfb19fc44d27c81e1d"
+ "92de284f4061edfd99280745ea6d2502030100010281801be0f04d9cae37"
+ "18691f035338308e91564b55899ffb5084d2460e6630257e05b3ceab0297"
+ "2dfabcd6ce5f6ee2589eb67911ed0fac16e43a444b8c861e544a05933657"
+ "72f8baf6b22fc9e3c5f1024b063ac080a7b2234cf8aee8f6c47bbf4fd3ac"
+ "e7240290bef16c0b3f7f3cdd64ce3ab5912cf6e32f39ab188358afcccd80"
+ "81024100e4b49ef50f765d3b24dde01aceaaf130f2c76670a91a61ae08af"
+ "497b4a82be6dee8fcdd5e3f7ba1cfb1f0c926b88f88c92bfab137fba2285"
+ "227b83c342ff7c55024100ddabb5839c4c7f6bf3d4183231f005b31aa58a"
+ "ffdda5c79e4cce217f6bc930dbe563d480706c24e9ebfcab28a6cdefd324"
+ "b77e1bf7251b709092c24ff501fd91024023d4340eda3445d8cd26c14411"
+ "da6fdca63c1ccd4b80a98ad52b78cc8ad8beb2842c1d280405bc2f6c1bea"
+ "214a1d742ab996b35b63a82a5e470fa88dbf823cdd02401b7b57449ad30d"
+ "1518249a5f56bb98294d4b6ac12ffc86940497a5a5837a6cf946262b4945"
+ "26d328c11e1126380fde04c24f916dec250892db09a6d77cdba351024077"
+ "62cd8f4d050da56bd591adb515d24d7ccd32cca0d05f866d583514bd7324"
+ "d5f33645e8ed8b4a1cb3cc4a1d67987399f2a09f5b3fb68c88d5e5d90ac3"
+ "3492d6");
+
+string ec_256_key =
+ hex2str("308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30"
+ "6b0201010420737c2ecd7b8d1940bf2930aa9b4ed3ff941eed09366bc032"
+ "99986481f3a4d859a14403420004bf85d7720d07c25461683bc648b4778a"
+ "9a14dd8a024e3bdd8c7ddd9ab2b528bbc7aa1b51f14ebbbb0bd0ce21bcc4"
+ "1c6eb00083cf3376d11fd44949e0b2183bfe");
+
+string ec_521_key =
+ hex2str("3081EE020100301006072A8648CE3D020106052B810400230481D63081D3"
+ "02010104420011458C586DB5DAA92AFAB03F4FE46AA9D9C3CE9A9B7A006A"
+ "8384BEC4C78E8E9D18D7D08B5BCFA0E53C75B064AD51C449BAE0258D54B9"
+ "4B1E885DED08ED4FB25CE9A1818903818600040149EC11C6DF0FA122C6A9"
+ "AFD9754A4FA9513A627CA329E349535A5629875A8ADFBE27DCB932C05198"
+ "6377108D054C28C6F39B6F2C9AF81802F9F326B842FF2E5F3C00AB7635CF"
+ "B36157FC0882D574A10D839C1A0C049DC5E0D775E2EE50671A208431BB45"
+ "E78E70BEFE930DB34818EE4D5C26259F5C6B8E28A652950F9F88D7B4B2C9"
+ "D9");
+
+string ec_256_key_rfc5915 =
+ hex2str("308193020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107047930"
+ "770201010420782370a8c8ce5537baadd04dcff079c8158cfa9c67b818b3"
+ "8e8d21c9fa750c1da00a06082a8648ce3d030107a14403420004e2cc561e"
+ "e701da0ad0ef0d176bb0c919d42e79c393fdc1bd6c4010d85cf2cf8e68c9"
+ "05464666f98dad4f01573ba81078b3428570a439ba3229fbc026c550682f");
+
+string ec_256_key_sec1 =
+ hex2str("308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30"
+ "6b0201010420782370a8c8ce5537baadd04dcff079c8158cfa9c67b818b3"
+ "8e8d21c9fa750c1da14403420004e2cc561ee701da0ad0ef0d176bb0c919"
+ "d42e79c393fdc1bd6c4010d85cf2cf8e68c905464666f98dad4f01573ba8"
+ "1078b3428570a439ba3229fbc026c550682f");
+
+struct RSA_Delete {
+ void operator()(RSA* p) { RSA_free(p); }
+};
+
+/* TODO(seleneh) add attestation verification codes like verify_chain() and
+ * attestation tests after we decided on the keymint 1 attestation changes.
+ */
+
+std::string make_string(const uint8_t* data, size_t length) {
+ return std::string(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(data), length);
+}
+
+template <size_t N>
+std::string make_string(const uint8_t (&a)[N]) {
+ return make_string(a, N);
+}
+
+class AidlBuf : public vector<uint8_t> {
+ typedef vector<uint8_t> super;
+
+ public:
+ AidlBuf() {}
+ AidlBuf(const super& other) : super(other) {}
+ AidlBuf(super&& other) : super(std::move(other)) {}
+ explicit AidlBuf(const std::string& other) : AidlBuf() { *this = other; }
+
+ AidlBuf& operator=(const super& other) {
+ super::operator=(other);
+ return *this;
+ }
+
+ AidlBuf& operator=(super&& other) {
+ super::operator=(std::move(other));
+ return *this;
+ }
+
+ AidlBuf& operator=(const string& other) {
+ resize(other.size());
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < other.size(); ++i) {
+ (*this)[i] = static_cast<uint8_t>(other[i]);
+ }
+ return *this;
+ }
+
+ string to_string() const { return string(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(data()), size()); }
+};
+
+} // namespace
+
+class NewKeyGenerationTest : public KeyMintAidlTestBase {
+ protected:
+ void CheckBaseParams(const KeyCharacteristics& keyCharacteristics) {
+ // TODO(swillden): Distinguish which params should be in which auth list.
+
+ AuthorizationSet auths(keyCharacteristics.hardwareEnforced);
+ auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(keyCharacteristics.softwareEnforced));
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::VERIFY));
+
+ // Verify that App ID, App data and ROT are NOT included.
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST));
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_APPLICATION_ID));
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA));
+
+ // Check that some unexpected tags/values are NOT present.
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT));
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT));
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, 301U));
+
+ // Now check that unspecified, defaulted tags are correct.
+ EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_CREATION_DATETIME));
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version()))
+ << "OS version is " << os_version() << " key reported "
+ << auths.GetTagValue(TAG_OS_VERSION);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level()))
+ << "OS patch level is " << os_patch_level() << " key reported "
+ << auths.GetTagValue(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL);
+ }
+};
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.Rsa
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint can generate all required RSA key sizes, and that the resulting keys
+ * have correct characteristics.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, Rsa) {
+ for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(key_size, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+ CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+
+ AuthorizationSet crypto_params;
+ if (IsSecure()) {
+ crypto_params = key_characteristics.hardwareEnforced;
+ } else {
+ crypto_params = key_characteristics.softwareEnforced;
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+ << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 65537U));
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.NoInvalidRsaSizes
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint cannot generate any RSA key sizes that are designated as invalid.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, NoInvalidRsaSizes) {
+ for (auto key_size : InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(key_size, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.RsaNoDefaultSize
+ *
+ * Verifies that failing to specify a key size for RSA key generation returns
+ * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, RsaNoDefaultSize) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA)
+ .Authorization(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 3U)
+ .SigningKey()));
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.Ecdsa
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint can generate all required EC key sizes, and that the resulting keys
+ * have correct characteristics.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, Ecdsa) {
+ for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC)) {
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().EcdsaSigningKey(key_size).Digest(Digest::NONE),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+ CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+
+ AuthorizationSet crypto_params;
+ if (IsSecure()) {
+ crypto_params = key_characteristics.hardwareEnforced;
+ } else {
+ crypto_params = key_characteristics.softwareEnforced;
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+ << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaDefaultSize
+ *
+ * Verifies that failing to specify a key size for EC key generation returns
+ * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaDefaultSize) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC)
+ .SigningKey()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaInvalidSize
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying an invalid key size for EC key generation returns
+ * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaInvalidSize) {
+ for (auto key_size : InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC)) {
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().EcdsaSigningKey(key_size).Digest(Digest::NONE),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder().EcdsaSigningKey(190).Digest(Digest::NONE)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaMismatchKeySize
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying mismatched key size and curve for EC key generation returns
+ * INVALID_ARGUMENT.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaMismatchKeySize) {
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(224)
+ .Authorization(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaAllValidSizes
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint supports all required EC key sizes.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaAllValidSizes) {
+ auto valid_sizes = ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC);
+ for (size_t size : valid_sizes) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder().EcdsaSigningKey(size).Digest(Digest::NONE)))
+ << "Failed to generate size: " << size;
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaInvalidCurves
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint does not support any curve designated as unsupported.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaAllValidCurves) {
+ Digest digest;
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+ digest = Digest::SHA_2_256;
+ } else {
+ digest = Digest::SHA_2_512;
+ }
+ for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder().EcdsaSigningKey(curve).Digest(digest)))
+ << "Failed to generate key on curve: " << curve;
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.Hmac
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint supports all required digests, and that the resulting keys have correct
+ * characteristics.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, Hmac) {
+ for (auto digest : ValidDigests(false /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */)) {
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics;
+ constexpr size_t key_size = 128;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().HmacKey(key_size).Digest(digest).Authorization(
+ TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+ CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+
+ AuthorizationSet hardwareEnforced = key_characteristics.hardwareEnforced;
+ AuthorizationSet softwareEnforced = key_characteristics.softwareEnforced;
+ if (IsSecure()) {
+ EXPECT_TRUE(hardwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(hardwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+ << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_TRUE(softwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(softwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+ << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+ }
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.HmacCheckKeySizes
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint supports all key sizes, and rejects all invalid key sizes.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, HmacCheckKeySizes) {
+ for (size_t key_size = 0; key_size <= 512; ++key_size) {
+ if (key_size < 64 || key_size % 8 != 0) {
+ // To keep this test from being very slow, we only test a random fraction of
+ // non-byte key sizes. We test only ~10% of such cases. Since there are 392 of
+ // them, we expect to run ~40 of them in each run.
+ if (key_size % 8 == 0 || random() % 10 == 0) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .HmacKey(key_size)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 256)))
+ << "HMAC key size " << key_size << " invalid";
+ }
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .HmacKey(key_size)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 256)))
+ << "Failed to generate HMAC key of size " << key_size;
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.HmacCheckMinMacLengths
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint supports all required MAC lengths and rejects all invalid lengths. This
+ * test is probabilistic in order to keep the runtime down, but any failure prints out the
+ * specific MAC length that failed, so reproducing a failed run will be easy.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, HmacCheckMinMacLengths) {
+ for (size_t min_mac_length = 0; min_mac_length <= 256; ++min_mac_length) {
+ if (min_mac_length < 64 || min_mac_length % 8 != 0) {
+ // To keep this test from being very long, we only test a random fraction of
+ // non-byte lengths. We test only ~10% of such cases. Since there are 172 of them,
+ // we expect to run ~17 of them in each run.
+ if (min_mac_length % 8 == 0 || random() % 10 == 0) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MIN_MAC_LENGTH,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .HmacKey(128)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, min_mac_length)))
+ << "HMAC min mac length " << min_mac_length << " invalid.";
+ }
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .HmacKey(128)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, min_mac_length)))
+ << "Failed to generate HMAC key with min MAC length " << min_mac_length;
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.HmacMultipleDigests
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint rejects HMAC key generation with multiple specified digest algorithms.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, HmacMultipleDigests) {
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .HmacKey(128)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA1)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.HmacDigestNone
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint rejects HMAC key generation with no digest or Digest::NONE
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, HmacDigestNone) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder().HmacKey(128).Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH,
+ 128)));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .HmacKey(128)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(NewKeyGenerationTest);
+
+typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase SigningOperationsTest;
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that raw RSA signature operations succeed.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaSuccess) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)));
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+ string signature = SignMessage(
+ message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaUseRequiresCorrectAppIdAppData
+ *
+ * Verifies that using an RSA key requires the correct app ID/data.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaUseRequiresCorrectAppIdAppData) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, "clientid")
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, "appdata")));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ AbortIfNeeded();
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, "clientid")));
+ AbortIfNeeded();
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, "appdata")));
+ AbortIfNeeded();
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, "appdata")
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, "clientid")));
+ AbortIfNeeded();
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaPssSha256Success
+ *
+ * Verifies that RSA-PSS signature operations succeed.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaPssSha256Success) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)));
+ // Use large message, which won't work without digesting.
+ string message(1024, 'a');
+ string signature = SignMessage(
+ message,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaPaddingNoneDoesNotAllowOther
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint rejects signature operations that specify a padding mode when the key
+ * supports only unpadded operations.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaPaddingNoneDoesNotAllowOther) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+ string signature;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.NoUserConfirmation
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint rejects signing operations for keys with
+ * TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED and no valid confirmation token
+ * presented.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, NoUserConfirmation) {
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(1024, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED)));
+
+ const string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ string signature;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::NO_USER_CONFIRMATION, Finish(message, &signature));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaPkcs1Sha256Success
+ *
+ * Verifies that digested RSA-PKCS1 signature operations succeed.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaPkcs1Sha256Success) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
+ string message(1024, 'a');
+ string signature = SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaPkcs1NoDigestSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that undigested RSA-PKCS1 signature operations succeed.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaPkcs1NoDigestSuccess) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
+ string message(53, 'a');
+ string signature = SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaPkcs1NoDigestTooLarge
+ *
+ * Verifies that undigested RSA-PKCS1 signature operations fail with the correct error code when
+ * given a too-long message.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaPkcs1NoDigestTooLong) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
+ string message(257, 'a');
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
+ string signature;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, &signature));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaPssSha512TooSmallKey
+ *
+ * Verifies that undigested RSA-PSS signature operations fail with the correct error code when
+ * used with a key that is too small for the message.
+ *
+ * A PSS-padded message is of length salt_size + digest_size + 16 (sizes in bits), and the
+ * keymint specification requires that salt_size == digest_size, so the message will be
+ * digest_size * 2 +
+ * 16. Such a message can only be signed by a given key if the key is at least that size. This
+ * test uses SHA512, which has a digest_size == 512, so the message size is 1040 bits, too large
+ * for a 1024-bit key.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaPssSha512TooSmallKey) {
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(1024, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_512)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_512)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaNoPaddingTooLong
+ *
+ * Verifies that raw RSA signature operations fail with the correct error code when
+ * given a too-long message.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaNoPaddingTooLong) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
+ // One byte too long
+ string message(2048 / 8 + 1, 'a');
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
+ string result;
+ ErrorCode finish_error_code = Finish(message, &result);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(finish_error_code == ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ||
+ finish_error_code == ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+
+ // Very large message that should exceed the transfer buffer size of any reasonable TEE.
+ message = string(128 * 1024, 'a');
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
+ finish_error_code = Finish(message, &result);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(finish_error_code == ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ||
+ finish_error_code == ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaAbort
+ *
+ * Verifies that operations can be aborted correctly. Uses an RSA signing operation for the
+ * test, but the behavior should be algorithm and purpose-independent.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaAbort) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Abort());
+
+ // Another abort should fail
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE, Abort());
+
+ // Set to sentinel, so TearDown() doesn't try to abort again.
+ op_.clear();
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaUnsupportedPadding
+ *
+ * Verifies that RSA operations fail with the correct error (but key gen succeeds) when used
+ * with a padding mode inappropriate for RSA.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaUnsupportedPadding) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256 /* supported digest */)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
+ ASSERT_EQ(
+ ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaPssNoDigest
+ *
+ * Verifies that RSA PSS operations fail when no digest is used. PSS requires a digest.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaNoDigest) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)));
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaPssNoDigest
+ *
+ * Verifies that RSA operations fail when no padding mode is specified. PaddingMode::NONE is
+ * supported in some cases (as validated in other tests), but a mode must be specified.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaNoPadding) {
+ // Padding must be specified
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .SigningKey()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)));
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaShortMessage
+ *
+ * Verifies that raw RSA signatures succeed with a message shorter than the key size.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaTooShortMessage) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ // Barely shorter
+ string message(2048 / 8 - 1, 'a');
+ SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
+
+ // Much shorter
+ message = "a";
+ SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaSignWithEncryptionKey
+ *
+ * Verifies that RSA encryption keys cannot be used to sign.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaSignWithEncryptionKey) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaSignTooLargeMessage
+ *
+ * Verifies that attempting a raw signature of a message which is the same length as the key,
+ * but numerically larger than the public modulus, fails with the correct error.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaSignTooLargeMessage) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ // Largest possible message will always be larger than the public modulus.
+ string message(2048 / 8, static_cast<char>(0xff));
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ string signature;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT, Finish(message, &signature));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.EcdsaAllSizesAndHashes
+ *
+ * Verifies that ECDSA operations succeed with all possible key sizes and hashes.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, EcdsaAllSizesAndHashes) {
+ for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC)) {
+ for (auto digest : ValidDigests(false /* withNone */, false /* withMD5 */)) {
+ ErrorCode error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(key_size)
+ .Digest(digest));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error) << "Failed to generate ECDSA key with size " << key_size
+ << " and digest " << digest;
+ if (error != ErrorCode::OK) continue;
+
+ string message(1024, 'a');
+ if (digest == Digest::NONE) message.resize(key_size / 8);
+ SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest));
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.EcdsaAllCurves
+ *
+ * Verifies that ECDSA operations succeed with all possible curves.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, EcdsaAllCurves) {
+ for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
+ ErrorCode error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error) << "Failed to generate ECDSA key with curve " << curve;
+ if (error != ErrorCode::OK) continue;
+
+ string message(1024, 'a');
+ SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256));
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.EcdsaNoDigestHugeData
+ *
+ * Verifies that ECDSA operations support very large messages, even without digesting. This
+ * should work because ECDSA actually only signs the leftmost L_n bits of the message, however
+ * large it may be. Not using digesting is a bad idea, but in some cases digesting is done by
+ * the framework.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, EcdsaNoDigestHugeData) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)));
+ string message(1 * 1024, 'a');
+ SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.EcUseRequiresCorrectAppIdAppData
+ *
+ * Verifies that using an EC key requires the correct app ID/data.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, EcUseRequiresCorrectAppIdAppData) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, "clientid")
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, "appdata")));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE)));
+ AbortIfNeeded();
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, "clientid")));
+ AbortIfNeeded();
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, "appdata")));
+ AbortIfNeeded();
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, "appdata")
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, "clientid")));
+ AbortIfNeeded();
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.AesEcbSign
+ *
+ * Verifies that attempts to use AES keys to sign fail in the correct way.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, AesEcbSign) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .SigningKey()
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)));
+
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSet() /* in_params */, &out_params));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY, AuthorizationSet() /* in_params */, &out_params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.HmacAllDigests
+ *
+ * Verifies that HMAC works with all digests.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, HmacAllDigests) {
+ for (auto digest : ValidDigests(false /* withNone */, false /* withMD5 */)) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .HmacKey(128)
+ .Digest(digest)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 160)))
+ << "Failed to create HMAC key with digest " << digest;
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+ string signature = MacMessage(message, digest, 160);
+ EXPECT_EQ(160U / 8U, signature.size())
+ << "Failed to sign with HMAC key with digest " << digest;
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.HmacSha256TooLargeMacLength
+ *
+ * Verifies that HMAC fails in the correct way when asked to generate a MAC larger than the
+ * digest size.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, HmacSha256TooLargeMacLength) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .HmacKey(128)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 256)));
+ AuthorizationSet output_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MAC_LENGTH, Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 264),
+ &output_params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.HmacSha256TooSmallMacLength
+ *
+ * Verifies that HMAC fails in the correct way when asked to generate a MAC smaller than the
+ * specified minimum MAC length.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, HmacSha256TooSmallMacLength) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .HmacKey(128)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+ AuthorizationSet output_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_MAC_LENGTH, Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 120),
+ &output_params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.HmacRfc4231TestCase3
+ *
+ * Validates against the test vectors from RFC 4231 test case 3.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, HmacRfc4231TestCase3) {
+ string key(20, 0xaa);
+ string message(50, 0xdd);
+ uint8_t sha_224_expected[] = {
+ 0x7f, 0xb3, 0xcb, 0x35, 0x88, 0xc6, 0xc1, 0xf6, 0xff, 0xa9, 0x69, 0x4d, 0x7d, 0x6a,
+ 0xd2, 0x64, 0x93, 0x65, 0xb0, 0xc1, 0xf6, 0x5d, 0x69, 0xd1, 0xec, 0x83, 0x33, 0xea,
+ };
+ uint8_t sha_256_expected[] = {
+ 0x77, 0x3e, 0xa9, 0x1e, 0x36, 0x80, 0x0e, 0x46, 0x85, 0x4d, 0xb8,
+ 0xeb, 0xd0, 0x91, 0x81, 0xa7, 0x29, 0x59, 0x09, 0x8b, 0x3e, 0xf8,
+ 0xc1, 0x22, 0xd9, 0x63, 0x55, 0x14, 0xce, 0xd5, 0x65, 0xfe,
+ };
+ uint8_t sha_384_expected[] = {
+ 0x88, 0x06, 0x26, 0x08, 0xd3, 0xe6, 0xad, 0x8a, 0x0a, 0xa2, 0xac, 0xe0,
+ 0x14, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x6f, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x35, 0xd9, 0x47, 0xac, 0x9f, 0xeb,
+ 0xe8, 0x3e, 0xf4, 0xe5, 0x59, 0x66, 0x14, 0x4b, 0x2a, 0x5a, 0xb3, 0x9d,
+ 0xc1, 0x38, 0x14, 0xb9, 0x4e, 0x3a, 0xb6, 0xe1, 0x01, 0xa3, 0x4f, 0x27,
+ };
+ uint8_t sha_512_expected[] = {
+ 0xfa, 0x73, 0xb0, 0x08, 0x9d, 0x56, 0xa2, 0x84, 0xef, 0xb0, 0xf0, 0x75, 0x6c,
+ 0x89, 0x0b, 0xe9, 0xb1, 0xb5, 0xdb, 0xdd, 0x8e, 0xe8, 0x1a, 0x36, 0x55, 0xf8,
+ 0x3e, 0x33, 0xb2, 0x27, 0x9d, 0x39, 0xbf, 0x3e, 0x84, 0x82, 0x79, 0xa7, 0x22,
+ 0xc8, 0x06, 0xb4, 0x85, 0xa4, 0x7e, 0x67, 0xc8, 0x07, 0xb9, 0x46, 0xa3, 0x37,
+ 0xbe, 0xe8, 0x94, 0x26, 0x74, 0x27, 0x88, 0x59, 0xe1, 0x32, 0x92, 0xfb,
+ };
+
+ CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_256, make_string(sha_256_expected));
+ if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+ CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_224, make_string(sha_224_expected));
+ CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_384, make_string(sha_384_expected));
+ CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_512, make_string(sha_512_expected));
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.HmacRfc4231TestCase5
+ *
+ * Validates against the test vectors from RFC 4231 test case 5.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, HmacRfc4231TestCase5) {
+ string key(20, 0x0c);
+ string message = "Test With Truncation";
+
+ uint8_t sha_224_expected[] = {
+ 0x0e, 0x2a, 0xea, 0x68, 0xa9, 0x0c, 0x8d, 0x37,
+ 0xc9, 0x88, 0xbc, 0xdb, 0x9f, 0xca, 0x6f, 0xa8,
+ };
+ uint8_t sha_256_expected[] = {
+ 0xa3, 0xb6, 0x16, 0x74, 0x73, 0x10, 0x0e, 0xe0,
+ 0x6e, 0x0c, 0x79, 0x6c, 0x29, 0x55, 0x55, 0x2b,
+ };
+ uint8_t sha_384_expected[] = {
+ 0x3a, 0xbf, 0x34, 0xc3, 0x50, 0x3b, 0x2a, 0x23,
+ 0xa4, 0x6e, 0xfc, 0x61, 0x9b, 0xae, 0xf8, 0x97,
+ };
+ uint8_t sha_512_expected[] = {
+ 0x41, 0x5f, 0xad, 0x62, 0x71, 0x58, 0x0a, 0x53,
+ 0x1d, 0x41, 0x79, 0xbc, 0x89, 0x1d, 0x87, 0xa6,
+ };
+
+ CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_256, make_string(sha_256_expected));
+ if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+ CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_224, make_string(sha_224_expected));
+ CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_384, make_string(sha_384_expected));
+ CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_512, make_string(sha_512_expected));
+ }
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(SigningOperationsTest);
+
+typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase VerificationOperationsTest;
+
+/*
+ * VerificationOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that a simple RSA signature/verification sequence succeeds.
+ */
+TEST_P(VerificationOperationsTest, RsaSuccess) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+ string signature = SignMessage(
+ message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
+ VerifyMessage(message, signature,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
+}
+
+/*
+ * VerificationOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies RSA signature/verification for all padding modes and digests.
+ */
+TEST_P(VerificationOperationsTest, RsaAllPaddingsAndDigests) {
+ auto authorizations = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(ValidDigests(true /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */))
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN);
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(authorizations));
+
+ string message(128, 'a');
+ string corrupt_message(message);
+ ++corrupt_message[corrupt_message.size() / 2];
+
+ for (auto padding :
+ {PaddingMode::NONE, PaddingMode::RSA_PSS, PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN}) {
+ for (auto digest : ValidDigests(true /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */)) {
+ if (padding == PaddingMode::NONE && digest != Digest::NONE) {
+ // Digesting only makes sense with padding.
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (padding == PaddingMode::RSA_PSS && digest == Digest::NONE) {
+ // PSS requires digesting.
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ string signature =
+ SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding));
+ VerifyMessage(message, signature,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding));
+
+ /* TODO(seleneh) add exportkey tests back later when we have decided on
+ * the new api.
+ if (digest != Digest::NONE) {
+ // Verify with OpenSSL.
+ vector<uint8_t> pubkey;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ExportKey(KeyFormat::X509, &pubkey));
+
+ const uint8_t* p = pubkey.data();
+ EVP_PKEY_Ptr pkey(d2i_PUBKEY(nullptr, &p, pubkey.size()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(pkey.get());
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX digest_ctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&digest_ctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX* pkey_ctx;
+ const EVP_MD* md = openssl_digest(digest);
+ ASSERT_NE(md, nullptr);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&digest_ctx, &pkey_ctx, md,
+ nullptr, pkey.get()));
+
+ switch (padding) {
+ case PaddingMode::RSA_PSS:
+ EXPECT_GT(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkey_ctx,
+ RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING), 0); EXPECT_GT(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkey_ctx,
+ EVP_MD_size(md)), 0); break; case PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN:
+ // PKCS1 is the default; don't need to set anything.
+ break;
+ default:
+ FAIL();
+ break;
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&digest_ctx, message.data(),
+ message.size())); EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&digest_ctx,
+ reinterpret_cast<const
+ uint8_t*>(signature.data()), signature.size())); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&digest_ctx);
+ }
+ */
+
+ // Corrupt signature shouldn't verify.
+ string corrupt_signature(signature);
+ ++corrupt_signature[corrupt_signature.size() / 2];
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding)));
+ string result;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(message, corrupt_signature, &result));
+
+ // Corrupt message shouldn't verify
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding)));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(corrupt_message, signature, &result));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * VerificationOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies ECDSA signature/verification for all digests and curves.
+ */
+TEST_P(VerificationOperationsTest, EcdsaAllDigestsAndCurves) {
+ auto digests = ValidDigests(true /* withNone */, false /* withMD5 */);
+
+ string message = "1234567890";
+ string corrupt_message = "2234567890";
+ for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
+ ErrorCode error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
+ .Digest(digests));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error) << "Failed to generate key for EC curve " << curve;
+ if (error != ErrorCode::OK) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ for (auto digest : digests) {
+ string signature = SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest));
+ VerifyMessage(message, signature, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest));
+
+ /* TODO(seleneh) add exportkey tests back later when we have decided on
+ * the new api.
+
+ // Verify with OpenSSL
+ if (digest != Digest::NONE) {
+ vector<uint8_t> pubkey;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ExportKey(KeyFormat::X509, &pubkey))
+ << curve << ' ' << digest;
+
+ const uint8_t* p = pubkey.data();
+ EVP_PKEY_Ptr pkey(d2i_PUBKEY(nullptr, &p, pubkey.size()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(pkey.get());
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX digest_ctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&digest_ctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX* pkey_ctx;
+ const EVP_MD* md = openssl_digest(digest);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&digest_ctx, &pkey_ctx, md,
+ nullptr, pkey.get()))
+ << curve << ' ' << digest;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&digest_ctx, message.data(),
+ message.size()))
+ << curve << ' ' << digest;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(1,
+ EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&digest_ctx,
+ reinterpret_cast<const
+ uint8_t*>(signature.data()), signature.size()))
+ << curve << ' ' << digest;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&digest_ctx);
+ }
+ */
+ // Corrupt signature shouldn't verify.
+ string corrupt_signature(signature);
+ ++corrupt_signature[corrupt_signature.size() / 2];
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest)))
+ << curve << ' ' << digest;
+
+ string result;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(message, corrupt_signature, &result))
+ << curve << ' ' << digest;
+
+ // Corrupt message shouldn't verify
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest)))
+ << curve << ' ' << digest;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(corrupt_message, signature, &result))
+ << curve << ' ' << digest;
+ }
+
+ auto rc = DeleteKey();
+ ASSERT_TRUE(rc == ErrorCode::OK || rc == ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * VerificationOperationsTest.HmacSigningKeyCannotVerify
+ *
+ * Verifies HMAC signing and verification, but that a signing key cannot be used to verify.
+ */
+TEST_P(VerificationOperationsTest, HmacSigningKeyCannotVerify) {
+ string key_material = "HelloThisIsAKey";
+
+ vector<uint8_t> signing_key, verification_key;
+ KeyCharacteristics signing_key_chars, verification_key_chars;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 160),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, key_material, &signing_key, &signing_key_chars));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::VERIFY)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 160),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, key_material, &verification_key, &verification_key_chars));
+
+ string message = "This is a message.";
+ string signature = SignMessage(
+ signing_key, message,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 160));
+
+ // Signing key should not work.
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY, signing_key,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256), &out_params));
+
+ // Verification key should work.
+ VerifyMessage(verification_key, message, signature,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256));
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&signing_key);
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&verification_key);
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(VerificationOperationsTest);
+
+typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase ExportKeyTest;
+
+/*
+ * ExportKeyTest.RsaUnsupportedKeyFormat
+ *
+ * Verifies that attempting to export RSA keys in PKCS#8 format fails with the correct error.
+ */
+// TODO(seleneh) add ExportKey to GenerateKey
+// check result
+
+class ImportKeyTest : public KeyMintAidlTestBase {
+ public:
+ template <TagType tag_type, Tag tag, typename ValueT>
+ void CheckCryptoParam(TypedTag<tag_type, tag> ttag, ValueT expected) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("CheckCryptoParam");
+ if (IsSecure()) {
+ EXPECT_TRUE(contains(key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced, ttag, expected))
+ << "Tag " << tag << " with value " << expected << " not found";
+ EXPECT_FALSE(contains(key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced, ttag))
+ << "Tag " << tag << " found";
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_TRUE(contains(key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced, ttag, expected))
+ << "Tag " << tag << " with value " << expected << " not found";
+ EXPECT_FALSE(contains(key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced, ttag))
+ << "Tag " << tag << " found";
+ }
+ }
+
+ void CheckOrigin() {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("CheckOrigin");
+ if (IsSecure()) {
+ EXPECT_TRUE(contains(key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced, TAG_ORIGIN,
+ KeyOrigin::IMPORTED));
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_TRUE(contains(key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced, TAG_ORIGIN,
+ KeyOrigin::IMPORTED));
+ }
+ }
+};
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.RsaSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing and using an RSA key pair works correctly.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, RsaSuccess) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaSigningKey(1024, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS),
+ KeyFormat::PKCS8, rsa_key));
+
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 1024U);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 65537U);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::RSA_PSS);
+ CheckOrigin();
+
+ string message(1024 / 8, 'a');
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS);
+ string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
+ VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.RsaKeySizeMismatch
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing an RSA key pair with a size that doesn't match the key fails in the
+ * correct way.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, RsaKeySizeMismatch) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH,
+ ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048 /* Doesn't match key */, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
+ KeyFormat::PKCS8, rsa_key));
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.RsaPublicExponentMismatch
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing an RSA key pair with a public exponent that doesn't match the key
+ * fails in the correct way.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, RsaPublicExponentMismatch) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH,
+ ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(1024, 3 /* Doesn't match key */)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
+ KeyFormat::PKCS8, rsa_key));
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.EcdsaSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing and using an ECDSA P-256 key pair works correctly.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaSuccess) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256),
+ KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key));
+
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 256U);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256);
+
+ CheckOrigin();
+
+ string message(32, 'a');
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
+ string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
+ VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.EcdsaP256RFC5915Success
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing and using an ECDSA P-256 key pair encoded using RFC5915 works
+ * correctly.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaP256RFC5915Success) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256),
+ KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key_rfc5915));
+
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 256U);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256);
+
+ CheckOrigin();
+
+ string message(32, 'a');
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
+ string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
+ VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.EcdsaP256SEC1Success
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing and using an ECDSA P-256 key pair encoded using SEC1 works correctly.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaP256SEC1Success) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256),
+ KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key_sec1));
+
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 256U);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256);
+
+ CheckOrigin();
+
+ string message(32, 'a');
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
+ string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
+ VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.Ecdsa521Success
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing and using an ECDSA P-521 key pair works correctly.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, Ecdsa521Success) {
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(521)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256),
+ KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_521_key));
+
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 521U);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_521);
+ CheckOrigin();
+
+ string message(32, 'a');
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
+ string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
+ VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.EcdsaSizeMismatch
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing an ECDSA key pair with a size that doesn't match the key fails in the
+ * correct way.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaSizeMismatch) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH,
+ ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(224 /* Doesn't match key */)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE),
+ KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key));
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.EcdsaCurveMismatch
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing an ECDSA key pair with a curve that doesn't match the key fails in
+ * the correct way.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaCurveMismatch) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH,
+ ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_224 /* Doesn't match key */)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE),
+ KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key));
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.AesSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing and using an AES key works.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, AesSuccess) {
+ string key = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(key.size() * 8)
+ .EcbMode()
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, key));
+
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::AES);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 128U);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB);
+ CheckOrigin();
+
+ string message = "Hello World!";
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.AesSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing and using an HMAC key works.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, HmacKeySuccess) {
+ string key = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .HmacKey(key.size() * 8)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 256),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, key));
+
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 128U);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
+ CheckOrigin();
+
+ string message = "Hello World!";
+ string signature = MacMessage(message, Digest::SHA_2_256, 256);
+ VerifyMessage(message, signature, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256));
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(ImportKeyTest);
+
+auto wrapped_key = hex2str(
+ "3082017902010004820100934bf94e2aa28a3f83c9f79297250262fbe3276b5a1c91159bbfa3ef8957aac8"
+ "4b59b30b455a79c2973480823d8b3863c3deef4a8e243590268d80e18751a0e130f67ce6a1ace9f79b95e0"
+ "97474febc981195b1d13a69086c0863f66a7b7fdb48792227b1ac5e2489febdf087ab5486483033a6f001c"
+ "a5d1ec1e27f5c30f4cec2642074a39ae68aee552e196627a8e3d867e67a8c01b11e75f13cca0a97ab668b5"
+ "0cda07a8ecb7cd8e3dd7009c9636534f6f239cffe1fc8daa466f78b676c7119efb96bce4e69ca2a25d0b34"
+ "ed9c3ff999b801597d5220e307eaa5bee507fb94d1fa69f9e519b2de315bac92c36f2ea1fa1df4478c0dde"
+ "deae8c70e0233cd098040cd796b02c370f1fa4cc0124f1302e0201033029a1083106020100020101a20302"
+ "0120a30402020100a4053103020101a6053103020140bf83770205000420ccd540855f833a5e1480bfd2d3"
+ "6faf3aeee15df5beabe2691bc82dde2a7aa910041064c9f689c60ff6223ab6e6999e0eb6e5");
+
+auto wrapped_key_masked = hex2str(
+ "3082017902010004820100aad93ed5924f283b4bb5526fbe7a1412f9d9749ec30db9062b29e574a8546f33"
+ "c88732452f5b8e6a391ee76c39ed1712c61d8df6213dec1cffbc17a8c6d04c7b30893d8daa9b2015213e21"
+ "946821553207f8f9931c4caba23ed3bee28b36947e47f10e0a5c3dc51c988a628daad3e5e1f4005e79c2d5"
+ "a96c284b4b8d7e4948f331e5b85dd5a236f85579f3ea1d1b848487470bdb0ab4f81a12bee42c99fe0df4be"
+ "e3759453e69ad1d68a809ce06b949f7694a990429b2fe81e066ff43e56a21602db70757922a4bcc23ab89f"
+ "1e35da77586775f423e519c2ea394caf48a28d0c8020f1dcf6b3a68ec246f615ae96dae9a079b1f6eb9590"
+ "33c1af5c125fd94168040c6d9721d08589581ab49204a3302e0201033029a1083106020100020101a20302"
+ "0120a30402020100a4053103020101a6053103020140bf83770205000420a61c6e247e25b3e6e69aa78eb0"
+ "3c2d4ac20d1f99a9a024a76f35c8e2cab9b68d04102560c70109ae67c030f00b98b512a670");
+
+auto wrapping_key = hex2str(
+ "308204be020100300d06092a864886f70d0101010500048204a8308204a40201000282010100aec367931d"
+ "8900ce56b0067f7d70e1fc653f3f34d194c1fed50018fb43db937b06e673a837313d56b1c725150a3fef86"
+ "acbddc41bb759c2854eae32d35841efb5c18d82bc90a1cb5c1d55adf245b02911f0b7cda88c421ff0ebafe"
+ "7c0d23be312d7bd5921ffaea1347c157406fef718f682643e4e5d33c6703d61c0cf7ac0bf4645c11f5c137"
+ "4c3886427411c449796792e0bef75dec858a2123c36753e02a95a96d7c454b504de385a642e0dfc3e60ac3"
+ "a7ee4991d0d48b0172a95f9536f02ba13cecccb92b727db5c27e5b2f5cec09600b286af5cf14c42024c61d"
+ "dfe71c2a8d7458f185234cb00e01d282f10f8fc6721d2aed3f4833cca2bd8fa62821dd5502030100010282"
+ "0100431447b6251908112b1ee76f99f3711a52b6630960046c2de70de188d833f8b8b91e4d785caeeeaf4f"
+ "0f74414e2cda40641f7fe24f14c67a88959bdb27766df9e710b630a03adc683b5d2c43080e52bee71e9eae"
+ "b6de297a5fea1072070d181c822bccff087d63c940ba8a45f670feb29fb4484d1c95e6d2579ba02aae0a00"
+ "900c3ebf490e3d2cd7ee8d0e20c536e4dc5a5097272888cddd7e91f228b1c4d7474c55b8fcd618c4a957bb"
+ "ddd5ad7407cc312d8d98a5caf7e08f4a0d6b45bb41c652659d5a5ba05b663737a8696281865ba20fbdd7f8"
+ "51e6c56e8cbe0ddbbf24dc03b2d2cb4c3d540fb0af52e034a2d06698b128e5f101e3b51a34f8d8b4f86181"
+ "02818100de392e18d682c829266cc3454e1d6166242f32d9a1d10577753e904ea7d08bff841be5bac82a16"
+ "4c5970007047b8c517db8f8f84e37bd5988561bdf503d4dc2bdb38f885434ae42c355f725c9a60f91f0788"
+ "e1f1a97223b524b5357fdf72e2f696bab7d78e32bf92ba8e1864eab1229e91346130748a6e3c124f9149d7"
+ "1c743502818100c95387c0f9d35f137b57d0d65c397c5e21cc251e47008ed62a542409c8b6b6ac7f8967b3"
+ "863ca645fcce49582a9aa17349db6c4a95affdae0dae612e1afac99ed39a2d934c880440aed8832f984316"
+ "3a47f27f392199dc1202f9a0f9bd08308007cb1e4e7f58309366a7de25f7c3c9b880677c068e1be936e812"
+ "88815252a8a102818057ff8ca1895080b2cae486ef0adfd791fb0235c0b8b36cd6c136e52e4085f4ea5a06"
+ "3212a4f105a3764743e53281988aba073f6e0027298e1c4378556e0efca0e14ece1af76ad0b030f27af6f0"
+ "ab35fb73a060d8b1a0e142fa2647e93b32e36d8282ae0a4de50ab7afe85500a16f43a64719d6e2b9439823"
+ "719cd08bcd03178102818100ba73b0bb28e3f81e9bd1c568713b101241acc607976c4ddccc90e65b6556ca"
+ "31516058f92b6e09f3b160ff0e374ec40d78ae4d4979fde6ac06a1a400c61dd31254186af30b22c10582a8"
+ "a43e34fe949c5f3b9755bae7baa7b7b7a6bd03b38cef55c86885fc6c1978b9cee7ef33da507c9df6b9277c"
+ "ff1e6aaa5d57aca528466102818100c931617c77829dfb1270502be9195c8f2830885f57dba869536811e6"
+ "864236d0c4736a0008a145af36b8357a7c3d139966d04c4e00934ea1aede3bb6b8ec841dc95e3f579751e2"
+ "bfdfe27ae778983f959356210723287b0affcc9f727044d48c373f1babde0724fa17a4fd4da0902c7c9b9b"
+ "f27ba61be6ad02dfddda8f4e6822");
+
+string zero_masking_key =
+ hex2str("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000");
+string masking_key = hex2str("D796B02C370F1FA4CC0124F14EC8CBEBE987E825246265050F399A51FD477DFC");
+
+class ImportWrappedKeyTest : public KeyMintAidlTestBase {};
+
+TEST_P(ImportWrappedKeyTest, Success) {
+ auto wrapping_key_desc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
+ .Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::WRAP_KEY);
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ ImportWrappedKey(wrapped_key, wrapping_key, wrapping_key_desc, zero_masking_key,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)));
+
+ string message = "Hello World!";
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+TEST_P(ImportWrappedKeyTest, SuccessMasked) {
+ auto wrapping_key_desc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
+ .Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::WRAP_KEY);
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ ImportWrappedKey(wrapped_key_masked, wrapping_key, wrapping_key_desc, masking_key,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)));
+}
+
+TEST_P(ImportWrappedKeyTest, WrongMask) {
+ auto wrapping_key_desc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
+ .Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::WRAP_KEY);
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(
+ ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED,
+ ImportWrappedKey(wrapped_key_masked, wrapping_key, wrapping_key_desc, zero_masking_key,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)));
+}
+
+TEST_P(ImportWrappedKeyTest, WrongPurpose) {
+ auto wrapping_key_desc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP);
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(
+ ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE,
+ ImportWrappedKey(wrapped_key_masked, wrapping_key, wrapping_key_desc, zero_masking_key,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)));
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(ImportWrappedKeyTest);
+
+typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase EncryptionOperationsTest;
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaNoPaddingSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that raw RSA encryption works.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaNoPaddingSuccess) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ string message = string(2048 / 8, 'a');
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext1.size());
+
+ string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext2.size());
+
+ // Unpadded RSA is deterministic
+ EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaNoPaddingShortMessage
+ *
+ * Verifies that raw RSA encryption of short messages works.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaNoPaddingShortMessage) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ string message = "1";
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext.size());
+
+ string expected_plaintext = string(2048U / 8 - 1, 0) + message;
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(expected_plaintext, plaintext);
+
+ // Degenerate case, encrypting a numeric 1 yields 0x00..01 as the ciphertext.
+ message = static_cast<char>(1);
+ ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext.size());
+ EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext, string(2048U / 8 - 1, 0) + message);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaNoPaddingTooLong
+ *
+ * Verifies that raw RSA encryption of too-long messages fails in the expected way.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaNoPaddingTooLong) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ string message(2048 / 8 + 1, 'a');
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+
+ string result;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, &result));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaNoPaddingTooLarge
+ *
+ * Verifies that raw RSA encryption of too-large (numerically) messages fails in the expected
+ * way.
+ */
+// TODO(seleneh) add RsaNoPaddingTooLarge test back after decided and implemented new
+// version of ExportKey inside generateKey
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations work, with all digests.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepSuccess) {
+ auto digests = ValidDigests(false /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */);
+
+ size_t key_size = 2048; // Need largish key for SHA-512 test.
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(key_size, 65537)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
+ .Digest(digests)));
+
+ string message = "Hello";
+
+ for (auto digest : digests) {
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP);
+ string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ if (HasNonfatalFailure()) std::cout << "-->" << digest << std::endl;
+ EXPECT_EQ(key_size / 8, ciphertext1.size());
+
+ string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(key_size / 8, ciphertext2.size());
+
+ // OAEP randomizes padding so every result should be different (with astronomically high
+ // probability).
+ EXPECT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
+
+ string plaintext1 = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext1) << "RSA-OAEP failed with digest " << digest;
+ string plaintext2 = DecryptMessage(ciphertext2, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext2) << "RSA-OAEP failed with digest " << digest;
+
+ // Decrypting corrupted ciphertext should fail.
+ size_t offset_to_corrupt = random() % ciphertext1.size();
+ char corrupt_byte;
+ do {
+ corrupt_byte = static_cast<char>(random() % 256);
+ } while (corrupt_byte == ciphertext1[offset_to_corrupt]);
+ ciphertext1[offset_to_corrupt] = corrupt_byte;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
+ string result;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR, Finish(ciphertext1, &result));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, result.size());
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepInvalidDigest
+ *
+ * Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to operate
+ * without a digest.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepInvalidDigest) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)));
+ string message = "Hello World!";
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP).Digest(Digest::NONE);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepInvalidDigest
+ *
+ * Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to decrypt
+ * with a different digest than was used to encrypt.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepDecryptWithWrongDigest) {
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(1024, 65537)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_224, Digest::SHA_2_256)));
+ string message = "Hello World!";
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(
+ message,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_224).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)));
+ string result;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR, Finish(ciphertext, &result));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, result.size());
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepTooLarge
+ *
+ * Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to encrypt a
+ * too-large message.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepTooLarge) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)));
+ constexpr size_t digest_size = 256 /* SHA_2_256 */ / 8;
+ constexpr size_t oaep_overhead = 2 * digest_size + 2;
+ string message(2048 / 8 - oaep_overhead + 1, 'a');
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)));
+ string result;
+ ErrorCode error = Finish(message, &result);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(error == ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH || error == ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, result.size());
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaPkcs1Success
+ *
+ * Verifies that RSA PKCS encryption/decrypts works.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaPkcs1Success) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT)));
+
+ string message = "Hello World!";
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT);
+ string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext1.size());
+
+ string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext2.size());
+
+ // PKCS1 v1.5 randomizes padding so every result should be different.
+ EXPECT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
+
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+
+ // Decrypting corrupted ciphertext should fail.
+ size_t offset_to_corrupt = random() % ciphertext1.size();
+ char corrupt_byte;
+ do {
+ corrupt_byte = static_cast<char>(random() % 256);
+ } while (corrupt_byte == ciphertext1[offset_to_corrupt]);
+ ciphertext1[offset_to_corrupt] = corrupt_byte;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
+ string result;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR, Finish(ciphertext1, &result));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, result.size());
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaPkcs1TooLarge
+ *
+ * Verifies that RSA PKCS encryption fails in the correct way when the mssage is too large.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaPkcs1TooLarge) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT)));
+ string message(2048 / 8 - 10, 'a');
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+ string result;
+ ErrorCode error = Finish(message, &result);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(error == ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH || error == ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, result.size());
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.EcdsaEncrypt
+ *
+ * Verifies that attempting to use ECDSA keys to encrypt fails in the correct way.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, EcdsaEncrypt) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)));
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.HmacEncrypt
+ *
+ * Verifies that attempting to use HMAC keys to encrypt fails in the correct way.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, HmacEncrypt) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .HmacKey(128)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbRoundTripSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES ECB mode works.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbRoundTripSuccess) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob_.size(), 0U);
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+
+ // Two-block message.
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+ string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext1.size());
+
+ string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(string(message), params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext2.size());
+
+ // ECB is deterministic.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
+
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbRoundTripSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES encryption fails in the correct way when an unauthorized mode is specified.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesWrongMode) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob_.size(), 0U);
+
+ // Two-block message.
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+ EXPECT_EQ(
+ ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesWrongPurpose
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES encryption fails in the correct way when an unauthorized purpose is
+ * specified.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesWrongPurpose) {
+ auto err = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, err) << "Got " << err;
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob_.size(), 0U);
+
+ err = Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE, err) << "Got " << err;
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ err = Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE, err) << "Got " << err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbNoPaddingWrongInputSize
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES encryption fails in the correct way when provided an input that is not a
+ * multiple of the block size and no padding is specified.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbNoPaddingWrongInputSize) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ // Message is slightly shorter than two blocks.
+ string message(16 * 2 - 1, 'a');
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+ string ciphertext;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, &ciphertext));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, ciphertext.size());
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbPkcs7Padding
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES PKCS7 padding works for any message length.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbPkcs7Padding) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+
+ // Try various message lengths; all should work.
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
+ string message(i, 'a');
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(i + 16 - (i % 16), ciphertext.size());
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbWrongPadding
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES enryption fails in the correct way when an unauthorized padding mode is
+ * specified.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbWrongPadding) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+
+ // Try various message lengths; all should fail
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
+ string message(i, 'a');
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbPkcs7PaddingCorrupted
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES decryption fails in the correct way when the padding is corrupted.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbPkcs7PaddingCorrupted) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+
+ string message = "a";
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(16U, ciphertext.size());
+ EXPECT_NE(ciphertext, message);
+ ++ciphertext[ciphertext.size() / 2];
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
+ string plaintext;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, &plaintext));
+}
+
+vector<uint8_t> CopyIv(const AuthorizationSet& set) {
+ auto iv = set.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(iv.isOk());
+ return iv.value();
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCtrRoundTripSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES CTR mode works.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesCtrRoundTripSuccess) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CTR)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CTR).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+
+ string message = "123";
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
+ vector<uint8_t> iv1 = CopyIv(out_params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(16U, iv1.size());
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext1.size());
+
+ out_params.Clear();
+ string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
+ vector<uint8_t> iv2 = CopyIv(out_params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(16U, iv2.size());
+
+ // IVs should be random, so ciphertexts should differ.
+ EXPECT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
+
+ auto params_iv1 =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorizations(params).Authorization(TAG_NONCE, iv1);
+ auto params_iv2 =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorizations(params).Authorization(TAG_NONCE, iv2);
+
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, params_iv1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+ plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext2, params_iv2);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+
+ // Using the wrong IV will result in a "valid" decryption, but the data will be garbage.
+ plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, params_iv2);
+ EXPECT_NE(message, plaintext);
+ plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext2, params_iv1);
+ EXPECT_NE(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesIncremental
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES works, all modes, when provided data in various size increments.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesIncremental) {
+ auto block_modes = {
+ BlockMode::ECB,
+ BlockMode::CBC,
+ BlockMode::CTR,
+ BlockMode::GCM,
+ };
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .BlockMode(block_modes)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+
+ for (int increment = 1; increment <= 240; ++increment) {
+ for (auto block_mode : block_modes) {
+ string message(240, 'a');
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128) /* for GCM */;
+
+ AuthorizationSet output_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params, &output_params));
+
+ string ciphertext;
+ int32_t input_consumed;
+ string to_send;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < message.size(); i += increment) {
+ to_send.append(message.substr(i, increment));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(to_send, &ciphertext, &input_consumed));
+ EXPECT_EQ(to_send.length(), input_consumed);
+ to_send = to_send.substr(input_consumed);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, to_send.length());
+
+ switch (block_mode) {
+ case BlockMode::ECB:
+ case BlockMode::CBC:
+ // Implementations must take as many blocks as possible, leaving less
+ // than a block.
+ EXPECT_LE(to_send.length(), 16U);
+ break;
+ case BlockMode::GCM:
+ case BlockMode::CTR:
+ // Implementations must always take all the data.
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, to_send.length());
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(to_send, &ciphertext)) << "Error sending " << to_send;
+
+ switch (block_mode) {
+ case BlockMode::GCM:
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size() + 16, ciphertext.size());
+ break;
+ case BlockMode::CTR:
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext.size());
+ break;
+ case BlockMode::CBC:
+ case BlockMode::ECB:
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size() + message.size() % 16, ciphertext.size());
+ break;
+ }
+
+ auto iv = output_params.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE);
+ switch (block_mode) {
+ case BlockMode::CBC:
+ case BlockMode::GCM:
+ case BlockMode::CTR:
+ ASSERT_TRUE(iv.isOk()) << "No IV for block mode " << block_mode;
+ EXPECT_EQ(block_mode == BlockMode::GCM ? 12U : 16U, iv.value().size());
+ params.push_back(TAG_NONCE, iv.value());
+ break;
+
+ case BlockMode::ECB:
+ EXPECT_FALSE(iv.isOk()) << "ECB mode should not generate IV";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params))
+ << "Decrypt begin() failed for block mode " << block_mode;
+
+ string plaintext;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < ciphertext.size(); i += increment) {
+ to_send.append(ciphertext.substr(i, increment));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(to_send, &plaintext, &input_consumed));
+ to_send = to_send.substr(input_consumed);
+ }
+ ErrorCode error = Finish(to_send, &plaintext);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error) << "Decryption failed for block mode " << block_mode
+ << " and increment " << increment;
+ if (error == ErrorCode::OK) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(message, plaintext) << "Decryption didn't match for block mode "
+ << block_mode << " and increment " << increment;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+struct AesCtrSp80038aTestVector {
+ const char* key;
+ const char* nonce;
+ const char* plaintext;
+ const char* ciphertext;
+};
+
+// These test vectors are taken from
+// http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf, section F.5.
+static const AesCtrSp80038aTestVector kAesCtrSp80038aTestVectors[] = {
+ // AES-128
+ {
+ "2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c",
+ "f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff",
+ "6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51"
+ "30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710",
+ "874d6191b620e3261bef6864990db6ce9806f66b7970fdff8617187bb9fffdff"
+ "5ae4df3edbd5d35e5b4f09020db03eab1e031dda2fbe03d1792170a0f3009cee",
+ },
+ // AES-192
+ {
+ "8e73b0f7da0e6452c810f32b809079e562f8ead2522c6b7b",
+ "f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff",
+ "6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51"
+ "30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710",
+ "1abc932417521ca24f2b0459fe7e6e0b090339ec0aa6faefd5ccc2c6f4ce8e94"
+ "1e36b26bd1ebc670d1bd1d665620abf74f78a7f6d29809585a97daec58c6b050",
+ },
+ // AES-256
+ {
+ "603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d77811f352c073b6108d72d9810a30914dff4",
+ "f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff",
+ "6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51"
+ "30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710",
+ "601ec313775789a5b7a7f504bbf3d228f443e3ca4d62b59aca84e990cacaf5c5"
+ "2b0930daa23de94ce87017ba2d84988ddfc9c58db67aada613c2dd08457941a6",
+ },
+};
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCtrSp80038aTestVector
+ *
+ * Verifies AES CTR implementation against SP800-38A test vectors.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesCtrSp80038aTestVector) {
+ std::vector<uint32_t> InvalidSizes = InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+ const AesCtrSp80038aTestVector& test(kAesCtrSp80038aTestVectors[i]);
+ const string key = hex2str(test.key);
+ if (std::find(InvalidSizes.begin(), InvalidSizes.end(), (key.size() * 8)) !=
+ InvalidSizes.end())
+ continue;
+ const string nonce = hex2str(test.nonce);
+ const string plaintext = hex2str(test.plaintext);
+ const string ciphertext = hex2str(test.ciphertext);
+ CheckAesCtrTestVector(key, nonce, plaintext, ciphertext);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCtrIncompatiblePaddingMode
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint rejects use of CTR mode with PKCS7 padding in the correct way.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesCtrIncompatiblePaddingMode) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CTR)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CTR).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCtrInvalidCallerNonce
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint fails correctly when the user supplies an incorrect-size nonce.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesCtrInvalidCallerNonce) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CTR)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CALLER_NONCE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CTR)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, AidlBuf(string(1, 'a')));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_NONCE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+
+ params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CTR)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, AidlBuf(string(15, 'a')));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_NONCE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+
+ params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CTR)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, AidlBuf(string(17, 'a')));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_NONCE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCtrInvalidCallerNonce
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint fails correctly when the user supplies an incorrect-size nonce.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesCbcRoundTripSuccess) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ // Two-block message.
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
+ vector<uint8_t> iv1 = CopyIv(out_params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext1.size());
+
+ out_params.Clear();
+
+ string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
+ vector<uint8_t> iv2 = CopyIv(out_params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext2.size());
+
+ // IVs should be random, so ciphertexts should differ.
+ EXPECT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
+
+ params.push_back(TAG_NONCE, iv1);
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCallerNonce
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES caller-provided nonces work correctly.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesCallerNonce) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CALLER_NONCE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+
+ // Don't specify nonce, should get a random one.
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext.size());
+ EXPECT_EQ(16U, out_params.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE).value().size());
+
+ params.push_back(TAG_NONCE, out_params.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE).value());
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+
+ // Now specify a nonce, should also work.
+ params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, AidlBuf("abcdefghijklmnop"));
+ out_params.Clear();
+ ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
+
+ // Decrypt with correct nonce.
+ plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+
+ // Try with wrong nonce.
+ params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, AidlBuf("aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"));
+ plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
+ EXPECT_NE(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCallerNonceProhibited
+ *
+ * Verifies that caller-provided nonces are not permitted when not specified in the key
+ * authorizations.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesCallerNonceProhibited) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+
+ // Don't specify nonce, should get a random one.
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext.size());
+ EXPECT_EQ(16U, out_params.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE).value().size());
+
+ params.push_back(TAG_NONCE, out_params.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE).value());
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+
+ // Now specify a nonce, should fail
+ params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, AidlBuf("abcdefghijklmnop"));
+ out_params.Clear();
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params, &out_params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmRoundTripSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES GCM mode works.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmRoundTripSuccess) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+
+ string aad = "foobar";
+ string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
+
+ auto begin_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+
+ auto update_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, aad.data(), aad.size());
+
+ // Encrypt
+ AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params))
+ << "Begin encrypt";
+ string ciphertext;
+ AuthorizationSet update_out_params;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(update_params, message, "", &update_out_params, &ciphertext));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ciphertext.length(), message.length() + 16);
+
+ // Grab nonce
+ begin_params.push_back(begin_out_params);
+
+ // Decrypt.
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, begin_params)) << "Begin decrypt";
+ string plaintext;
+ int32_t input_consumed;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Update(update_params, ciphertext, &update_out_params, &plaintext, &input_consumed));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext.size(), input_consumed);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish("", &plaintext));
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.length(), plaintext.length());
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmRoundTripWithDelaySuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES GCM mode works, even when there's a long delay
+ * between operations.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmRoundTripWithDelaySuccess) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+
+ string aad = "foobar";
+ string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
+
+ auto begin_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+
+ auto update_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, aad.data(), aad.size());
+
+ // Encrypt
+ AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params))
+ << "Begin encrypt";
+ string ciphertext;
+ AuthorizationSet update_out_params;
+ sleep(5);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(update_params, message, "", &update_out_params, &ciphertext));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ciphertext.length(), message.length() + 16);
+
+ // Grab nonce
+ begin_params.push_back(begin_out_params);
+
+ // Decrypt.
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, begin_params)) << "Begin decrypt";
+ string plaintext;
+ int32_t input_consumed;
+ sleep(5);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Update(update_params, ciphertext, &update_out_params, &plaintext, &input_consumed));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext.size(), input_consumed);
+ sleep(5);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish("", &plaintext));
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.length(), plaintext.length());
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmDifferentNonces
+ *
+ * Verifies that encrypting the same data with different nonces produces different outputs.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmDifferentNonces) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CALLER_NONCE)));
+
+ string aad = "foobar";
+ string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
+ string nonce1 = "000000000000";
+ string nonce2 = "111111111111";
+ string nonce3 = "222222222222";
+
+ string ciphertext1 =
+ EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::GCM, PaddingMode::NONE, 128, AidlBuf(nonce1));
+ string ciphertext2 =
+ EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::GCM, PaddingMode::NONE, 128, AidlBuf(nonce2));
+ string ciphertext3 =
+ EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::GCM, PaddingMode::NONE, 128, AidlBuf(nonce3));
+
+ ASSERT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
+ ASSERT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext3);
+ ASSERT_NE(ciphertext2, ciphertext3);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmTooShortTag
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES GCM mode fails correctly when a too-short tag length is specified.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmTooShortTag) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+ string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 96);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_MAC_LENGTH, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmTooShortTagOnDecrypt
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES GCM mode fails correctly when a too-short tag is provided to decryption.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmTooShortTagOnDecrypt) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+ string aad = "foobar";
+ string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+
+ auto finish_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, aad.data(), aad.size());
+
+ // Encrypt
+ AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params, &begin_out_params));
+ EXPECT_EQ(1U, begin_out_params.size());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(begin_out_params.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE).isOk());
+
+ AuthorizationSet finish_out_params;
+ string ciphertext;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Finish(finish_params, message, "" /* signature */, &finish_out_params, &ciphertext));
+
+ params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorizations(begin_out_params)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 96);
+
+ // Decrypt.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_MAC_LENGTH, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmCorruptKey
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES GCM mode fails correctly when the decryption key is incorrect.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmCorruptKey) {
+ const uint8_t nonce_bytes[] = {
+ 0xb7, 0x94, 0x37, 0xae, 0x08, 0xff, 0x35, 0x5d, 0x7d, 0x8a, 0x4d, 0x0f,
+ };
+ string nonce = make_string(nonce_bytes);
+ const uint8_t ciphertext_bytes[] = {
+ 0xb3, 0xf6, 0x79, 0x9e, 0x8f, 0x93, 0x26, 0xf2, 0xdf, 0x1e, 0x80, 0xfc,
+ 0xd2, 0xcb, 0x16, 0xd7, 0x8c, 0x9d, 0xc7, 0xcc, 0x14, 0xbb, 0x67, 0x78,
+ 0x62, 0xdc, 0x6c, 0x63, 0x9b, 0x3a, 0x63, 0x38, 0xd2, 0x4b, 0x31, 0x2d,
+ 0x39, 0x89, 0xe5, 0x92, 0x0b, 0x5d, 0xbf, 0xc9, 0x76, 0x76, 0x5e, 0xfb,
+ 0xfe, 0x57, 0xbb, 0x38, 0x59, 0x40, 0xa7, 0xa4, 0x3b, 0xdf, 0x05, 0xbd,
+ 0xda, 0xe3, 0xc9, 0xd6, 0xa2, 0xfb, 0xbd, 0xfc, 0xc0, 0xcb, 0xa0,
+ };
+ string ciphertext = make_string(ciphertext_bytes);
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, nonce.data(), nonce.size());
+
+ auto import_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CALLER_NONCE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+
+ // Import correct key and decrypt
+ const uint8_t key_bytes[] = {
+ 0xba, 0x76, 0x35, 0x4f, 0x0a, 0xed, 0x6e, 0x8d,
+ 0x91, 0xf4, 0x5c, 0x4f, 0xf5, 0xa0, 0x62, 0xdb,
+ };
+ string key = make_string(key_bytes);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(import_params, KeyFormat::RAW, key));
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+
+ // Corrupt key and attempt to decrypt
+ key[0] = 0;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(import_params, KeyFormat::RAW, key));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(ciphertext, &plaintext));
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmAadNoData
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES GCM mode works when provided additional authenticated data, but no data to
+ * encrypt.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmAadNoData) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+
+ string aad = "1234567890123456";
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+
+ auto finish_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, aad.data(), aad.size());
+
+ // Encrypt
+ AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params, &begin_out_params));
+ string ciphertext;
+ AuthorizationSet finish_out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(finish_params, "" /* input */, "" /* signature */,
+ &finish_out_params, &ciphertext));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(finish_out_params.empty());
+
+ // Grab nonce
+ params.push_back(begin_out_params);
+
+ // Decrypt.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
+ string plaintext;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(finish_params, ciphertext, "" /* signature */,
+ &finish_out_params, &plaintext));
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(finish_out_params.empty());
+
+ EXPECT_EQ("", plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmMultiPartAad
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES GCM mode works when provided additional authenticated data in multiple
+ * chunks.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmMultiPartAad) {
+ const size_t tag_bits = 128;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+
+ string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
+ auto begin_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, tag_bits);
+ AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
+
+ auto update_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, "foo", (size_t)3);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params));
+
+ // No data, AAD only.
+ string ciphertext;
+ int32_t input_consumed;
+ AuthorizationSet update_out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(update_params, "" /* input */, &update_out_params, &ciphertext,
+ &input_consumed));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, input_consumed);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, ciphertext.size());
+ EXPECT_TRUE(update_out_params.empty());
+
+ // AAD and data.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Update(update_params, message, &update_out_params, &ciphertext, &input_consumed));
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), input_consumed);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(update_out_params.empty());
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish("" /* input */, &ciphertext));
+ // Expect 128-bit (16-byte) tag appended to ciphertext.
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size() + (tag_bits >> 3), ciphertext.size());
+
+ // Grab nonce.
+ begin_params.push_back(begin_out_params);
+
+ // Decrypt
+ update_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, "foofoo", (size_t)6);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, begin_params));
+ string plaintext;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(update_params, ciphertext, "" /* signature */,
+ &update_out_params, &plaintext));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(update_out_params.empty());
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmAadOutOfOrder
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES GCM mode fails correctly when given AAD after data to encipher.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmAadOutOfOrder) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+
+ string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
+ auto begin_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+ AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
+
+ auto update_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, "foo", (size_t)3);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params));
+
+ // No data, AAD only.
+ string ciphertext;
+ int32_t input_consumed;
+ AuthorizationSet update_out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(update_params, "" /* input */, &update_out_params, &ciphertext,
+ &input_consumed));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, input_consumed);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, ciphertext.size());
+ EXPECT_TRUE(update_out_params.empty());
+
+ // AAD and data.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Update(update_params, message, &update_out_params, &ciphertext, &input_consumed));
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), input_consumed);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(update_out_params.empty());
+
+ // More AAD
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG,
+ Update(update_params, "", &update_out_params, &ciphertext, &input_consumed));
+
+ op_.clear();
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmBadAad
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES GCM decryption fails correctly when additional authenticated date is wrong.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmBadAad) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+ auto begin_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+
+ auto finish_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, "foobar", (size_t)6);
+
+ // Encrypt
+ AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params));
+ string ciphertext;
+ AuthorizationSet finish_out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Finish(finish_params, message, "" /* signature */, &finish_out_params, &ciphertext));
+
+ // Grab nonce
+ begin_params.push_back(begin_out_params);
+
+ finish_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA,
+ "barfoo" /* Wrong AAD */, (size_t)6);
+
+ // Decrypt.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params));
+ string plaintext;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(finish_params, ciphertext, "" /* signature */,
+ &finish_out_params, &plaintext));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmWrongNonce
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES GCM decryption fails correctly when the nonce is incorrect.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmWrongNonce) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+ auto begin_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+
+ auto finish_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, "foobar", (size_t)6);
+
+ // Encrypt
+ AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params));
+ string ciphertext;
+ AuthorizationSet finish_out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Finish(finish_params, message, "" /* signature */, &finish_out_params, &ciphertext));
+
+ // Wrong nonce
+ begin_params.push_back(TAG_NONCE, AidlBuf("123456789012"));
+
+ // Decrypt.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params));
+ string plaintext;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(finish_params, ciphertext, "" /* signature */,
+ &finish_out_params, &plaintext));
+
+ // With wrong nonce, should have gotten garbage plaintext (or none).
+ EXPECT_NE(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmCorruptTag
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES GCM decryption fails correctly when the tag is wrong.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmCorruptTag) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+
+ string aad = "1234567890123456";
+ string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+
+ auto finish_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, aad.data(), aad.size());
+
+ // Encrypt
+ AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params, &begin_out_params));
+ string ciphertext;
+ AuthorizationSet finish_out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Finish(finish_params, message, "" /* signature */, &finish_out_params, &ciphertext));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(finish_out_params.empty());
+
+ // Corrupt tag
+ ++(*ciphertext.rbegin());
+
+ // Grab nonce
+ params.push_back(begin_out_params);
+
+ // Decrypt.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
+ string plaintext;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(finish_params, ciphertext, "" /* signature */,
+ &finish_out_params, &plaintext));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(finish_out_params.empty());
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesEcbRoundTripSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that 3DES is basically functional.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesEcbRoundTripSuccess) {
+ auto auths = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(auths));
+ // Two-block message.
+ string message = "1234567890123456";
+ auto inParams = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, inParams);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext1.size());
+
+ string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(string(message), inParams);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext2.size());
+
+ // ECB is deterministic.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
+
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, inParams);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesEcbNotAuthorized
+ *
+ * Verifies that CBC keys reject ECB usage.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesEcbNotAuthorized) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ auto inParams = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, inParams));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesEcbPkcs7Padding
+ *
+ * Tests ECB mode with PKCS#7 padding, various message sizes.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesEcbPkcs7Padding) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
+ string message(i, 'a');
+ auto inParams =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, inParams);
+ EXPECT_EQ(i + 8 - (i % 8), ciphertext.size());
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, inParams);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesEcbNoPaddingKeyWithPkcs7Padding
+ *
+ * Verifies that keys configured for no padding reject PKCS7 padding
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesEcbNoPaddingKeyWithPkcs7Padding) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
+ auto inParams =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, inParams));
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesEcbPkcs7PaddingCorrupted
+ *
+ * Verifies that corrupted padding is detected.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesEcbPkcs7PaddingCorrupted) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
+
+ string message = "a";
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::ECB, PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+ EXPECT_EQ(8U, ciphertext.size());
+ EXPECT_NE(ciphertext, message);
+ ++ciphertext[ciphertext.size() / 2];
+
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder begin_params;
+ begin_params.push_back(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB);
+ begin_params.push_back(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, begin_params));
+ string plaintext;
+ int32_t input_consumed;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(ciphertext, &plaintext, &input_consumed));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext.size(), input_consumed);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT, Finish(&plaintext));
+}
+
+struct TripleDesTestVector {
+ const char* name;
+ const KeyPurpose purpose;
+ const BlockMode block_mode;
+ const PaddingMode padding_mode;
+ const char* key;
+ const char* iv;
+ const char* input;
+ const char* output;
+};
+
+// These test vectors are from NIST CAVP, plus a few custom variants to test padding, since all
+// of the NIST vectors are multiples of the block size.
+static const TripleDesTestVector kTripleDesTestVectors[] = {
+ {
+ "TECBMMT3 Encrypt 0", KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, BlockMode::ECB, PaddingMode::NONE,
+ "a2b5bc67da13dc92cd9d344aa238544a0e1fa79ef76810cd", // key
+ "", // IV
+ "329d86bdf1bc5af4", // input
+ "d946c2756d78633f", // output
+ },
+ {
+ "TECBMMT3 Encrypt 1", KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, BlockMode::ECB, PaddingMode::NONE,
+ "49e692290d2a5e46bace79b9648a4c5d491004c262dc9d49", // key
+ "", // IV
+ "6b1540781b01ce1997adae102dbf3c5b", // input
+ "4d0dc182d6e481ac4a3dc6ab6976ccae", // output
+ },
+ {
+ "TECBMMT3 Decrypt 0", KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, BlockMode::ECB, PaddingMode::NONE,
+ "52daec2ac7dc1958377392682f37860b2cc1ea2304bab0e9", // key
+ "", // IV
+ "6daad94ce08acfe7", // input
+ "660e7d32dcc90e79", // output
+ },
+ {
+ "TECBMMT3 Decrypt 1", KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, BlockMode::ECB, PaddingMode::NONE,
+ "7f8fe3d3f4a48394fb682c2919926d6ddfce8932529229ce", // key
+ "", // IV
+ "e9653a0a1f05d31b9acd12d73aa9879d", // input
+ "9b2ae9d998efe62f1b592e7e1df8ff38", // output
+ },
+ {
+ "TCBCMMT3 Encrypt 0", KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE,
+ "b5cb1504802326c73df186e3e352a20de643b0d63ee30e37", // key
+ "43f791134c5647ba", // IV
+ "dcc153cef81d6f24", // input
+ "92538bd8af18d3ba", // output
+ },
+ {
+ "TCBCMMT3 Encrypt 1", KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE,
+ "a49d7564199e97cb529d2c9d97bf2f98d35edf57ba1f7358", // key
+ "c2e999cb6249023c", // IV
+ "c689aee38a301bb316da75db36f110b5", // input
+ "e9afaba5ec75ea1bbe65506655bb4ecb", // output
+ },
+ {
+ "TCBCMMT3 Encrypt 1 PKCS7 variant", KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, BlockMode::CBC,
+ PaddingMode::PKCS7,
+ "a49d7564199e97cb529d2c9d97bf2f98d35edf57ba1f7358", // key
+ "c2e999cb6249023c", // IV
+ "c689aee38a301bb316da75db36f110b500", // input
+ "e9afaba5ec75ea1bbe65506655bb4ecb825aa27ec0656156", // output
+ },
+ {
+ "TCBCMMT3 Encrypt 1 PKCS7 decrypted", KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, BlockMode::CBC,
+ PaddingMode::PKCS7,
+ "a49d7564199e97cb529d2c9d97bf2f98d35edf57ba1f7358", // key
+ "c2e999cb6249023c", // IV
+ "e9afaba5ec75ea1bbe65506655bb4ecb825aa27ec0656156", // input
+ "c689aee38a301bb316da75db36f110b500", // output
+ },
+ {
+ "TCBCMMT3 Decrypt 0", KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE,
+ "5eb6040d46082c7aa7d06dfd08dfeac8c18364c1548c3ba1", // key
+ "41746c7e442d3681", // IV
+ "c53a7b0ec40600fe", // input
+ "d4f00eb455de1034", // output
+ },
+ {
+ "TCBCMMT3 Decrypt 1", KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE,
+ "5b1cce7c0dc1ec49130dfb4af45785ab9179e567f2c7d549", // key
+ "3982bc02c3727d45", // IV
+ "6006f10adef52991fcc777a1238bbb65", // input
+ "edae09288e9e3bc05746d872b48e3b29", // output
+ },
+};
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesTestVector
+ *
+ * Verifies that NIST (plus a few extra) test vectors produce the correct results.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesTestVector) {
+ constexpr size_t num_tests = sizeof(kTripleDesTestVectors) / sizeof(TripleDesTestVector);
+ for (auto* test = kTripleDesTestVectors; test < kTripleDesTestVectors + num_tests; ++test) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(test->name);
+ CheckTripleDesTestVector(test->purpose, test->block_mode, test->padding_mode,
+ hex2str(test->key), hex2str(test->iv), hex2str(test->input),
+ hex2str(test->output));
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesCbcRoundTripSuccess
+ *
+ * Validates CBC mode functionality.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcRoundTripSuccess) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob_.size(), 0U);
+
+ // Two-block message.
+ string message = "1234567890123456";
+ vector<uint8_t> iv1;
+ string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, &iv1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext1.size());
+
+ vector<uint8_t> iv2;
+ string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, &iv2);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext2.size());
+
+ // IVs should be random, so ciphertexts should differ.
+ EXPECT_NE(iv1, iv2);
+ EXPECT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
+
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, iv1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesCallerIv
+ *
+ * Validates that 3DES keys can allow caller-specified IVs, and use them correctly.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCallerIv) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CALLER_NONCE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ string message = "1234567890123456";
+ vector<uint8_t> iv;
+ // Don't specify IV, should get a random one.
+ string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, &iv);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext1.size());
+ EXPECT_EQ(8U, iv.size());
+
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, iv);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+
+ // Now specify an IV, should also work.
+ iv = AidlBuf("abcdefgh");
+ string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, iv);
+
+ // Decrypt with correct IV.
+ plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext2, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, iv);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+
+ // Now try with wrong IV.
+ plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext2, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, AidlBuf("aaaaaaaa"));
+ EXPECT_NE(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCallerNonceProhibited.
+ *
+ * Verifies that 3DES keys without TAG_CALLER_NONCE do not allow caller-specified IVS.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCallerNonceProhibited) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+ vector<uint8_t> iv;
+ // Don't specify nonce, should get a random one.
+ string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, &iv);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext1.size());
+ EXPECT_EQ(8U, iv.size());
+
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, iv);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+
+ // Now specify a nonce, should fail.
+ auto input_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, AidlBuf("abcdefgh"))
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ AuthorizationSet output_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, input_params, &output_params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesCbcNotAuthorized
+ *
+ * Verifies that 3DES ECB-only keys do not allow CBC usage.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcNotAuthorized) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ // Two-block message.
+ string message = "1234567890123456";
+ auto begin_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesCbcNoPaddingWrongInputSize
+ *
+ * Verifies that unpadded CBC operations reject inputs that are not a multiple of block size.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcNoPaddingWrongInputSize) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ // Message is slightly shorter than two blocks.
+ string message = "123456789012345";
+
+ auto begin_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ AuthorizationSet output_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &output_params));
+ string ciphertext;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, "", &ciphertext));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcPkcs7Padding.
+ *
+ * Verifies that PKCS7 padding works correctly in CBC mode.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcPkcs7Padding) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
+
+ // Try various message lengths; all should work.
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
+ string message(i, 'a');
+ vector<uint8_t> iv;
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::PKCS7, &iv);
+ EXPECT_EQ(i + 8 - (i % 8), ciphertext.size());
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::PKCS7, iv);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesCbcNoPaddingKeyWithPkcs7Padding
+ *
+ * Verifies that a key that requires PKCS7 padding cannot be used in unpadded mode.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcNoPaddingKeyWithPkcs7Padding) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ // Try various message lengths; all should fail.
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
+ auto begin_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params));
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesCbcPkcs7PaddingCorrupted
+ *
+ * Verifies that corrupted PKCS7 padding is rejected during decryption.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcPkcs7PaddingCorrupted) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
+
+ string message = "a";
+ vector<uint8_t> iv;
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::PKCS7, &iv);
+ EXPECT_EQ(8U, ciphertext.size());
+ EXPECT_NE(ciphertext, message);
+ ++ciphertext[ciphertext.size() / 2];
+
+ auto begin_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, iv);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, begin_params));
+ string plaintext;
+ int32_t input_consumed;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(ciphertext, &plaintext, &input_consumed));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext.size(), input_consumed);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT, Finish(&plaintext));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcIncrementalNoPadding.
+ *
+ * Verifies that 3DES CBC works with many different input sizes.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcIncrementalNoPadding) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ int increment = 7;
+ string message(240, 'a');
+ AuthorizationSet input_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ AuthorizationSet output_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, input_params, &output_params));
+
+ string ciphertext;
+ int32_t input_consumed;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < message.size(); i += increment)
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Update(message.substr(i, increment), &ciphertext, &input_consumed));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(&ciphertext));
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext.size());
+
+ // Move TAG_NONCE into input_params
+ input_params = output_params;
+ input_params.push_back(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CBC);
+ input_params.push_back(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::NONE);
+ output_params.Clear();
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, input_params, &output_params));
+ string plaintext;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < ciphertext.size(); i += increment)
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ Update(ciphertext.substr(i, increment), &plaintext, &input_consumed));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(&plaintext));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext.size(), plaintext.size());
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(EncryptionOperationsTest);
+
+typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase MaxOperationsTest;
+
+/*
+ * MaxOperationsTest.TestLimitAes
+ *
+ * Verifies that the max uses per boot tag works correctly with AES keys.
+ */
+TEST_P(MaxOperationsTest, TestLimitAes) {
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .EcbMode()
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAX_USES_PER_BOOT, 3)));
+
+ string message = "1234567890123456";
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().EcbMode().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+
+ EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EncryptMessage(message, params);
+
+ // Fourth time should fail.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::KEY_MAX_OPS_EXCEEDED, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * MaxOperationsTest.TestLimitAes
+ *
+ * Verifies that the max uses per boot tag works correctly with RSA keys.
+ */
+TEST_P(MaxOperationsTest, TestLimitRsa) {
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaSigningKey(1024, 65537)
+ .NoDigestOrPadding()
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAX_USES_PER_BOOT, 3)));
+
+ string message = "1234567890123456";
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().NoDigestOrPadding();
+
+ SignMessage(message, params);
+ SignMessage(message, params);
+ SignMessage(message, params);
+
+ // Fourth time should fail.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::KEY_MAX_OPS_EXCEEDED, Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, params));
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(MaxOperationsTest);
+
+typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase AddEntropyTest;
+
+/*
+ * AddEntropyTest.AddEntropy
+ *
+ * Verifies that the addRngEntropy method doesn't blow up. There's no way to test that entropy
+ * is actually added.
+ */
+TEST_P(AddEntropyTest, AddEntropy) {
+ string data = "foo";
+ EXPECT_TRUE(keyMint().addRngEntropy(vector<uint8_t>(data.begin(), data.end())).isOk());
+}
+
+/*
+ * AddEntropyTest.AddEmptyEntropy
+ *
+ * Verifies that the addRngEntropy method doesn't blow up when given an empty buffer.
+ */
+TEST_P(AddEntropyTest, AddEmptyEntropy) {
+ EXPECT_TRUE(keyMint().addRngEntropy(AidlBuf()).isOk());
+}
+
+/*
+ * AddEntropyTest.AddLargeEntropy
+ *
+ * Verifies that the addRngEntropy method doesn't blow up when given a largish amount of data.
+ */
+TEST_P(AddEntropyTest, AddLargeEntropy) {
+ EXPECT_TRUE(keyMint().addRngEntropy(AidlBuf(string(2 * 1024, 'a'))).isOk());
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(AddEntropyTest);
+
+typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase AttestationTest;
+
+/*
+ * AttestationTest.RsaAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that attesting to RSA keys works and generates the expected output.
+ */
+// TODO(seleneh) add attestation tests back after decided on the new attestation
+// behavior under generateKey and importKey
+
+typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase KeyDeletionTest;
+
+/**
+ * KeyDeletionTest.DeleteKey
+ *
+ * This test checks that if rollback protection is implemented, DeleteKey invalidates a formerly
+ * valid key blob.
+ */
+TEST_P(KeyDeletionTest, DeleteKey) {
+ auto error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(error == ErrorCode::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE || error == ErrorCode::OK);
+
+ // Delete must work if rollback protection is implemented
+ if (error == ErrorCode::OK) {
+ AuthorizationSet hardwareEnforced(key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(hardwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, DeleteKey(true /* keep key blob */));
+
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+ AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
+ &begin_out_params));
+ AbortIfNeeded();
+ key_blob_ = AidlBuf();
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * KeyDeletionTest.DeleteInvalidKey
+ *
+ * This test checks that the HAL excepts invalid key blobs..
+ */
+TEST_P(KeyDeletionTest, DeleteInvalidKey) {
+ // Generate key just to check if rollback protection is implemented
+ auto error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(error == ErrorCode::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE || error == ErrorCode::OK);
+
+ // Delete must work if rollback protection is implemented
+ if (error == ErrorCode::OK) {
+ AuthorizationSet hardwareEnforced(key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(hardwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE));
+
+ // Delete the key we don't care about the result at this point.
+ DeleteKey();
+
+ // Now create an invalid key blob and delete it.
+ key_blob_ = AidlBuf("just some garbage data which is not a valid key blob");
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, DeleteKey());
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * KeyDeletionTest.DeleteAllKeys
+ *
+ * This test is disarmed by default. To arm it use --arm_deleteAllKeys.
+ *
+ * BEWARE: This test has serious side effects. All user keys will be lost! This includes
+ * FBE/FDE encryption keys, which means that the device will not even boot until after the
+ * device has been wiped manually (e.g., fastboot flashall -w), and new FBE/FDE keys have
+ * been provisioned. Use this test only on dedicated testing devices that have no valuable
+ * credentials stored in Keystore/Keymint.
+ */
+TEST_P(KeyDeletionTest, DeleteAllKeys) {
+ if (!arm_deleteAllKeys) return;
+ auto error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(error == ErrorCode::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE || error == ErrorCode::OK);
+
+ // Delete must work if rollback protection is implemented
+ if (error == ErrorCode::OK) {
+ AuthorizationSet hardwareEnforced(key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(hardwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, DeleteAllKeys());
+
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+ AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
+ &begin_out_params));
+ AbortIfNeeded();
+ key_blob_ = AidlBuf();
+ }
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(KeyDeletionTest);
+
+using UpgradeKeyTest = KeyMintAidlTestBase;
+
+/*
+ * UpgradeKeyTest.UpgradeKey
+ *
+ * Verifies that calling upgrade key on an up-to-date key works (i.e. does nothing).
+ */
+TEST_P(UpgradeKeyTest, UpgradeKey) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)));
+
+ auto result = UpgradeKey(key_blob_);
+
+ // Key doesn't need upgrading. Should get okay, but no new key blob.
+ EXPECT_EQ(result, std::make_pair(ErrorCode::OK, vector<uint8_t>()));
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(UpgradeKeyTest);
+
+using ClearOperationsTest = KeyMintAidlTestBase;
+
+/*
+ * ClearSlotsTest.TooManyOperations
+ *
+ * Verifies that TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS is returned after the max number of
+ * operations are started without being finished or aborted. Also verifies
+ * that aborting the operations clears the operations.
+ *
+ */
+TEST_P(ClearOperationsTest, TooManyOperations) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ constexpr size_t max_operations = 100; // set to arbituary large number
+ sp<IKeyMintOperation> op_handles[max_operations];
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ ErrorCode result;
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < max_operations; i++) {
+ result = Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, key_blob_, params, &out_params, op_handles[i]);
+ if (ErrorCode::OK != result) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS, result);
+ // Try again just in case there's a weird overflow bug
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, key_blob_, params, &out_params));
+ for (size_t j = 0; j < i; j++) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Abort(op_handles[j]))
+ << "Aboort failed for i = " << j << std::endl;
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, key_blob_, params, &out_params));
+ AbortIfNeeded();
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(ClearOperationsTest);
+
+typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase TransportLimitTest;
+
+/*
+ * TransportLimitTest.FinishInput
+ *
+ * Verifies that passing input data to finish succeeds as expected.
+ */
+TEST_P(TransportLimitTest, LargeFinishInput) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+
+ for (int msg_size = 8 /* 256 bytes */; msg_size <= 11 /* 2 KiB */; msg_size++) {
+ auto cipher_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, cipher_params, &out_params));
+
+ string plain_message = std::string(1 << msg_size, 'x');
+ string encrypted_message;
+ auto rc = Finish(plain_message, &encrypted_message);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, rc);
+ EXPECT_EQ(plain_message.size(), encrypted_message.size())
+ << "Encrypt finish returned OK, but did not consume all of the given input";
+ cipher_params.push_back(out_params);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, cipher_params));
+
+ string decrypted_message;
+ rc = Finish(encrypted_message, &decrypted_message);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, rc);
+ EXPECT_EQ(plain_message.size(), decrypted_message.size())
+ << "Decrypt finish returned OK, did not consume all of the given input";
+ }
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(TransportLimitTest);
+
+} // namespace test
+} // namespace keymint
+} // namespace hardware
+} // namespace android
+
+int main(int argc, char** argv) {
+ ::testing::InitGoogleTest(&argc, argv);
+ for (int i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
+ if (argv[i][0] == '-') {
+ if (std::string(argv[i]) == "--arm_deleteAllKeys") {
+ arm_deleteAllKeys = true;
+ }
+ if (std::string(argv[i]) == "--dump_attestations") {
+ dump_Attestations = true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ int status = RUN_ALL_TESTS();
+ ALOGI("Test result = %d", status);
+ return status;
+}