diff --git a/audio/common/7.0/enums/include/android_audio_policy_configuration_V7_0-enums.h b/audio/common/7.0/enums/include/android_audio_policy_configuration_V7_0-enums.h
index 79243b6..a92a277 100644
--- a/audio/common/7.0/enums/include/android_audio_policy_configuration_V7_0-enums.h
+++ b/audio/common/7.0/enums/include/android_audio_policy_configuration_V7_0-enums.h
@@ -225,14 +225,6 @@
     return isTelephonyDevice(stringToAudioDevice(device));
 }
 
-static inline bool isEchoReferenceDevice(AudioDevice device) {
-    return device == AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_ECHO_REFERENCE;
-}
-
-static inline bool isEchoReferenceDevice(const std::string& device) {
-    return isEchoReferenceDevice(stringToAudioDevice(device));
-}
-
 static inline bool maybeVendorExtension(const std::string& s) {
     // Only checks whether the string starts with the "vendor prefix".
     static const std::string vendorPrefix = "VX_";
diff --git a/audio/common/all-versions/test/utility/Android.bp b/audio/common/all-versions/test/utility/Android.bp
index 1602d25..757f8a8 100644
--- a/audio/common/all-versions/test/utility/Android.bp
+++ b/audio/common/all-versions/test/utility/Android.bp
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
 
 cc_library_static {
     name: "android.hardware.audio.common.test.utility",
-    defaults : ["hidl_defaults"],
+    defaults: ["hidl_defaults"],
     srcs: ["src/ValidateXml.cpp"],
     cflags: [
         "-O0",
@@ -34,7 +34,34 @@
     ],
     local_include_dirs: ["include/utility"],
     export_include_dirs: ["include"],
-    shared_libs: ["libxml2", "liblog"],
+    shared_libs: [
+        "libxml2",
+        "liblog",
+    ],
     static_libs: ["libgtest"],
     export_static_lib_headers: ["libgtest"],
 }
+
+// Note: this isn't a VTS test, but rather a unit test
+// to verify correctness of test utilities.
+cc_test {
+    name: "android.hardware.audio.common.test.utility_tests",
+    host_supported: true,
+    local_include_dirs: ["include/utility"],
+    srcs: [
+        "src/ValidateXml.cpp",
+        "tests/utility_tests.cpp",
+    ],
+    cflags: [
+        "-Werror",
+        "-Wall",
+        "-g",
+    ],
+    shared_libs: [
+        "libbase",
+        "libxml2",
+        "liblog",
+    ],
+    static_libs: ["libgtest"],
+    test_suites: ["general-tests"],
+}
diff --git a/audio/common/all-versions/test/utility/TEST_MAPPING b/audio/common/all-versions/test/utility/TEST_MAPPING
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0bc1871
--- /dev/null
+++ b/audio/common/all-versions/test/utility/TEST_MAPPING
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+{
+  "presubmit": [
+    {
+      "name": "android.hardware.audio.common.test.utility_tests"
+    }
+  ]
+}
diff --git a/audio/common/all-versions/test/utility/src/ValidateXml.cpp b/audio/common/all-versions/test/utility/src/ValidateXml.cpp
index a866104..f111c01 100644
--- a/audio/common/all-versions/test/utility/src/ValidateXml.cpp
+++ b/audio/common/all-versions/test/utility/src/ValidateXml.cpp
@@ -112,7 +112,8 @@
         return ::testing::AssertionFailure() << "Failed to parse xml\n" << context();
     }
 
-    if (xmlXIncludeProcess(doc.get()) == -1) {
+    // Process 'include' directives w/o modifying elements loaded from included files.
+    if (xmlXIncludeProcessFlags(doc.get(), XML_PARSE_NOBASEFIX) == -1) {
         return ::testing::AssertionFailure() << "Failed to resolve xincludes in xml\n" << context();
     }
 
diff --git a/audio/common/all-versions/test/utility/tests/utility_tests.cpp b/audio/common/all-versions/test/utility/tests/utility_tests.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c523066
--- /dev/null
+++ b/audio/common/all-versions/test/utility/tests/utility_tests.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include <android-base/file.h>
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+
+#include <ValidateXml.h>
+
+using ::android::hardware::audio::common::test::utility::validateXml;
+
+const char* XSD_SOURCE =
+        "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?>"
+        "<xs:schema version=\"2.0\""
+        "           elementFormDefault=\"qualified\""
+        "           attributeFormDefault=\"unqualified\""
+        "           xmlns:xs=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema\">"
+        "  <xs:element name=\"audioPolicyConfiguration\">"
+        "    <xs:complexType>"
+        "      <xs:sequence>"
+        "        <xs:element name=\"modules\">"
+        "          <xs:complexType>"
+        "            <xs:sequence>"
+        "              <xs:element name=\"module\" maxOccurs=\"unbounded\">"
+        "                <xs:complexType>"
+        "                  <xs:attribute name=\"name\" type=\"xs:string\" use=\"required\"/>"
+        "                </xs:complexType>"
+        "              </xs:element>"
+        "            </xs:sequence>"
+        "          </xs:complexType>"
+        "        </xs:element>"
+        "      </xs:sequence>"
+        "    </xs:complexType>"
+        "  </xs:element>"
+        "</xs:schema>";
+
+const char* INVALID_XML_SOURCE =
+        "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\" standalone=\"yes\"?>"
+        "<audioPolicyKonfiguration />";
+
+const char* VALID_XML_SOURCE =
+        "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\" standalone=\"yes\"?>"
+        "<audioPolicyConfiguration>"
+        "  <modules>"
+        "    <module name=\"aaa\" />"
+        "    %s"
+        "  </modules>"
+        "</audioPolicyConfiguration>";
+
+const char* MODULE_SOURCE = "<module name=\"bbb\" />";
+
+const char* XI_INCLUDE = "<xi:include xmlns:xi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude\" href=\"%s\" />";
+
+const char* XML_INCLUDED_SOURCE = "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?>%s";
+
+namespace {
+
+std::string substitute(const char* fmt, const char* param) {
+    std::string buffer(static_cast<size_t>(strlen(fmt) + strlen(param)), '\0');
+    snprintf(buffer.data(), buffer.size(), fmt, param);
+    return buffer;
+}
+
+std::string substitute(const char* fmt, const std::string& s) {
+    return substitute(fmt, s.c_str());
+}
+
+}  // namespace
+
+TEST(ValidateXml, InvalidXml) {
+    TemporaryFile xml;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(android::base::WriteStringToFile(INVALID_XML_SOURCE, xml.path)) << strerror(errno);
+    TemporaryFile xsd;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(android::base::WriteStringToFile(XSD_SOURCE, xsd.path)) << strerror(errno);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(validateXml("xml", "xsd", xml.path, xsd.path));
+}
+
+TEST(ValidateXml, ValidXml) {
+    TemporaryFile xml;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(
+            android::base::WriteStringToFile(substitute(VALID_XML_SOURCE, MODULE_SOURCE), xml.path))
+            << strerror(errno);
+    TemporaryFile xsd;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(android::base::WriteStringToFile(XSD_SOURCE, xsd.path)) << strerror(errno);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(validateXml("xml", "xsd", xml.path, xsd.path));
+}
+
+TEST(ValidateXml, IncludeAbsolutePath) {
+    TemporaryFile xmlInclude;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(android::base::WriteStringToFile(substitute(XML_INCLUDED_SOURCE, MODULE_SOURCE),
+                                                 xmlInclude.path))
+            << strerror(errno);
+    TemporaryFile xml;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(android::base::WriteStringToFile(
+            substitute(VALID_XML_SOURCE, substitute(XI_INCLUDE, xmlInclude.path)), xml.path))
+            << strerror(errno);
+    TemporaryFile xsd;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(android::base::WriteStringToFile(XSD_SOURCE, xsd.path)) << strerror(errno);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(validateXml("xml", "xsd", xml.path, xsd.path));
+}
+
+TEST(ValidateXml, IncludeSameDirRelativePath) {
+    TemporaryFile xmlInclude;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(android::base::WriteStringToFile(substitute(XML_INCLUDED_SOURCE, MODULE_SOURCE),
+                                                 xmlInclude.path))
+            << strerror(errno);
+    TemporaryFile xml;
+    ASSERT_EQ(android::base::Dirname(xml.path), android::base::Dirname(xmlInclude.path));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(android::base::WriteStringToFile(
+            substitute(VALID_XML_SOURCE,
+                       substitute(XI_INCLUDE, android::base::Basename(xmlInclude.path))),
+            xml.path))
+            << strerror(errno);
+    TemporaryFile xsd;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(android::base::WriteStringToFile(XSD_SOURCE, xsd.path)) << strerror(errno);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(validateXml("xml", "xsd", xml.path, xsd.path));
+}
+
+TEST(ValidateXml, IncludeSubdirRelativePath) {
+    TemporaryDir xmlIncludeDir;
+    TemporaryFile xmlInclude(xmlIncludeDir.path);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(android::base::WriteStringToFile(substitute(XML_INCLUDED_SOURCE, MODULE_SOURCE),
+                                                 xmlInclude.path))
+            << strerror(errno);
+    TemporaryFile xml;
+    ASSERT_EQ(android::base::Dirname(xml.path), android::base::Dirname(xmlIncludeDir.path));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(android::base::WriteStringToFile(
+            substitute(VALID_XML_SOURCE,
+                       substitute(XI_INCLUDE, android::base::Basename(xmlIncludeDir.path) + "/" +
+                                                      android::base::Basename(xmlInclude.path))),
+            xml.path))
+            << strerror(errno);
+    TemporaryFile xsd;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(android::base::WriteStringToFile(XSD_SOURCE, xsd.path)) << strerror(errno);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(validateXml("xml", "xsd", xml.path, xsd.path));
+}
+
+TEST(ValidateXml, IncludeParentDirRelativePath) {
+    // An XML file from a subdirectory includes a file from the parent directory using '..' syntax.
+    TemporaryFile xmlInclude;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(android::base::WriteStringToFile(substitute(XML_INCLUDED_SOURCE, MODULE_SOURCE),
+                                                 xmlInclude.path))
+            << strerror(errno);
+    TemporaryDir xmlIncludeDir;
+    TemporaryFile xmlParentInclude(xmlIncludeDir.path);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(android::base::WriteStringToFile(
+            substitute(XML_INCLUDED_SOURCE,
+                       substitute(XI_INCLUDE, "../" + android::base::Basename(xmlInclude.path))),
+            xmlParentInclude.path))
+            << strerror(errno);
+    TemporaryFile xml;
+    ASSERT_EQ(android::base::Dirname(xml.path), android::base::Dirname(xmlInclude.path));
+    ASSERT_EQ(android::base::Dirname(xml.path), android::base::Dirname(xmlIncludeDir.path));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(android::base::WriteStringToFile(
+            substitute(
+                    VALID_XML_SOURCE,
+                    substitute(XI_INCLUDE, android::base::Basename(xmlIncludeDir.path) + "/" +
+                                                   android::base::Basename(xmlParentInclude.path))),
+            xml.path))
+            << strerror(errno);
+    TemporaryFile xsd;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(android::base::WriteStringToFile(XSD_SOURCE, xsd.path)) << strerror(errno);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(validateXml("xml", "xsd", xml.path, xsd.path));
+}
diff --git a/audio/core/all-versions/vts/functional/7.0/AudioPrimaryHidlHalTest.cpp b/audio/core/all-versions/vts/functional/7.0/AudioPrimaryHidlHalTest.cpp
index 79ac295..0b3098b 100644
--- a/audio/core/all-versions/vts/functional/7.0/AudioPrimaryHidlHalTest.cpp
+++ b/audio/core/all-versions/vts/functional/7.0/AudioPrimaryHidlHalTest.cpp
@@ -710,8 +710,7 @@
         // Returning 'true' when no source is found so the test can fail later with a more clear
         // problem description.
         return !maybeSourceAddress.has_value() ||
-               !(xsd::isTelephonyDevice(maybeSourceAddress.value().deviceType) ||
-                 xsd::isEchoReferenceDevice(maybeSourceAddress.value().deviceType));
+               !xsd::isTelephonyDevice(maybeSourceAddress.value().deviceType);
     }
 
     void createPatchIfNeeded() {
diff --git a/biometrics/face/aidl/default/Session.cpp b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/Session.cpp
index d980c5f..0cb7c95 100644
--- a/biometrics/face/aidl/default/Session.cpp
+++ b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/Session.cpp
@@ -34,12 +34,15 @@
     }
 };
 
-Session::Session(std::shared_ptr<ISessionCallback> cb) : cb_(std::move(cb)) {}
+Session::Session(std::shared_ptr<ISessionCallback> cb)
+    : cb_(std::move(cb)), mRandom(std::mt19937::default_seed) {}
 
 ndk::ScopedAStatus Session::generateChallenge() {
     LOG(INFO) << "generateChallenge";
     if (cb_) {
-        cb_->onChallengeGenerated(0);
+        std::uniform_int_distribution<int64_t> dist;
+        auto challenge = dist(mRandom);
+        cb_->onChallengeGenerated(challenge);
     }
     return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
 }
@@ -63,6 +66,9 @@
         const std::vector<Feature>& /*features*/, const NativeHandle& /*previewSurface*/,
         std::shared_ptr<biometrics::common::ICancellationSignal>* /*return_val*/) {
     LOG(INFO) << "enroll";
+    if (cb_) {
+        cb_->onError(Error::UNABLE_TO_PROCESS, 0 /* vendorError */);
+    }
     return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
 }
 
@@ -100,6 +106,9 @@
 
 ndk::ScopedAStatus Session::getFeatures() {
     LOG(INFO) << "getFeatures";
+    if (cb_) {
+        cb_->onFeaturesRetrieved({});
+    }
     return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
 }
 
@@ -119,6 +128,9 @@
 
 ndk::ScopedAStatus Session::invalidateAuthenticatorId() {
     LOG(INFO) << "invalidateAuthenticatorId";
+    if (cb_) {
+        cb_->onAuthenticatorIdInvalidated(0);
+    }
     return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
 }
 
diff --git a/biometrics/face/aidl/default/Session.h b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/Session.h
index caf81f8..4d213e3 100644
--- a/biometrics/face/aidl/default/Session.h
+++ b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/Session.h
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
 
 #pragma once
 
+#include <random>
+
 #include <aidl/android/hardware/biometrics/face/BnSession.h>
 #include <aidl/android/hardware/biometrics/face/ISessionCallback.h>
 
@@ -68,6 +70,7 @@
 
   private:
     std::shared_ptr<ISessionCallback> cb_;
+    std::mt19937 mRandom;
 };
 
 }  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::biometrics::face
diff --git a/biometrics/face/aidl/vts/VtsHalBiometricsFaceTargetTest.cpp b/biometrics/face/aidl/vts/VtsHalBiometricsFaceTargetTest.cpp
index 47a7813..4dc44f1 100644
--- a/biometrics/face/aidl/vts/VtsHalBiometricsFaceTargetTest.cpp
+++ b/biometrics/face/aidl/vts/VtsHalBiometricsFaceTargetTest.cpp
@@ -29,16 +29,26 @@
 
 using namespace std::literals::chrono_literals;
 
+using aidl::android::hardware::common::NativeHandle;
+
 constexpr int kSensorId = 0;
 constexpr int kUserId = 0;
 
 class SessionCallback : public BnSessionCallback {
   public:
-    ndk::ScopedAStatus onChallengeGenerated(int64_t /*challenge*/) override {
+    ndk::ScopedAStatus onChallengeGenerated(int64_t challenge) override {
+        auto lock = std::lock_guard{mMutex};
+        mOnChallengeGeneratedInvoked = true;
+        mGeneratedChallenge = challenge;
+        mCv.notify_one();
         return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
     }
 
-    ndk::ScopedAStatus onChallengeRevoked(int64_t /*challenge*/) override {
+    ndk::ScopedAStatus onChallengeRevoked(int64_t challenge) override {
+        auto lock = std::lock_guard{mMutex};
+        mOnChallengeRevokedInvoked = true;
+        mRevokedChallenge = challenge;
+        mCv.notify_one();
         return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
     }
 
@@ -50,10 +60,9 @@
         return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
     }
 
-    ndk::ScopedAStatus onError(Error error, int32_t vendorCode) override {
+    ndk::ScopedAStatus onError(Error error, int32_t /*vendorCode*/) override {
         auto lock = std::lock_guard<std::mutex>{mMutex};
         mError = error;
-        mVendorCode = vendorCode;
         mOnErrorInvoked = true;
         mCv.notify_one();
         return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
@@ -83,15 +92,24 @@
 
     ndk::ScopedAStatus onEnrollmentsEnumerated(
             const std::vector<int32_t>& /*enrollmentIds*/) override {
+        auto lock = std::lock_guard{mMutex};
+        mOnEnrollmentsEnumeratedInvoked = true;
+        mCv.notify_one();
         return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
     }
 
     ndk::ScopedAStatus onEnrollmentsRemoved(
             const std::vector<int32_t>& /*enrollmentIds*/) override {
+        auto lock = std::lock_guard{mMutex};
+        mOnEnrollmentsRemovedInvoked = true;
+        mCv.notify_one();
         return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
     }
 
     ndk::ScopedAStatus onFeaturesRetrieved(const std::vector<Feature>& /*features*/) override {
+        auto lock = std::lock_guard{mMutex};
+        mOnFeaturesRetrievedInvoked = true;
+        mCv.notify_one();
         return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
     }
 
@@ -100,10 +118,16 @@
     }
 
     ndk::ScopedAStatus onAuthenticatorIdRetrieved(int64_t /*authenticatorId*/) override {
+        auto lock = std::lock_guard{mMutex};
+        mOnAuthenticatorIdRetrievedInvoked = true;
+        mCv.notify_one();
         return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
     }
 
     ndk::ScopedAStatus onAuthenticatorIdInvalidated(int64_t /*newAuthenticatorId*/) override {
+        auto lock = std::lock_guard{mMutex};
+        mOnAuthenticatorIdInvalidatedInvoked = true;
+        mCv.notify_one();
         return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
     }
 
@@ -117,46 +141,177 @@
     std::mutex mMutex;
     std::condition_variable mCv;
     Error mError = Error::UNKNOWN;
-    int32_t mVendorCode = 0;
+    int64_t mGeneratedChallenge = 0;
+    int64_t mRevokedChallenge = 0;
+    bool mOnChallengeGeneratedInvoked = false;
+    bool mOnChallengeRevokedInvoked = false;
     bool mOnErrorInvoked = false;
+    bool mOnEnrollmentsEnumeratedInvoked = false;
+    bool mOnEnrollmentsRemovedInvoked = false;
+    bool mOnFeaturesRetrievedInvoked = false;
+    bool mOnAuthenticatorIdRetrievedInvoked = false;
+    bool mOnAuthenticatorIdInvalidatedInvoked = false;
     bool mOnSessionClosedInvoked = false;
 };
 
 class Face : public testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
   protected:
     void SetUp() override {
-        AIBinder* binder = AServiceManager_waitForService(GetParam().c_str());
-        ASSERT_NE(binder, nullptr);
-        mHal = IFace::fromBinder(ndk::SpAIBinder(binder));
+        // Prepare the callback.
+        mCb = ndk::SharedRefBase::make<SessionCallback>();
+
+        int retries = 0;
+        bool isOk = false;
+        // If the first attempt to create a session fails, we try to create a session again. The
+        // first attempt might fail if the framework already has an active session. The AIDL
+        // contract doesn't allow to create a new session without closing the old one. However, we
+        // can't close the framework's session from VTS. The expectation here is that the HAL will
+        // crash after the first illegal attempt to create a session, then it will restart, and then
+        // we'll be able to create a session.
+        do {
+            // Get an instance of the HAL.
+            AIBinder* binder = AServiceManager_waitForService(GetParam().c_str());
+            ASSERT_NE(binder, nullptr);
+            mHal = IFace::fromBinder(ndk::SpAIBinder(binder));
+
+            // Create a session.
+            isOk = mHal->createSession(kSensorId, kUserId, mCb, &mSession).isOk();
+            ++retries;
+        } while (!isOk && retries < 2);
+
+        ASSERT_TRUE(isOk);
+    }
+
+    void TearDown() override {
+        // Close the mSession.
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mSession->close().isOk());
+
+        // Make sure the mSession is closed.
+        auto lock = std::unique_lock<std::mutex>(mCb->mMutex);
+        mCb->mCv.wait(lock, [this] { return mCb->mOnSessionClosedInvoked; });
     }
 
     std::shared_ptr<IFace> mHal;
+    std::shared_ptr<SessionCallback> mCb;
+    std::shared_ptr<ISession> mSession;
 };
 
-TEST_P(Face, AuthenticateTest) {
-    // Prepare the callback.
-    auto cb = ndk::SharedRefBase::make<SessionCallback>();
+TEST_P(Face, GetSensorPropsWorksTest) {
+    std::vector<SensorProps> sensorProps;
 
-    // Create a session
-    std::shared_ptr<ISession> session;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(mHal->createSession(kSensorId, kUserId, cb, &session).isOk());
+    // Call the method.
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mHal->getSensorProps(&sensorProps).isOk());
 
-    // Call authenticate
+    // Make sure the sensorProps aren't empty.
+    ASSERT_FALSE(sensorProps.empty());
+    ASSERT_FALSE(sensorProps[0].commonProps.componentInfo.empty());
+}
+
+TEST_P(Face, EnrollWithBadHatResultsInErrorTest) {
+    // Call the method.
+    auto hat = keymaster::HardwareAuthToken{};
     std::shared_ptr<common::ICancellationSignal> cancellationSignal;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(session->authenticate(0 /* operationId */, &cancellationSignal).isOk());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(
+            mSession->enroll(hat, EnrollmentType::DEFAULT, {}, NativeHandle{}, &cancellationSignal)
+                    .isOk());
 
-    auto lock = std::unique_lock<std::mutex>(cb->mMutex);
-    cb->mCv.wait(lock, [&cb] { return cb->mOnErrorInvoked; });
-    // Get the results
-    EXPECT_EQ(cb->mError, Error::UNABLE_TO_PROCESS);
-    EXPECT_EQ(cb->mVendorCode, 0);
+    // Make sure an error is returned.
+    auto lock = std::unique_lock{mCb->mMutex};
+    mCb->mCv.wait(lock, [this] { return mCb->mOnErrorInvoked; });
+}
+
+TEST_P(Face, GenerateChallengeProducesUniqueChallengesTest) {
+    static constexpr int kIterations = 100;
+
+    auto challenges = std::set<int>{};
+    for (unsigned int i = 0; i < kIterations; ++i) {
+        // Call the method.
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mSession->generateChallenge().isOk());
+
+        // Check that the generated challenge is unique and not 0.
+        auto lock = std::unique_lock{mCb->mMutex};
+        mCb->mCv.wait(lock, [this] { return mCb->mOnChallengeGeneratedInvoked; });
+        ASSERT_NE(mCb->mGeneratedChallenge, 0);
+        ASSERT_EQ(challenges.find(mCb->mGeneratedChallenge), challenges.end());
+
+        challenges.insert(mCb->mGeneratedChallenge);
+        mCb->mOnChallengeGeneratedInvoked = false;
+    }
+}
+
+TEST_P(Face, RevokeChallengeWorksForNonexistentChallengeTest) {
+    const int64_t nonexistentChallenge = 123;
+
+    // Call the method.
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mSession->revokeChallenge(nonexistentChallenge).isOk());
+
+    // Check that the challenge is revoked and matches the requested challenge.
+    auto lock = std::unique_lock{mCb->mMutex};
+    mCb->mCv.wait(lock, [this] { return mCb->mOnChallengeRevokedInvoked; });
+    ASSERT_EQ(mCb->mRevokedChallenge, nonexistentChallenge);
+}
+
+TEST_P(Face, RevokeChallengeWorksForExistentChallengeTest) {
+    // Generate a challenge.
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mSession->generateChallenge().isOk());
+
+    // Wait for the result.
+    auto lock = std::unique_lock{mCb->mMutex};
+    mCb->mCv.wait(lock, [this] { return mCb->mOnChallengeGeneratedInvoked; });
     lock.unlock();
 
-    // Close the session
-    ASSERT_TRUE(session->close().isOk());
+    // Revoke the challenge.
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mSession->revokeChallenge(mCb->mGeneratedChallenge).isOk());
 
+    // Check that the challenge is revoked and matches the requested challenge.
     lock.lock();
-    cb->mCv.wait(lock, [&cb] { return cb->mOnSessionClosedInvoked; });
+    mCb->mCv.wait(lock, [this] { return mCb->mOnChallengeRevokedInvoked; });
+    ASSERT_EQ(mCb->mRevokedChallenge, mCb->mGeneratedChallenge);
+}
+
+TEST_P(Face, EnumerateEnrollmentsWorksTest) {
+    // Call the method.
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mSession->enumerateEnrollments().isOk());
+
+    // Wait for the result.
+    auto lock = std::unique_lock{mCb->mMutex};
+    mCb->mCv.wait(lock, [this] { return mCb->mOnEnrollmentsEnumeratedInvoked; });
+}
+
+TEST_P(Face, RemoveEnrollmentsWorksTest) {
+    // Call the method.
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mSession->removeEnrollments({}).isOk());
+
+    // Wait for the result.
+    auto lock = std::unique_lock{mCb->mMutex};
+    mCb->mCv.wait(lock, [this] { return mCb->mOnEnrollmentsRemovedInvoked; });
+}
+
+TEST_P(Face, GetFeaturesWorksTest) {
+    // Call the method.
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mSession->getFeatures().isOk());
+
+    // Wait for the result.
+    auto lock = std::unique_lock{mCb->mMutex};
+    mCb->mCv.wait(lock, [this] { return mCb->mOnFeaturesRetrievedInvoked; });
+}
+
+TEST_P(Face, GetAuthenticatorIdWorksTest) {
+    // Call the method.
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mSession->getAuthenticatorId().isOk());
+
+    // Wait for the result.
+    auto lock = std::unique_lock{mCb->mMutex};
+    mCb->mCv.wait(lock, [this] { return mCb->mOnAuthenticatorIdRetrievedInvoked; });
+}
+
+TEST_P(Face, InvalidateAuthenticatorIdWorksTest) {
+    // Call the method.
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mSession->invalidateAuthenticatorId().isOk());
+
+    // Wait for the result.
+    auto lock = std::unique_lock{mCb->mMutex};
+    mCb->mCv.wait(lock, [this] { return mCb->mOnAuthenticatorIdInvalidatedInvoked; });
 }
 
 GTEST_ALLOW_UNINSTANTIATED_PARAMETERIZED_TEST(Face);
diff --git a/camera/device/3.7/types.hal b/camera/device/3.7/types.hal
index 6910e65..55aceb8 100644
--- a/camera/device/3.7/types.hal
+++ b/camera/device/3.7/types.hal
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
     /**
      * The surface group id used for multi-resolution output streams.
      *
-     * This works simliar to the surfaceGroupId of OutputConfiguration in the
+     * This works similar to the surfaceGroupId of OutputConfiguration in the
      * public API, with the exception that this is for multi-resolution image
      * reader and is used by the camera HAL to choose a target stream within
      * the same group to which images are written. All streams in the same group
diff --git a/camera/metadata/3.2/types.hal b/camera/metadata/3.2/types.hal
index ad671d9..4b02830 100644
--- a/camera/metadata/3.2/types.hal
+++ b/camera/metadata/3.2/types.hal
@@ -686,7 +686,9 @@
     /** android.jpeg.maxSize [static, int32, system]
      *
      * <p>Maximum size in bytes for the compressed
-     * JPEG buffer</p>
+     * JPEG buffer, in default sensor pixel mode (see ANDROID_SENSOR_PIXEL_MODE)</p>
+     *
+     * @see ANDROID_SENSOR_PIXEL_MODE
      */
     ANDROID_JPEG_MAX_SIZE,
 
diff --git a/camera/provider/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalCameraProviderV2_4TargetTest.cpp b/camera/provider/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalCameraProviderV2_4TargetTest.cpp
index 41a08f9..49e00f4 100644
--- a/camera/provider/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalCameraProviderV2_4TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/camera/provider/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalCameraProviderV2_4TargetTest.cpp
@@ -230,10 +230,10 @@
         return false;
     }
 
-    int getCameraDeviceVersion(const hidl_string& deviceName,
-            const hidl_string &providerType) {
+    int getCameraDeviceVersionAndId(const hidl_string& deviceName,
+            const hidl_string &providerType, std::string* id) {
         std::string version;
-        bool match = matchDeviceName(deviceName, providerType, &version, nullptr);
+        bool match = matchDeviceName(deviceName, providerType, &version, id);
         if (!match) {
             return -1;
         }
@@ -256,6 +256,11 @@
         return 0;
     }
 
+    int getCameraDeviceVersion(const hidl_string& deviceName,
+            const hidl_string &providerType) {
+        return getCameraDeviceVersionAndId(deviceName, providerType, nullptr);
+    }
+
     bool parseProviderName(const std::string& name, std::string *type /*out*/,
             uint32_t *id /*out*/) {
         if (!type || !id) {
@@ -930,6 +935,7 @@
             camera_metadata_ro_entry* streamConfigs,
             camera_metadata_ro_entry* maxResolutionStreamConfigs,
             const camera_metadata_t* staticMetadata);
+    static bool isColorCamera(const camera_metadata_t *metadata);
 
     static V3_2::DataspaceFlags getDataspace(PixelFormat format);
 
@@ -6179,6 +6185,167 @@
     }
 }
 
+// Test the multi-camera API requirement for Google Requirement Freeze S
+// Note that this requirement can only be partially tested. If a vendor
+// device doesn't expose a physical camera in any shape or form, there is no way
+// the test can catch it.
+TEST_P(CameraHidlTest, grfSMultiCameraTest) {
+    const int socGrfApi = property_get_int32("ro.board.first_api_level", /*default*/ -1);
+    if (socGrfApi < 31 /*S*/) {
+        // Non-GRF devices, or version < 31 Skip
+        ALOGI("%s: socGrfApi level is %d. Skipping", __FUNCTION__, socGrfApi);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    // Test that if more than one color cameras facing the same direction are
+    // supported, there must be at least one logical camera facing that
+    // direction.
+    hidl_vec<hidl_string> cameraDeviceNames = getCameraDeviceNames(mProvider);
+    // Front and back facing non-logical color cameras
+    std::set<std::string> frontColorCameras, rearColorCameras;
+    // Front and back facing logical cameras' physical camera Id sets
+    std::set<std::set<std::string>> frontPhysicalIds, rearPhysicalIds;
+    for (const auto& name : cameraDeviceNames) {
+        std::string cameraId;
+        int deviceVersion = getCameraDeviceVersionAndId(name, mProviderType, &cameraId);
+        switch (deviceVersion) {
+            case CAMERA_DEVICE_API_VERSION_3_7:
+            case CAMERA_DEVICE_API_VERSION_3_6:
+            case CAMERA_DEVICE_API_VERSION_3_5:
+            case CAMERA_DEVICE_API_VERSION_3_4:
+            case CAMERA_DEVICE_API_VERSION_3_3:
+            case CAMERA_DEVICE_API_VERSION_3_2: {
+                ::android::sp<::android::hardware::camera::device::V3_2::ICameraDevice> device3_x;
+                ALOGI("getCameraCharacteristics: Testing camera device %s", name.c_str());
+                Return<void> ret;
+                ret = mProvider->getCameraDeviceInterface_V3_x(
+                        name, [&](auto status, const auto& device) {
+                            ALOGI("getCameraDeviceInterface_V3_x returns status:%d", (int)status);
+                            ASSERT_EQ(Status::OK, status);
+                            ASSERT_NE(device, nullptr);
+                            device3_x = device;
+                        });
+                ASSERT_TRUE(ret.isOk());
+
+                ret = device3_x->getCameraCharacteristics([&](auto status, const auto& chars) {
+                    ASSERT_EQ(Status::OK, status);
+                    const camera_metadata_t* metadata = (camera_metadata_t*)chars.data();
+
+                    // Skip if this is not a color camera.
+                    if (!CameraHidlTest::isColorCamera(metadata)) {
+                        return;
+                    }
+
+                    // Check camera facing. Skip if facing is neither FRONT
+                    // nor BACK. If this is not a logical camera, only note down
+                    // the camera ID, and skip.
+                    camera_metadata_ro_entry entry;
+                    int retcode = find_camera_metadata_ro_entry(
+                            metadata, ANDROID_LENS_FACING, &entry);
+                    ASSERT_EQ(retcode, 0);
+                    ASSERT_GT(entry.count, 0);
+                    uint8_t facing = entry.data.u8[0];
+                    bool isLogicalCamera = (isLogicalMultiCamera(metadata) == Status::OK);
+                    if (facing == ANDROID_LENS_FACING_FRONT) {
+                        if (!isLogicalCamera) {
+                            frontColorCameras.insert(cameraId);
+                            return;
+                        }
+                    } else if (facing == ANDROID_LENS_FACING_BACK) {
+                        if (!isLogicalCamera) {
+                            rearColorCameras.insert(cameraId);
+                            return;
+                        }
+                    } else {
+                        // Not FRONT or BACK facing. Skip.
+                        return;
+                    }
+
+                    // Check logical camera's physical camera IDs for color
+                    // cameras.
+                    std::unordered_set<std::string> physicalCameraIds;
+                    Status s = getPhysicalCameraIds(metadata, &physicalCameraIds);
+                    ASSERT_EQ(Status::OK, s);
+                    if (facing == ANDROID_LENS_FACING_FRONT) {
+                        frontPhysicalIds.emplace(physicalCameraIds.begin(), physicalCameraIds.end());
+                    } else {
+                        rearPhysicalIds.emplace(physicalCameraIds.begin(), physicalCameraIds.end());
+                    }
+                    for (const auto& physicalId : physicalCameraIds) {
+                        // Skip if the physicalId is publicly available
+                        for (auto& deviceName : cameraDeviceNames) {
+                            std::string publicVersion, publicId;
+                            ASSERT_TRUE(::matchDeviceName(deviceName, mProviderType,
+                                                          &publicVersion, &publicId));
+                            if (physicalId == publicId) {
+                                // Skip because public Ids will be iterated in outer loop.
+                                return;
+                            }
+                        }
+
+                        auto castResult = device::V3_5::ICameraDevice::castFrom(device3_x);
+                        ASSERT_TRUE(castResult.isOk());
+                        ::android::sp<::android::hardware::camera::device::V3_5::ICameraDevice>
+                                device3_5 = castResult;
+                        ASSERT_NE(device3_5, nullptr);
+
+                        // Check camera characteristics for hidden camera id
+                        Return<void> ret = device3_5->getPhysicalCameraCharacteristics(
+                                physicalId, [&](auto status, const auto& chars) {
+                            ASSERT_EQ(Status::OK, status);
+                            const camera_metadata_t* physicalMetadata =
+                                    (camera_metadata_t*)chars.data();
+
+                            if (CameraHidlTest::isColorCamera(physicalMetadata)) {
+                                if (facing == ANDROID_LENS_FACING_FRONT) {
+                                    frontColorCameras.insert(physicalId);
+                                } else if (facing == ANDROID_LENS_FACING_BACK) {
+                                    rearColorCameras.insert(physicalId);
+                                }
+                            }
+                        });
+                        ASSERT_TRUE(ret.isOk());
+                    }
+                });
+                ASSERT_TRUE(ret.isOk());
+            } break;
+            case CAMERA_DEVICE_API_VERSION_1_0: {
+                // Not applicable
+            } break;
+            default: {
+                ALOGE("%s: Unsupported device version %d", __func__, deviceVersion);
+                ADD_FAILURE();
+            } break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    // If there are more than one color cameras facing one direction, a logical
+    // multi-camera must be defined consisting of all color cameras facing that
+    // direction.
+    if (frontColorCameras.size() > 1) {
+        bool hasFrontLogical = false;
+        for (const auto& physicalIds : frontPhysicalIds) {
+            if (std::includes(physicalIds.begin(), physicalIds.end(),
+                    frontColorCameras.begin(), frontColorCameras.end())) {
+                hasFrontLogical = true;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        ASSERT_TRUE(hasFrontLogical);
+    }
+    if (rearColorCameras.size() > 1) {
+        bool hasRearLogical = false;
+        for (const auto& physicalIds : rearPhysicalIds) {
+            if (std::includes(physicalIds.begin(), physicalIds.end(),
+                    rearColorCameras.begin(), rearColorCameras.end())) {
+                hasRearLogical = true;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        ASSERT_TRUE(hasRearLogical);
+    }
+}
+
 // Retrieve all valid output stream resolutions from the camera
 // static characteristics.
 Status CameraHidlTest::getAvailableOutputStreams(const camera_metadata_t* staticMeta,
@@ -6651,6 +6818,23 @@
     return ret;
 }
 
+bool CameraHidlTest::isColorCamera(const camera_metadata_t *metadata) {
+    camera_metadata_ro_entry entry;
+    int retcode = find_camera_metadata_ro_entry(
+            metadata, ANDROID_REQUEST_AVAILABLE_CAPABILITIES, &entry);
+    if ((0 == retcode) && (entry.count > 0)) {
+        bool isBackwardCompatible = (std::find(entry.data.u8, entry.data.u8 + entry.count,
+                ANDROID_REQUEST_AVAILABLE_CAPABILITIES_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE) !=
+                entry.data.u8 + entry.count);
+        bool isMonochrome = (std::find(entry.data.u8, entry.data.u8 + entry.count,
+                ANDROID_REQUEST_AVAILABLE_CAPABILITIES_MONOCHROME) !=
+                entry.data.u8 + entry.count);
+        bool isColor = isBackwardCompatible && !isMonochrome;
+        return isColor;
+    }
+    return false;
+}
+
 // Retrieve the reprocess input-output format map from the static
 // camera characteristics.
 Status CameraHidlTest::getZSLInputOutputMap(camera_metadata_t *staticMeta,
diff --git a/current.txt b/current.txt
index 908ecc4..fbad3da 100644
--- a/current.txt
+++ b/current.txt
@@ -768,6 +768,8 @@
 98592d193a717066facf91428426e5abe211e3bd718bc372e29fb944ddbe6e7c android.hardware.wifi.supplicant@1.3::types
 
 # ABI preserving changes to HALs during Android S
+# b/193346383
+93d29fbe2fcc5e4e053a9db7c9abbd9190c46b85b443f2698a3460db2ee76c8d android.hardware.camera.metadata@3.2::types
 159a0069336035852e9eca6354b86b7990680d1b239f23ef2f631b01807c4cb9 android.hardware.camera.metadata@3.5::types
 e042522daa4b5f7fd4a0a19bcdadb93c79a1b04c09ef2c9813a3a8941032f3f5 android.hardware.contexthub@1.0::IContexthub
 c2f64133b83ede65c9939ef97ab5bd867b73faf3dba0e7e69f77c3c43d9e487e android.hardware.contexthub@1.0::IContexthubCallback
@@ -838,7 +840,7 @@
 1a1dff6e8d25dbc02a69fed3c077dd0782b30331ca3f345848ec52fc67744224 android.hardware.camera.device@3.7::ICameraDevice
 3be6faa3d11ad9c7ec01a1a0a009cf11cb65d701d109dab37613ce9cfb3cdd60 android.hardware.camera.device@3.7::ICameraDeviceSession
 3740ec773b2eb8fa6bd8c6e879eedb56c4e4306b88f1c20fa51103d791d871b1 android.hardware.camera.device@3.7::ICameraInjectionSession
-21f023685571daf46148097d98b89cea353f07e3ed83b2ed5685b23bd136c3ee android.hardware.camera.device@3.7::types
+d272697484c41bbf76a0924d2aaebf065ce37a822fcb438316eb5dd2d112f052 android.hardware.camera.device@3.7::types
 e932e7ef95210142e1fd3a4504e1d19bdb1acc988450f1ced543f3401f67855a android.hardware.camera.metadata@3.6::types
 98ff825a7d37e5ab983502d13cec1f2e5a9cac9b674b6ff1a52bcf540f4e315e android.hardware.camera.provider@2.7::ICameraProvider
 51fd14005859b16be55872660c34f5d423c77a2abcc5d4bdd5a537c40f32516b android.hardware.camera.provider@2.7::types
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.2/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_2ReadbackTest.cpp b/graphics/composer/2.2/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_2ReadbackTest.cpp
index 7a1568b..7a053f1 100644
--- a/graphics/composer/2.2/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_2ReadbackTest.cpp
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.2/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_2ReadbackTest.cpp
@@ -458,6 +458,7 @@
                           << " pixel format: PixelFormat::RGBA_8888 dataspace: "
                           << ReadbackHelper::getDataspaceString(clientDataspace)
                           << " unsupported for display" << std::endl;
+                mReader->mCompositionChanges.clear();
                 continue;
             }
 
diff --git a/memtrack/aidl/android/hardware/memtrack/IMemtrack.aidl b/memtrack/aidl/android/hardware/memtrack/IMemtrack.aidl
index 13c3389..88b090b 100644
--- a/memtrack/aidl/android/hardware/memtrack/IMemtrack.aidl
+++ b/memtrack/aidl/android/hardware/memtrack/IMemtrack.aidl
@@ -44,6 +44,12 @@
  *     This category should report all GPU private allocations for the specified
  *     PID that are not accounted in /proc/<pid>/smaps.
  *
+ *     getMemory() called with PID 0 should report the global total GPU-private
+ *     memory, for MemtrackType::GL and MemtrackRecord::FLAG_SMAPS_UNACCOUNTED.
+ *
+ *     getMemory() called with PID 0 for a MemtrackType other than GL should
+ *     report 0.
+ *
  * - MemtrackType::OTHER and MemtrackRecord::FLAG_SMAPS_UNACCOUNTED
  *     Any other memory not accounted for in /proc/<pid>/smaps if any, otherwise
  *     this should return 0.
@@ -52,6 +58,9 @@
  * VM_PFNMAP flag set. For these mappings PSS and RSS are reported as 0 in smaps.
  * Such mappings have no backing page structs from which PSS/RSS can be calculated.
  *
+ * Any memtrack operation that is not supported should return a binder status with
+ * exception code EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION.
+ *
  * Constructor for the interface should be used to perform memtrack management
  * setup actions and must be called once before any calls to getMemory().
  */
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/DeviceInfo.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/DeviceInfo.aidl
index 32d69cd..b0761bf 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/DeviceInfo.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/DeviceInfo.aidl
@@ -44,6 +44,12 @@
      *         ? "vendor_patch_level" : uint,                   // YYYYMMDD
      *         "version" : 1,                      // The CDDL schema version.
      *         "security_level" : "tee" / "strongbox"
+     *         "att_id_state": "locked" / "open",  // Attestation IDs State. If "locked", this
+     *                                             // indicates a device's attestable IDs are
+     *                                             // factory-locked and immutable. If "open",
+     *                                             // this indicates the device is still in a
+     *                                             // provisionable state and the attestable IDs
+     *                                             // are not yet frozen.
      *     }
      */
     byte[] deviceInfo;
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl
index 31dbb28..24cdbc1 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl
@@ -158,20 +158,7 @@
      *         payload: bstr .cbor BccPayload
      *     ]
      *
-     *     VerifiedDeviceInfo = {
-     *         ? "brand" : tstr,
-     *         ? "manufacturer" : tstr,
-     *         ? "product" : tstr,
-     *         ? "model" : tstr,
-     *         ? "board" : tstr,
-     *         ? "device" : tstr,
-     *         ? "vb_state" : "green" / "yellow" / "orange",
-     *         ? "bootloader_state" : "locked" / "unlocked",
-     *         ? "os_version" : tstr,
-     *         ? "system_patch_level" : uint,        // YYYYMMDD
-     *         ? "boot_patch_level" : uint,          // YYYYMMDD
-     *         ? "vendor_patch_level" : uint,        // YYYYMMDD
-     *     }
+     *     VerifiedDeviceInfo = DeviceInfo  // See DeviceInfo.aidl
      *
      *     PubKeyX25519 = {                 // COSE_Key
      *          1 : 1,                      // Key type : Octet Key Pair
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
index 270574b..67a0214 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
@@ -18,10 +18,6 @@
 
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.TagType;
 
-// TODO(seleneh) : note aidl currently does not support double nested enum definitions such as
-// ROOT_OF_TRUST = TagType:BYTES | 704.  So we are forced to write definitions as
-// ROOT_OF_TRUST = (9 << 28) for now.  Will need to flip this back later when aidl support is added.
-
 /**
  * Tag specifies various kinds of tags that can be set in KeyParameter to identify what kind of
  * data are stored in KeyParameter.
@@ -33,7 +29,7 @@
     /**
      * Tag::INVALID should never be set.  It means you hit an error.
      */
-    INVALID = (0 << 28) | 0,
+    INVALID = 0,
 
     /**
      * Tag::PURPOSE specifies the set of purposes for which the key may be used.  Possible values
@@ -47,7 +43,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    PURPOSE = (2 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM_REP */ | 1,
+    PURPOSE = TagType.ENUM_REP | 1,
 
     /**
      * Tag::ALGORITHM specifies the cryptographic algorithm with which the key is used.  This tag
@@ -56,7 +52,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    ALGORITHM = (1 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM */ | 2,
+    ALGORITHM = TagType.ENUM | 2,
 
     /**
      * Tag::KEY_SIZE specifies the size, in bits, of the key, measuring in the normal way for the
@@ -68,7 +64,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    KEY_SIZE = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 3,
+    KEY_SIZE = TagType.UINT | 3,
 
     /**
      * Tag::BLOCK_MODE specifies the block cipher mode(s) with which the key may be used.  This tag
@@ -81,7 +77,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    BLOCK_MODE = (2 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM_REP */ | 4,
+    BLOCK_MODE = TagType.ENUM_REP | 4,
 
     /**
      * Tag::DIGEST specifies the digest algorithms that may be used with the key to perform signing
@@ -95,7 +91,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    DIGEST = (2 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM_REP */ | 5,
+    DIGEST = TagType.ENUM_REP | 5,
 
     /**
      * Tag::PADDING specifies the padding modes that may be used with the key.  This tag is relevant
@@ -123,7 +119,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    PADDING = (2 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM_REP */ | 6,
+    PADDING = TagType.ENUM_REP | 6,
 
     /**
      * Tag::CALLER_NONCE specifies that the caller can provide a nonce for nonce-requiring
@@ -136,7 +132,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    CALLER_NONCE = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 7,
+    CALLER_NONCE = TagType.BOOL | 7,
 
     /**
      * Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH specifies the minimum length of MAC that can be requested or verified
@@ -149,7 +145,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    MIN_MAC_LENGTH = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 8,
+    MIN_MAC_LENGTH = TagType.UINT | 8,
 
     // Tag 9 reserved
 
@@ -159,7 +155,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    EC_CURVE = (1 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM */ | 10,
+    EC_CURVE = TagType.ENUM | 10,
 
     /**
      * Tag::RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT specifies the value of the public exponent for an RSA key pair.
@@ -173,7 +169,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT = (5 << 28) /* TagType:ULONG */ | 200,
+    RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT = TagType.ULONG | 200,
 
     // Tag 201 reserved
 
@@ -184,7 +180,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 202,
+    INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID = TagType.BOOL | 202,
 
     /**
      * Tag::RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST specifies the MGF1 digest algorithms that may be used with RSA
@@ -197,7 +193,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST = (2 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM_REP */ | 203,
+    RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST = TagType.ENUM_REP | 203,
 
     // Tag 301 reserved
 
@@ -209,7 +205,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    BOOTLOADER_ONLY = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 302,
+    BOOTLOADER_ONLY = TagType.BOOL | 302,
 
     /**
      * Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE specifies that the key has rollback resistance, meaning that when
@@ -224,10 +220,10 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 303,
+    ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE = TagType.BOOL | 303,
 
     // Reserved for future use.
-    HARDWARE_TYPE = (1 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM */ | 304,
+    HARDWARE_TYPE = TagType.ENUM | 304,
 
     /**
      * Keys tagged with EARLY_BOOT_ONLY may only be used during early boot, until
@@ -236,7 +232,7 @@
      * provided to IKeyMintDevice::importKey, the import must fail with
      * ErrorCode::EARLY_BOOT_ENDED.
      */
-    EARLY_BOOT_ONLY = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 305,
+    EARLY_BOOT_ONLY = TagType.BOOL | 305,
 
     /**
      * Tag::ACTIVE_DATETIME specifies the date and time at which the key becomes active, in
@@ -245,7 +241,7 @@
      *
      * Need not be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    ACTIVE_DATETIME = (6 << 28) /* TagType:DATE */ | 400,
+    ACTIVE_DATETIME = TagType.DATE | 400,
 
     /**
      * Tag::ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME specifies the date and time at which the key expires for
@@ -257,7 +253,7 @@
      *
      * Need not be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME = (6 << 28) /* TagType:DATE */ | 401,
+    ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME = TagType.DATE | 401,
 
     /**
      * Tag::USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME specifies the date and time at which the key expires for
@@ -269,7 +265,7 @@
      *
      * Need not be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME = (6 << 28) /* TagType:DATE */ | 402,
+    USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME = TagType.DATE | 402,
 
     /**
      * TODO(seleneh) this tag need to be deleted.
@@ -293,8 +289,10 @@
      * fails because the table is full, KeyMint returns ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS.
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
+     *
+     * TODO(b/191738660): Remove in KeyMint V2. Currently only used for FDE.
      */
-    MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 403,
+    MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS = TagType.UINT | 403,
 
     /**
      * Tag::MAX_USES_PER_BOOT specifies the maximum number of times that a key may be used between
@@ -314,7 +312,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    MAX_USES_PER_BOOT = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 404,
+    MAX_USES_PER_BOOT = TagType.UINT | 404,
 
     /**
      * Tag::USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT specifies the number of times that a key may be used. This can be
@@ -343,14 +341,14 @@
      * record. This tag must have the same SecurityLevel as the tag that is added to the key
      * characteristics.
      */
-    USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT = (3 << 28) | 405, /* TagType:UINT */
+    USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT = TagType.UINT | 405,
 
     /**
      * Tag::USER_ID specifies the ID of the Android user that is permitted to use the key.
      *
      * Must not be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    USER_ID = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 501,
+    USER_ID = TagType.UINT | 501,
 
     /**
      * Tag::USER_SECURE_ID specifies that a key may only be used under a particular secure user
@@ -383,7 +381,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    USER_SECURE_ID = (10 << 28) /* TagType:ULONG_REP */ | 502,
+    USER_SECURE_ID = TagType.ULONG_REP | 502,
 
     /**
      * Tag::NO_AUTH_REQUIRED specifies that no authentication is required to use this key.  This tag
@@ -391,7 +389,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    NO_AUTH_REQUIRED = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 503,
+    NO_AUTH_REQUIRED = TagType.BOOL | 503,
 
     /**
      * Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE specifies the types of user authenticators that may be used to authorize
@@ -410,7 +408,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    USER_AUTH_TYPE = (1 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM */ | 504,
+    USER_AUTH_TYPE = TagType.ENUM | 504,
 
     /**
      * Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT specifies the time in seconds for which the key is authorized for use,
@@ -424,7 +422,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    AUTH_TIMEOUT = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 505,
+    AUTH_TIMEOUT = TagType.UINT | 505,
 
     /**
      * Tag::ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY specifies that the key may be used after authentication timeout if
@@ -432,7 +430,7 @@
      *
      * Cannot be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 506,
+    ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY = TagType.BOOL | 506,
 
     /**
      * TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED is an optional feature that specifies that this key must be
@@ -479,7 +477,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 507,
+    TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED = TagType.BOOL | 507,
 
     /**
      * Tag::TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED is only applicable to keys with KeyPurpose SIGN, and
@@ -493,7 +491,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 508,
+    TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED = TagType.BOOL | 508,
 
     /**
      * Tag::UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED specifies that the key may only be used when the device is
@@ -503,7 +501,7 @@
      * Must be hardware-enforced (but is also keystore-enforced on a per-user basis: see the
      * deviceLocked() documentation).
      */
-    UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 509,
+    UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED = TagType.BOOL | 509,
 
     /**
      * Tag::APPLICATION_ID.  When provided to generateKey or importKey, this tag specifies data
@@ -519,7 +517,7 @@
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
-    APPLICATION_ID = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 601,
+    APPLICATION_ID = TagType.BYTES | 601,
 
     /*
      * Semantically unenforceable tags, either because they have no specific meaning or because
@@ -540,7 +538,7 @@
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
-    APPLICATION_DATA = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 700,
+    APPLICATION_DATA = TagType.BYTES | 700,
 
     /**
      * Tag::CREATION_DATETIME specifies the date and time the key was created, in milliseconds since
@@ -548,7 +546,7 @@
      *
      * Must be in the software-enforced list, if provided.
      */
-    CREATION_DATETIME = (6 << 28) /* TagType:DATE */ | 701,
+    CREATION_DATETIME = TagType.DATE | 701,
 
     /**
      * Tag::ORIGIN specifies where the key was created, if known.  This tag must not be specified
@@ -557,7 +555,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    ORIGIN = (1 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM */ | 702,
+    ORIGIN = TagType.ENUM | 702,
 
     // 703 is unused.
 
@@ -569,7 +567,7 @@
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
-    ROOT_OF_TRUST = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 704,
+    ROOT_OF_TRUST = TagType.BYTES | 704,
 
     /**
      * Tag::OS_VERSION specifies the system OS version with which the key may be used.  This tag is
@@ -592,7 +590,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    OS_VERSION = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 705,
+    OS_VERSION = TagType.UINT | 705,
 
     /**
      * Tag::OS_PATCHLEVEL specifies the system security patch level with which the key may be used.
@@ -613,7 +611,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    OS_PATCHLEVEL = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 706,
+    OS_PATCHLEVEL = TagType.UINT | 706,
 
     /**
      * Tag::UNIQUE_ID specifies a unique, time-based identifier.  This tag is never provided to or
@@ -648,7 +646,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    UNIQUE_ID = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 707,
+    UNIQUE_ID = TagType.BYTES | 707,
 
     /**
      * Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is used to deliver a "challenge" value to the attested key
@@ -657,7 +655,7 @@
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
-    ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 708,
+    ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE = TagType.BYTES | 708,
 
     /**
      * Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID identifies the set of applications which may use a key, used
@@ -683,7 +681,7 @@
      *
      * Cannot be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 709,
+    ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID = TagType.BYTES | 709,
 
     /**
      * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND provides the device's brand name, as returned by Build.BRAND in
@@ -696,7 +694,7 @@
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
-    ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 710,
+    ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND = TagType.BYTES | 710,
 
     /**
      * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE provides the device's device name, as returned by Build.DEVICE in
@@ -709,7 +707,7 @@
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
-    ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 711,
+    ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE = TagType.BYTES | 711,
 
     /**
      * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT provides the device's product name, as returned by Build.PRODUCT
@@ -722,7 +720,7 @@
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
-    ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 712,
+    ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT = TagType.BYTES | 712,
 
     /**
      * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL the device's serial number.  This field must be set only when
@@ -734,7 +732,7 @@
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
-    ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 713,
+    ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL = TagType.BYTES | 713,
 
     /**
      * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI provides the IMEIs for all radios on the device to attested key
@@ -747,7 +745,7 @@
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
-    ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 714,
+    ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI = TagType.BYTES | 714,
 
     /**
      * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MEID provides the MEIDs for all radios on the device to attested key
@@ -760,7 +758,7 @@
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
-    ATTESTATION_ID_MEID = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 715,
+    ATTESTATION_ID_MEID = TagType.BYTES | 715,
 
     /**
      * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER provides the device's manufacturer name, as returned by
@@ -773,7 +771,7 @@
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
-    ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 716,
+    ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER = TagType.BYTES | 716,
 
     /**
      * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL provides the device's model name, as returned by Build.MODEL in
@@ -786,7 +784,7 @@
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
-    ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 717,
+    ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL = TagType.BYTES | 717,
 
     /**
      * Tag::VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL specifies the vendor image security patch level with which the key may
@@ -808,7 +806,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 718,
+    VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL = TagType.UINT | 718,
 
     /**
      * Tag::BOOT_PATCHLEVEL specifies the boot image (kernel) security patch level with which the
@@ -828,16 +826,26 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    BOOT_PATCHLEVEL = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 719,
+    BOOT_PATCHLEVEL = TagType.UINT | 719,
 
     /**
      * DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION is an argument to IKeyMintDevice::attested key generation/import
      * operations.  It indicates that attestation using a device-unique key is requested, rather
-     * than a batch key.  When a device-unique key is used, the returned chain should contain two
-     * certificates:
+     * than a batch key. When a device-unique key is used, the returned chain contains two or
+     * three certificates.
+     *
+     * In case the chain contains two certificates, they should be:
      *    * The attestation certificate, containing the attestation extension, as described in
-            KeyCreationResult.aidl.
+     *      KeyCreationResult.aidl.
      *    * A self-signed root certificate, signed by the device-unique key.
+     *
+     * In case the chain contains three certificates, they should be:
+     *    * The attestation certificate, containing the attestation extension, as described in
+     *      KeyCreationResult.aidl, signed by the device-unique key.
+     *    * An intermediate certificate, containing the public portion of the device-unique key.
+     *    * A self-signed root certificate, signed by a dedicated key, certifying the
+     *      intermediate.
+     *
      * No additional chained certificates are provided. Only SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX
      * IKeyMintDevices may support device-unique attestations.  SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT
      * IKeyMintDevices must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT if they receive
@@ -854,7 +862,7 @@
      * IKeyMintDevice implementations that support device-unique attestation MUST add the
      * DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION tag to device-unique attestations.
      */
-    DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 720,
+    DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION = TagType.BOOL | 720,
 
     /**
      * IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY is never used by IKeyMintDevice, is not a valid argument to key
@@ -862,7 +870,7 @@
      * attestation.  It is used in attestations produced by the IIdentityCredential HAL when that
      * HAL attests to Credential Keys.  IIdentityCredential produces KeyMint-style attestations.
      */
-    IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 721,
+    IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY = TagType.BOOL | 721,
 
     /**
      * To prevent keys from being compromised if an attacker acquires read access to system / kernel
@@ -880,12 +888,13 @@
      * ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION is returned when a key with Tag::STORAGE_KEY is provided to
      * begin().
      */
-    STORAGE_KEY = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 722,
+    STORAGE_KEY = TagType.BOOL | 722,
 
     /**
-     * TODO: Delete when keystore1 is deleted.
+     * OBSOLETE: Do not use. See IKeyMintOperation.updateAad instead.
+     * TODO(b/191738660): Remove in KeyMint v2.
      */
-    ASSOCIATED_DATA = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 1000,
+    ASSOCIATED_DATA = TagType.BYTES | 1000,
 
     /**
      * Tag::NONCE is used to provide or return a nonce or Initialization Vector (IV) for AES-GCM,
@@ -900,7 +909,7 @@
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
-    NONCE = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 1001,
+    NONCE = TagType.BYTES | 1001,
 
     /**
      * Tag::MAC_LENGTH provides the requested length of a MAC or GCM authentication tag, in bits.
@@ -911,7 +920,7 @@
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
-    MAC_LENGTH = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 1003,
+    MAC_LENGTH = TagType.UINT | 1003,
 
     /**
      * Tag::RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION specifies whether the device has been factory reset since the
@@ -919,7 +928,7 @@
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
-    RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 1004,
+    RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION = TagType.BOOL | 1004,
 
     /**
      * OBSOLETE: Do not use. See the authToken parameter for IKeyMintDevice::begin and for
@@ -927,7 +936,7 @@
      *
      * TODO(b/191738660): Delete when keystore1 is deleted.
      */
-    CONFIRMATION_TOKEN = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 1005,
+    CONFIRMATION_TOKEN = TagType.BYTES | 1005,
 
     /**
      * Tag::CERTIFICATE_SERIAL specifies the serial number to be assigned to the attestation
@@ -935,7 +944,7 @@
      * keyMint in the attestation parameters during generateKey() and importKey().  If not provided,
      * the serial shall default to 1.
      */
-    CERTIFICATE_SERIAL = (8 << 28) /* TagType:BIGNUM */ | 1006,
+    CERTIFICATE_SERIAL = TagType.BIGNUM | 1006,
 
     /**
      * Tag::CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT the certificate subject.  The value is a DER encoded X509 NAME.
@@ -943,7 +952,7 @@
      * during generateKey and importKey. If not provided the subject name shall default to
      * CN="Android Keystore Key".
      */
-    CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 1007,
+    CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT = TagType.BYTES | 1007,
 
     /**
      * Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE the beginning of the validity of the certificate in UNIX epoch
@@ -951,7 +960,7 @@
      * certificates.  ErrorCode::MISSING_NOT_BEFORE must be returned if this tag is not provided if
      * this tag is not provided to generateKey or importKey.
      */
-    CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE = (6 << 28) /* TagType:DATE */ | 1008,
+    CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE = TagType.DATE | 1008,
 
     /**
      * Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER the end of the validity of the certificate in UNIX epoch time in
@@ -959,7 +968,7 @@
      * ErrorCode::MISSING_NOT_AFTER must be returned if this tag is not provided to generateKey or
      * importKey.
      */
-    CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER = (6 << 28) /* TagType:DATE */ | 1009,
+    CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER = TagType.DATE | 1009,
 
     /**
      * Tag::MAX_BOOT_LEVEL specifies a maximum boot level at which a key should function.
@@ -970,5 +979,5 @@
      *
      * Cannot be hardware enforced in this version.
      */
-    MAX_BOOT_LEVEL = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 1010,
+    MAX_BOOT_LEVEL = TagType.UINT | 1010,
 }
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
index a3ed3ad..d7abf07 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
@@ -40,11 +40,16 @@
 
         AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
 
-        // The device-unique attestation chain should contain exactly two certificates:
+        // The device-unique attestation chain should contain exactly three certificates:
         // * The leaf with the attestation extension.
-        // * A self-signed root, signed using the device-unique key.
-        ASSERT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 2);
-        EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+        // * An intermediate, signing the leaf using the device-unique key.
+        // * A self-signed root, signed using some authority's key, certifying
+        //   the device-unique key.
+        const size_t chain_length = cert_chain_.size();
+        ASSERT_TRUE(chain_length == 2 || chain_length == 3);
+        // TODO(b/191361618): Once StrongBox implementations use a correctly-issued
+        // certificate chain, do not skip issuers matching.
+        EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_, /* strict_issuer_check= */ false));
 
         AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
         EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("challenge", "foo", sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
index 5359b3b..2032411 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
@@ -1493,7 +1493,8 @@
     return authList;
 }
 
-AssertionResult ChainSignaturesAreValid(const vector<Certificate>& chain) {
+AssertionResult ChainSignaturesAreValid(const vector<Certificate>& chain,
+                                        bool strict_issuer_check) {
     std::stringstream cert_data;
 
     for (size_t i = 0; i < chain.size(); ++i) {
@@ -1520,7 +1521,7 @@
 
         string cert_issuer = x509NameToStr(X509_get_issuer_name(key_cert.get()));
         string signer_subj = x509NameToStr(X509_get_subject_name(signing_cert.get()));
-        if (cert_issuer != signer_subj) {
+        if (cert_issuer != signer_subj && strict_issuer_check) {
             return AssertionFailure() << "Cert " << i << " has wrong issuer.\n"
                                       << " Signer subject is " << signer_subj
                                       << " Issuer subject is " << cert_issuer << endl
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
index d592d36..ec3fcf6 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
@@ -349,7 +349,8 @@
 
 AuthorizationSet HwEnforcedAuthorizations(const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics);
 AuthorizationSet SwEnforcedAuthorizations(const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics);
-::testing::AssertionResult ChainSignaturesAreValid(const vector<Certificate>& chain);
+::testing::AssertionResult ChainSignaturesAreValid(const vector<Certificate>& chain,
+                                                   bool strict_issuer_check = true);
 
 #define INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(name)                                          \
     INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(PerInstance, name,                                      \
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
index d41d270..5a87b83 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
@@ -1487,9 +1487,8 @@
             tag.tag == TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE) {
             continue;
         }
-        if (result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_TAG &&
-            (tag.tag == TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY || tag.tag == TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED)) {
-            // Optional tag not supported by this KeyMint implementation.
+        if (result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_TAG && tag.tag == TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED) {
+            // Tag not required to be supported by all KeyMint implementations.
             continue;
         }
         ASSERT_EQ(result, ErrorCode::OK);
@@ -1501,9 +1500,8 @@
 
         AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
         AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
-        if (tag.tag != TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID) {
-            // Expect to find most of the extra tags in the key characteristics
-            // of the generated key (but not for ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID).
+        // Some tags are optional, so don't require them to be in the enforcements.
+        if (tag.tag != TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID && tag.tag != TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY) {
             EXPECT_TRUE(hw_enforced.Contains(tag.tag) || sw_enforced.Contains(tag.tag))
                     << tag << " not in hw:" << hw_enforced << " nor sw:" << sw_enforced;
         }
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
index 78f8f08..af951e8 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include <openssl/ec_key.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 #include <remote_prov/remote_prov_utils.h>
+#include <vector>
 
 #include "KeyMintAidlTestBase.h"
 
@@ -102,8 +103,8 @@
     return std::move(corruptSig);
 }
 
-ErrMsgOr<EekChain> corrupt_sig_chain(const EekChain& eek, int which) {
-    auto [chain, _, parseErr] = cppbor::parse(eek.chain);
+ErrMsgOr<bytevec> corrupt_sig_chain(const bytevec& encodedEekChain, int which) {
+    auto [chain, _, parseErr] = cppbor::parse(encodedEekChain);
     if (!chain || !chain->asArray()) {
         return "EekChain parse failed";
     }
@@ -125,7 +126,7 @@
             corruptChain.add(eekChain->get(ii)->clone());
         }
     }
-    return EekChain{corruptChain.encode(), eek.last_pubkey, eek.last_privkey};
+    return corruptChain.encode();
 }
 
 string device_suffix(const string& name) {
@@ -271,14 +272,14 @@
 class CertificateRequestTest : public VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests {
   protected:
     CertificateRequestTest() : eekId_(string_to_bytevec("eekid")), challenge_(randomBytes(32)) {
-        generateEek(3);
+        generateTestEekChain(3);
     }
 
-    void generateEek(size_t eekLength) {
+    void generateTestEekChain(size_t eekLength) {
         auto chain = generateEekChain(eekLength, eekId_);
         EXPECT_TRUE(chain) << chain.message();
-        if (chain) eekChain_ = chain.moveValue();
-        eekLength_ = eekLength;
+        if (chain) testEekChain_ = chain.moveValue();
+        testEekLength_ = eekLength;
     }
 
     void generateKeys(bool testMode, size_t numKeys) {
@@ -297,7 +298,8 @@
     }
 
     void checkProtectedData(const DeviceInfo& deviceInfo, const cppbor::Array& keysToSign,
-                            const bytevec& keysToSignMac, const ProtectedData& protectedData) {
+                            const bytevec& keysToSignMac, const ProtectedData& protectedData,
+                            std::vector<BccEntryData>* bccOutput = nullptr) {
         auto [parsedProtectedData, _, protDataErrMsg] = cppbor::parse(protectedData.protectedData);
         ASSERT_TRUE(parsedProtectedData) << protDataErrMsg;
         ASSERT_TRUE(parsedProtectedData->asArray());
@@ -307,8 +309,9 @@
         ASSERT_TRUE(senderPubkey) << senderPubkey.message();
         EXPECT_EQ(senderPubkey->second, eekId_);
 
-        auto sessionKey = x25519_HKDF_DeriveKey(eekChain_.last_pubkey, eekChain_.last_privkey,
-                                                senderPubkey->first, false /* senderIsA */);
+        auto sessionKey =
+                x25519_HKDF_DeriveKey(testEekChain_.last_pubkey, testEekChain_.last_privkey,
+                                      senderPubkey->first, false /* senderIsA */);
         ASSERT_TRUE(sessionKey) << sessionKey.message();
 
         auto protectedDataPayload =
@@ -354,11 +357,15 @@
 
         auto macPayload = verifyAndParseCoseMac0(&coseMac0, *macKey);
         ASSERT_TRUE(macPayload) << macPayload.message();
+
+        if (bccOutput) {
+            *bccOutput = std::move(*bccContents);
+        }
     }
 
     bytevec eekId_;
-    size_t eekLength_;
-    EekChain eekChain_;
+    size_t testEekLength_;
+    EekChain testEekChain_;
     bytevec challenge_;
     std::vector<MacedPublicKey> keysToSign_;
     cppbor::Array cborKeysToSign_;
@@ -372,13 +379,13 @@
     bool testMode = true;
     for (size_t eekLength : {2, 3, 7}) {
         SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "EEK of length " << eekLength);
-        generateEek(eekLength);
+        generateTestEekChain(eekLength);
 
         bytevec keysToSignMac;
         DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
         ProtectedData protectedData;
         auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
-                testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
+                testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
                 &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
         ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
 
@@ -387,31 +394,62 @@
 }
 
 /**
- * Generate an empty certificate request in prod mode.  Generation will fail because we don't have a
- * valid GEEK.
- *
- * TODO(swillden): Get a valid GEEK and use it so the generation can succeed, though we won't be
- * able to decrypt.
+ * Ensure that test mode outputs a unique BCC root key every time we request a
+ * certificate request. Else, it's possible that the test mode API could be used
+ * to fingerprint devices. Only the GEEK should be allowed to decrypt the same
+ * device public key multiple times.
  */
-TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, EmptyRequest_prodMode) {
-    bool testMode = false;
-    for (size_t eekLength : {2, 3, 7}) {
-        SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "EEK of length " << eekLength);
-        generateEek(eekLength);
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NewKeyPerCallInTestMode) {
+    constexpr bool testMode = true;
 
-        bytevec keysToSignMac;
-        DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
-        ProtectedData protectedData;
-        auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
-                testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
-                &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
-        EXPECT_FALSE(status.isOk());
-        EXPECT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(),
-                  BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_EEK);
+    bytevec keysToSignMac;
+    DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
+    ProtectedData protectedData;
+    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
+            testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
+            &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+
+    std::vector<BccEntryData> firstBcc;
+    checkProtectedData(deviceInfo, /*keysToSign=*/cppbor::Array(), keysToSignMac, protectedData,
+                       &firstBcc);
+
+    status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
+            testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
+            &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+
+    std::vector<BccEntryData> secondBcc;
+    checkProtectedData(deviceInfo, /*keysToSign=*/cppbor::Array(), keysToSignMac, protectedData,
+                       &secondBcc);
+
+    // Verify that none of the keys in the first BCC are repeated in the second one.
+    for (const auto& i : firstBcc) {
+        for (auto& j : secondBcc) {
+            ASSERT_THAT(i.pubKey, testing::Not(testing::ElementsAreArray(j.pubKey)))
+                    << "Found a repeated pubkey in two generateCertificateRequest test mode calls";
+        }
     }
 }
 
 /**
+ * Generate an empty certificate request in prod mode. This test must be run explicitly, and
+ * is not run by default. Not all devices are GMS devices, and therefore they do not all
+ * trust the Google EEK root.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, DISABLED_EmptyRequest_prodMode) {
+    bool testMode = false;
+
+    bytevec keysToSignMac;
+    DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
+    ProtectedData protectedData;
+    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
+            testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, getProdEekChain(), challenge_, &deviceInfo,
+            &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(status.isOk());
+}
+
+/**
  * Generate a non-empty certificate request in test mode.  Decrypt, parse and validate the contents.
  */
 TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequest_testMode) {
@@ -420,13 +458,13 @@
 
     for (size_t eekLength : {2, 3, 7}) {
         SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "EEK of length " << eekLength);
-        generateEek(eekLength);
+        generateTestEekChain(eekLength);
 
         bytevec keysToSignMac;
         DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
         ProtectedData protectedData;
         auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
-                testMode, keysToSign_, eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,
+                testMode, keysToSign_, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,
                 &keysToSignMac);
         ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
 
@@ -435,30 +473,21 @@
 }
 
 /**
- * Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode.  Must fail because we don't have a valid
- * GEEK.
- *
- * TODO(swillden): Get a valid GEEK and use it so the generation can succeed, though we won't be
- * able to decrypt.
+ * Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode. This test must be run explicitly, and
+ * is not run by default. Not all devices are GMS devices, and therefore they do not all
+ * trust the Google EEK root.
  */
-TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequest_prodMode) {
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, DISABLED_NonEmptyRequest_prodMode) {
     bool testMode = false;
     generateKeys(testMode, 4 /* numKeys */);
 
-    for (size_t eekLength : {2, 3, 7}) {
-        SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "EEK of length " << eekLength);
-        generateEek(eekLength);
-
-        bytevec keysToSignMac;
-        DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
-        ProtectedData protectedData;
-        auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
-                testMode, keysToSign_, eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,
-                &keysToSignMac);
-        EXPECT_FALSE(status.isOk());
-        EXPECT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(),
-                  BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_EEK);
-    }
+    bytevec keysToSignMac;
+    DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
+    ProtectedData protectedData;
+    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
+            testMode, keysToSign_, getProdEekChain(), challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,
+            &keysToSignMac);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(status.isOk());
 }
 
 /**
@@ -473,8 +502,8 @@
     DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
     ProtectedData protectedData;
     auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
-            testMode, {keyWithCorruptMac}, eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,
-            &keysToSignMac);
+            testMode, {keyWithCorruptMac}, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
+            &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
     ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
     EXPECT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(), BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_MAC);
 }
@@ -483,7 +512,7 @@
  * Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode, but with the MAC corrupted on the keypair.
  */
 TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequestCorruptMac_prodMode) {
-    bool testMode = true;
+    bool testMode = false;
     generateKeys(testMode, 1 /* numKeys */);
     MacedPublicKey keyWithCorruptMac = corrupt_maced_key(keysToSign_[0]).moveValue();
 
@@ -491,38 +520,35 @@
     DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
     ProtectedData protectedData;
     auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
-            testMode, {keyWithCorruptMac}, eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,
-            &keysToSignMac);
+            testMode, {keyWithCorruptMac}, getProdEekChain(), challenge_, &deviceInfo,
+            &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
     ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
-    auto rc = status.getServiceSpecificError();
-
-    // TODO(drysdale): drop the INVALID_EEK potential error code when a real GEEK is available.
-    EXPECT_TRUE(rc == BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_EEK ||
-                rc == BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_MAC);
+    EXPECT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(), BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_MAC);
 }
 
 /**
  * Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode that has a corrupt EEK chain.
  * Confirm that the request is rejected.
- *
- * TODO(drysdale): Update to use a valid GEEK, so that the test actually confirms that the
- * implementation is checking signatures.
  */
 TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyCorruptEekRequest_prodMode) {
     bool testMode = false;
     generateKeys(testMode, 4 /* numKeys */);
 
-    for (size_t ii = 0; ii < eekLength_; ii++) {
-        auto chain = corrupt_sig_chain(eekChain_, ii);
+    auto prodEekChain = getProdEekChain();
+    auto [parsedChain, _, parseErr] = cppbor::parse(prodEekChain);
+    ASSERT_NE(parsedChain, nullptr) << parseErr;
+    ASSERT_NE(parsedChain->asArray(), nullptr);
+
+    for (int ii = 0; ii < parsedChain->asArray()->size(); ++ii) {
+        auto chain = corrupt_sig_chain(prodEekChain, ii);
         ASSERT_TRUE(chain) << chain.message();
-        EekChain corruptEek = chain.moveValue();
 
         bytevec keysToSignMac;
         DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
         ProtectedData protectedData;
-        auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
-                testMode, keysToSign_, corruptEek.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,
-                &keysToSignMac);
+        auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(testMode, keysToSign_, *chain,
+                                                                 challenge_, &deviceInfo,
+                                                                 &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
         ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk());
         ASSERT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(),
                   BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_EEK);
@@ -532,9 +558,6 @@
 /**
  * Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode that has an incomplete EEK chain.
  * Confirm that the request is rejected.
- *
- * TODO(drysdale): Update to use a valid GEEK, so that the test actually confirms that the
- * implementation is checking signatures.
  */
 TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyIncompleteEekRequest_prodMode) {
     bool testMode = false;
@@ -542,7 +565,7 @@
 
     // Build an EEK chain that omits the first self-signed cert.
     auto truncatedChain = cppbor::Array();
-    auto [chain, _, parseErr] = cppbor::parse(eekChain_.chain);
+    auto [chain, _, parseErr] = cppbor::parse(getProdEekChain());
     ASSERT_TRUE(chain);
     auto eekChain = chain->asArray();
     ASSERT_NE(eekChain, nullptr);
@@ -571,7 +594,7 @@
     DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
     ProtectedData protectedData;
     auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
-            true /* testMode */, keysToSign_, eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
+            true /* testMode */, keysToSign_, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
             &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
     ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk());
     ASSERT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(),
@@ -589,7 +612,7 @@
     DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
     ProtectedData protectedData;
     auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
-            false /* testMode */, keysToSign_, eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
+            false /* testMode */, keysToSign_, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
             &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
     ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk());
     ASSERT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(),
diff --git a/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorTargetTest.cpp b/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorTargetTest.cpp
index c56bd9a..553d7f0 100644
--- a/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorTargetTest.cpp
+++ b/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorTargetTest.cpp
@@ -60,9 +60,10 @@
     android::enum_range<CompositePrimitive>().begin(),
     android::enum_range<CompositePrimitive>().end()};
 
-const std::vector<CompositePrimitive> kOptionalPrimitives = {
-    CompositePrimitive::THUD,
-    CompositePrimitive::SPIN,
+const std::vector<CompositePrimitive> kRequiredPrimitives = {
+        CompositePrimitive::CLICK,      CompositePrimitive::LIGHT_TICK,
+        CompositePrimitive::QUICK_RISE, CompositePrimitive::SLOW_RISE,
+        CompositePrimitive::QUICK_FALL,
 };
 
 const std::vector<CompositePrimitive> kInvalidPrimitives = {
@@ -393,11 +394,11 @@
         for (auto primitive : kCompositePrimitives) {
             bool isPrimitiveSupported =
                 std::find(supported.begin(), supported.end(), primitive) != supported.end();
-            bool isPrimitiveOptional =
-                std::find(kOptionalPrimitives.begin(), kOptionalPrimitives.end(), primitive) !=
-                kOptionalPrimitives.end();
+            bool isPrimitiveRequired =
+                    std::find(kRequiredPrimitives.begin(), kRequiredPrimitives.end(), primitive) !=
+                    kRequiredPrimitives.end();
 
-            EXPECT_TRUE(isPrimitiveSupported || isPrimitiveOptional) << toString(primitive);
+            EXPECT_TRUE(isPrimitiveSupported || !isPrimitiveRequired) << toString(primitive);
         }
     }
 }
diff --git a/wifi/1.5/default/ringbuffer.cpp b/wifi/1.5/default/ringbuffer.cpp
index 26971ff..f554111 100644
--- a/wifi/1.5/default/ringbuffer.cpp
+++ b/wifi/1.5/default/ringbuffer.cpp
@@ -47,6 +47,11 @@
     return data_;
 }
 
+void Ringbuffer::clear() {
+    data_.clear();
+    size_ = 0;
+}
+
 }  // namespace implementation
 }  // namespace V1_5
 }  // namespace wifi
diff --git a/wifi/1.5/default/ringbuffer.h b/wifi/1.5/default/ringbuffer.h
index d8b87f2..03fb37a 100644
--- a/wifi/1.5/default/ringbuffer.h
+++ b/wifi/1.5/default/ringbuffer.h
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
     // within |maxSize_|.
     void append(const std::vector<uint8_t>& input);
     const std::list<std::vector<uint8_t>>& getData() const;
+    void clear();
 
    private:
     std::list<std::vector<uint8_t>> data_;
diff --git a/wifi/1.5/default/wifi_chip.cpp b/wifi/1.5/default/wifi_chip.cpp
index 6fa9601..82d794c 100644
--- a/wifi/1.5/default/wifi_chip.cpp
+++ b/wifi/1.5/default/wifi_chip.cpp
@@ -1948,8 +1948,8 @@
     // write ringbuffers to file
     {
         std::unique_lock<std::mutex> lk(lock_t);
-        for (const auto& item : ringbuffer_map_) {
-            const Ringbuffer& cur_buffer = item.second;
+        for (auto& item : ringbuffer_map_) {
+            Ringbuffer& cur_buffer = item.second;
             if (cur_buffer.getData().empty()) {
                 continue;
             }
@@ -1967,6 +1967,7 @@
                     PLOG(ERROR) << "Error writing to file";
                 }
             }
+            cur_buffer.clear();
         }
         // unique_lock unlocked here
     }