diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp b/keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp
index 000d46e..27e00c1 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp
@@ -321,19 +321,20 @@
         LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Failed record parsing";
         return ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
     }
-    if (!record->tee_enforced) {
-        LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Failed hardware characteristic parsing";
+
+    KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST* root_of_trust = nullptr;
+    if (record->tee_enforced && record->tee_enforced->root_of_trust) {
+        root_of_trust = record->tee_enforced->root_of_trust;
+    } else if (record->software_enforced && record->software_enforced->root_of_trust) {
+        root_of_trust = record->software_enforced->root_of_trust;
+    } else {
+        LOG(ERROR) << AT << " Failed root of trust parsing";
         return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
     }
-    if (!record->tee_enforced->root_of_trust) {
-        LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Failed root of trust parsing";
+    if (!root_of_trust->verified_boot_key) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << AT << " Failed verified boot key parsing";
         return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
     }
-    if (!record->tee_enforced->root_of_trust->verified_boot_key) {
-        LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Failed verified boot key parsing";
-        return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-    }
-    KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST* root_of_trust = record->tee_enforced->root_of_trust;
 
     auto& vb_key = root_of_trust->verified_boot_key;
     verified_boot_key->resize(vb_key->length);
@@ -342,19 +343,19 @@
     *verified_boot_state = static_cast<keymaster_verified_boot_t>(
             ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(root_of_trust->verified_boot_state));
     if (!verified_boot_state) {
-        LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Failed verified boot state parsing";
+        LOG(ERROR) << AT << " Failed verified boot state parsing";
         return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
     }
 
     *device_locked = root_of_trust->device_locked;
     if (!device_locked) {
-        LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Failed device locked parsing";
+        LOG(ERROR) << AT << " Failed device locked parsing";
         return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
     }
 
     auto& vb_hash = root_of_trust->verified_boot_hash;
     if (!vb_hash) {
-        LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Failed verified boot hash parsing";
+        LOG(ERROR) << AT << " Failed verified boot hash parsing";
         return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
     }
     verified_boot_hash->resize(vb_hash->length);
diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/KeymasterHidlTest.cpp b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/KeymasterHidlTest.cpp
index 5d0e262..2d2ba63 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/KeymasterHidlTest.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/KeymasterHidlTest.cpp
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
 using namespace std::literals::chrono_literals;
 
 void KeymasterHidlTest::InitializeKeymaster() {
+    std::string instance_name = GetParam();
     keymaster_ = IKeymasterDevice::getService(GetParam());
     ASSERT_NE(keymaster_, nullptr);
 
@@ -127,7 +128,7 @@
                                               string masking_key,
                                               const AuthorizationSet& unwrapping_params) {
     ErrorCode error;
-    ImportKey(wrapping_key_desc, KeyFormat::PKCS8, wrapping_key);
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(wrapping_key_desc, KeyFormat::PKCS8, wrapping_key));
     EXPECT_TRUE(keymaster_
                     ->importWrappedKey(HidlBuf(wrapped_key), key_blob_, HidlBuf(masking_key),
                                        unwrapping_params.hidl_data(), 0 /* passwordSid */,
@@ -196,7 +197,9 @@
     HidlBuf empty_buf = {};
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
               GetCharacteristics(key_blob, client_id, app_data, key_characteristics));
-    EXPECT_GT(key_characteristics->hardwareEnforced.size(), 0);
+    if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE) {
+        EXPECT_GT(key_characteristics->hardwareEnforced.size(), 0);
+    }
     EXPECT_GT(key_characteristics->softwareEnforced.size(), 0);
 
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
@@ -636,23 +639,25 @@
     switch (algorithm) {
         case Algorithm::RSA:
             switch (SecLevel()) {
+                case SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE:
                 case SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT:
                     return {2048, 3072, 4096};
                 case SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX:
                     return {2048};
                 default:
-                    CHECK(false) << "Invalid security level " << uint32_t(SecLevel());
+                    ADD_FAILURE() << "Invalid security level " << uint32_t(SecLevel());
                     break;
             }
             break;
         case Algorithm::EC:
             switch (SecLevel()) {
+                case SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE:
                 case SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT:
                     return {224, 256, 384, 521};
                 case SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX:
                     return {256};
                 default:
-                    CHECK(false) << "Invalid security level " << uint32_t(SecLevel());
+                    ADD_FAILURE() << "Invalid security level " << uint32_t(SecLevel());
                     break;
             }
             break;
@@ -667,25 +672,27 @@
             return retval;
         }
         default:
-            CHECK(false) << "Invalid Algorithm: " << algorithm;
+            ADD_FAILURE() << "Invalid Algorithm: " << algorithm;
             return {};
     }
-    CHECK(false) << "Should be impossible to get here";
+    ADD_FAILURE() << "Should be impossible to get here";
     return {};
 }
+
 std::vector<uint32_t> KeymasterHidlTest::InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm algorithm) {
-    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT) return {};
-    CHECK(SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX);
-    switch (algorithm) {
-        case Algorithm::RSA:
-            return {3072, 4096};
-        case Algorithm::EC:
-            return {224, 384, 521};
-        case Algorithm::AES:
-            return {192};
-        default:
-            return {};
+    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+        switch (algorithm) {
+            case Algorithm::RSA:
+                return {3072, 4096};
+            case Algorithm::EC:
+                return {224, 384, 521};
+            case Algorithm::AES:
+                return {192};
+            default:
+                return {};
+        }
     }
+    return {};
 }
 
 std::vector<EcCurve> KeymasterHidlTest::ValidCurves() {
@@ -704,6 +711,7 @@
 
 std::vector<Digest> KeymasterHidlTest::ValidDigests(bool withNone, bool withMD5) {
     switch (SecLevel()) {
+        case SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE:
         case SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT:
             if (withNone) {
                 if (withMD5)
@@ -729,10 +737,10 @@
                 return {Digest::SHA_2_256};
             break;
         default:
-            CHECK(false) << "Invalid security level " << uint32_t(SecLevel());
+            ADD_FAILURE() << "Invalid security level " << uint32_t(SecLevel());
             break;
     }
-    CHECK(false) << "Should be impossible to get here";
+    ADD_FAILURE() << "Should be impossible to get here";
     return {};
 }
 
diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/KeymasterHidlTest.h b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/KeymasterHidlTest.h
index faa7c75..34a4473 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/KeymasterHidlTest.h
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/KeymasterHidlTest.h
@@ -204,6 +204,11 @@
     KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics_;
     OperationHandle op_handle_ = kOpHandleSentinel;
 
+    static std::vector<std::string> build_params() {
+        auto params = android::hardware::getAllHalInstanceNames(IKeymasterDevice::descriptor);
+        return params;
+    }
+
   private:
     sp<IKeymasterDevice> keymaster_;
     uint32_t os_version_;
@@ -214,10 +219,9 @@
     hidl_string author_;
 };
 
-#define INSTANTIATE_KEYMASTER_HIDL_TEST(name)                                             \
-    INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(PerInstance, name,                                           \
-                             testing::ValuesIn(android::hardware::getAllHalInstanceNames( \
-                                     IKeymasterDevice::descriptor)),                      \
+#define INSTANTIATE_KEYMASTER_HIDL_TEST(name)                                      \
+    INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(PerInstance, name,                                    \
+                             testing::ValuesIn(KeymasterHidlTest::build_params()), \
                              android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString)
 
 }  // namespace test
diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
index fb450d1..ace389b 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
@@ -397,10 +397,16 @@
     // true. A provided boolean tag that can be pulled back out of the certificate indicates correct
     // encoding. No need to check if it's in both lists, since the AuthorizationSet compare below
     // will handle mismatches of tags.
-    EXPECT_TRUE(expected_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED));
+    if (security_level == SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE) {
+        EXPECT_TRUE(expected_sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED));
+    } else {
+        EXPECT_TRUE(expected_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED));
+    }
 
     // Alternatively this checks the opposite - a false boolean tag (one that isn't provided in
     // the authorization list during key generation) isn't being attested to in the certificate.
+    EXPECT_FALSE(expected_sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
+    EXPECT_FALSE(att_sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
     EXPECT_FALSE(expected_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
     EXPECT_FALSE(att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
 
@@ -461,10 +467,10 @@
                             verified_boot_key.size()));
     } else if (!strcmp(property_value, "red")) {
         EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_FAILED);
-        EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(verified_boot_key.data(), empty_boot_key.data(),
-                            verified_boot_key.size()));
     } else {
-        EXPECT_TRUE(false);
+        EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_UNVERIFIED);
+        EXPECT_NE(0, memcmp(verified_boot_key.data(), empty_boot_key.data(),
+                            verified_boot_key.size()));
     }
 
     att_sw_enforced.Sort();