Actor signature overlayable policy
There are cases where an app can ship overlays for itself,
but the "signature" policy as described would open up
a vulnerability by allowing the system actor to create
and sign any arbitrary overlay that will apply to the target.
To prevent this, redefine "signature" as target package only,
and introduce "actor" for checking against the actor signature.
Any app that wishes to use both can include both policies.
Bug: 130563563
Test: m aapt2_tests idmapt2_tests and run from host test output
Test: atest libandroidfw_tests
Change-Id: I1c583a5b37f4abbeb18fc6a35c502377d8977a41
diff --git a/cmds/idmap2/tests/TestConstants.h b/cmds/idmap2/tests/TestConstants.h
index c874dc9..6bc924e 100644
--- a/cmds/idmap2/tests/TestConstants.h
+++ b/cmds/idmap2/tests/TestConstants.h
@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@
namespace android::idmap2::TestConstants {
-constexpr const auto TARGET_CRC = 0x76a20829;
-constexpr const auto TARGET_CRC_STRING = "76a20829";
+constexpr const auto TARGET_CRC = 0x41c60c8c;
+constexpr const auto TARGET_CRC_STRING = "41c60c8c";
constexpr const auto OVERLAY_CRC = 0xc054fb26;
constexpr const auto OVERLAY_CRC_STRING = "c054fb26";