Cumulative patch from commit e376290c667e970d751acc916e0efe2ed16292ed
e376290 HS 2.0R2: Add update_identifier field to network
5bc2857 Fix some sparse warnings about u16 vs. le16
42619d6 Fix CTRL-EVENT-REGDOM-CHANGE event init= value
a520bf4 Mark function static
0cb79d3 dbus: Fix indentation level to match code logic
8f03ac9 Mark functions static
6891f0e Allow SCAN command to specify scan_ssid=1 SSIDs
18389ab WPS: Clear keys/PINs explicitly
b7175b4 Clear hostapd configuration keys explicitly
d1ecca6 HS 2.0 R2: Clear hs20-osu-client configuration keys explicitly
0a13e06 EAP server: Clear keying material on deinit
f534ee0 EAP peer: Clear keying material on deinit
19c48da Clear wpa_supplicant configuration keys explicitly
28bfa29 EAP-AKA: Remove unnecessary dead increment
62493df EAP-GPSK: Avoid dead increment by checking pos pointer
164a453 FT: Debug print extra response data
70bfc77 PCSC: Debug print extra response data
5dbbf36 Interworking: Remove unnecessary dead increment
a1e46f3 Check for no key_mgmt/proto/auth_alg entries in config writer
290ea6a Remove unnecessary tracking of first entry
d3fa2bb WFD: Explicit limit for subelement length (CID 68127)
745ef18 HS 2.0: Verify assoc_req_ie buffer size for indication elements
0233dca SAE: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons
34ef46c WEP shared key: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons
3e4b77c EAP-GTC: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons
a6eae3f EAP-MSCHAPv2: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons
30411b3 EAP-TTLS: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons
a564d9c EAP-MD5: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons
4685482 EAP-PSK: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons
cba0f86 EAP-PEAP: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons
7b1e745 EAP-LEAP: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons
8f92826 EAP-GPSK: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons
e1550d4 EAP-PAX: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons
c434503 EAP-FAST: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons
dddf7bb EAP-EKE: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons
dfb5608 EAP-SAKE: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons
05c79d6 EAP-SIM/AKA: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons
675ddad EAP-IKEv2: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons
2049a3c TLS: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons
a79aea5 Milenage: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons
05f916e AES-GCM: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons
87a5c93 AES-CCM: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons
7c24f53 EAPOL supplicant: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons
870834a RSN authenticator: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons
0d15b69 RSN supplicant: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons
72619ce MACsec: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons
c237195 RADIUS: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons
ce9c9bc WPS: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons
afc3c8b Add constant time memory comparison function os_memcmp_const
ee352f1 EAP-pwd: Add explicit total length limit
b2b8a4c EAP-SIM/AKA: Pass EAP type as argument to eap_sim_msg_finish()
f107d00 PeerKey: Clean up EAPOL-Key Key Data processing
010fc5f dbus: Clean up array-array-type property getter
Change-Id: I1dbe483be2678a7468e6955d70ea261f8e53b26d
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@google.com>
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap.c b/src/eap_peer/eap.c
index 47cbbee..a2faeb2 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap.c
@@ -92,6 +92,15 @@
}
+static void eap_sm_free_key(struct eap_sm *sm)
+{
+ if (sm->eapKeyData) {
+ bin_clear_free(sm->eapKeyData, sm->eapKeyDataLen);
+ sm->eapKeyData = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+
static void eap_deinit_prev_method(struct eap_sm *sm, const char *txt)
{
ext_password_free(sm->ext_pw_buf);
@@ -159,8 +168,7 @@
eapol_set_int(sm, EAPOL_idleWhile, sm->ClientTimeout);
eapol_set_bool(sm, EAPOL_eapSuccess, FALSE);
eapol_set_bool(sm, EAPOL_eapFail, FALSE);
- os_free(sm->eapKeyData);
- sm->eapKeyData = NULL;
+ eap_sm_free_key(sm);
os_free(sm->eapSessionId);
sm->eapSessionId = NULL;
sm->eapKeyAvailable = FALSE;
@@ -404,7 +412,7 @@
if (sm->m->isKeyAvailable && sm->m->getKey &&
sm->m->isKeyAvailable(sm, sm->eap_method_priv)) {
- os_free(sm->eapKeyData);
+ eap_sm_free_key(sm);
sm->eapKeyData = sm->m->getKey(sm, sm->eap_method_priv,
&sm->eapKeyDataLen);
os_free(sm->eapSessionId);
@@ -1488,8 +1496,7 @@
sm->lastRespData = NULL;
wpabuf_free(sm->eapRespData);
sm->eapRespData = NULL;
- os_free(sm->eapKeyData);
- sm->eapKeyData = NULL;
+ eap_sm_free_key(sm);
os_free(sm->eapSessionId);
sm->eapSessionId = NULL;
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_aka.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_aka.c
index 3f31866..0662ae7 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_aka.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_aka.c
@@ -126,6 +126,21 @@
#endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME */
+static void eap_aka_clear_keys(struct eap_aka_data *data, int reauth)
+{
+ if (!reauth) {
+ os_memset(data->mk, 0, EAP_SIM_MK_LEN);
+ os_memset(data->k_aut, 0, EAP_AKA_PRIME_K_AUT_LEN);
+ os_memset(data->k_encr, 0, EAP_SIM_K_ENCR_LEN);
+ os_memset(data->k_re, 0, EAP_AKA_PRIME_K_RE_LEN);
+ }
+ os_memset(data->msk, 0, EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN);
+ os_memset(data->emsk, 0, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
+ os_memset(data->autn, 0, EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN);
+ os_memset(data->auts, 0, EAP_AKA_AUTS_LEN);
+}
+
+
static void eap_aka_deinit(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
{
struct eap_aka_data *data = priv;
@@ -135,6 +150,7 @@
os_free(data->last_eap_identity);
wpabuf_free(data->id_msgs);
os_free(data->network_name);
+ eap_aka_clear_keys(data, 0);
os_free(data);
}
}
@@ -151,7 +167,7 @@
pos += os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, ":");
pos += wpa_snprintf_hex(pos, end - pos, data->rand, EAP_AKA_RAND_LEN);
pos += os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, ":");
- pos += wpa_snprintf_hex(pos, end - pos, data->autn, EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN);
+ wpa_snprintf_hex(pos, end - pos, data->autn, EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN);
eap_sm_request_sim(sm, req);
return 1;
@@ -294,7 +310,7 @@
{
u8 autn[EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN];
os_memset(autn, '1', EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN);
- if (os_memcmp(autn, data->autn, EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN) != 0) {
+ if (os_memcmp_const(autn, data->autn, EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN) != 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: AUTN did not match "
"with expected value");
return -1;
@@ -509,7 +525,7 @@
#endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME */
sha1_vector(1, &addr, &len, hash);
- if (os_memcmp(hash, checkcode, hash_len) != 0) {
+ if (os_memcmp_const(hash, checkcode, hash_len) != 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Mismatch in AT_CHECKCODE");
return -1;
}
@@ -532,7 +548,7 @@
msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, data->eap_method,
EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_CLIENT_ERROR);
eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE, err, NULL, 0);
- return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, data->eap_method, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
@@ -549,7 +565,7 @@
"(id=%d)", id);
msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, data->eap_method,
EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT);
- return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, data->eap_method, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
@@ -568,7 +584,7 @@
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_AUTS");
eap_sim_msg_add_full(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_AUTS, data->auts,
EAP_AKA_AUTS_LEN);
- return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, data->eap_method, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
@@ -612,7 +628,7 @@
identity, identity_len);
}
- return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, data->eap_method, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
@@ -634,7 +650,8 @@
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_MAC");
eap_sim_msg_add_mac(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_MAC);
- return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, data->k_aut, (u8 *) "", 0);
+ return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, data->eap_method, data->k_aut, (u8 *) "",
+ 0);
}
@@ -676,7 +693,7 @@
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_MAC");
eap_sim_msg_add_mac(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_MAC);
- return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, data->k_aut, nonce_s,
+ return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, data->eap_method, data->k_aut, nonce_s,
EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN);
}
@@ -710,7 +727,7 @@
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_MAC");
eap_sim_msg_add_mac(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_MAC);
}
- return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, k_aut, (u8 *) "", 0);
+ return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, data->eap_method, k_aut, (u8 *) "", 0);
}
@@ -790,7 +807,7 @@
EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_CHALLENGE);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_KDF");
eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_KDF, kdf, NULL, 0);
- return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, data->eap_method, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
@@ -1372,6 +1389,7 @@
data->id_msgs = NULL;
data->use_result_ind = 0;
data->kdf_negotiation = 0;
+ eap_aka_clear_keys(data, 1);
}
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h
index daa1d32..2591e11 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@
*
* If left out, this will be asked through control interface.
*/
- u8 *private_key_passwd;
+ char *private_key_passwd;
/**
* dh_file - File path to DH/DSA parameters file (in PEM format)
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@
* This field is like private_key_passwd, but used for phase 2 (inside
* EAP-TTLS/PEAP/FAST tunnel) authentication.
*/
- u8 *private_key2_passwd;
+ char *private_key2_passwd;
/**
* dh_file2 - File path to DH/DSA parameters file (in PEM format)
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_eke.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_eke.c
index 6818b08..9fec66c 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_eke.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_eke.c
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@
os_free(data->serverid);
os_free(data->peerid);
wpabuf_free(data->msgs);
- os_free(data);
+ bin_clear_free(data, sizeof(*data));
}
@@ -566,8 +566,8 @@
EAP_EKE_FAIL_PRIVATE_INTERNAL_ERROR);
}
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Auth_S", auth_s, data->sess.prf_len);
- if (os_memcmp(auth_s, pos + data->sess.pnonce_ps_len,
- data->sess.prf_len) != 0) {
+ if (os_memcmp_const(auth_s, pos + data->sess.pnonce_ps_len,
+ data->sess.prf_len) != 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Auth_S does not match");
return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
EAP_EKE_FAIL_AUTHENTICATION_FAIL);
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_fast.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_fast.c
index b3f6a52..0739187 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_fast.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_fast.c
@@ -250,6 +250,8 @@
pac = pac->next;
eap_fast_free_pac(prev);
}
+ os_memset(data->key_data, 0, EAP_FAST_KEY_LEN);
+ os_memset(data->emsk, 0, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
os_free(data->session_id);
wpabuf_free(data->pending_phase2_req);
os_free(data);
@@ -767,7 +769,7 @@
"MAC calculation", (u8 *) _bind, bind_len);
hmac_sha1(cmk, EAP_FAST_CMK_LEN, (u8 *) _bind, bind_len,
_bind->compound_mac);
- res = os_memcmp(cmac, _bind->compound_mac, sizeof(cmac));
+ res = os_memcmp_const(cmac, _bind->compound_mac, sizeof(cmac));
wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-FAST: Received Compound MAC",
cmac, sizeof(cmac));
wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-FAST: Calculated Compound MAC",
@@ -1636,6 +1638,8 @@
os_free(data);
return NULL;
}
+ os_memset(data->key_data, 0, EAP_FAST_KEY_LEN);
+ os_memset(data->emsk, 0, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
os_free(data->session_id);
data->session_id = NULL;
if (data->phase2_priv && data->phase2_method &&
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_gpsk.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_gpsk.c
index 3c9cbf4..c54bf11 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_gpsk.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_gpsk.c
@@ -134,8 +134,11 @@
struct eap_gpsk_data *data = priv;
os_free(data->id_server);
os_free(data->id_peer);
- os_free(data->psk);
- os_free(data);
+ if (data->psk) {
+ os_memset(data->psk, 0, data->psk_len);
+ os_free(data->psk);
+ }
+ bin_clear_free(data, sizeof(*data));
}
@@ -565,7 +568,7 @@
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-GPSK: Failed to compute MIC");
return NULL;
}
- if (os_memcmp(mic, pos, miclen) != 0) {
+ if (os_memcmp_const(mic, pos, miclen) != 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-GPSK: Incorrect MIC in GPSK-3");
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-GPSK: Received MIC", pos, miclen);
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-GPSK: Computed MIC", mic, miclen);
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_ikev2.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_ikev2.c
index 568a448..c12b519 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_ikev2.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_ikev2.c
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@
wpabuf_free(data->in_buf);
wpabuf_free(data->out_buf);
ikev2_responder_deinit(&data->ikev2);
- os_free(data);
+ bin_clear_free(data, sizeof(*data));
}
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_leap.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_leap.c
index df34013..e0f8bcf 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_leap.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_leap.c
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@
ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
ret->allowNotifications = FALSE;
- if (os_memcmp(pos, expected, LEAP_RESPONSE_LEN) != 0) {
+ if (os_memcmp_const(pos, expected, LEAP_RESPONSE_LEN) != 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-LEAP: AP sent an invalid "
"response - authentication failed");
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-LEAP: Expected response from AP",
@@ -383,6 +383,9 @@
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-LEAP: master key", key, LEAP_KEY_LEN);
*len = LEAP_KEY_LEN;
+ os_memset(pw_hash, 0, sizeof(pw_hash));
+ os_memset(pw_hash_hash, 0, sizeof(pw_hash_hash));
+
return key;
}
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_mschapv2.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_mschapv2.c
index f2fcc37..430c501 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_mschapv2.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_mschapv2.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@
os_free(data->peer_challenge);
os_free(data->auth_challenge);
wpabuf_free(data->prev_challenge);
- os_free(data);
+ bin_clear_free(data, sizeof(*data));
}
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@
WPA_EVENT_PASSWORD_CHANGED
"EAP-MSCHAPV2: Password changed successfully");
data->prev_error = 0;
- os_free(config->password);
+ bin_clear_free(config->password, config->password_len);
if (config->flags & EAP_CONFIG_FLAGS_EXT_PASSWORD) {
/* TODO: update external storage */
} else if (config->flags & EAP_CONFIG_FLAGS_PASSWORD_NTHASH) {
@@ -313,11 +313,13 @@
nt_password_hash(config->new_password,
config->new_password_len,
config->password)) {
- os_free(config->password);
+ bin_clear_free(config->password,
+ config->password_len);
config->password = NULL;
config->password_len = 0;
}
- os_free(config->new_password);
+ bin_clear_free(config->new_password,
+ config->new_password_len);
} else {
config->password = config->new_password;
config->password_len = config->new_password_len;
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pax.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pax.c
index 7f87052..1c111c2 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pax.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pax.c
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@
{
struct eap_pax_data *data = priv;
os_free(data->cid);
- os_free(data);
+ bin_clear_free(data, sizeof(*data));
}
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@
eap_pax_mac(data->mac_id, data->ck, EAP_PAX_CK_LEN,
data->rand.r.y, EAP_PAX_RAND_LEN,
(u8 *) data->cid, data->cid_len, NULL, 0, mac);
- if (os_memcmp(pos, mac, EAP_PAX_MAC_LEN) != 0) {
+ if (os_memcmp_const(pos, mac, EAP_PAX_MAC_LEN) != 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PAX: Invalid MAC_CK(B, CID) "
"received");
wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-PAX: expected MAC_CK(B, CID)",
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@
wpabuf_head(reqData), mlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
icvbuf);
}
- if (os_memcmp(icv, icvbuf, EAP_PAX_ICV_LEN) != 0) {
+ if (os_memcmp_const(icv, icvbuf, EAP_PAX_ICV_LEN) != 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PAX: invalid ICV - ignoring the "
"message");
wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-PAX: expected ICV",
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
index 8634f75..472e861 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
@@ -170,6 +170,15 @@
}
+static void eap_peap_free_key(struct eap_peap_data *data)
+{
+ if (data->key_data) {
+ bin_clear_free(data->key_data, EAP_TLS_KEY_LEN);
+ data->key_data = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+
static void eap_peap_deinit(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
{
struct eap_peap_data *data = priv;
@@ -179,7 +188,7 @@
data->phase2_method->deinit(sm, data->phase2_priv);
os_free(data->phase2_types);
eap_peer_tls_ssl_deinit(sm, &data->ssl);
- os_free(data->key_data);
+ eap_peap_free_key(data);
os_free(data->session_id);
wpabuf_free(data->pending_phase2_req);
os_free(data);
@@ -423,7 +432,7 @@
buf, sizeof(buf));
hmac_sha1(data->cmk, 20, buf, sizeof(buf), mac);
- if (os_memcmp(mac, pos, SHA1_MAC_LEN) != 0) {
+ if (os_memcmp_const(mac, pos, SHA1_MAC_LEN) != 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Invalid Compound_MAC in "
"cryptobinding TLV");
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Received MAC",
@@ -1005,7 +1014,7 @@
char *label;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"EAP-PEAP: TLS done, proceed to Phase 2");
- os_free(data->key_data);
+ eap_peap_free_key(data);
/* draft-josefsson-ppext-eap-tls-eap-05.txt
* specifies that PEAPv1 would use "client PEAP
* encryption" as the label. However, most existing
@@ -1115,8 +1124,7 @@
static void * eap_peap_init_for_reauth(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
{
struct eap_peap_data *data = priv;
- os_free(data->key_data);
- data->key_data = NULL;
+ eap_peap_free_key(data);
os_free(data->session_id);
data->session_id = NULL;
if (eap_peer_tls_reauth_init(sm, &data->ssl)) {
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_psk.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_psk.c
index cd0e3f9..f012663 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_psk.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_psk.c
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@
struct eap_psk_data *data = priv;
os_free(data->id_s);
os_free(data->id_p);
- os_free(data);
+ bin_clear_free(data, sizeof(*data));
}
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@
return NULL;
}
os_free(buf);
- if (os_memcmp(mac, hdr3->mac_s, EAP_PSK_MAC_LEN) != 0) {
+ if (os_memcmp_const(mac, hdr3->mac_s, EAP_PSK_MAC_LEN) != 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-PSK: Invalid MAC_S in third "
"message");
ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
index 2aa7ba5..bdcca0b 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@
EC_POINT_free(data->server_element);
os_free(data->id_peer);
os_free(data->id_server);
- os_free(data->password);
+ bin_clear_free(data->password, data->password_len);
if (data->grp) {
EC_GROUP_free(data->grp->group);
EC_POINT_free(data->grp->pwe);
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@
}
wpabuf_free(data->inbuf);
wpabuf_free(data->outbuf);
- os_free(data);
+ bin_clear_free(data, sizeof(*data));
}
@@ -782,6 +782,8 @@
tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments whose "
"total length = %d", tot_len);
+ if (tot_len > 15000)
+ return NULL;
data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Out of memory to buffer "
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_sake.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_sake.c
index 431519c..7d14907 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_sake.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_sake.c
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@
struct eap_sake_data *data = priv;
os_free(data->serverid);
os_free(data->peerid);
- os_free(data);
+ bin_clear_free(data, sizeof(*data));
}
@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@
data->peerid, data->peerid_len, 0,
wpabuf_head(reqData), wpabuf_len(reqData),
attr.mic_s, mic_s);
- if (os_memcmp(attr.mic_s, mic_s, EAP_SAKE_MIC_LEN) != 0) {
+ if (os_memcmp_const(attr.mic_s, mic_s, EAP_SAKE_MIC_LEN) != 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SAKE: Incorrect AT_MIC_S");
eap_sake_state(data, FAILURE);
ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_sim.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_sim.c
index 63c8939..bd06df7 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_sim.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_sim.c
@@ -130,6 +130,20 @@
}
+static void eap_sim_clear_keys(struct eap_sim_data *data, int reauth)
+{
+ if (!reauth) {
+ os_memset(data->mk, 0, EAP_SIM_MK_LEN);
+ os_memset(data->k_aut, 0, EAP_SIM_K_AUT_LEN);
+ os_memset(data->k_encr, 0, EAP_SIM_K_ENCR_LEN);
+ }
+ os_memset(data->kc, 0, 3 * EAP_SIM_KC_LEN);
+ os_memset(data->sres, 0, 3 * EAP_SIM_SRES_LEN);
+ os_memset(data->msk, 0, EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN);
+ os_memset(data->emsk, 0, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
+}
+
+
static void eap_sim_deinit(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
{
struct eap_sim_data *data = priv;
@@ -138,6 +152,7 @@
os_free(data->pseudonym);
os_free(data->reauth_id);
os_free(data->last_eap_identity);
+ eap_sim_clear_keys(data, 0);
os_free(data);
}
}
@@ -449,7 +464,7 @@
msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, EAP_TYPE_SIM,
EAP_SIM_SUBTYPE_CLIENT_ERROR);
eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE, err, NULL, 0);
- return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, EAP_TYPE_SIM, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
@@ -502,7 +517,7 @@
identity, identity_len);
}
- return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, EAP_TYPE_SIM, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
@@ -520,7 +535,8 @@
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_MAC");
eap_sim_msg_add_mac(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_MAC);
- return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, data->k_aut, (u8 *) data->sres,
+ return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, EAP_TYPE_SIM, data->k_aut,
+ (u8 *) data->sres,
data->num_chal * EAP_SIM_SRES_LEN);
}
@@ -562,7 +578,7 @@
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_MAC");
eap_sim_msg_add_mac(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_MAC);
- return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, data->k_aut, nonce_s,
+ return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, EAP_TYPE_SIM, data->k_aut, nonce_s,
EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN);
}
@@ -596,7 +612,7 @@
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_MAC");
eap_sim_msg_add_mac(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_MAC);
}
- return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, k_aut, (u8 *) "", 0);
+ return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, EAP_TYPE_SIM, k_aut, (u8 *) "", 0);
}
@@ -1109,6 +1125,7 @@
struct eap_sim_data *data = priv;
eap_sim_clear_identities(sm, data, CLEAR_EAP_ID);
data->use_result_ind = 0;
+ eap_sim_clear_keys(data, 1);
}
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls.c
index bb9f3f2..5aa3fd5 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls.c
@@ -125,13 +125,22 @@
#endif /* CONFIG_HS20 */
+static void eap_tls_free_key(struct eap_tls_data *data)
+{
+ if (data->key_data) {
+ bin_clear_free(data->key_data, EAP_TLS_KEY_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN);
+ data->key_data = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+
static void eap_tls_deinit(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
{
struct eap_tls_data *data = priv;
if (data == NULL)
return;
eap_peer_tls_ssl_deinit(sm, &data->ssl);
- os_free(data->key_data);
+ eap_tls_free_key(data);
os_free(data->session_id);
os_free(data);
}
@@ -181,7 +190,7 @@
ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
ret->decision = DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC;
- os_free(data->key_data);
+ eap_tls_free_key(data);
data->key_data = eap_peer_tls_derive_key(sm, &data->ssl,
"client EAP encryption",
EAP_TLS_KEY_LEN +
@@ -267,8 +276,7 @@
static void * eap_tls_init_for_reauth(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
{
struct eap_tls_data *data = priv;
- os_free(data->key_data);
- data->key_data = NULL;
+ eap_tls_free_key(data);
os_free(data->session_id);
data->session_id = NULL;
if (eap_peer_tls_reauth_init(sm, &data->ssl)) {
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_ttls.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_ttls.c
index 5091bf0..e110236 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_ttls.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_ttls.c
@@ -133,6 +133,15 @@
}
+static void eap_ttls_free_key(struct eap_ttls_data *data)
+{
+ if (data->key_data) {
+ bin_clear_free(data->key_data, EAP_TLS_KEY_LEN);
+ data->key_data = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+
static void eap_ttls_deinit(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
{
struct eap_ttls_data *data = priv;
@@ -141,7 +150,7 @@
eap_ttls_phase2_eap_deinit(sm, data);
os_free(data->phase2_eap_types);
eap_peer_tls_ssl_deinit(sm, &data->ssl);
- os_free(data->key_data);
+ eap_ttls_free_key(data);
os_free(data->session_id);
wpabuf_free(data->pending_phase2_req);
os_free(data);
@@ -213,7 +222,7 @@
static int eap_ttls_v0_derive_key(struct eap_sm *sm,
struct eap_ttls_data *data)
{
- os_free(data->key_data);
+ eap_ttls_free_key(data);
data->key_data = eap_peer_tls_derive_key(sm, &data->ssl,
"ttls keying material",
EAP_TLS_KEY_LEN);
@@ -1540,8 +1549,7 @@
static void * eap_ttls_init_for_reauth(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
{
struct eap_ttls_data *data = priv;
- os_free(data->key_data);
- data->key_data = NULL;
+ eap_ttls_free_key(data);
os_free(data->session_id);
data->session_id = NULL;
if (eap_peer_tls_reauth_init(sm, &data->ssl)) {
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/ikev2.c b/src/eap_peer/ikev2.c
index fb2f619..8186afb 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/ikev2.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/ikev2.c
@@ -565,7 +565,7 @@
return -1;
if (auth_len != prf->hash_len ||
- os_memcmp(auth, auth_data, auth_len) != 0) {
+ os_memcmp_const(auth, auth_data, auth_len) != 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "IKEV2: Invalid Authentication Data");
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "IKEV2: Received Authentication Data",
auth, auth_len);
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/mschapv2.c b/src/eap_peer/mschapv2.c
index 37e6735..9bc7370 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/mschapv2.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/mschapv2.c
@@ -117,8 +117,8 @@
buf[0] != 'S' || buf[1] != '=' ||
hexstr2bin((char *) (buf + 2), recv_response,
MSCHAPV2_AUTH_RESPONSE_LEN) ||
- os_memcmp(auth_response, recv_response,
- MSCHAPV2_AUTH_RESPONSE_LEN) != 0)
+ os_memcmp_const(auth_response, recv_response,
+ MSCHAPV2_AUTH_RESPONSE_LEN) != 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}