Revert "fortify: allow diagnostics without run-time checks"
This reverts commit d7e11b88531665de59de466bbc9ee6c480b00a4f.
Reason for revert: Breaks aosp_x86_64-eng. Will look into it and
unbreak when it's not almost midnight. :)
Change-Id: I21f76efe4d19c70d0b14630e441376d359a45b49
diff --git a/libc/include/bits/fortify/stdio.h b/libc/include/bits/fortify/stdio.h
index fb503c3..528d5fb 100644
--- a/libc/include/bits/fortify/stdio.h
+++ b/libc/include/bits/fortify/stdio.h
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
#if defined(__BIONIC_FORTIFY) && !defined(__BIONIC_NO_STDIO_FORTIFY)
-#if __ANDROID_API__ >= __ANDROID_API_J_MR1__ && __BIONIC_FORTIFY_RUNTIME_CHECKS_ENABLED
+#if __ANDROID_API__ >= __ANDROID_API_J_MR1__
/* No diag -- clang diagnoses misuses of this on its own. */
__BIONIC_FORTIFY_INLINE __printflike(3, 0)
int vsnprintf(char* const __pass_object_size dest, size_t size, const char* format, va_list ap)
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
int vsprintf(char* const __pass_object_size dest, const char* format, va_list ap) __overloadable {
return __builtin___vsprintf_chk(dest, 0, __bos(dest), format, ap);
}
-#endif
+#endif /* __ANDROID_API__ >= __ANDROID_API_J_MR1__ */
__BIONIC_ERROR_FUNCTION_VISIBILITY
int sprintf(char* dest, const char* format)
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
"format string will always overflow destination buffer")
__errorattr("format string will always overflow destination buffer");
-#if __ANDROID_API__ >= __ANDROID_API_J_MR1__ && __BIONIC_FORTIFY_RUNTIME_CHECKS_ENABLED
+#if __ANDROID_API__ >= __ANDROID_API_J_MR1__
__BIONIC_FORTIFY_VARIADIC __printflike(2, 3)
int sprintf(char* const __pass_object_size dest, const char* format, ...) __overloadable {
va_list va;
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@
va_end(va);
return result;
}
-#endif
+#endif /* __ANDROID_API__ >= __ANDROID_API_J_MR1__ */
#define __bos_trivially_ge_mul(bos_val, size, count) \
__bos_dynamic_check_impl_and(bos_val, >=, (size) * (count), \
@@ -90,13 +90,13 @@
"in call to 'fread', size * count overflows")
__clang_error_if(__bos_unevaluated_lt(__bos0(buf), size * count),
"in call to 'fread', size * count is too large for the given buffer") {
-#if __ANDROID_API__ >= __ANDROID_API_N__ && __BIONIC_FORTIFY_RUNTIME_CHECKS_ENABLED
+#if __ANDROID_API__ >= __ANDROID_API_N__
size_t bos = __bos0(buf);
if (!__bos_trivially_ge_mul(bos, size, count)) {
return __fread_chk(buf, size, count, stream, bos);
}
-#endif
+#endif /* __ANDROID_API__ >= __ANDROID_API_N__ */
return __call_bypassing_fortify(fread)(buf, size, count, stream);
}
@@ -107,13 +107,13 @@
"in call to 'fwrite', size * count overflows")
__clang_error_if(__bos_unevaluated_lt(__bos0(buf), size * count),
"in call to 'fwrite', size * count is too large for the given buffer") {
-#if __ANDROID_API__ >= __ANDROID_API_N__ && __BIONIC_FORTIFY_RUNTIME_CHECKS_ENABLED
+#if __ANDROID_API__ >= __ANDROID_API_N__
size_t bos = __bos0(buf);
if (!__bos_trivially_ge_mul(bos, size, count)) {
return __fwrite_chk(buf, size, count, stream, bos);
}
-#endif
+#endif /* __ANDROID_API__ >= __ANDROID_API_N__ */
return __call_bypassing_fortify(fwrite)(buf, size, count, stream);
}
#undef __bos_trivially_ge_mul
@@ -124,13 +124,13 @@
__clang_error_if(size < 0, "in call to 'fgets', size should not be negative")
__clang_error_if(__bos_unevaluated_lt(__bos(dest), size),
"in call to 'fgets', size is larger than the destination buffer") {
-#if __ANDROID_API__ >= __ANDROID_API_J_MR1__ && __BIONIC_FORTIFY_RUNTIME_CHECKS_ENABLED
+#if __ANDROID_API__ >= __ANDROID_API_J_MR1__
size_t bos = __bos(dest);
if (!__bos_dynamic_check_impl_and(bos, >=, (size_t)size, size >= 0)) {
return __fgets_chk(dest, size, stream, bos);
}
-#endif
+#endif /* __ANDROID_API__ >= __ANDROID_API_J_MR1__ */
return __call_bypassing_fortify(fgets)(dest, size, stream);
}